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

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HISTORY

OF THE

GREEK REVOLUTION

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CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

BOOK THIRD.

THE SUCCESSES OF THE GREEKS.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONDITION OF GREECE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE.

	Page
Firmness of Sultan Mahmud,	2
He adopts a conciliatory policy,	4
Great fire destroys the Turkish armaments in 1823,	5
Plan of campaign for 1823,	6
Negligence of the Greek government,	7
Olympian armatoli plunder Skiathos and Skopelos,	7
Operations of the Turks,	9
Death of Marco Botzares,	10
Advance of the Othoman army,	12
Siege of Anatolikon,	13
Operations of the Greek and Turkish fleets,	14
Escape of eight Psarian sailors,	16
Violation of Ionian neutrality,	18
Misconduct of the sailors in the Greek fleet,	20
Surrender of the Turks in the Acrocorinth,	21
Lord Byron in Greece,	22
First Greek loan contracted in England,	26
First civil war,	28
Mohammed Ali engages to assist the sultan,	28
The political state of Greece in 1824,	30
Position of Kolettes,	32
Position of Mavrocordatos,	33
Second civil war,	34
Characters of Zaimes, Londos, and Sessini,	34
Evil effects of the two civil wars,	37
Wasteful expenditure of the two loans,	38
Anecdotes,	41
Military expenditure,	42
Naval expenditure,	43

BOOK FOURTH.

THE SUCCESSES OF THE TURKS.

CHAPTER I.

NAVAL SUCCESS.—IBRAHIM IN THE MOREA.

	Page
Destruction of Kasos,	47
Destruction of Psara,	49
Expedition of Mohammed Ali,	53
The Baïram at Makry,	54
Naval battles off Budrun,	55
Failure of the Turks at Samos,	60
Ibrahim driven back when off Crete,	61
He lands in Greece,	62
Greeks unprepared for defence,	63
Greek army defeated,	65
Egyptians take Sphakteria,	67
Escape of the brig Mars,	70
Capitulation of Pylos and Navarin,	70
Success of Miaoulis at Modon,	72
Kolokotrones appointed commander-in-chief,	74
Death of the archimandrite Dikaios,	75
Defeat of Kolokotrones at Makryplagi,	77
Ibrahim repulsed at Lerna,	78
Defeat of Kolokotrones at Trikorphas,	79
Ibrahim ravages the Morea,	81
Receives orders to aid in the siege of Mesolonghi,	82

CHAPTER II.

THE SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI.

Operations of Reshid Pasha,	84
State of Mesolonghi,	85
Number of the garrison and of the besiegers,	85
Arrival of the Othoman fleet,	87
Arrival of the Greek fleet,	88
Difficult position of Reshid,	89
The mound,	90
Treason of Odysseus,	92
Military operations in continental Greece,	94
Reshid withdraws to a fortified camp,	96
Operations of the Turkish and Greek fleets,	97
Ibrahim arrives before Mesolonghi,	98
Lethargy of the Greeks and of their government,	99

Page
Turks take Vasiladi and Anatolikon, ... 101
Offers of capitulation rejected, ... 102
Turkish attack on Klissova repulsed, ... 103
Defeat of the Greek fleet under Miaoulis, ... 104
Final sortie, ... 106
Fall of Mesolonghi, ... 110

CHAPTER III.

THE SIEGE OF ATHENS.

Ibrahim's operations in the Morea during 1826, ... 112
Reshid's operations in continental Greece, ... 114
Athens invested, and battle of Khaïdari, ... 116
Death of Goura, ... 118
Grigiottes throws himself into the Acropolis, ... 119
Karaïskaki's operations to raise the siege, ... 121
Fabvier throws himself into the Acropolis, ... 124
State of Greece during the winter of 1826-27, ... 126
Expeditions under Gordon, Burbaki, and Heideck, ... 131
General Sir Richard Church, ... 135
Lord Cochrane (Earl of Dundonald), ... 137
Election of Capodistrias as president of Greece, ... 138
Naval expedition under Captain Hastings, ... 139
Greek traders supply Reshid's army with provisions, ... 142
Operations of Church and Cochrane to relieve Athens, ... 143
Massacre of the garrison of the monastery of St Spiridion, ... 146
Karaïskaki's death, ... 148
Defeat of Sir Richard Church at the Phalerum, ... 149
Evacuation of the Acropolis, ... 152
Conduct of Philhellenes in Greece, England, and America, ... 154
Lord Cochrane's naval review at Poros, ... 157
Sufferings of the agricultural population, ... 158
Assistance sent from the United States, ... 159

BOOK FIFTH.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GREEK KINGDOM.

CHAPTER I.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION.—BATTLE OF NAVARIN.

Conduct of Russia, ... 160
Conduct of Great Britain, ... 161
Congress of Verona, ... 162

Page

Russian memoir relating to the pacification of Greece, . . . 163
Effects of this memoir, ... 165
Turkey complains of the conduct of Great Britain, . . . 167
Greece seeks the protection of Great Britain, ... 169
Protocol of 4th April 1826, ... 172
Destruction of the janissaries, ... 173
Treaty of 6th July 1827 for the pacification of Greece, . . . 174
State of Greece in 1827, ... 174
Victory of Hastings at Salona, ... 176
Battle of Navarin, ... 178
Greek slaves carried to Alexandria, ... 183
Greek troops cross into Acarnania, ... 185
Hastings takes Vasiladi, ... 186
Death of Hastings, ... 188
Russia declares war with Turkey, ... 189
French troops compel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea, . . . 192

CHAPTER II.

PRESIDENCY OF COUNT CAPODISTRIAS.—JANUARY 1828 TO OCTOBER 1831.

Character of Count John Capodistrias, ... 195
First administrative measures of the president, ... 198
His opinions and policy, ... 198
Organisation of the army, ... 200
Fabvier's resignation, ... 205
Operations in Eastern and Western Greece, ... 206
Termination of hostilities, ... 207
Civil administration, ... 208
Viaro Capodistrias, ... 210
Financial administration, ... 213
Judicial administration, ... 216
Public instruction, ... 218
National assembly of Argos, ... 219
Protocols of the three protecting powers, ... 221
Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg sovereign of Greece, . . . 224
Prince Leopold's resignation, ... 228
Capodistrias becomes a tyrant, ... 230
Hostility to the liberty of the press, ... 231
Tyranny of Capodistrias, ... 233
Affair of Poros, ... 235
Destruction of the Greek fleet, ... 238
Sack of Poros, ... 240
Family of Mavromichales, ... 242
Assassination of Capodistrias, ... 245

CHAPTER III.

ANARCHY.—9TH OCTOBER 1831 TO 1ST FEBRUARY 1833.

	Page
The governing commission refuses to grant a general amnesty after the murder of Capodistrias,	248
Second national assembly of Argos,	250
Romeliot military opposition,	252
Agostino Capodistrias president of Greece,	254
Romeliots expelled from Argos,	255
Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum,	255
Romeliots invade the Morea,	257
Conduct of the residents,	259
Agostino ejected from the presidency,	260
New governing commission,	261
State of Greece,	262
Anarchy,	266
French troops garrison Nauplia,	269
Djavellas occupies Patras,	270
Kolokotrones rallies the Capodistrians,	271
National assembly of Pronia,	272
Constitutional liberty in abeyance,	277
Intrigues of the senate,	278
Municipal institutions arrest the progress of anarchy in the Morea,	279
Condition of Messenia,	281
Position of Kolokotrones and Kolettes,	283
True nature of the municipal institutions of Greece under the Turks not generally understood,	284
Attack on the French troops at Argos,	285
Establishment of the Bavarian dynasty,	287

CHAPTER IV.

BAVARIAN DESPOTISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION.—FEBRUARY 1833 TO SEPTEMBER 1843.

Landing of King Otho,	290
The regency, its members and duties,	293
Royal proclamation—administrative measures,	300
Military organisation,	302
Civil administration—municipal institutions,	305
Financial administration—monetary system,	308
Judicial organisation,	312
The Greek church—reforms of the regency,	314
Synodal Tomos,	318
Monasteries,	319
Public instruction,	320

Page

Restrictions on the liberty of the press, ... 321
Roads—Order of the Redeemer, ... 322
Quarrels in the regency, ... 324
Kolokotrones's plot and Armansperg's intrigue, ... 326
Armansperg's administration, ... 333
Bavarian influence, ... 336
Disputes with England, ... 341
Alarming increase of brigandage, ... 342
Insurrections in Maina and Messenia, ... 345
Brigandage in 1835, ... 350
General Gordon's expedition, ... 353
Insurrection in Acarnania, ... 357
Opinions of Lord Lyons and General Gordon on the state of Greece, . 361
Brigandage continues, ... 363
King Otho's personal government, ... 365
Attacks on King Otho in the English newspapers, . . . 367
Causes of the Revolution of 1843, ... 368
Revolution, ... 372
Observations on the constitution, ... 377
Conclusion, ... 381
Appendix—
Hastings's memorandum on the use of steamers armed with heavy guns, 385
Napier's memorandum on military operations against Ibrahim Pasha, . 390
Index, ... 393

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THE CONDITION OF GREECE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE.

"Τοιγαροῦν χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ τὰ κοινὰ χειρίζοντες παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἐὰν τάλαντον μόνον πιστευθῶσιν, ἀντιγραφεῖς ἔχοντες δέκα, καὶ σφραγῖδες τοσαύτας καὶ μάρτυρας διπλασίους οὐ δύνανται τηρεῖν τὴν πίστιν."—POLYBIUS, vi. 56, 13.

Not to mention other defects, no Greek who is intrusted with public money can refrain from peculation, even if ten commissioners be appointed to watch over the expenditure, and though ten bonds be signed with twice as many witnesses as a security for his honesty.

FIRMNESS OF SULTAN MAHMUD—HE ADOPTS A CONCILIATORY POLICY—A GREAT FIRE AT CONSTANTINOPLE DESTROYS HIS ARMAMENTS IN 1823—PLAN OF CAMPAIGN FOR 1823—NEGLIGENCE OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT—OLYMPIAN ARMATOLI PLUNDER SKIATHOS AND SKOPELOS—OPERATIONS OF THE TURKS—DEATH OF MARCO BOTZARES—ADVANCE OF THE TURKISH ARMY—SIEGE OF ANATOLIKON—OPERATIONS OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH FLEETS—ESCAPE OF EIGHT PSARIAN SAILORS—VIOLATION OF IONIAN NEUTRALITY—MISCONDUCT OF THE SAILORS ON BOARD THE GREEK FLEET—SURRENDER OF THE TURKS IN THE ACROCORINTH—LORD BYRON IN GREECE—FIRST GREEK LOAN CONTRACTED IN ENGLAND—FIRST CIVIL WAR—MOHAMMED ALI ENGAGES TO ASSIST THE SULTAN—THE POLITICAL STATE OF GREECE IN 1824—POSITION OF KOLETTES—OF MAVROCORDATOS—SECOND CIVIL WAR—EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE TWO CIVIL WARS—WASTEFUL EXPENDITURE OF THE TWO LOANS—ANECDOTES—MILITARY EXPENDITURE—NAVAL EXPENDITURE.

THE successes of the Greeks during the year 1822 established Greece as an independent state, and forced

even those who were hostile to the Revolution to acknowledge that the war was no longer a struggle of the Porte with a few rebellious rayahs. The importance of the Greek nation could no longer be denied, whatever might be the failings of the Greek government. The war was now the battle of an oppressed people against a powerful sovereign. The inhabitants of Greece, whether of the Hellenic or the Albanian race, fought to secure their religious liberty and the independence of their country. Sultan Mahmud fought to maintain Othoman supremacy and the divine right of tyranny. Both were supported by strong feelings of religious and national antipathy; but the strength of the Greek cause lay in the hearts of the people, and that of the Turkish in the energy of the sovereign. Between such enemies there could neither be peace nor truce.

To the friends of civil and religious liberty the cause of Greece seemed sure of victory. A nation in arms is not easily conquered. Holland established her independence, under greater difficulties, against a far greater power than the Othoman empire in the present time. Switzerland was another example of the success of patriotism when the people are determined to be free. The people in Greece had adopted that determination, and they neither counted the cost of their struggle, nor shrank from encountering any hardships to gain their end.

The noble resolution of the Greeks and of the Christian Albanians in Greece to live or die free, encountered a firm determination on the part of Sultan Mahmud to re-establish his authority even by the extermination of the inhabitants of liberated Greece. When his fleets were defeated and his armies destroyed; when Russia threatened his northern frontier, and Persia invaded his eastern provinces; when, to

meet his expenditure, he was cheating his subjects by A. D. 1823.
debasing his coinage; when the janissaries revolted in his capital, and the timariots and spahis refused to march against the rebellious infidels; when rival pashas fought with one another instead of marching against the Greeks; and when all Turkey appeared to be a scene of anarchy, the inflexible sultan pursued steadily his great object of preserving the integrity of the Othoman empire. When European statesmen treated him as a frantic tyrant, he was revealing to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the sagacious policy which raised that skilful diplomatist to his profound mastery of Eastern questions. The shattered fabric of the falling empire was for some years upheld by the profound administrative views, the unwearied perseverance, and the iron character of Sultan Mahmud. He was an energetic, if not a great man, and his calm melancholy look was an index to his sagacious and saturnine intellect.

The spectacle of a duel between such a sovereign and the resuscitated Demos of Greece, was a spectacle that deservedly excited the attention of civilised nations. Mohammedanism and Christianity, tyranny and liberty, despotism and law, were all deeply compromised in the result. The massacres at Chios and the defeat of Dramali were considered proofs that the sultan could not reconquer the Greeks, and Christendom could not allow him to exterminate a Christian people. Public opinion—the watch-dog whose bark sounds as an evil omen in the ear of monarchs—began to growl a warning to Christian kings not longer to neglect the rights of Christian nations, and statesmen began to feel that the sympathies of the people in Western Europe were at last fairly interested in the cause of Greece. But the friends of the holy alliance still argued that anarchy was inflicting hourly more

misery in Greece than the sultan's government inflicted annually on the Greeks in Turkey; that the extortions of Kolokotrones and Odysseus, and the misgovernment of Mavrocordatos, produced greater evils than the faults of pashas and the errors of Sultan Mahmud; and that the power and resources of the Othoman empire rendered the success of the Greek Revolution hopeless. The friends of Greece, on the other hand, replied, that if the Greek chiefs were worthless, and the Greek government weak, the will of the people was strong, and the nation would prove unconquerable. The Greeks, they said, might yet find a government worthy of their cause, and the liberties of Greece might find a champion like William of Orange or Washington; or, if liberty produced no champion, war might give the nation a chief like Cromwell or Napoleon.

The animosity of the belligerents was never more violent than at the commencement of 1823, but the resources of both were for the time exhausted. The sultan, finding that his indiscriminate cruelty had only strengthened the Greeks in their determination to oppose his power, changed his policy, and began to treat them with mildness. Many who had been thrown into prison merely as hostages, were released, and the Greek communities generally were allowed to enjoy their old municipal privileges, and manage their own financial affairs. Strict orders were transmitted to all pashas to act equitably to the Greek subjects of the Porte. Some slight concessions were also made in order to conciliate Russia, and negotiations were opened with Persia, which eventually terminated the war with that power.[1] Even the sympathy of Western nations in the Greek cause was not overlooked. Sultan

[1] The treaty of peace between Turkey and Persia was signed on the 28th July 1823, but it was not published at Constantinople until the month of October, and not ratified by the Shah of Persia until January 1824.

Mahmud knew little of public opinion, but he was not A. D. 1823.
ignorant of the power of popular feeling. The early events of his life, and the state of his capital, had taught him to fear insurrections. He was persuaded by his own judgment, as well as by foreign ambassadors and his own ministers, that Christian nations might force kings and emperors to defend the Greeks, and that it would be wise to avert a combination of the Christian powers for such a purpose. He therefore ordered the new capitan-pasha, Khosref Mehemet, called Topal, to assure the English ambassador and the Austrian internuncio, that the Othoman fleet would not lay waste the defenceless islands of the Archipelago, and that terms of submission would be offered to all Christians who had taken up arms.

The sultan's preparations for the campaign of 1823 were suddenly paralysed by a great disaster. The arsenal and cannon foundery at Tophana were destroyed by fire. An immense train of artillery had been prepared for the army of Thessaly; twelve hundred brass guns were ready to arm new ships in the port; an extraordinary supply of ammunition and military stores was packed up for service: all these materials were destroyed by one of the most terrible conflagrations ever witnessed, even by the inhabitants of Constantinople. Besides the artillery arsenal, fifty mosques and about six thousand houses were destroyed. A large part of Pera was reduced to ashes.

This fire was attributed by public rumour to the malevolence of the janissaries, and that rumour was believed by Sultan Mahmud. Fifteen ortas were under orders to march against the Greeks. They dared not refuse marching against infidels, but without the materials of war, destroyed by this conflagration, their departure was useless. They had now gained time to organise an insurrection, and their discontent alarmed

the sultan to such a degree that, contrary to the established usage of the empire, he did not appear in public on several occasions. But neither his personal danger, nor the destruction of his artillery, abated his energy. A small fleet was fitted out, and, instead of making a decisive attack on the Greeks, it was resolved to harass them with desultory operations. The capitan-pasha hoisted his flag in a frigate, and his fleet was unencumbered by a single line-of-battle ship. The financial difficulties of the Turkish government were met by a new issue of debased money, which was at that time the substitute for a loan. By the old plan of debasing the coinage, the loss fell on the sultan's own subjects; by the new plan of borrowing money, it is sure to fall on strangers, and in all probability on the subjects of Queen Victoria.

The sultan's plan of campaign was as usual well devised. An army was destined to invade the Morea. Instead of entering the peninsula by the Isthmus of Corinth, it was to cross the gulf at Lepanto, and establish its headquarters at Patras. The garrison of Corinth was to be provisioned and strengthened by the Othoman fleet. Elis and Messenia offered facilities for the employment of the Turkish cavalry. Abundant supplies of all kinds might be obtained from the Ionian Islands to fill the magazines of the army at Patras, Modon, and Ceron.

Yussuf Berkoftzalee, who was well known to the Greeks by his exploits in Moldavia, was ordered to advance from Thessaly through Eastern Greece, with a strong body of cavalry. The main army, consisting of Guegs under Mustaï Pasha of Scodra, and Tosks under Omer Vrioni, pasha of Joannina, was ordered to advance through Western Greece. A junction was to be effected either at Lepanto or at Patras, where the Othoman fleet was to meet the army.

Mavrocordatos had been driven from office by his own mismanagement. His successors at the head of the Greek government were too ignorant to adopt measures for retarding the advance of the Turks, and too selfish to think of anything but their personal interests. The people stood ready to do their duty, but the popular energy was left without guidance. The captains and best soldiers were far from the frontier, collecting and consuming the national revenues. The Morea was filled with well-paid troops; but few were disposed to quit the flesh-pots of the districts in which they had taken up their quarters; so that, when the campaign opened, Greece had no army in the field. A. D. 1823.

Reshid Pasha (Kiutayhé) commenced the military operations of the year 1823, by treading out the ashes of the Revolution that still smouldered on Mount Pelion. He subdued Trikheri in conjunction with the capitan-pasha, and drove the Olympian armatoli from their last retreat in Thessaly.[1]

The Olympian armatoli escaped to Skiathos and Skopelos, where they maintained themselves by plundering the inhabitants, while Yussuf Berkoftzalee was laying waste Eastern Greece. In the month of July, the inhabitants of Skiathos were driven from their houses by these Greek troops, who took possession of the town, and consumed the grain, oil, and wine which they found stored up in the magazines. Parties of soldiers scoured the island, and seized the sheep and goats as if they had been in an enemy's country. The inhabitants fled to an ancient castle about five miles from the town, with as much of their property as they could save, and defended this strong position against their intrusive countrymen. The armatoli were so much pleased with their idle life, varied with goat hunts and skirmishes with the natives, that they re-

[1] See vol. i. p. 246.

fused to obey the orders they received from the Greek government, to join a body of troops in Eubœa. Admiral Miaoulis visited Skiathos on the 11th of October, and found the inhabitants in a state of destitution and distress. They were shut up in the castle, and their supplies were exhausted, while the soldiers were consuming the last remains of their property in the town. The authority, the solicitations, and the reproaches of Miaoulis, were employed in vain to expel the armatoli from the island, and the lawless soldiery did not quit Skiathos until they had consumed everything on which they could lay their hands.

While the Olympian armatoli were ruining Skiathos and plundering Skopelos, Yussuf Berkoftzalee was laying waste Phocis and Bœotia. Many villages, and several monasteries on Parnassus and Helicon, which had hitherto escaped devastation, were plundered and burned. Kastri, the village which occupies the site of Delphi, was pillaged; but instead of establishing himself at Salona, opening communications with Lepanto, and co-operating with the army of Mustaï Pasha, Berkoftzalee fixed his headquarters at Thebes, sent his infantry to Negrepont, and pushed forward his foraging parties into the plain of Athens.

Kolettes, like Mavrocordatos, was eager for military glory, and even more unfit for military command. He now persuaded the other members of the government to appoint him commander-in-chief of a Greek army which he was to assemble in Eubœa. He had no military qualifications but a portly frame and the Albanian dress; but these physical and artificial advantages induced the stout Zinzar Vallachian to despise the moral courage and the patriotic disinterestedness of his phanariot rival, whose frame, though smaller, was far more active. When the Turks appeared, Kolettes fled and abandoned Eubœa to its fate.

Odysseus, however, who commanded the Greek force in the southern part of the island, defeated the Mussulmans in a skirmish near Kanystos. As a trophy of his victory, he sent fifty heads and three living Turks to Athens. The modern Athenians deliberately stoned these three unfortunate prisoners to death. A. D. 1823.

Mustaï Pasha assembled his army at Ochrida. It consisted of five thousand Mohammedan Guegs, and three thousand Catholic Miridits. These Catholics, who speak the Guegh dialect of the Albanian language, boast of their descent from the Christians who fought against the Turks under their national hero Skanderbeg, or George Castriot. But their hatred of the orthodox Greeks has long since bound them in a closer alliance with the Mussulman tribes in their neighbourhood, than with any body of Christians. On the present occasion, the Miridits formed the advanced guard of Mustaï's army. They upheld the military glory of their race, and ridiculed the vanity of the Greeks, who attempted to filch from them the glory of Skanderbeg.

The Greeks made no preparations to oppose Mustaï. Mavrocordatos had quitted Mesolonghi. While he remained there, he concentrated in his own person the three offices of President of Greece, Governor-General of the Western Provinces, and Commander-in-Chief of the Etolian army; but when he departed he left three persons to execute the duties of commander-in-chief. This absurd arrangement would doubtless have created anarchy had it not already existed, and it tended to increase the disorders that already prevailed. Almost every chief, both in Etolia and Acarnania, engaged in quarrels with his neighbours. Sometimes they fought in order to decide who should march to encounter Mustaï's army, and the prize of victory was liberty to stay at home and plunder the peasantry. In most

cases their proceedings were an inexplicable enigma; and their most intelligent countrymen could only tell strangers, what indeed was very evident without their communication, that the conduct of the captains and primates was ruining the people.

The advance of Mustaï's army was signalised by one of the most brilliant exploits of the war. The first division of the Othoman force consisted of four thousand men, Catholics and Mussulmans, under the command of Djelaleddin Bey. It encamped in the valley of Karpenisi, near an abundant fountain of pure water, which forms a brook as it flows from its basin, shaded by a fine old willow-tree.

At midnight on the 21st of August 1823 the orthodox Tosks surprised the camp of the Catholic and Mussulman Guegs. Marco Botzares, at the head of three hundred and fifty Suliots, broke into the midst of their enemies and rushed forward to slay the bey. The Othoman troops, roused from sleep, fled with precipitation, leaving their arms behind. Had the Greek captains descended with the armatoli of Etolia and Acarnania from the villages in which they were idly watching the flashes of the Suliot arms, they might have annihilated the Turkish force. But Greek envy sacrificed the Albanian hero. The bey of Ochrida had pitched his tent in a mandra or walled enclosure, built to protect beehives or young lambs from badgers and foxes. Botzares reached this wall, and, not finding the entrance, raised his head to look over it, in order to discover a means of entering it with his followers. The alarm had now roused Djelaleddin's veterans, who were familiar with nocturnal surprises. Several were on the watch when the head of Botzares rose above the wall, and showed itself marked on the grey sky; a ball immediately pierced his brain, and the Suliots took up his body. Even then a few hand-grenades

would have driven Djelaleddin's guard from the enclosure, and completed the defeat of the Turkish force; but the Suliots had learned nothing of the art of war during their long intercourse with the Russians, French, and English in the Ionian Islands. Like most warlike savages, they despised the improvements of science; and the consequence was, that their victorious career was now stopped by a rough wall, built as a defence against foxes and badgers. But before retiring with the body of their leader, they collected and carried off their booty. No attempt was made to interrupt their retreat to Mikrokherio, where they arrived accompanied by a train of mules caught in the camp, and laden with spoil. Horse-hair sacks filled with silver-mounted pistols, yataghans, and cartridge-cases, were fastened over pack-saddles like bags of meal, and long Albanian muskets were tied up in bundles like fagots of firewood. The booty was very great, but the death of Marco Botzarés cast a gloom over their spirits. The Greek soldiers in the neighbouring villages of Tranakhorio and Nostimo, when it was too late, became ashamed of their inactivity, and reproached their captains for causing the death of the bravest chief in the Greek army. As the news of the loss spread, the whole nation grieved over the noble Suliot. A. D. 1823.

The affair at Karpenisi is one of the examples of the secondary part which the rival dominant races of Othomans and Greeks often bore in the war of the Greek Revolution. The Othomans who accompanied the army of Mustaï were still in the plain of Thessaly. The Greeks were encamped idly on the hills. The battle was fought between the Catholic Guegs and the orthodox Tosks.

The troops of Djelaleddin remained in possession of the field of battle, and buried their dead on the spot. Two English travellers who passed the place during

the following summer saw a number of small wooden crosses fixed over the graves of the Miridits.

The Suliots who bore a part in this memorable exploit near the fountain and the old willow-tree, were long distinguished by the richly ornamented and strangely mounted arms they wore; but many regretted their dearly-purchased splendour, and thought the night accursed on which it was obtained, saying, that it had been better for them and for Greece had Markos still lived, and they had continued to carry the plain rifles of their fathers.

The success of the Suliots did not retard the advance of Mustaï. His Guegs pressed on, eager to avenge their losses and wipe off the stain on their military reputation. The Greeks abandoned their positions at Tranokhorio, and made an unsuccessful attempt to defend the valley between the two precipitous mountains of Khelidoni and Kaliakudi.

The road from Karpenisi to Vrachori runs through a succession of frightful passes and giant rocks. It may be compared with the most difficult footpaths over the Alps. The great mountain Kaliakudi closes the entrance by a wall of precipices, broken by one chasm, through which the river of Karpenisi forces its passage to join the Achelous. In this pass a skirmish took place, and the Greeks boast of an imaginary victory at Kaliakudi. To any one who has visited the monastery of Brusó, it must be evident that three hundred men, inspired with the spirit of Markos Botzares, might have stopped an army as numerous as that of Xerxes or of Brennus. But the Albanians of Mustaï drove the Greek armatoli before them through the sublime valleys which diverge from Brusó. It has been said that Mustaï sowed distrust among the Greek chiefs, by promising capitanliks to some venal leaders. He could hardly have ventured to march

through the pass of Brusó had he not been assured A. D. 1823.
that he should find no enemy to oppose him.

At Vrachori Mustaï found Omer Vrioni with an army of Mussulman Tosks. The dialects of the Guegs and Tosks do not afford a better means of communicating than those of the Irish and the Welsh. The dress of the two tribes is as dissimilar as their speech. The white kilt of the Tosk forms as strong a contrast with the red tunic of the Gueg, as the grey top-coat of Paddy with Sandy's checkered plaid. The followers of the two pashas quarrelled, and the pashas did not agree.

In October 1823 their united force attacked Anatolikon, a small town in the Etolian lagoons, about five miles west of Mesolonghi. The Greeks had only a mud battery, mounting six guns, to defend the place. In the hour of need they allowed William Martin, who had deserted with another seaman from an English ship, to constitute himself captain of a gun.[1] He dismounted the only piece of artillery the Turks placed in battery. The pashas found it impossible to do anything but bombard the place from a couple of mortars, which they planted out of reach of the fire of the Greeks. Their shells did little damage, and only about twenty persons were killed and wounded. On the 11th of December Mustaï raised the siege, and retired to Epirus, through the unguarded pass of Markynoros. Before commencing his retreat, he buried some guns which arrived too late to be of any use, and in order to conceal them from the Greeks, he surrounded them with a low wall of masonry, and ornamented the place like a Turkish cemetery. The Greeks showed the spot with pride, boasting of the beys who had fallen under

[1] Martin's companion died of typhus fever at Mesolonghi shortly after Mustaï's defeat. Martin was left without either pay or rations, and imprisoned by the Greeks for insubordination. From his own mouth the author learned that he must have died of want had he not been relieved by Mr Blackett.

their deadly fire; but when Kiutayhé besieged Mesolonghi in 1825, he commenced operations by digging up the brass guns in the tombs of the beys.

The new Othoman admiral Khosref, called Topal or the lame pasha, was a man of a courteous disposition and considerable ability—far better suited to be minister of foreign affairs than capitan-pasha. He was not more of a sailor, and quite as great a coward, as his unworthy predecessor Kara Mehemet, but he knew better how to make the officers of the fleet obey his orders. He issued from the Dardanelles at the end of May with a fine fleet, composed of fourteen frigates and twenty corvettes and brigs, attended by forty transports. On the 4th of June he landed three thousand Asiatic troops at Kargstos, and sent several transports laden with military stores to Negrepont. He then sailed past Hydra, threw supplies into Coron and Modon, and landed a body of troops and a large sum of money at Patras on the 20th of the same month. Instead, however, of remaining on the western coast of Greece, to support the operations of Mustaï, who was still at Ochrida, he hastened back to the Dardanelles.

The Albanians of Hydra and Spetzas displayed neither activity nor zeal during the year 1823. The Greeks of Psara, Kasos, and Samos, on the contrary, were never more active and enterprising. The Psarians made a descent on the Asiatic coast at Tchanderlik, on the site of Pitane in Æolis, where they stormed a battery, burned the town, and carried off the harem of a bey belonging to the great house of Kara Osman Oglou of Magnesia. The booty gained by plundering the town was increased by the receipt of ten thousand dollars as ransom for the bey's family. The shores of the gulf of Adrymetti were then plundered, and contributions were levied on the Greeks of Mytilene.

The ravages committed on the coast of Asia Minor caused the Mussulman population to break out into open revolt. The sultan was accused of sparing the Giaours to please the Christian ambassadors at Constantinople, and the people called on all true believers to avenge the slaughter of the Turks at Tchanderlik and other places by murdering the Greeks. In many towns the Christians were attacked by fanatical mobs, and at Pergamus several hundred Greeks perished before the Othoman authorities could restore order. A. D. 1823.

During the autumn Miaoulis sailed from Hydra with a small fleet. On his return he complained bitterly of the misconduct of those under his command. Some of the ships of Hydra delayed joining him. At Psara quarrels occurred between the Albanian and Greek sailors; and on the 5th of October the Psarians, in defiance of Miaoulis, seized some Turkish prisoners on board a Hydriot brig, and carried them on shore. Several were publicly tortured before the town hall of Psara, and the rest were murdered in the streets. When the fleet reached Skiathos fresh disorders broke out. The efforts of the admiral to expel the Olympian armatoli, who were plundering the island, proved ineffectual, as has been already mentioned, partly in consequence of the misconduct of the Albanian sailors. A fight took place on shore between the Hydriots and Spetziots, in which three Spetziots were killed and eight wounded. These dissensions rendered all co-operation between the ships of the three islands impossible, and Miaoulis returned to Hydra on the 16th of October almost in a state of despair.

The conduct of the sailors had been insolent and mutinous during the whole cruise. They landed at Lithi, on the west coast of Chios, without orders, robbed the poor Greek peasants of their oxen, plundered the men of their money, and violated the women. Com-

plaints of these acts were laid before Miaoulis, but he was unable to punish the offenders.

Admiral Miaoulis and six brigs were exposed to great danger off Mount Athos on the 27th of September. A Turkish squadron, consisting of five frigates and four sloops-of-war, gained the wind of the Greeks while their ships lay in a calm. A cannonade of three hours and a half ensued, in which several thousand shot were fired; but as the Turks declined engaging their enemy at close quarters, the Hydriots escaped through the Turkish line with the loss of only eight men killed. The Turks declared that they did not lose a single man; and it is not improbable that they never ventured within range of the smaller guns of the Greek ships.

A romantic event during this cruise deserves to be recorded: On the 1st of October the Psarian admiral picked up a boat with eight of his countrymen on board, who were drifting about in the Archipelago without either provisions or water. They had encountered strange vicissitudes during the previous fortnight. An Austrian schooner had seized them in the gulf of Smyrna, where they were looking out for prizes without papers from the Greek government. They were delivered to the Turkish authorities as pirates, and put on board a small vessel bound for the Dardanelles. At the lower castles they were transferred to a boat manned by fifteen Turks, which was to convey them to the bagnio at Constantinople. They proceeded to Tchanek-skelessi, where most of the Turkish boatmen slept ashore. The Psarians contrived to kill those who remained on board without noise, and, casting loose the moorings, they were carried by the current beyond the lower castles before daybreak. There they were met by a contrary wind, without provisions and with only one jar of water.

In this difficulty they were forced to put into a secluded creek in Tenedos, and two of their number, who were dressed like the Greek sailors who serve in the Turkish fleet, walked to the town to purchase bread and carry back two jars of water. One of them had fortunately succeeded in concealing a small gold coin in the upper leather of his slippers before he was searched by the lynx-eyed janissaries of Smyrna. The two Psarians remained all day in a Greek wine-shop kept by an Ionian, as the safest place of concealment, bought bread, and procured water. In the evening they walked back to their companions, who had found water, but were famished with hunger. At midnight they left Tenedos; but before they could reach any Greek island the wind became calm or contrary, and they had been rowing incessantly for thirty-six hours, endeavouring to reach Psara, when they were picked up by Admiral Apostoles. A. D. 1823.

A Greek squadron was sent to relieve Anatolikon, when it was besieged by Mustaï Pasha. Before the Hydriot and Spetziot sailors would embark they insisted on receiving a month's pay in advance. The primates made their mutinous behaviour during the previous cruise a pretext for refusing to make any advance. The Greeks of Psara, with more patriotism, immediately sent a few brigs and a fire-ship to Hydra, where their promptitude to serve the cause of their country was regarded as an offence. The Hydriots, who were intent only on the question of pay, attacked the Psarian sailors, in order to punish them for giving a bad example to the rest of the Greek navy. Several Psarians were cruelly beaten, and a civil war was on the point of breaking out. Shame, and the expectation of being speedily repaid by Lord Byron, at last induced the Hydriot primates to advance the sum required to fit out seven vessels and two fire-ships.

The fire-ships of Hydra were generally prepared as jobs, and were rarely of any service. One of these could not go farther than Navarin. The Hydriot squadron was joined by five Spetziot brigs and a fire-ship. Miaoulis, disgusted with the insubordination displayed in the preceding cruise, remained on shore, and the command was given to Captain Pinotzi, who hoisted a broad pennant, for the Greeks mimicked the external signs of naval organisation, though they neglected the essentials of discipline and tactics. Mavrocordatos embarked to resume his dictatorship in Western Greece, expecting to find a firm support in the influence of Lord Byron, who had recently arrived at Cephalonia.

On the 11th of December 1823 this squadron fell in with a Turkish brig off the Skrophes. Five Greek ships came up with her, and raked her with their broadsides until she was in a sinking state. None of these vessels ventured to run alongside and carry her by boarding, so that she was enabled to reach Ithaca, where the Turks expected to find protection under the English flag. This brig mounted twenty-two six-pounders, and carried a crew of eighty men, besides twenty passengers. She had sailed from Previsa the day before with a large sum of money for the garrison of Patras.

The Greeks had too often violated their most solemn treaties to care much about violating Ionian neutrality, when it appeared that they could do so with impunity. The sailors landed on Ithaca, and murdered the Turks who attempted to defend their ship. The brig was seized as soon as she was abandoned by her crew, and the treasure on board was transferred to the Greek ships. The captain, who refused to quit the deck, was slain. The brig presented a terrible spectacle to her captors. Upwards of forty

Turks had been killed during the action, and their dead bodies were found piled up between decks, in order that they might be taken ashore for burial. While some of the Greek sailors were plundering the stranded vessel, others were shooting down the Turks on shore, whose flight was impeded by the people of the island. The arrival of a company of English soldiers saved thirty-five men, who were carried to the lazaretto. Every one of these had received severe wounds. A. D. 1823

The English government was justly indignant at this conduct on the part of a Greek claiming the rights of an organised force, and sailing under a broad pennant. It seemed intolerable that a navy which pretended to enjoy all the advantages accorded to Christian governments, should commit atrocities that would have disgraced Algerine pirates. The behaviour of the Greeks was on this occasion peculiarly offensive, for the neutrality of the Ionian Islands had been rendered by the British government extremely advantageous to Greece. Kalamos was at that very time serving as a refuge to the population of Acarnania and Etolia, which had fled from the armies of Omer Vrioni and Mustaï. Karaiskaki, a distinguished captain, was receiving not only protection, but also medical assistance gratis, and hundreds of families of Greek armatoli were then fed by the British government; yet the newspapers of the Continent afford evidence that at this time the Greeks were calumniating England over all Europe from Marseilles to St Petersburg.

Among the wounded Turks who were carried into the lazaretto of Ithaca, there was one man of a noble aspect and of dignified manners, who had been left for dead all night on the beach. In the morning he was found breathing, and carried to the lazaretto to die. But after his wounds were dressed, his face and hands

washed, and his green turban arranged on his head, he muttered a few words of thankfulness in Greek, and made signs for a pipe. He smoked one or two pipes, and the two English surgeons who were attending him thought it not improbable that he would die smoking. The pipes, however, appeared to restore him, and he gradually recovered. His convalescence was long; and during the time he remained in Ithaca, the fluency with which he spoke Greek, and the good sense he displayed in his conversation, made him a favourite. He had been cadi of Tripolitza just before the Revolution broke out, but had accompanied Khurshid's army to Thessaly. This man considered the Othoman empire on the verge of ruin; but he ridiculed the idea of its being replaced by a Greek kingdom. He feared a coalition of the Christian powers.

The Greek vessels returned to Mesolonghi with their booty, and quarrelled about the division of the spoil. A schooner, with several chests of treasure on board, attempted to escape, but was brought back by force, and anchored in the midst of the Hydriot brigs. Mavrocordatos, who was an involuntary spectator of these disgraceful scenes, attempted in vain to persuade the Hydriots to make an honourable division of their dishonest gains. On the 17th of December a scheme of division, modelled on the system of shares in the mercantile operations of the islanders, was adopted. The share of one of the Hydriot ships, which had sailed shamefully under-manned, with only forty-eight seamen on board, but which drew shares for seventy-one, amounted to 77 okas of paras, measured by weight, and 267 gold mahmudiés in coin, besides other plunder, estimated at 770 piastres.[1]

[1] An English gentleman, once a midshipman in the navy, was accidentally on board the Hydriot squadron as a volunteer, and witnessed the events above narrated.

No sooner was the division of the treasure terminated than the crews demanded pay for a second month in advance. Application was made to Lord Byron, but he considered it impolitic to purchase the service of such ill-manned ships, and hopeless to expect honourable service from such disorderly and mutinous crews. The Hydriots quitted Mesolonghi, and they so timed their voyage that they made Hydra on the 29th December, the very day on which the month paid in advance ended. A. D. 1823.

The Ionian government forgot its dignity in avenging the injury it had received. The Lord High Commissioner issued a violent proclamation, upbraiding Mavrocordatos in rather unseemly terms for calling himself a prince, which certainly was no violation of Ionian neutrality. The sultan called upon the Ionian government for indemnification for the loss he had sustained in consequence of their neglect to enforce neutrality, and his demand was immediately recognised. The Greek government foolishly refused to refund the money, until the British government, losing patience, ordered Captain Pechell in H.M.S. Sybille to enforce the claim. Several Greek ships were then seized, and not released until an indemnity of forty thousand dollars was refunded.

The Greeks had regained possession of the Acrocorinth before the Albanian pashas had raised the siege of Anatolikon. The Turks capitulated on the 7th November 1823. On this occasion the firmness and honourable conduct of Niketas, supported by the soldiers under his immediate orders, prevented Greece from being stained by another infamous massacre. But all the energy and activity of Niketas could not prevent four or five Turks from being murdered on the way from Corinth to Kenchries. The indifference shown by Kolokotrones to the disorderly conduct of

the Greek troops under his command on this occasion, induced many to believe that he would have willingly seen a repetition of the massacres of Tripolitza.

In the autumn of 1823 Lord Byron directed the attention of all Europe to the affairs of Greece by joining the cause. He arrived at Mesolonghi on the 5th of January 1824. His short career in Greece was unconnected with any important military event, for he died on the 19th of April; but the enthusiasm he awakened perhaps served Greece more than his personal exertions would have done, had his life been prolonged. Wherever the English language was known, an electric shock was felt when it was heard that

> "The pilgrim of eternity, whose fame
> Over his living head like heaven was bent,
> An early but enduring monument,"

had died "where his young mind first caught ethereal fire."

The genius of Lord Byron would in all probability never have unfolded either political or military talent. He was not disposed to assume an active part in public affairs. He regarded politics as the art of cheating the people, by concealing one-half of the truth and misrepresenting the other; and whatever abstract enthusiasm he might feel for military glory was joined to an innate detestation of the trade of war. Both his character and his conduct presented unceasing contradictions. It seemed as if two different souls occupied his body alternately. One was feminine, and full of sympathy; the other masculine, and characterised by clear judgment. When one arrived the other departed. In company, his sympathetic soul was his tyrant. Alone, or with a single person, his masculine prudence displayed itself as his friend. No man could then arrange facts, investigate their causes, or examine their

consequences, with more logical accuracy, or in a more practical spirit. Yet, in his most sagacious moment, the entrance of a third person would derange the order of his ideas,—judgment fled, and sympathy, generally laughing, took its place. Hence he appeared in his conduct extremely capricious, while in his opinions he had really great firmness. He often, however, displayed a feminine turn for deception in trifles, while at the same time he possessed a feminine candour of soul, and a natural love of truth, which made him often despise himself quite as much as he despised English fashionable society for what he called its brazen hypocrisy. He felt his want of self-command; and there can be no doubt that his strongest reason for withdrawing from society, and shunning public affairs, was the conviction of his inability to compress the sympathies which were in opposition to his judgment. A. D. 1823.

No stranger estimated the character of the Greeks more correctly than Lord Byron. At Cephalonia he sometimes smiled at the enthusiasm of Sir Charles Napier, and pointed out where the soldier's ardour appeared to mislead his judgment. It may, however, be observed, that to nobody did the Greeks ever unmask their selfishness and self-deceit so candidly. Almost every distinguished statesman and general sent him letters soliciting his favour, his influence, or his money. Kolokotrones invited him to a national assembly at Salamis. Mavrocordatos informed him that he would be of no use anywhere but at Hydra, for Mavrocordatos was then in that island. Constantine Metaxa, who was then governor of Mesolonghi, wrote, saying that Greece would be ruined unless Lord Byron visited that fortress. Petrobey used plainer words. He informed Lord Byron that the true way to save Greece was to lend him, the bey, a thousand pounds. With

that sum not three hundred but three thousand Spartans would be put in motion to the frontier, and the fall of the Othoman empire would be certain. Every Greek chief celebrated his own praises and Lord Byron's liberality, but most of them injured their own cause by dilating too eloquently on the vices and crimes of some friend or rival. Lord Byron made many sagacious and satirical comments on the *chiaroscuro* of these communications. He wrote: "Of the Greeks I can't say much good hitherto, and I do not like to speak ill of them, though they do of one another." He knew his own character so well, that he remained some time at Cephalonia, not venturing to trust himself among such a cunning and scheming set, fearing lest unworthy persons should exercise too much influence over his conduct. This feeling induced him to avoid familiarity with the Greeks, even after his arrival at Mesolonghi, and with Mavrocordatos his intercourse was not intimate. Business and ceremony alone brought them together. Their social and mental characteristics were not of a nature to create reciprocal confidence, and they felt no mutual esteem.

Lord Byron did not overlook the vices of the Greek leaders, but at the same time he did not underrate the virtues of the people. The determined spirit with which they asserted their independence received his sincere praise, even while the rapacity, cruelty, and dissensions of the military weighed heavily on his mind. Nothing, during his residence at Mesolonghi, distressed him more than the conduct of the Suliots whom he had taken into his pay. He saw that he had degraded himself into the chief of a band of personal followers, who thought of nothing but extorting money from their foreign leader. Three hundred Suliots were enrolled in his band; of these upwards of one hundred demanded double pay and triple rations, pretending

to be officers, whose dignity would not allow them to lounge about the coffee-houses of Mesolonghi unless they were attended by a henchman or pipebearer. Lord Byron, annoyed by their absurd pretensions, remembered Napier's plans for the formation of a small regular military force, and lamented his own inability to carry them into execution. Colonel Leicester Stanhope (the Earl of Harrington) increased his irritation by appearing as the agent of the Greek committee, and giving in to all the pedantic delusions of the literati. The typographical colonel, as Lord Byron sarcastically termed him, seemed to think that newspapers would be more effectual in driving back the Othoman armies than well-drilled troops and military tactics. A. D. 18

The political information which Lord Byron extracted from Mavrocordatos in their personal interviews, and the proceedings of that statesman in the conduct of the public administration, revealed the thousand obstacles to the establishment of an honest government in Greece. A mist fell from Lord Byron's eyes. He owned that his sagacity was at fault, and he abandoned all hope of being able to guide the Greeks, or to assist them in improving their administration. Not long before his death, he frequently repeated, that with Napier to command and form regular troops, with Hastings to arm and command a steamer, and with an able financier, Greece would be sure of victory. Then, too, he began to express doubts whether circumstances had authorised him to recommend the Greek loan to his friends in England. He was struck by the fact that a majority of the Moreot captains and primates opposed pledging the confiscated Turkish property as a security to the lenders. He feared that the proceeds of a loan might be misspent by one party, and the loan itself disowned by another. Bowring and the

bankers, he said, would secure their commissions and their gains, but he feared many honest English families might lose their money by his Philhellenism.

Lord Byron's knowledge of the prominent defects of the Greek character, his personal experience of their rapacity, and his conviction that selfishness was the principal cause of a civil war in Argolis which broke out about the time of his arrival at Mesolonghi, made him an advocate for the formation of a strong central government. Order was, in his opinion, the first step to liberty. The Earl of Harrington talked as if he considered Lord Byron's desire for order a proof of his indifference to liberty. Lord Byron was, however, a far wiser counsellor than the typographical colonel, and, had he lived, might have done much to arrest the factious madness and shameless expenditure which rendered the English loans the prize and the aliment of two civil wars.

The first Greek loan was contracted early in 1824. The Greeks received about £300,000, and they engaged to pay annually £40,000 as interest, as the capital of the debt created was £800,000 at five per cent. The lenders risked their money to deliver Greece, and they have never received a shilling of interest or a syllable of gratitude from the thousands whom their money enriched. Indeed, the Greeks generally appear to have considered the loan as a small payment for the debt due by civilised society to the country that produced Homer and Plato. The modern Greek habit of reducing everything to a pecuniary standard, made Homer, Plato, & Co. creditors for a large capital and an enormous accumulation of unpaid interest.

A worse speculation, in a financial point of view, than the Greek loan, could not have been undertaken. Both the loan contractors and the members of the Greek committee knew that the revenues of Greece in

1823 fell short of £80,000. Yet with this knowledge A. D. 1824.
they placed the absolute control of a sum equal to nearly four years' revenue of the country in the hands of a faction engaged in civil war. Foreigners were amazed at this display of financial insanity on the London Stock Exchange. Future years have proved that the disease returns in periodical fits, which can only be cured by copious bleeding.

Though the contractors of the Greek loan, when they paid over the money to a government engaged in civil war, could not be ignorant that the money would be diverted from carrying on hostilities against the Turks, in order to be employed in warring with domestic rivals, various attempts were made to check its wasteful expenditure during the year 1824. Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, now her Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, visited Greece, by request of the contractors of the loan, "to see if the nature of the Greek government warranted the payment of the portion not yet advanced." Sir Henry stated the following observations for the benefit of his countrymen, as the result of his experience: "We (the English) have generally busied ourselves about the government of Greece, which really was no business of ours; while the management of our money, in which we might be thought concerned, has been left entirely in the hands of the Greeks."[1] General Gordon was subsequently invited to return to Greece, which he had left shortly after the fall of Tripolitza, in order to watch over the expenditure of the second loan; but he wisely refused to have anything to do with the business when he read the instructions on which he was to act. He has recorded his deliberate opinion of the men who were intrusted with the expenditure of the English loans in very strong terms: "With, *perhaps*, the exception of

[1] *An Autumn in Greece.* By H. Lytton Bulwer, Esq. 8vo. London, 1826.

Zaimes, the members of the executive are no better than public robbers."[1] The internal history of Greece, from the defeat of Dramali to the arrival of King Otho, attests the truth of this severe sentence. The country was ruined by intestine broils, originating in private rapacity. Amidst these disorders, two civil wars stand out with disgraceful prominence, as having consumed the proceeds of the English loans, abandoned Psara and Kasos to be conquered by the Turks, and prepared the Morea to be subdued by Ibrahim Pasha.

The first of these civil wars was called the war of Kolokotrones, because that old chieftain was its principal author. It commenced in November 1823, and finished in June 1824. It was concluded as soon as the news reached the belligerents that an instalment of the first English loan had arrived at Zante. Panos, the eldest son of Kolokotrones, who held possession of Nauplia, immediately surrendered it to the executive body on receiving a share of the English money. This transaction took place on the 5th of June 1824.

While the Greeks were fighting among themselves, Sultan Mahmud was smoothing away the obstacles which impeded the co-operation of his powerful vassal, Mohammed Ali, pasha of Egypt, in attacking them. By his prudent arrangements he secured the zealous support of the Egyptian pasha. Mohammed Ali was already disposed to chastise the Greeks for the losses he had sustained from their cruisers. He also feared that a prolonged contest with the insurgent Christians might end in bringing a Russian fleet into the Mediterranean. He therefore received the proposals made to his political agent at Constantinople in the most conciliatory spirit. The sultan invested his son Ibrahim with the rank of vizier of the Morea, and wrote a flattering letter to the great pasha himself, calling him

[1] *History of the Greek Revolution*, ii. 72.

the champion of Islam. Mohammed Ali received this letter with the warmest expressions of pleasure, and engaged to send a powerful fleet and army to attack the Greeks. He had not yet been inspired by French intrigue with delusive visions of making himself the founder of an Arab empire. A. D. 1824.

The Greeks heard with indifference of the preparations which were going on at the dockyards of Constantinople and Alexandria. They treated the rumoured co-operation of the sultan and the pasha as impossible. They insisted on supposing that Mohammed Ali reasoned like themselves. They thought that the pasha must want his own money for his own schemes, and deluded themselves with the idea that he was more likely to act against the sultan than for him. They argued that he must be more anxious to establish his own independence than to destroy theirs. Their whole souls were absorbed in party contests for wealth and power, until they were awakened from their delusive dreams by a series of terrible calamities.

It has been mentioned that the Kolokotrones's civil war embittered the last months of Lord Byron's life, by doubts of the propriety of intrusting the Greeks with large sums of money. He foresaw that selfishness would find more nutriment in foreign loans than patriotism.

The executive government which defeated the rebellion of Kolokotrones was supported by a majority in the legislative assembly. It cannot be said that the members of this assembly were freely chosen by the people; yet, on the whole, its feelings represented those of the best portion of the Greek population. Many were well-meaning men, who could clothe their thoughts in energetic and eloquent language, but few had any experience in legislation and politics. Their deliberations rarely conducted them to practical resolu-

tions, and their incapacity prevented their exercising any control over the financial affairs of their country. The consequence of this inaptitude for business was, that George Konduriottes and Kolettes exercised absolute power in the name of the executive body.

The government which vanquished the faction of Kolokotrones was formed by a coalition of three parties: the Albanian shipowners of Hydra and Spetzas; the Greek primates of the Morea; and the Romeliot captains of armatoli. The chief authority was conceded to the Albanian shipowners; George Konduriottes of Hydra was elected president of Greece, and Botasses of Spetzas, vice-president. It is necessary to record the sad truth, that two more ignorant and incapable persons were never intrusted with the direction of a nation's affairs. The Greeks are the most prejudiced of all Europeans when there is a question of the purity of the Hellenic race, and no people regards education with more favour; yet with all this nationality and pedantry they intrusted their public affairs, in a period of great difficulty, to two men who could not address them in the Greek language, and whose intellectual deficiencies prevented them from expressing their thoughts with clearness even in the corrupt Tosk dialect which they habitually used. The descendants of Pericles and Demosthenes submitted tamely to these aliens in civilisation and race, because they were orthodox and wealthy.

The interest of the president and vice-president was identical with that of the shipowners of Hydra and Spetzas, and it was directly opposed to the formation of a national navy. The money placed at their disposal was wasted in paying inefficient ships, and hiring the support of mutinous sailors; and they refused to purchase and arm a single steamer at the recommendation of Captain Hastings, when such a vessel

might have frustrated the operations of Mohammed Ali, and prevented Ibrahim Pasha from landing in the Morea. Had they possessed a very little naval knowledge and a small share of patriotism, they might have obtained the glory of initiating the change in naval warfare which is in progress throughout all maritime nations.[1] A. D. 1824.

The party of the Moreot primates was next in importance to that of the naval islanders; but this party soon forfeited its influence and fell into contempt, by the unprincipled selfishness of its leading members. Had the Moreot primates supported the just demands of the people for a system of publicity in financial business, they might have become the guardians of the liberties of Greece, and the founders of their country's constitution. They were, perhaps, the only persons capable, from their administrative experience, of placing the existing municipal institutions in harmony with the action of the central government.

The Romeliot captains of armatoli, though they already possessed great territorial and political influence when the government of Konduriottes entered on office, had not yet constituted themselves into a distinct party in the state. Kolettes now succeeded by his schemes in uniting them together, and allying them with himself by the ties of a common interest. He purchased their services by securing to them a large share of the English loans; and he taught them to maintain themselves in provincial commands, in imitation of the old system of armatoliks. Kolettes acted as their agent and representative in the executive body That astute Vallach was the first to perceive how their political influence might be rendered supreme in liberated Greece, by imitating the administrative practice

[1] The memoir which Hastings laid before Konduriottes's government is subjoined in Appendix I.

of Ali of Joannina, with which he was well acquainted. He conducted their bargains for pay and rations with the central government; he assisted them in obtaining contracts for farming the taxes of the provinces of which they had obtained the military command; and he regulated with them the number of the personal followers they were to be permitted to charge on the public revenues as national troops.

The position which Kolettes created for himself by these arrangements rendered him the most influential politician in the government, and nothing but his want of personal courage and honesty prevented him from being the first man in Greece. It has been already said that he was a Zinzar Vallachian, and not a Greek, and all the moral and physical peculiarities of that race were strongly marked both in his mind and his personal appearance. Both contrasted with those of the Greeks and Albanians by whom he was surrounded. He exhibited neither the boorish pride of the Albanian islanders, nor the loquacious self-sufficiency of the Greek logiotati. With patience and stolid silence he profited by the blunders of his colleagues, always himself doing and saying as little as possible. He trusted that others, by their restless intrigues and precipitate ambition, would ruin their own position, and leave the field open for him. His policy was crowned with success. Hypsilantes, Mavrocordatos, Konduriottes, and Zaimes, all ruined their own personal position by exhibiting more ambition than capacity.

The second civil war, called the War of the Primates, constituted Kolettes the leader of the Romeliot military faction, and victory rendered that faction the most powerful party in Greece. During the period of Bavarian despotism, Kolettes was sent as minister to the court of Louis Philippe, and those who saw

and conversed with him in Paris were surprised at the A. D. 182
political reputation he had enjoyed in Greece. When they listened to the grave and portly Vallach, in his Albanian habiliments, uttering platitudes with an oracular air, they felt inclined to apply to him Fox's observation on Lord Thurlow's first appearance on the woolsack: "That fellow is a humbug; no man can be as wise as he looks." Kolettes, however, only acted a wise look, though it must be owned that he was not a bad actor.

In England, Mavrocordatos was supposed to be at the head of a powerful constitutional party. If this had ever been possible, he had destroyed that possibility by abandoning the presidency of Greece to play the commander-in-chief at Petta. The testimony of English Philhellenes and well-informed foreigners was, however, unavailing to undeceive the British public. The delusion appears to have originated among the Greeks settled in Western Europe, who believed that Mavrocordatos was the most disinterested statesman in Greece, and that a strong constitutional party ought to exist in a free country. But Mavrocordatos, by his grasping ambition, his schemes for governmental centralisation, his personal mismanagement, and his political indecision, had ruined his influence before the year 1824. Feeling his position changed, and ill satisfied unless he was the first man at the seat of government, he lingered at Mesolonghi during the whole of the important year 1824, and allowed all parties to learn that public business could go on perfectly well without him.

In Western Greece his administration, after Lord Byron's death, was neither honourable to himself nor advantageous to the country. A civil war broke out in the district of Vlochos between two rival captains, Staikos and Vlachopulos. Its continuance was ascribed

to his imprudence and indecision. His civil administration was unpopular. He gave his support to John Soutzos, the eparch of Venetico, who was stigmatised as the most corrupt and rapacious phanariot in Greece.

Before quitting Mesolonghi to return to the seat of government, Mavrocordatos convoked an assembly of captains and eparchs, to concert measures for defending the country against the incursions of the Turks, and for reforming internal abuses. His dictatorial authority authorised him to take this step, but he ought to have perceived its imprudence. Its effect was to legalise the system of capitanliks, which had been tacitly revived, and to consolidate the personal independence of the military chiefs, who learned to act in concert whenever it was their interest to resist the central government. The peasants were not blind to the effect of Mavrocordatos's conduct. They saw that it would perpetuate a state of anarchy, and many were so alarmed that they fled to Kalamos, declaring that the prince, as they still called their governor-general, had assembled a pack of wolves to debate how the sheep could be preserved from the eagles and reserved for their own eating.

The second civil war, or war of the primates, was not of long duration. Zaimes was the principal author of this iniquitous movement, and his object was to deprive Konduriottes and those who supported his government of the wealth and influence they enjoyed, by disposing of the proceeds of the English loans.

In appearance and manners Andreas Zaimes was a perfect gentleman. His disposition was generous, and his private conduct upright; but his position as a hereditary primate made him ambitious, while nature had made him neither energetic nor courageous. He thrust himself forward as a statesman and military

chief, but he was too weak for a political leader, and A. D. 1824.
utterly unfit for a soldier.

Andreas Londos was next in rank and influence among the conspirators. He was a warm personal friend of Zaimes, and the constant affection which the two Andreas showed to one another in prosperity and adversity was most honourable to both. It proved that they had virtuous stuff in their hearts. Londos was brave and active. His personal courage, however, proved of no use to his party, for, instead of establishing order and enforcing discipline among his followers, he allowed them to commit as great depredations on the property of the Moreot peasants, as were committed by the most lawless chief of Romeliot armatoli. Londos was at this time addicted to riotous debauchery.[1]

Both Zaimes and Londos had assumed the position of Turkish beys, and the Greek government allowed them to collect the taxes and administer the greater part of the public affairs of their respective districts. They pretended to employ the revenues for the public service, and in maintaining troops to blockade Patras. But it was too evident that they surrounded themselves with bands of personal followers withdrawn from the armies of Greece, and that Patras was hardly blockaded at all.

Sessini of Gastuni was another influential man in the party of the primates. He was descended from a Venetian family, and had studied medicine in his youth. Shortly after the retreat of the Mussulmans

[1] Lord Byron used to describe an evening passed in the company of Londos at Vostitza, when both were young men, with a spirit that rendered the scene worthy of a place in *Don Juan*. After supper, Londos, who had the face and figure of a chimpanzee, sprang upon a table, which appeared to be a relic of the Venetian domination, and whose antiquity rendered the exploit a dangerous enterprise, and commenced singing through his nose Rhiga's Hymn to Liberty. A new cadi, passing near the house, inquired the cause of the discordant hubbub. A native Mussulman replied, "It is only the young primate Londos, who is drunk, and is singing hymns to the new panaghia of the Greeks, whom they call Elefitheria."

from Lalla, he contrived to assume a position in Elis between that of a voevode and a pasha. He became receiver-general of taxes, paymaster of troops, and farmer-general of confiscated Turkish estates. He adopted the pride and many other vices of the Osmanlees. His household was maintained with considerable pomp. The courtyard was filled with well-caparisoned horses; the galleries were crowded with armed followers. He never quitted his dwelling without a suite of horsemen, armed guards on foot, and grooms leading Persian greyhounds. His sons were addressed as beys; and Ibrahim Pasha, when he occupied Gastuni, was much amused by the tales he heard from the peasantry, who said they had been compelled to fall down on their knees whenever they addressed a word to the medical primate, even in reply to the simplest question.[1]

Notaras, Deliyannes, and Kolokotrones, all joined the war of the primates, which broke out in November 1824.

[1] Many stories were current concerning the manner in which Sessini had collected his wealth; one may be mentioned, relating to the loss of a part of his ill-gotten riches. Whether true or false, it excited much amusement at Zante. Madame Sessini resided in that island, and acted as her husband's agent. Before the war of the primates commenced, he wished to place some of his treasure where it would be secure against the Greek government in case of defeat. He wished, however, to do this with great secrecy, for many valuable jewels had been deposited with him by Turkish families who had been obliged to escape in a hurry to Patras at the outbreak of the Revolution. His enemies accused him of intending to declare that these deposits were lost in the civil war. Sessini wrote to inform his wife that he would send the most valuable jewels in his possession to her in a cheese and skin of butter, with peculiar marks. The letter miscarried; and when the cheese and the skin of butter arrived, the lady, having a large supply of both, sold them to a bakal or grocer, who had often purchased previous consignments which she had received from old Sessini. A few days passed before the lost letter arrived. When it reached the lady she hastened to the bakal, but he denied all knowledge of the jewellery. He showed her a cheese with the mark for which she sought untouched, and a skin of butter unopened. The accounts of the customhouse showed that she had only imported cheese and butter. Lawyers and justice could not aid her. The bakal kept the treasure, and the world laughed at Madame Sessini and her rapacious husband. But it was said that the bakal proved himself a better man than the primate, and that he restored a valuable jewel to a Turkish family who had intrusted it to the keeping of Sessini, when that family passed by Zante on its way to Alexandria. The whole story may be the creation of an idle brain, but it deserves notice as a specimen of popular rumour. *Si non è vero e ben trovato.*

Kolettes was at this time the most active member of A. D. 181
Konduriottes's government. In six weeks he marched an overwhelming force of Romeliot armatoli into the Morea, and crushed the rebels. Had the Greek government displayed similar energy in arraying the forces against the Turks during the years 1823 and 1824, the war might have changed its aspect. Panos Kolokotrones, the eldest son of the old klepht, after plundering the peasants of Arcadia like a brigand, was slain in a trifling skirmish. Old Kolokotrones and Deliyannes were made prisoners, and confined in a monastery at Hydra. Sessini sought safety at Zante; but the English government was determined to discountenance the unprincipled civil broils of the Greeks, and refused him permission to land. He had no resource but to submit to the clemency of the executive body, and join Kolokotrones in prison. Zaimes, Londos, and Niketas fled to Acarnania, where Mavrocordatos allowed them to hide themselves, and where they were protected by Zongas.

Konduriottes and Kolettes used their victory with impolitic barbarity. Their troops plundered innumerable Greek families who had taken no part in the civil war of everything they possessed. The working oxen of the peasantry were carried off, and in many villages the land remained unsown. The sheep and goats having been also devoured by the armatoli, the people were left to starve. The progress of Ibrahim Pasha in the following year was greatly facilitated by the misgovernment of Konduriottes, the barbarity of Kolettes, and the inhuman ravages of the Romeliot troops.

The two civil wars are black spots in the history of the Greek Revolution. No apology can be offered for those who took up arms against the government in either case, but in the second civil war the conduct of the primates was peculiarly blamable. Patriotism

had certainly nothing to do with a contest in which Zaimes and Londos were acting in concert with Kolokotrones. Ambition and avidity were the only motives of action. The coalition of the primates and military chiefs was based on a tacit pretension which they entertained of forming a territorial aristocracy in the Morea. The leaders of the rebels knew that the great body of the people were discontented, and eager to constitute a national representation capable of controlling the executive body and enforcing financial responsibility. Zaimes and Kolokotrones attempted to make this patriotism of the people a means of binding them with fresh fetters. Had the primates given a thought to the interests of their country, they would have supported the demands of the people in a legal way, and there can be no doubt that they would have soon secured a majority in the legislative assembly, even as it was then constituted. Their rebellion inaugurated a long period of administrative anarchy, wasted the resources of Greece, and created a new race of tyrants as despotic as, and far meaner than, the hated Turks.

The victors in the civil wars were as corrupt as the vanquished had been rapacious. The members of the executive wasted the proceeds of the loans with dishonesty as well as extravagance; and the anomalous condition to which Greece was reduced by the stupidity of its government, cannot be exhibited in a clearer light than by tracing the way in which the money was consumed.

The first sums which arrived from England in 1824 were absorbed by arrears due on public and private debts. The payments made had no reference to the necessities of the public service, they were determined by the influence of individual members of the government. The greater part of the first loan was paid over to the shipowners and sailors of what was called the

Greek fleet; and the lion's share was appropriated to A. D. 1824
the Albanians of Hydra and Spetzas. The civil wars engulfed considerable sums. Romeliot captains and soldiers received large bribes to attack their countrymen. No inconsiderable amount was divided among the members of the legislative assembly, and among a large body of useless partisans, who were characterised as public officials. Every man of any consideration in his own imagination wanted to place himself at the head of a band of armed men, and hundreds of civilians paraded the streets of Nauplia with trains of kilted followers, like Scottish chieftains. Phanariots and doctors in medicine, who, in the month of April 1824, were clad in ragged coats, and who lived on scanty rations, threw off that patriotic chrysalis before summer was past, and emerged in all the splendour of brigand life, fluttering about in rich Albanian habiliments, refulgent with brilliant and unused arms, and followed by diminutive pipe-bearers and tall henchmen. The small stature, voluble tongues, turnspit legs, and Hebrew physiognomies of these Byzantine emigrants, excited the contempt, as much as their sudden and superfluous splendour awakened the envy, of the native Hellenes. Nauplia certainly offered a splendid spectacle to any one who could forget that it was the capital of an impoverished nation struggling through starvation to establish its liberty. The streets were for many months crowded with thousands of gallant young men in picturesque dresses and richly ornamented arms, who ought to have been on the frontiers of Greece.

To the stranger who saw only the fortress of Nauplia filled with troops, Greece appeared to be well prepared to resist the whole force of the Othoman empire. Veteran soldiers and enthusiastic volunteers were numerous. Military commands were distributed with a bountiful hand. Rhodios, the Secretary of State, who

had studied medicine, was made colonel of the regular troops. It is needless to say that the appointment soon made them as irregular as any other troops in Greece. Military chiefs were allowed to enrol under their private banners upwards of thirty thousand men, and pay was actually issued for this number of troops from the proceeds of the English loans. But over these troops the Greek government exercised no direct control. No measure was taken even to verify the numbers of the men for whom pay and rations were furnished. Everything was left to the chiefs, who contracted to furnish a certain number of men for a certain amount of pay and a fixed number of daily rations. Amidst this lavish military expenditure, Modon, Coron, Patras, and Lepanto were left almost unwatched, and without any force to keep up a regular blockade.

The illegal gains made by drawing pay and rations for troops who were never mustered, quite as much as the commissions of colonel given to apothecaries, and of captain to grooms and pipe-bearers, demoralised the military forces of Greece. The war with the sultan seemed to be forgotten by the soldiers, who thought only of indulging in the luxury of embroidered dresses and splendid arms. This is the dominant passion of every military class in Turkey, whether Greeks, Albanians, or Turks. The money poured into Greece by the loans suddenly created a demand for Albanian equipments. The bazaars of Tripolitza, Nauplia, Mesolonghi, and Athens were filled with gold-embroidered jackets, gilded yataghans, and silver-mounted pistols. Tailors came flocking to Greece from Joannina and Saloniki. Sabres, pistols, and long guns, richly mounted, were constantly passing through the Ionian Islands as articles of trade between Albania and the Morea. The arms and dress of an ordinary palikari, made in imitation of the garb of the Tosks of Southern

Albania, often cost £50. Those of a chiliarch or a A. D. 182
strategos, with the showy trappings for his horse, generally exceeded £300. These sums were obtained from the loans, and were abstracted from the service of the country. The complaint that Greece was in danger of being ruined by this extravagant expenditure was general, yet everybody seemed to do his utmost to increase the evil by spending as much money as possible in idle parade. Strange stories were current at the time concerning the large sums of money which individuals contrived to amass. The Arabs, who took Sphakteria and slew the henchman of Mavrocordatos, were said to have found about £300 in his belt, in English sovereigns and Venetian sequins. This man had been appointed an officer in the Greek army, though he knew nothing of military service, and had only learned to carry a gun, as a municipal guard, when it was his duty to protect the vineyards of Vrachori from the hostilities of the dogs of the Turkish quarter and the invasions of the foxes of the neighbouring hills.

Makrys was for a time the hero of Mesolonghi, and the captain of the neighbouring district, Zygos. He was a brave man, but a lawless, and, consequently, a bad soldier. His early years were passed as a brigand, and he often recounted how he had lived for many days on the unbaked dough he had prepared from pounded Indian-corn. He first gained wealth by participating in the plunder and massacre of the Jews and Turks of Vrachori. The English loans increased his treasures, which the exaggerations of the people of Mesolonghi swelled to a fabulous amount. Yet, with all his wealth, he was in the habit of drawing pay and rations for five hundred men, when he had only fifty under arms.

Amongst the literary Greeks it has been the fashion to talk and write much concerning the patriotic spirit

and the extraordinary military exploits of the klephts, as if these robbers had been the champions of Greek liberty. But the truth is, that these men were mere brigands, who, both before the Revolution, during the revolutionary war, and under the government of King Otho, have plundered the Greeks more than they were ever plundered by the Turks.

It is not to be supposed that military anarchy was established without some opposition on the part of many patriotic Greeks. But its opponents were civilians, and men generally without either practical experience or local influence. The treatment which the few who ventured to make any efforts to put some restraint on the frauds and peculations of the military chiefs received at the hands of the soldiery, prevented this kind of patriotism from finding imitators. Before the siege of Mesolonghi by the army of Reshid Pasha, a patriotic commissary made an attempt to force the chiefs in the Greek camp to muster their followers, in order that no more rations might be issued than were really required, as he found that a large sum was expended by the Greek government in transporting provisions to the camp, while the chiefs who received these provisions as rations for their soldiers compelled the peasants to carry them back to Mesolonghi. The soldiers of Makrys, instigated by their leader, declared that to muster troops was an arbitrary and despotic act, and pronounced that the reforming commissary was an enemy to constitutional liberty. The troops resolved that the rights of the military should not be violated by this undue assumption of power on the part of the central government, and they carried their resolution into effect by beating the patriotic commissary, and plundering the public magazine. The unfortunate man was confined to his bed for several days, and, if his patriotism was not diminished, we may be

sure that he was more prudent and reserved in exhibiting a virtue which had proved so distasteful to the defenders of his country, and so calamitous to himself. His friends gave him no consolation during his convalescence. They reproached him with not commencing his reforms by cutting off the extra rations which were issued to Katzaro, the captain of the body-guard of Mavrocordatos, who drew fifty rations, and did duty with only seven armed followers; or with General Vlachopulos, who pretended to be the leader of four hundred soldiers, but who was said to be unable to muster more than about eighty. These abuses were universal. Mr Tricoupi informs the world that the veteran Anagnostaras, who fell at Sphakteria, marched against the enemy with only seventeen armed peasants, though he was paid by the Greek government to enrol seven hundred men.[1] Ghoura subsequently drew twelve thousand rations, when he commanded only from three to four thousand men.[2] It is vain for historians and orators to tell us that true patriotism existed in the hearts of men so wanting in common honesty. Men who combine heroism and fraud ought to be praised only in French novels. A. D. 1824.

The waste of money on the navy was even greater than on the army. Ill-equipped and dull-sailing vessels were hired to take their place in the Greek fleet, because their owners belonged to the faction of Konduriottes and Botasses. Fire-ships were purchased and fitted out at an unnecessary expense, because their proprietors wished to dispose of useless vessels. The great number of fire-ships belonging to the island of Hydra, which were consumed during the years 1824 and 1825 without inflicting any loss on the Turkish fleet, attest

[1] Tricoupi, iii. 206. Phrantzes considers Anagnostaras, the archimandrite Dikaois, and Odysseus, as the three principal corrupters of the Greek soldiery. —Vol. ii. p. 343, note.

[2] Gordon, ii. 231, 267. Phrantzes, ii. 403, note.

the maladministration which took place in this department of the naval service. The sailors, who were spectators of the jobs of the primates and captains, became every month more insolent and disorderly. During one cruise they landed at Santorin, and, not content with carrying off large supplies of grapes and figs, they deliberately plundered the cotton plantations, and sent boat-loads of cotton on board their ships, as if they had conquered a lawful prize in an enemy's territory.

Yet all these disorders, abuses, waste, and extravagance seem hardly sufficient to explain the rapidity with which the proceeds of the loans disappeared; and indeed it required the assistance of equal extravagance and similar jobbing in London and New York to empty the Greek treasury. But the thing was done quickly and effectually. Early in the year 1826, the government at Nauplia had spent every farthing it could obtain, and made a vain attempt to raise a loan of £800,000 among the Greeks themselves, which was to be immediately repaid from the proceeds of sales of national lands. This property had been pledged only a short time before by the same government to the English bondholders as a security for the second loan. The Greeks, who were better informed concerning the proceedings and bad faith of their countrymen than strangers, would not advance a single dollar. The dishonesty of the government, the rapacity of the military, and the indiscipline of the navy, were forerunners of the misfortunes of the nation.

BOOK FOURTH.

THE SUCCESSES OF THE TURKS.

CHAPTER I.

NAVAL SUCCESSES—IBRAHIM IN THE MOREA.

"Heaven's cause
Won us not victory where wisdom was not."

DESTRUCTION OF KASOS—DESTRUCTION OF PSARA—EXPEDITION OF MOHAMMED ALI—THE BAIRAM AT MAKRY—NAVAL BATTLES OFF BUDRUN—FAILURE OF THE TURKS AT SAMOS—IBRAHIM DRIVEN BACK FROM CRETE—IBRAHIM LANDS IN GREECE—GREEKS UNPREPARED FOR DEFENCE—DEFEAT OF THE GREEK ARMY—EGYPTIANS TAKE SPHAKTERIA—ESCAPE OF THE BRIG MARS—CAPITULATION OF NAVARIN—SUCCESS OF MIAOULIS AT MODON—KOLOKOTRONES GENERAL IN THE PELOPONNESUS—DEFEAT OF THE GREEKS AND DEATH OF THE ARCHIMANDRITE DIKAIOS AT MANIAKI—DEFEAT OF KOLOKOTRONES AT MAKRYPLAGI — IBRAHIM REPULSED AT LERNA — DEFEAT OF KOLOKOTRONES AT TRIKORPHA—IBRAHIM RAVAGES THE MOREA—RECEIVES ORDERS TO AID IN THE SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI.

THE tide of success which had hitherto borne the Greeks onward to glory and independence began to ebb in 1824. Sultan Mahmud studied the causes of the disasters of his fleets and armies, and laboured with stern industry to remedy their defects. He observed that his own resources were not diminished by his losses, while those of the Greeks were daily declining, and were sure to be utterly exhausted if he could prolong the contest for a few years. He therefore changed his plans. Instead of invading Greece, where

the great mass of the population was determined to defend its liberty with desperate courage, he resolved to destroy all the outlying resources of his enemy before attempting to attack the centre of their power.

He saw that the first step to reconquering Greece was to recover the command of the sea. This, he soon discovered, was easier than was generally supposed. The Greeks were not in a condition to replace the loss of a few ships; the Othoman empire could rebuild a fleet every year. The destruction, therefore, of a single ship and a few sailors, was cheaply purchased by the conflagration of a line-of-battle ship or a frigate; the ruin of a Greek naval island by the sacrifice of an Othoman fleet. The sultan selected Psará and Kasos as the first objects of attack. They were the most exposed naval stations of the Greeks. Their cruisers inflicted the most extensive losses on the Turkish population, and their destruction would be more popular in the Othoman empire than any victory either by land or sea. Psara was the cause of intolerable evils to the Mussulmans in Thrace and Asia Minor; Kasos was an eyesore and a torment to Syria and Egypt. Mahmud and Mohammed Ali concerted their operations to attack the two islands suddenly and simultaneously with two fleets. Their plans were framed with skill and executed with vigour.

The commercial activity of Kasos adds another to the proofs already mentioned that the principles of the sultan's policy were better than the administration of his authority. Christians or Mussulmans, Yezidees and Nestorians, Druses and Maronites, were often prosperous and contented under the sultan's government, but rarely either the one or the other when their affairs were conducted by Othoman officials. Secluded valleys, like the valley of the river of Arta, were carefully cultivated; barren rocks, like Hydra, were peopled by

active seamen. The Vallachs of Kalarites and Syrako, A. D. 1824.
and the Albanians of Hydra, administered their own affairs without being controlled by a pasha or a voevode.

Kasos afforded a striking example of the advantages to be derived from the sultan's protection, when it could be obtained without the evils of the Othoman administration. This island is about twelve miles long, and in its aridity and iron-bound coast it resembles Hydra. It also has no secure port; yet at this time it contained seven thousand inhabitants, who owned fifteen square-rigged vessels and forty smaller craft, all of which had for three years been employed in plundering the islands of Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus, and ravaging the coasts of Karamania, Syria, and Egypt. It was said that the Kasiots usually murdered their captives at sea; and there is reason to fear that the accusation is well founded, for few Turkish prisoners were ever brought to the island. Indeed, during the years 1821 and 1822 the inhabitants had difficulty in procuring bread for themselves, and could not feed their enemies. Mercy, it must be owned, was a virtue as little practised by the Christian as by the Mussulman combatants at the commencement of the Greek Revolution, and few lives were spared from motives of humanity.

Sultan Mahmud expected to paralyse the Greeks with terror, by destroying Kasos and Psara at the same time. But the Egyptian fleet was ready for action before that of the capitan-pasha could leave Constantinople. The force destined by Mohammed Ali to attack Kasos consisted of three frigates and ten sloops of war, under the command of Ismael Gibraltar Pasha. On board this squadron three thousand Albanians were embarked under Hussein Bey Djeritlee, an able officer, who fell afterwards at Mesolonghi.

Kasos was ill fortified, and the inhabitants neglected every precaution which common prudence ought to have suggested for preventing a landing. The Albanians effected their landing on the 19th of June 1824, during the night, not far from the usual landing-place, and they scaled the rocks that commanded the Kasiot batteries without encountering any resistance. The surprise was complete. The islanders dwelt in four villages situated high in the mountain. The troops of Husseïn climbed the rugged ascent in silence, and fell unexpectedly on the villagers. The men capable of bearing arms were slain without mercy. The old women shared their fate, but the young women and children, who were deemed suitable for the slave-market of Alexandria, were carried on board the ships. The Kasiots posted in the batteries near the beach stood firm. But the Albanians, experienced in mountain warfare, occupied the higher grounds, and crept forward, under the cover of rocks and stones, until they could shoot the islanders at their guns. Fourteen square-rigged vessels and about thirty small craft were captured, and five hundred Kasiot seamen were slain. The Albanians lost only thirty killed and wounded. Upwards of two thousand women and children were enslaved. The Albanians were allowed twenty-four hours to plunder, and to collect booty and slaves. The instant that term was expired, Ismael Gibraltar and Husseïn took effective measures to restore order, and gave protection to every Greek who submitted to the sultan's authority.

The news of this sad disaster spread consternation through all Greece. It was a forewarning of the vigour of their new enemy; but the admonition was given in vain.

A greater calamity followed. Khosreff Pasha sailed from the Dardanelles in the month of May, before the

Greeks had any cruisers out to watch his movements. A. D. 1824.
After a feint attack on Skopelos, the Othoman fleet returned to Mytilene, where it was soon joined by transports carrying three thousand janissaries. The capitan-pasha then embarked four thousand Asiatic troops and sailed for Psara. His force consisted of thirty-eight frigates, corvettes, and brigs, and forty transports, with about eight thousand soldiers.

Psara is a high rocky island, smaller than Kasos. Its northern and eastern sides are precipitous and were considered unassailable. The town is situated in the south-western part. Below it, to the west, there is a good roadstead sheltered by a rocky islet, called Antipsara. A small port to the south of the town also affords shelter to a few vessels. The native Psarians amounted to seven thousand souls; but in the year 1824 there were so many refugees from Chios, Kydonies, and Smyrna, residing in the island, that the population exceeded twelve thousand. About a thousand of the Romeliot armatoli, who had plundered Skiathos, were now engaged to defend Psara. Every point where it was supposed that the Turks would attempt to land was fortified. The Psarians unfortunately overrated their own knowledge of military affairs, and greatly underrated the skill and enterprise of their enemy. Two hundred pieces of artillery were mounted in ill-constructed and ill-placed batteries.

Extraordinary success in privateering had rendered the Psarians presumptuous. They spoke of the Turks as cowards, and of Sultan Mahmud as a tyrant, a fool, and a butcher. Foreigners who possessed military knowledge in vain pointed out to them the defects of their batteries; their advice was treated with contempt. Their domineering conduct was insupportable to their countrymen in the Archipelago; they were the tyrants of the Greek islands on the Asiatic coast.

They seemed to emulate the insolence of the ancient Athenians. To complete the similarity, they commenced hostilities with the Samians, who refused to receive a Psarian governor and a Psarian tax-collector. Samos was blockaded, and the Turks of Asia Minor were relieved from the depredations of the Greeks, while the privateers of Psara were pursuing and plundering the privateers of Samos. The Psarians were also accused of neglecting to aid the brave inhabitants of Trikheri in their last struggle with the Turks, and of pillaging the Greeks of Mount Pelion, whom their neglect had compelled to acknowledge the sultan's authority.

Unlike the Athenians of old, the Psarians placed more confidence in their stone batteries than in their wooden walls. As sailors, they knew the inferiority of their ships; their utter ignorance of the art of war made them fancy that their batteries were impregnable. They laid up the greater part of their ships in the roadstead of Antipsara, and employed the crews as gunners on shore. The island was defended by four thousand well-armed men, but these men were without order and without a leader; they were consequently little better than an armed mob.

The safety of Psara depended on the activity of the Greek fleet, and on the skill of the Psarians in using fire-ships. Unfortunately for Greece, the plan of defence adopted by the local government threw away the best chance of success. Upwards of fifteen hundred seamen, who had acquired great naval skill, some degree of discipline, and some knowledge of marine artillery when embarked in small vessels, were rendered of little use by being mixed up with undisciplined armatoli in ill-constructed batteries without artillery officers.

The capitan-pasha consumed six weeks in making

preparations which ought to have been completed in as many days. The Greek government had, therefore, ample time to send a fleet to meet him in the narrow seas, to oppose his embarking troops at Mytilene, and to attack his transports when he attempted to effect a landing at Psara. The avarice of the Hydriot primates and the self-sufficiency of the Psarians prevented Greece from profiting by the delay. A. D. 1824

The attack on Psara was skilfully conducted. Khosreff with ten ships opened a heavy cannonade on the batteries, while he detached a part of his fleet in a direction which rendered it visible from the town, and which induced the Psarians to expect that it intended to debark troops. The attention of the islanders was diverted by this simple stratagem. In the mean time a body of Arnaouts and Asiatics landed at a small open beach and stormed a battery manned by fifty armatoli. They then climbed the mountain, concealing themselves as much as possible from observation until they reached the heights above the town. On gaining that point they unfurled the Turkish flag, and announced their success to the capitan-pasha and the astonished Greeks by a discharge of firearms. At a signal from the Othoman flag-ship a hundred boats, filled with troops, immediately pushed off, and attacked simultaneously all the batteries at the roadstead. After a short engagement the Turks were everywhere victorious. Terror seized both the armatoli and the Psarians. All who saw a chance of escape fled. Those whose retreat was cut off made a desperate resistance, and no Psarian laid down his arms. What yesterday had been insolence and pride to-day was converted into patriotism. But the valour which, under the guidance of discipline and science, might have repulsed the Turks, could only secure an honourable death. Eight thousand persons were slain or reduced to slavery; about

four thousand, chiefly Psarians, succeeded in getting on board vessels in the port and in putting to sea while their enemies were engaged in the sack of the town. The victorious Turks slew every male capable of bearing arms, and the heads of the vanquished were piled into one of those ghastly pyramidal trophies with which Othoman pashas then commemorated their triumphs. One hundred vessels of various sizes fell into the hands of the capitan-pasha. Only twenty vessels escaped.

The Turks of Asia Minor were frantic with joy, and their cruelty might have equalled that of the Greeks at Navarín and Tripolitza, had their avarice not induced them to spare the women and children for the slave-markets of Smyrna and Constantinople. Great were the festivities on the coasts of Thrace and Asia Minor when it was known that the dwellings of the Psarians were desolate, and the sailors who had plundered the true believers were slain.

The Albanians of Hydra and Spetzas had been slow to aid the Greeks of Kasos and Psara. This neglect was not caused by any prejudice of race, but by ignoble feelings of interest. When the terrible catastrophe of Psara was known at Hydra, fear for their own safety inspired the islanders with a degree of activity, which, if displayed a few weeks earlier, might have saved both Kasos and Psara. Both at Hydra and Spetzas, soldiers were hired to defend the islands during the absence of the sailors, who hastened on board their ships, and the whole Greek fleet put to sea.

The capitan-pasha had returned to Mytilene with the booty and slaves captured at Psara before Miaoulis appeared; so that the Greek fleet could only save a few of the fugitives who had concealed themselves in caverns and in secluded ravines. Two transports with some of the captives on board were also captured in

the port. Khosreff celebrated the Courban Baïram at Mytilene. It was his intention to attack Samos, and, had he carried that project immediately into execution, it would have had a good chance of success. The blockade of Samos by the Psarians had thrown the affairs of that island into confusion, and the people were ill prepared for defence. But the month which the capitan-pasha wasted at Mytilene was not left unemployed. The fate of Kasos and Psara awakened all the energies of the Samians, and when the Greek and Turkish fleets appeared in the waters of Samos at the same time, the capitan-pasha did not venture to make an attempt to land troops. After some manœuvring, he bore up for Budrun, where he was to effect his junction with the Egyptian fleet. A. D. 1824.

Mohammed Ali, having resolved to become the sultan's agent for reconquering the Morea, prepared for the enterprise with prudence and vigour. He had been previously engaged in forming a fleet, of which one of the finest ships, called the Asia, had been recently fitted out at Deptford. A fleet of twenty-five sail was now prepared for sea, and a hundred transports were collected in the port of Alexandria to receive troops, provisions, and military stores. Everything necessary for a long voyage was supplied in profusion, and eight thousand men and a thousand horses were embarked. An experienced English seaman who was present, declared that the stores were carefully packed, and that the transports could not have embarked the same number of men and the same amount of material in less time in most English ports, though the operation would of course be performed at home with less noise and fewer men. This service, like all other military and naval business in Egypt at this time, was organised and directed by French and Italian officers who had served in the armies of Napoleon I.

Ibrahim sailed from Alexandria on the 19th July 1824. The difficulty of getting clear of the Egyptian coast during the strong north winds which prevail in summer, forced the transports to beat up in small squadrons; and the whole sea between Egypt, Cyprus, and Crete was crowded with ships. A few Greek cruisers might have made great havoc, and secured valuable prizes—perhaps frustrated the expedition. But, at this time, the supineness and civil wars of the Greeks formed a discouraging contrast with the activity and harmony of the Turks.

On the 2d of August Ibrahim put into the Gulf of Makry, where he found two of his frigates repairing the damage they had sustained in a gale of wind. Many of the transports had already reached this rendezvous. The pasha landed the troops to celebrate the feast of Baïram, and the ceremonies of this great Mohammedan festival were performed in a very imposing manner. In the afternoon the whole army was drawn up on the beach. When the sun went down, bright-coloured lanterns were hoisted at the mast-heads of all the ships, and a salute was fired from every gun in the fleet. The troops on shore followed the example, firing by platoons, companies, and battalions as rapidly as possible, until their fire became at last a continuous discharge of musketry along the whole line, which was prolonged in an incessant roar for a quarter of an hour. The spectacle was wild and strange, in a deserted bay, overlooked by the sculptured tombs of the ancient Telmessus. Ibrahim seemed to be rivalling the folly of Caligula. Suddenly, when the din of artillery and musketry had swelled into a sound like thunder, every noise was hushed, and, as the smoke rolled away, the thin silver crescent of the new moon was visible. A prolonged shout, repeated in melancholy cadence, rose from the army, and was

echoed back from the fleet. A minute after, a hundred camp-fires blazed up as if by enchantment. The line was broken, and the busy hum of the soldiers hastening to receive their rations of pilaf, reminded the spectator that the pageant on which he had gazed with delight was only a transient interlude in a bloody drama. A. D. 1824

The Egyptian fleet, after quitting Makry, proceeded to Budrun. In passing Rhodes it was ordered to bear up and come to anchor. The reason for this strange order was never known. Ibrahim's frigate gave the signal, and let go its anchor in sixty fathoms. Another frigate, in her zeal to obey the signal, let go her anchor in a hundred and fifty fathoms, and of course lost anchor and cable. A day or two after, Ibrahim's frigate drove into deeper water, and her crew being unable to get up the anchor, the pasha ordered her captain to be bastinadoed on the quarterdeck. There can be no doubt that if Miaoulis had possessed the power of applying the cat-o'-nine-tails to the backs of his mutinous sailors, the Greek fleet would have been a more dangerous adversary to the Egyptian than it proved.

Ibrahim joined the capitan-pasha at Budrun on the 1st of September. Their united fleets consisted of a seventy-four, bearing the flag of Khosreff, twenty frigates, twenty-five corvettes, and forty brigs and schooners, with nearly three hundred transports of all sizes and shapes. Great improvements had been made in the Othoman fleet during the preceding winter, but it was far from being in good order. The ships were in general so over-masted, and so heavily rigged, that they could not have carried their spars for an hour during a heavy gale in the Channel. Even in their own seas, the miltems, or summer gales, caused great confusion, and English seamen gave a good picture of the fleet in that condition, by speaking of the Othoman navy as being adrift in the Archipelago.

The Greek fleet, consisting of between seventy and eighty sail, mounting eight hundred and fifty guns, and manned by five thousand able seamen, appeared in the channel between Cos and the island of Kappari on the 5th of September. The Turkish fleet got under weigh and stood out to engage it. The capitan-pasha, though a man of some administrative capacity, was a coward. He fancied every Greek brig was a fire-ship prepared to blow him up, like his predecessor Kara Ali, and, to avoid that fate, he always contrived that some accident should prevent his ship from getting into danger. On this occasion, he carried away his maintop-sail and his topgallant-yard while in stays, and then ran behind Orak to refit.

The Greeks endeavoured to throw their enemies into confusion, hoping that when the ships were crowded together a favourable opportunity would occur for using their fire-ships. This object seemed nearly gained, when four frigates stood boldly on to gain the weather-gage of the Greeks. They were endeavouring to force Miaoulis and the leading ships of the Greek fleet under the guns of the fort of Cos. The naval skill of the Hydriots baffled this manœuvre. An Egyptian corvette at the same time engaged a Greek pretty closely for ten minutes, and did not haul off until her captain was killed. The frigates of Ibrahim and Ismael Gibraltar ran along the Greek line firing with steadiness, but at too great a distance to do much damage, and quite out of range of the smaller guns of their opponents. A fire-ship was directed against Ibrahim's frigate, but it drifted past, and consumed itself harmlessly in the midst of the Othoman fleet. The Egyptians succeeded in forcing another fire-ship under the guns of Cos, where it was abandoned by its crew with such precipitation, that it fell uninjured into the hands of the Turks, who examined its construction with the greatest

interest. These two failures diminished the fear with A. D. 1824
which the Greek fire-ships had been hitherto regarded.

The first battle off Budrun was more favourable to the Turks than to the Greeks. A long day was spent by the hostile fleets in an incessant cannonade, and much powder was wasted beyond the range of any guns. To the Turks this was of use as practice; and if we take into account the number of ships engaged, the inexperience of the crews and officers, and the advantage which the narrow channel afforded to the light ships and naval skill of the Greeks, it appeared surprising that the Turks escaped with so little loss. Among the Constantinopolitan division of the fleet there was often considerable disorder. Several ships ran foul of each other. Most fired their broadsides as the guns were laid before getting under weigh, so that when the Greeks were to windward the shot were seen flying through the air like shells, and when the enemy was to leeward the broadsides lashed the sea into a foam at a hundred yards from the muzzles of the guns, while the Greeks were a mile distant. The day ended in a much greater loss of jib-booms and spars than of men on the part of the Turks. The Greeks lost two fire-ships. It is supposed that not twenty men were killed on both sides. Ibrahim was extremely proud of his exploits. It was his first naval engagement. He had baffled one Greek fire-ship and captured another. Half-a-dozen such battles would give him the command of the sea.

The Greek fleet anchored in the bay of Sandama. On the 10th of September the Turks again stood out of Budrun. Their object was to force a passage to Samos. Several ships endeavoured to get to windward of the Greeks by standing out to Leros, and for a time it seemed probable that Miaoulis, who lay becalmed near the rock Ataki with a dozen brigs, would be cut

off from the rest of the fleet, and be surrounded by the enemy.[1] The breeze, which had hitherto only favoured the Turks, at last reached the Greeks, who knew how to employ it to the best advantage. A confused engagement ensued, in which both parties suffered several disasters. A Greek fire-ship was dismasted, but was burned by its own crew before it was abandoned. Three fire-ships, manned by Albanian islanders, were successively launched against an Egyptian brig, which disquieted the Greeks by the skill and daring of its manœuvres. For a moment the brig seemed to be enveloped in flames, and the report was spread through the Greek fleet that it was destroyed. This was a mistake. The little brig emerged from the flames uninjured, while the three fire-ships, drifting away, burned harmless to the water's edge. The sight of four fire-ships consumed in vain, inspired the Turks with unusual boldness. The Tunisian commodore led his squadron to attack the Greeks with more courage than caution. Two Hydriot fire-ships bore down upon him, and one grappled his frigate, which was blown up. The crew consisted of four hundred men, and she carried two hundred and fifty Arab regular troops. The commodore, the colonel of the troops, and about fifty men, were picked up by Greek boats. All the rest perished at the time, and most of those then saved were subsequently murdered at a massacre of Turkish prisoners in Hydra.[2]

[1] Gordon, ii. 154, by some mistake writes Zatalia instead of Ataki. Tricoupi, who habitually transposes the ancient and modern names of his authorities, misled by the word, supposes that the fleets were off Attaleia, which is at least two hundred miles distant.—Tricoupi, iii. 164. Gordon's information concerning the naval operations in 1824 was in part drawn from the journal of an Englishman in Ibrahim's fleet, which was lent to him by the author on his complaining that he had found great difficulty in obtaining accurate accounts of the movements of the Greek fleet from the Greek islanders.

[2] Sir James Emerson Tennent, in *A Picture of Greece in* 1825, by James Emerson, vol. i. 244, gives an account of this massacre, of which he was an eyewitness. Two hundred innocent and helpless prisoners were butchered like sheep in the public square of Hydra, and no primate or captain made an effort to save their lives. This unparalleled act of atrocity was caused by a mere rumour that a Hydriot vessel had been blown up by a Turkish slave, though it was as probable that it was destroyed by the carelessness of its crew.

A Turkish corvette was also destroyed by a Psarian fire-ship. These losses so terrified the Turks that they hauled off, and both fleets returned to their former anchorages. A. D. 1824

In this second engagement the Egyptians remained almost inactive. Ibrahim and Gibraltar, who were neither of them deficient in courage, were not disposed to expose their ships to secure victory for a capitan-pasha who kept always at a distance from the enemy. Jealousy also prevailed between Ibrahim and Khosreff. The superior rank of the capitan-pasha had enabled him to assume airs of superiority, which had mortified the Egyptian. It was now necessary to secure the cordial co-operation of Ibrahim, since it was evident that it would be impossible for the Othoman fleet alone to effect a debarkation at Samos. After a few days had been passed in negotiations and ceremonious visits, Ibrahim consented to send all his frigates to assist the Turks, and encamped his own troops at Budrun until the capitan-pasha's operations should be finished.

It may be here observed, that if the Greeks had endeavoured to learn the truth concerning their enemies, they might easily have ascertained that they were now about to encounter a much more dangerous enemy than any who had previously attacked them. While the Egyptian regulars remained at Budrun they maintained strict discipline. Neither in the town nor in the neighbouring country were the Christians molested in any way by Ibrahim's soldiers, though two thousand Albanians, whose services had been transferred by the capitan-pasha to the Egyptian expedition, could hardly be prevented from plundering Mussulman and Christian alike. Ibrahim had accepted their services in order to keep them as a check on the Turks in the Cretan fortresses.

The Greek and Turkish fleets met again between

Icaria and Samos. Some severe skirmishing ensued, in which the Greeks compelled the capitan-pasha to abandon the project of landing on Samos. Heavy gales during the latter part of September dispersed both fleets, and the capitan-pasha returned to the Dardanelles early in October, leaving several Othoman frigates and corvettes with the Egyptian fleet.

The Greek fleet was about the same time weakened by the departure of the Psarians, but Miaoulis continued to harass the Egyptians. An engagement took place off Mytilene, in which Nicodemos, the only Psarian who remained with the Greek fleet, burned a Turkish corvette, and two other fire-ships destroyed an Egyptian brig. Again, however, a Hydriot fire-ship was burned uselessly in consequence of the timidity, the indiscipline, or the inexperience of the crew. Ibrahim was so dissatisfied with the conduct of his captains in this engagement, that he expressed his displeasure in strong terms. He ordered the captain of the brig which had been burned to be strangled for abandoning his ship too precipitately, and he ordered another captain to be bastinadoed on his own quarterdeck, for running foul of a frigate in order to escape a Greek fire-ship.

The season was far advanced before the Egyptians returned to Budrun. Most of the Greek ships, without waiting for orders, sailed for Hydra and Spetzas. Miaoulis remained with twenty-five sail, and continued to watch the enemy with indefatigable zeal. Ibrahim lost no time in embarking his army in order to reach Crete, where a considerable number of men and a large amount of military stores had already arrived direct from Alexandria.

On the 13th of November 1824, while the whole Egyptian fleet was approaching Crete, about twenty Greek brigs hove in sight, and bore down on the transports, which were far ahead of the men-of-war. A

single frigate, which was much to windward of the others, was surrounded by five Greek brigs, and might easily have been carried by boarding her from stem and stern, had the Greek islanders ventured to come to close quarters. Their timid manœuvres allowed her to escape, which she did in the most unseamanlike way, by running towards the middle of the transports with all her studding-sails set. The Greeks, who outsailed her, passed successively under her stern, and raked her with their broadsides. A fire-ship was also sent down on her, and her studding-sails caught fire, but they were cut away, and the fire prevented from spreading to the other sails. The aversion of the Hydriots to encountering the Turks sword in hand, prevented their taking advantage of the confusion produced by the conflagration. A bold attack would have insured either the capture or the destruction of the frigate. In the afternoon all the transports had retired behind the men-of-war, and Ibrahim Pasha, his admiral Ismael Gibraltar, with nine more frigates, formed a line to protect them. The Greek force before night was increased to forty sail. Two fire-ships were directed against one of the Egyptian frigates, but she avoided them without much trouble. The night came on dark and squally, and the Egyptians were ordered to bear away between Crete and Kasos. A. D. 1824.

Next morning a number of transports assembled under the lee of Karpathos, where they found Ibrahim's frigate. They then made sail for Rhodes; but as that island affords no anchorage during the winter, the bay of Marmorice, on the opposite coast, was fixed on for the general rendezvous. In the engagement of the 13th the Greeks captured only seven or eight transports, but they dispersed the convoy so completely that many vessels bore away for Alexandria. A few, however, by holding on their course, gained Suda in

safety. At Marmorice Ibrahim degraded eleven captains for neglecting to keep to windward of the transports, according to orders.

The Greeks allowed themselves to be deluded into a belief that Ibrahim would not dare to renew his voyage to Crete during the winter. They returned to Hydra with their prizes, and the persevering pasha sailed from Marmorice on the 5th of December, and before the end of the year 1824 he reached Suda, where he observed to one of the European officers of his suite, "As we have now outmanœuvred the Greeks at sea, we shall certainly find little difficulty in beating them on shore."

A calm survey of the campaign of 1824 at last convinced the Greeks that their navy was inadequate to obtain a decisive victory over the Turks. The expedition against Samos had indeed been frustrated, and seven Turkish ships had been destroyed. But to obtain these successes, twenty-two Greek fire-ships had been consumed. On the other hand, the Turks had to boast of the destruction of Kasos and Psara, and of having captured nearly a hundred and fifty Greek vessels, and slain about four thousand Greek seamen. The Greeks could only hope for ultimate success by changing their system of warfare. Captain Hastings urged them to purchase steam-ships, arm them with heavy guns, and make use of shells and hot shot. Had his proposition been promptly accepted, and its execution intrusted to his zeal and activity, Greece might still have been saved by her own exertions.

When Ibrahim Pasha quitted Alexandria in July 1824, he made a vow not to put his foot on shore until he landed in Greece. On the 24th of February 1825, he debarked at Modon with four thousand regular infantry and five hundred cavalry. His fleet immediately returned to Crete, and soon came back, bringing the second division of his army, consisting of six thou-

sand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and a strong corps of field artillery. On the 21st of March the Egyptian army encamped before Navarin. A. D. 1825

After the unfortunate battle of Petta, the Greeks banished every semblance of military discipline from their armies in the field. At the beginning of 1825 no words were strong enough to express their contempt for the regular troops of the Egyptian pasha. They said that the Arabs would run away at the sight of the armatoli, who had always been victorious over the bravest Mussulmans in the sultan's empire. This self-confidence had prevented them taking any precautions against an enemy they despised. For more than six months the Greek government had known that Navarin would be the first fortress attacked, yet no measures had been adopted for putting it in a state of defence. Yet a small sum laid out at Navarin might have rendered it capable of a prolonged resistance, and nothing was so likely to disgust Mohammed Ali with the war in Greece as a long and expensive siege. Such an enterprise would also have afforded the Greek navy frequent opportunities of cutting off the supplies of the besieging army.

At this crisis of the Revolution, the president of Greece, George Konduriottes, showed himself utterly unworthy of the high trust he had received from the nation, and Kolettes proved himself ignorant and incapable. The Greek government had for several months been paying thirty thousand men, who were called soldiers; when it now became necessary to march against the invaders of the Morea, ten thousand men could not be collected. The sycophants who surrounded Konduriottes persuaded him to take the command of the army. The president departed from Nauplia with great pomp, mounted on a richly caparisoned horse, which he hung over as if he had been a

sack of hay, supported by two grooms. His ungraceful exhibition of horsemanship was followed by a long train composed of secretaries, guards, grooms, and pipe-bearers. "As he passed under the lofty arched gateway of Nauplia on the 28th of March, the cannon from the ramparts and from the fortress above pealed out their loud salutations, and were answered by the batteries on the shore and the shipping in the harbour."[1] Mavrocordatos, whose presidency had been characterised by a similar attempt to play the generalissimo, accompanied Konduriottes as a cabinet counsellor. An old Hydriot sea-captain, named Skourti, who had displayed some skill as a sailor, and some courage on the quarterdeck, was named lieutenant-general of the Greek army. So little idea had the president of the real point where danger was to be apprehended, that he proposed besieging Patras. When he reached Tripolitza, he found that a storm had burst on another quarter. The natural imbecility of Konduriottes got the better of his pride, and he could not conceal his incapacity to form any resolution. He felt that he ought to hasten in person to Navarin, and he set out; but instead of taking the direct road, he turned off to Kalamata, lingered there a moment, and then regained the seat of government without ever seeing an enemy.

The simplicity with which Ibrahim Pasha took the field formed a striking contrast to the pomp affected by the Hydriot president and the Greek captains. The aspect of the two armies was equally dissimilar. The gold of the English loan glittered profusely in the embroidered jackets and richly ornamented arms of the Greek soldiers, while in the Egyptian army the dress and the arms were plain and simple. The Greek officers were equipped for show; the Egyptian for

[1] *Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution*, by Dr S. G. Home, who was an eyewitness, page 226.

service. The Greek camp seemed to contain an acci- A. D. 1825
dental crowd of armed men. The Egyptian camp exhibited strict discipline and perfect order. One half of the regular troops was engaged in constant exercise or unceasing labour, while the other half reposed. The artillery and material for a siege were brought up from Modon to the camp with order and celerity.

The first attempt of the Greeks to interrupt Ibrahim's operations was made by the veteran chieftain Karatassos, and it was defeated with severe loss. The armatoli found to their surprise that the Arab boys, who had been disciplined by Ibrahim, were more dangerous enemies than the bravest Arnaouts the Greeks had ever encountered. Karatassos stated that this was the case to the executive government. His opinion was disregarded. It was said that he praised the discipline of the Egyptians to excuse his defeat and he had conducted his attack carelessly because he was envious of the honour conferred on Captain Skourti, and wished to be named commander-in-chief.

Ibrahim formed the sieges of Navarin and of the old castle on the ruins of Pylos at the same time. Navarin contained a garrison of sixteen hundred men; Pylos of eight hundred. The flower of the Greek army advanced to relieve these two places, with the intention of falling on the rear of the besiegers, who were divided into two separate bodies, and compelled to keep up communications with Modon. The Greeks were commanded by Skourti. Their force exceeded seven thousand, and was composed of Romeliot armatoli, choice Moreot troops, and a band of Suliots. Ibrahim, who divined the plan of his enemy, did not allow him to choose his point of attack. On the 19th of April he attacked the Greek position at the head of three thousand regular infantry, four hundred cavalry, and four guns. The Suliots under Djavella and Constantine

Botzares, the armatoli under Karaïskaki, and the Albanians of Argolis under Skourti, received the Egyptians in positions which they had themselves selected for their encampment. They were supported by a body of irregular cavalry, consisting in great part of Servians and Bulgarians. The leader, Hadji Christos, made a gallant show. He was surrounded by a retinue in imitation of a pasha of three tails, with kettledrums, timbileks, and a topuz-bearer.

After a short halt, which Ibrahim employed in reconnoitring the Greek position, the first regiment of Arabs was ordered to charge the Suliots and armatoli with the bayonet. The regulars marched steadily up to the Greek intrenchments without wavering, though many fell. As they approached the enemy their officers cheered them on in double-quick time to the assault; but the best troops of Greece shrank from their encounter, and after a feeble resistance fled in every direction. A few round shot and a charge of cavalry dispersed the rest of the army and completed the victory. The vanquished Greeks fled in wild confusion, leaving six hundred men dead on the field. The Egyptians, particularly the cavalry, collected a rich booty; and silver-mounted arms, which had been thrown away by the Turks after their defeats at Valtetzi and Dervenaki, were now in like manner abandoned by the fugitive Greeks to insure their escape. This affair at Krommydi—for it cannot be called a battle—convinced every military friend of Greece that the best Greek irregular troops were unfit to encounter the most ordinary disciplined battalions in a pitched battle in the plain.

A few days after this victory, Hussein Djeritlee, the conqueror of Kasos, arrived at the Egyptian camp with reinforcements. Hussein had the eye of a soldier, and he immediately pointed out to Ibrahim that his

engineer, Colonel Romey, had not selected the best position for the batteries he had constructed against Navarin. Without having read Thucydides, Hussein also observed that the island of Sphakteria was the key of Navarin. It commanded the port, and its possession would render the defence of both Navarin and Pylos impracticable. He proposed to change the whole plan of attack. Ibrahim followed his advice, and intrusted him with the direction of the operations against Sphakteria. A. D. 1825.

When Ibrahim opened his trenches before Navarin, that fortress was ill supplied with provisions and ammunition. The neglect both of the government and the officers commanding in the place had been so great, that when the Egyptians cut off the water of the aqueduct half the cisterns were empty. Even Sphakteria had been left without defence. At last an effort was made to prevent the island from being occupied by the enemy. Eight brigs were at anchor in the harbour. Tsamados, who commanded one, the Mars, landed three eighteen-pounders, which he had embarked at Nauplia, and constructed a battery on the point of Sphakteria, in order to prevent the Egyptian ships from entering the port.[1] Though it was evident that this battery could oppose no obstacle to a landing of the Egyptians in other parts of the island, it was only with great difficulty that several foreign officers in Navarin could persuade the Greeks to take more effectual measures for the defence of Sphakteria. Mavrocordatos, who possessed more moral courage as well as more activity and ability than Konduriottes, fortunately visited Navarin to concert measures for its relief when the president fled back from Messenia. Mavrocordatos, Sakturi, the governor, and Tsamados, succeeded by their co-operation in getting four more

[1] These guns were intended by the Greek government for the siege of Patras,

guns in battery on the island, to protect the only spot where it was supposed that the Egyptians would attempt to land.[1]

On the 8th of May 1825, the Egyptian fleet, carrying three thousand troops, stood out from Modon, and on reaching Sphakteria opened a cannonade on the Greek batteries. Under cover of the smoke, a regiment of Arab regulars and a body of Moreot Turks, who had volunteered to lead the attack, effected a landing. Husseïn Bey led them on to charge the Greeks who defended the guns, but Romeliots, Moreot klephts, and artillerymen, all fled at his approach, and abandoned the batteries without offering any resistance. The Arab bayonet swept all before it. Tsamados, who had landed with a few of his crew to assume the direction of a carronade belonging to his ship, stood his ground, and died bravely at his post. He was a member of the Hydriot aristocracy, and had shown himself more inclined to the introduction of discipline in the Greek fleet, and to avail himself of scientific improvements, than the rest of his countrymen. He commanded his own brig, and on several occasions he had displayed a degree of naval skill and personal courage which had obtained for him warm praise from Miaoulis. His amiable character, his youth, his enlightened views, and his true patriotism, rendered his death a national calamity at this moment.

The veteran Hetairist, Anagnostaras, who had forfeited a good name won at the siege of Tripolitza by his subsequent avarice and rapacity, was recognised by a Moreot Mussulman, and slain to avenge the blood of the slaughtered Turks. The victor carried the rich arms of Anagnostaras during the whole campaign of 1825.

[1] Collegno—*Diario dell' Asedio di Navarino*, p. 54—says there were twelve guns in battery on the 7th of May, but other authorities equally well informed agree in giving the number as only seven.

Count Santa Rosa, a Piedmontese exile, fell also in this affair. No man's death was more sincerely regretted, and none fell to whom death was so welcome. The Greek deputies at London, at the suggestion of some of the liberal counsellors by whom they were surrounded, invited Santa Rosa to serve in Greece. On his arrival at Nauplia he found the members of the Greek government turned from him with pride. Everything he said was treated with contempt, and he himself with neglect. Yet, as he understood much better than Mavrocordatos, Kolettes, and Rhodios the extent of the danger to which Greece was then exposed, he deemed it dishonourable to abandon her cause at such a crisis. His services not having been accepted, he was serving at Sphakteria as a volunteer. After receiving a severe wound, he refused to surrender, and was killed by an Arab soldier, who found a small sum of money and a seal in his possession. The sight of this seal enabled a friend in the Egyptian camp to learn his fate.[1] A. D. 1825

Three hundred and fifty Greeks were killed, and two hundred taken prisoners, at Sphakteria. The victorious Arabs gained considerable booty, for the majority of the slain wore silver-mounted arms, and their belts were lined with English gold. Sovereigns soon circulated in the bazaar of Modon, and the war became extremely popular in the Egyptian army.

There were five brigs remaining in the harbour of Navarin when Hussein Bey stormed the island. They

[1] This seal was given to the author by a Philhellene who was taken prisoner a few days later. Collegno accompanied Santa Rosa to Greece. Like every foreigner, his feelings were wounded by the treatment his friend received, and he reproaches the Greeks with their ingratitude. Tricoupi gave a strong example of this national vice. His funeral oration in memory of those who fell at Sphakteria, amidst much hyperbole concerning Greek courage, omitted all mention of Santa Rosa's name, though he and many of his hearers knew well that Santa Rosa was one of the very small number who fell honourably fighting. The neglect was the more disgraceful, because the orator had known Santa Rosa personally, and knew his virtues.—Collegno, *Diario*, p. 118.

immediately stood out to sea, one only lingering at the entrance of the port. This was the Mars, which sent its boats to the shore to bring off the captain. Mavrocordatos and Sakturi escaped in these boats, and brought on board the news that Tsamados had refused to abandon his post, and had fallen doing his duty. Sakturi did not think of returning to his at Navarin. He left the governorship to anybody who wanted it, and remained on board the Mars, though there was both time and opportunity to return to his post. The Mars was obliged to pass through the Egyptian fleet, and receive the broadsides of several frigates, yet she lost only two men killed and seven wounded, so trifling was the danger in the severest naval engagement during this war, unless when fire-ships were successful. Lord Byron, who witnessed the firing of two Turkish men-of-war endeavouring to prevent the Greeks from taking possession of a stranded brig, quaintly observed, "These Turks, with so many guns, would prove dangerous enemies if they should happen to fire without taking aim."

Three days after the conquest of Sphakteria, Pylos capitulated. The garrison, consisting of seven hundred and eighty-six men, laid down its arms, and the Greeks were allowed to depart uninjured.

Navarin was feebly defended. The Romeliot troops in the place were eager to capitulate. George Mavromichales, who afterwards assassinated Capodistrias, displayed great determination, and urged his countrymen to defend the place to the last. He harangued the soldiers, and opposed all terms of capitulation. It was evident, however, that the fortress could not hold out many days. All hope of relief, both by land and sea, was cut off. Ibrahim offered honourable terms of capitulation. He was desirous of winning the Greeks to submit to his government, and for this purpose he

was eager to exhibit proofs of his humanity. He had established his military superiority; he wished now to place his civil and financial administration in contrast with that of the Greek government. He expected by his treatment of the garrison of Navarin to facilitate his future conquests. The Greeks laid down their arms and surrendered all their property. The field-officers alone were allowed to retain their swords. The whole garrison was transported to Kalamata in neutral vessels, under the escort of a French and Austrian man-of-war. Ibrahim, who thought that the British government showed undue favour to the Greek cause, refused to allow any mention of an English escort to be inserted in the capitulation. A. D. 1825.

On the 21st of May the Greeks marched out of Navarin to embark in the transports prepared for their reception. A crowd of Moreot Turks from Modon and Coron, excited by a few survivors of the massacre of Navarin, assembled to waylay the Greeks as they were embarking. But Ibrahim was a man of a firmer character and more enlarged political views than the primates and chieftains of Greece. He had foreseen the attempt, and he adopted effectual measures for preventing any stain on his good faith. A body of regular cavalry prevented the Turks from approaching the ground; and the unarmed Greeks marched securely to the ships between lines of Arab infantry with fixed bayonets. George Mavromichales and Iatrakos of Mistra were detained as hostages for the release of the two pashas who were detained by the Greeks after the capitulation of Nauplia. George Mavromichales, like Ali of Argos, had refused to sign the capitulation. The exchange was soon effected.

We have often had occasion to observe that the Greek fleet arrived too late to avert disaster. It mattered little whether the Greek government was destitute of

money or rolling in wealth, whether the scene of danger was near or far off, the same supineness and selfishness always characterised the proceedings of the Albanian islanders. At Chios, at Kasos, at Psara, at Sphakteria, and at Mesolonghi, the neglect of the Greek government and the sordid spirit of the Hydriots were equally conspicuous. A small squadron put to sea when the news of Ibrahim's landing in the Morea reached Hydra, but it was so weak that Miaoulis could not prevent Hussein Bey from conquering Sphakteria, and gaining possession of the magnificent harbour of Navarin, where the Egyptian fleet was anchored in safety, even before the fortress capitulated. But when Miaoulis reached Modon, he observed that a part of the Egyptian fleet was still at that place, and by instant action he hoped to inflict such a loss on Ibrahim as might delay the fall of Navarin, and perhaps save the place.

On the 12th of May he sent six fire-ships simultaneously into the midst of the Egyptian squadron as it lay at anchor. The attack was well planned and promptly and boldly executed. The conflagration was terrible, and accident alone prevented it from being more extensive. A fine double-banked frigate, the Asia, which, it has been mentioned, was fitted out at Deptford, three sloops of war, and seven transports, were destroyed; but on shore the fire was prevented from destroying anything but a magazine of provisions.[1] The explosion of the powder-magazines of the ships of war was heard both in Ibrahim's camp and in Navarin; and for some time a report prevailed that all the transports and military stores had been destroyed. Successive couriers soon brought exact accounts of the real loss sustained. Ibrahim was satisfied that it was not sufficient to interrupt his operations for a single

[1] The Egyptians reported their loss as one frigate, two brigs, and eight transports.—Collegno, *Diario*, 75.

hour. The Greeks considered this affair of Modon as a brilliant achievement; with equal justice, the Egyptians regarded it as an insignificant disaster.[1] A. D. 1825

Even the fall of Navarin did not entirely awaken the Greeks from the lethargy and corruption into which they had sunk. The government did everything in its power to conceal the disgrace sustained by the Greek army, and the people were willing to be deceived. The news of the capitulation spread slowly, and was in some degree neutralised by fabricated reports of imaginary successes.[2]

Ibrahim advanced towards the centre of the Peloponnesus before the Moreots made any national effort to repel his invasion. Selfishness and party animosity were more powerful than patriotism. But the timid Konduriottes observed with alarm many signs of his own declining influence, and of the reviving power of the Peloponnesian primates and chieftains. The departure of the Romeliot troops, who had quitted the Morea when they heard of the invasion of Western Greece by Kiutayhé, left the executive body without a strong military force on which it could depend. The nullity of Konduriottes, the administrative ignorance of Kolettes, the licentiousness of the archimandrite Dikaios, and the shallow presumption of Rhodios, added to the fiscal corruption of the civil officials and the rapacity and dissensions of the military, enabled the municipal authorities to recover some portion of their former power. They raised a cry for the deliverance of Kolokotrones and the other primates and chiefs imprisoned at Hydra; and the people soon sup-

[1] Two eyewitnesses give accurate information concerning the siege of Navarin—Collegno in his *Diario*, and Dr Millingen in *Memoirs of the Affairs of Greece*.

[2] Some time elapsed before the Greek newspapers alluded to the fall of Navarin, and the private journals of many Philhellenes which the author has examined record reports of victories which, though generally circulated, were entirely without foundation.

ported their demand in a voice which the government did not dare to disobey.

It was necessary to raise a new army in order to replace the armatoli who had abandoned the defence of the Peloponnesus. Kolokotrones was the only man whom the Moreots were inclined to follow to the field. There was therefore no alternative but to reinstate him in his former position as general-in-chief of the Peloponnesian forces, to release all who were in prison for their share in the second civil war, and to conciliate the two primates, Zaimes and Londos, who had returned from exile, and declared their wish to serve their country and forget past dissensions. Konduriottes's government proclaimed a general amnesty: thanksgivings were offered up in the churches of Nauplia for the happy change which had taken place in the hearts of the rulers of Greece; harangues in praise of forgiveness and concord were now uttered by men who had hitherto been the most violent instigators of discord and vengeance. By these timely and politic concessions, Konduriottes, Kolettes, and Rhodios purchased immunity for the violence and peculation which had characterised their public administration. Kolokotrones resumed his former power and his old habits. The severe lesson he had learned, and the calamities he had brought on his country, had not moderated the egoism of his ambition. His administrative and military views were as confined as ever, and his avarice remained insatiable.

The archimandrite Dikaios (Pappa Phlesas) was still Minister of the Interior. He was the most unprincipled man of his party, and had been, with Kolettes, the most violent persecutor of the Moreot chiefs. The universal indignation now expressed at his conduct convinced him that it would be dangerous for him to remain at Nauplia, where his licentious life and gross peculation

pointed him out as the first object of popular vengeance, and the scapegoat for the sins of his colleagues. The archimandrite was destitute of private virtue and political honesty, but he was a man of activity and courage. Perhaps, too, at this decisive moment a sense of shame urged him to cancel his previous misdeeds by an act of patriotism. He asked permission of the government to march against the Egyptians, boasting that he would vanquish Ibrahim or perish in the combat. The permission was readily granted, though little confidence was felt in his military conduct. He quitted Nauplia with great parade, attended by a body of veteran soldiers; and when he reached the village of Maniaki, in the hills to the east of Gargaliano, his force exceeded three thousand men. A. D. 1825.

The bold priest possessed no military quality but courage. He posted his troops in an ill-selected position, and awaited the attack of Ibrahim, who advanced in person to carry the position at the head of six thousand men on the 1st of June. Many of the archimandrite's troops, seeing the superior force of the Egyptians, deserted during the night, and only about fifteen hundred men remained. The pasha's regulars were led on to storm the Greek intrenchments in gallant style, and a short and desperate struggle ensued. The Greeks were forced from their position before they fled. The affair was the best contested during the war, for a thousand Greeks perished by the Arab bayonets, and four hundred Arabs lay dead on the field.[1] In spite of the defeat and the severe loss sustained by the Greeks, they gained both honour and courage by the battle of Maniaki. The national spirit, which had been greatly depressed by the flight of the Romeliots, and by the ease with which the Egyptians had taken Sphakteria, again revived at seeing so great

[1] Phrantzes, ii. 347-351.

a loss inflicted on Ibrahim's army by a body of men consisting in great part of armed Moreot peasants. Very little had been expected from Dikaios as a military leader. He had selected his position ill, and he had not known how to construct proper intrenchments, but he had given his followers an example of brilliant courage, and died nobly at his post. The result induced the Greeks to expect a great victory when the Moreot soldiery took the field under their tried champion Kolokotrones.

The indefatigable Ibrahim lost no time in profiting by his victory. After allowing his troops to plunder the town of Arcadia, he marched to occupy Nisi and Kalamata, which the Maniats, who called themselves Spartans, abandoned at his approach. On the 10th of June he made a short incursion into Maina, but, seeing the mountaineers prepared to dispute his progress, he advanced no farther than Kytries.

Kolokotrones was now in the field. It is said that he wished to destroy the walls and citadel of Tripolitza, but that the executive body refused to sanction this measure, fearing lest it should tend more towards rendering Kolokotrones master of the Morea than towards defending the country against Ibrahim Pasha.[1] Kolokotrones made his dispositions for defending the passes between Messenia and Arcadia by establishing magazines at Leondari, and fixing his headquarters at Makryplagi, where his troops constructed their tambouria or stone intrenchments to cover the defile. His force was considerable, but he was incompetent to employ it to advantage. A thousand Greeks were posted at Poliani, a village which commands a difficult passage over the northern slopes of Mount Taygetus. But in spite of the advantage of the ground, Kolokotrones made his dispositions so ill that he allowed the

[1] Phrantzes, ii. 356.

Egyptians to turn his flank. The general-in-chief of the Peloponnesus always appeared to be more ignorant of Greek topography than the Egyptian pasha. The troops at Poliani were left without provisions. Their officers, who usually derive a considerable profit from the extra rations they draw, hastened to Makryplagi to upbraid Kolokotrones with his neglect, which they ascribed to his avarice. Ibrahim profited by this misconduct. Advancing along an almost impracticable mountain track, he gained possession of Poliani, and on the 16th June compelled the Greeks to abandon the pass of Makryplagi. The superiority of Ibrahim to Kolokotrones as a general, and the inferiority of the irregular Greek troops to the regular Arab battalions, were never exhibited in a more decisive manner. The Greeks had selected their own positions in an almost impracticable country, with which they were well acquainted. They were routed by a foreign force which could make no use of its cavalry and artillery, and on ground where even regular infantry was compelled to act almost as irregulars. Kolokotrones was perhaps a better military chief than Dikaios, but he wanted his bravery and patriotism. A.D. 1825.

The Greek army fled to Karitena, leaving the road to Tripolitza without defence; and Ibrahim on reaching that city found it abandoned by its inhabitants and garrison. He found in it large stores of provisions, which the officers commanding in the place had neglected to destroy. Without losing a moment, the pasha pushed on to the plain of Argos with about five thousand men, hoping to gain possession of Nauplia either by surprise or treachery.

On the 24th of June he reached the mills of Lerna. Nauplia was thrown into a state of the wildest confusion by his unexpected appearance. A report of treason spread among the citizens, and several persons

were accused of holding treasonable correspondence with the enemy. Among these was George Orphanides, a friend of Kolettes, who was tried and acquitted.[1] The patriotism of the people awakened with a sense of the magnitude of the danger to which their country was exposed. Captain Makryannes and Constantine Mavromichales, who afterwards assassinated Capodistrias, with about three hundred and fifty soldiers, hastened over to defend the mills of Lerna as soon as the Egyptians were descried on the hills. Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes and several Philhellenes followed as volunteers. A large quantity of grain for the supply of Nauplia was stored at Lerna. Its loss would have endangered the safety of that fortress.

The mills of Lerna were surrounded by a stone wall, flanked by the celebrated marsh and a deep pond. The garrison was supported by two gunboats anchored within musket-shot of the shore. There was, however, a small break in the wall, which the Greeks, with their usual carelessness, had neglected to repair. Through this space a company of Arabs attempted to force an entrance into the enclosure. They crowded over the breach, and attempted to form in the court; but before they could get into order, they were charged by Makryannes and a band of Greeks and Philhellenes sword in hand, who cut down thirteen on the spot, and drove the rest back over the breach. The Greeks then occupied the wall of the enclosure, and opened loop-holes. Ibrahim, finding that the garrison was prepared for a desperate defence, and was constantly receiving reinforcements, did not venture to renew the attack. He marched on to Argos to pass the night; and after remaining there a day or two, and reconnoitring the environs of Nauplia, he returned with his little army

[1] Tricoupi, iii. 221.

to Tripolitza on the 29th of June, without the Greeks venturing to attack him on the way. A. D. 1825.

As Ibrahim carried with him no provisions on this expedition, it has been inferred that he trusted to some secret intelligence, and expected to gain an entrance into Nauplia by treachery. It seems, however, that he counted rather on surprise and intimidation. The arrival of Captain Hamilton in the Cambrian, accompanied by another frigate and a sloop of war, appears to have hastened his departure. Hamilton landed at Nauplia with a number of his officers, and held a private conference with the members of the Greek government. He encouraged them, and every person with whom he spoke, to put the place in the best state of defence; and he took up such a position with his ships as induced both the Greeks and the Egyptians to infer that he proposed aiding in the defence of the fortress. A report was spread and generally believed at the time, that, in case of an attack, the Greeks were authorised to hoist the English flag, and place their country under British protection.[1] Ibrahim, who was informed of all that passed, retired immediately; but he drew off his troops without precipitation, and took such precautions to secure his flanks that Kolokotrones, with the whole forces of the Morea, did not attempt to make the Kakeskala of Mount Parthenius a scene of triumph to the Greeks like the defile of Dervenaki. The army of Ibrahim received considerable reinforcements shortly after his return to Tripolitza.

Early in July Kolokotrones had assembled upwards of ten thousand men on the hills overlooking the great Arcadian plain.[2] He then occupied Trikorphas, and began to make preparations for blockading Tripolitza.

[1] Tricoupi, iii. 224.
[2] Phrantzes, ii. 367; and Tricoupi, iii. 226.

Ibrahim, on the 6th of July, anticipated his design by making a simultaneous attack on all his positions. The pasha directed the attack on Trikorphas in person. Kolokotrones made a feeble resistance, but the Greeks lost two hundred men, most of whom were killed in their flight after they had abandoned their intrenchments.[1] The Greek army was completely defeated, but the soldiers felt that they had been worsted in consequence of the bad dispositions of their chiefs, and they did not disperse. They rallied in the mountain passes that lead into the great Arcadian plain, and showed by their activity and perseverance that they only required an abler chief to keep Ibrahim blockaded in Tripolitza. After his defeat, Kolokotrones invited the Maniats to hasten to his assistance, declaring that he had still four thousand men under arms at Karitena and three thousand at Vervena.[2]

Kolokotrones, with his usual military incapacity, neglected to fortify the mills of Piana, Zarakova, and Davia, from which the garrison of Tripolitza obtained the necessary supplies of flour. The siege of Tripolitza by the Greeks ought to have taught him the importance of keeping possession of these mills; but even experience could not teach him foresight where his own personal interests were not directly and immediately concerned. The Egyptian pasha profited by his enemy's neglect. He seized and fortified these mills, and secured their communications with Tripolitza by a line of posts which he established in the mountains. His foraging parties then covered the plains of Arcadia from Mantinea to Megalopolis, and collected large quantities of grain.

On the 8th of August Ibrahim drove Hypsilantes and

[1] Phrantzes, ii. 370.

[2] Phrantzes, ii. 372, who gives Kolokotrones's letter. It proves that Phrantzes assigns an erroneous date to the affair of Trikorphas.

Mavromichales from the camp at Vervena, established A.D. 1825
a strong garrison at Leondari, and returned to Modon on the 13th. Soon after his departure from Arcadia, the Greeks surprised the post at Trikorpha, and recovered possession of the mills of Piana and Zarakova; but when Ibrahim returned to Tripolitza, before the end of the month they were again driven from their conquests.

Ibrahim then led his troops through Tzakonia to Monemvasia, laying waste the country in every direction. The Greeks nowhere opposed him with vigour. Their spirit seemed broken, and they contented themselves with following on his flanks and rear to waylay foragers and recapture small portions of his plunder.[1] He was now intent on destroying the resources of the population. The Egyptians carried on a war of extermination; the Greeks replied by a war of brigandage. The ultimate result of such a system of warfare was inevitable. The invaders were fed by supplies from abroad; the country could not long furnish the means of subsistence to its defenders. Famine would soon consume those who escaped the sword.

During the expedition to Tzakonia, Colonel Fabvier, who had been appointed to command a body of Greek regulars, made an attempt to surprise Tripolitza. It failed, in consequence of the irregulars under Andreas Londos not making the concerted diversion.

On returning to Tripolitza, and finding everything in good order, Ibrahim marched to Arcadia (Cyparissia), carrying off all the provisions from the districts through which he passed, and laying waste the towns of Philiatra and Gargaliano. The campaign

[1] Tricoupi says, "τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἔβλαπταν κλεπτοπολεμοῦντες" (iii. 233); and no great injury could they inflict by such contemptible warfare.

of 1825 terminated when he reached Modon on the 30th of September.

Mohammed Ali was induced by the sultan to send large reinforcements to Ibrahim about this time, and to order him to co-operate with Reshid Pasha in the siege of Mesolonghi.

CHAPTER II.

THE SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI.

"Pride points the path that leads to liberty.
Back to the struggle, baffled in the strife,
War, war is still their cry—war even to the knife."

OPERATIONS OF RESHID PASHA—STATE OF MESOLONGHI—NUMBER OF ITS GARRISON AND OF ITS BESIEGERS—ARRIVAL OF THE OTHOMAN FLEET—ARRIVAL OF THE GREEK FLEET—DIFFICULT POSITION OF RESHID—HE CONSTRUCTS A MOUND—TREASON OF ODYSSEUS—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CONTINENTAL GREECE—RESHID WITHDRAWS TO A FORTIFIED CAMP—OPERATIONS OF THE TURKISH AND GREEK FLEETS—IBRAHIM ARRIVES BEFORE MESOLONGHI—LETHARGY OF THE GREEKS AND OF THEIR GOVERNMENT—THE TURKS TAKE VASILADI AND ANATOLIKON—OFFERS OF CAPITULATION REJECTED—TURKISH ATTACK ON KLISSOVA REPULSED—DEFEAT OF THE GREEK FLEET UNDER MIAOULIS—FINAL SORTIE—FALL OF MESOLONGHI.

THE second siege of Mesolonghi is the most glorious military operation of the Greek Revolution: it is also one of the most characteristic of the moral and political condition of the nation, for it exhibits the invincible energy of the people in strong contrast with the inefficiency of the military chiefs, and the inertness and ignorance of the members of the government. Never was greater courage and constancy displayed by the population of a besieged town; rarely has less science been shown by combatants, at a time when military science formed the chief element of success in warfare.

Greek patriotism seemed to have concentrated itself within the walls of Mesolonghi. Elsewhere hostilities languished. While the citizens of a small town, the

fishermen of a shallow lagoon, and the peasants of a desolated district, sustained the vigorous attack of a determined enemy, the fleets and armies wasted their time and their strength in trifling and desultory operations. An undisciplined population performed the duty of a trained garrison. Here, therefore, the valour of the individual demands a record in history. Yet, though private deeds of heroism were of daily occurrence, the historian shrinks from selecting the acts of heroism, and the names of the warriors that deserve pre-eminence. All within the town seemed to be inspired by the warmest love for political liberty and national independence, and all proved that they were ready to guarantee the sincerity of their feeling with the sacrifice of their lives.

Reshid Pasha of Joannina, who, it has been already said, was generally called Kiutayhé by the Greeks and Albanians, had distinguished himself at the battle of Petta. When he assumed the command of the Othoman forces destined to invade Western Greece in the year 1825, much was expected by the sultan from his known firmness and ability. On the 6th of April he seized the pass of Makrynoros, which the Greek chieftains neglected to defend, and where the Greek government had only stationed a few guards under the command of Nothi Botzares, a veteran Suliot. No three hundred Greeks were now found to make an effort for the defence of these Western Thermopylæ.[1] Reshid advanced through Acarnania without encountering any opposition. The inhabitants fled before him. Many, with their flocks and herds, found shelter under the English flag in Calamo, where the poor were maintained by rations from the British government; others retired to Mesolonghi, and formed part of the garrison which defended that place. On the 27th of April,

[1] Tricoupi, iii. 281.

Reshid established his headquarters in the plain, and two days afterwards he opened his first parallel against Mesolonghi, at a distance of about six hundred yards from the walls.[1] His force then consisted of only six thousand men and three guns. A. D. 1825.

Mesolonghi was in a good state of defence. An earthen rampart of two thousand three hundred yards in length extended from the waters of the lagoon across the promontory on which the town was built. This rampart was partly faced with masonry, flanked by two bastions near the centre, strengthened towards its eastern extremity by a lunette and a tenaille, and protected where it joined the lagoon to the west by a battery on an islet called Marmaro, distant about two hundred yards from the angle of the place. In front of the rampart a muddy ditch, not easy to pass, separated the fortress from the adjoining plain. Forty-eight guns and four mortars were mounted in battery. The garrison consisted of four thousand soldiers and armed peasants, and one thousand citizens and boatmen. The place was well supplied with provisions and ammunition at the commencement of the siege, but there were upwards of twelve thousand persons to feed within the walls.

The army of Reshid never exceeded ten thousand troops, and a considerable part of it never entered the plain of Mesolonghi, for he was obliged to employ about two thousand men in guarding a line of stations from Makrynoros and Karavanserai, on the Ambracian Gulf, to Kakiscala on the Gulf of Patras, in order to keep open his communications with Arta, Previsa, Lepanto, and Patras. But in addition to his troops, Reshid was accompanied by three thousand pioneers, muleteers, and camp-followers.[2] It was not until the

[1] Gordon, ii. 233. Tricoupi, iii. 287.
[2] Compare Gordon, ii. 233, and Tricoupi, iii. 281. Reshid's commissariat

commencement of June that the besiegers obtained a supply of artillery from Patras, which increased their force to eight guns and four mortars. For several weeks, therefore, Reshid trusted more to the spade than to his fire, and during this time he pushed forward his approaches with indefatigable industry. Early in June he had advanced to within thirty yards of the bastion Franklin, which covered the western side of the walls. But his ammunition was then so much reduced that he was compelled to fire stones from his mortars instead of shells.[1]

While the Turks were working at their approaches, the Greeks constructed traverses and erected new batteries.

Little progress had been made in the active operations of the siege, when a Greek squadron of seven sail arrived off Mesolonghi on the 10th of June. It encouraged the besieged by announcing that Miaoulis would soon make his appearance with a large fleet, and by landing considerable supplies of provisions and ammunition. The garrison, confident of success, began to make frequent and vigorous sorties. In one of these, Routsos, a native of Mesolonghi, was taken prisoner by the Turks, and was terrified into revealing to the enemy the position of the subterraneous aqueducts which supplied the town with water. The supply was immediately cut off, but fortunately the besieged found fresh water in abundance by digging new wells, so that very little inconvenience was felt, even during the

distributed twenty-five thousand rations at the commencement of this campaign. A deduction of one-third must be made in estimating the number of men then actually under arms. A few weeks of actual service usually reduced a Turkish army to one-half of the number of the rations issued. It must also be observed that Reshid detached two thousand men under his kehaya to dislodge the Greeks from Salona.

[1] Gordon, Fabvier, and Tricoupi, all indicate the position and nature of the defensive works of Mesolonghi with sufficient accuracy. The bastion Franklin to the west, and the bastion Botzares to the east, formed the centre. Between them was the battery Koraes. Against these the principal attack of Reshid was directed.

greatest heat of summer, from the destruction of the aqueducts. The besiegers, who had pushed on their operations with great activity, at last made an attempt to carry the islet of Marmoras by assault, which was repulsed, and entailed on them a severe loss. A. D. 1825

On the 10th of July the Greeks met with their first great disappointment. The defenders of Mesolonghi were looking forward to the arrival of the fleet, which they fondly expected would compel Reshid to raise the siege. Several vessels were descried in the offing. Their joy reached the highest pitch, and they overwhelmed the advanced-guard of the besiegers, which consisted of Albanians, with insulting boasts. Soon, however, fresh ships hove in sight, and it was evident that the fleet was too numerous and the ships too large to be Greek. The red flag became visible both to Turks and Greeks, and gradually the broad white streaks on the hulls and the numerous ports showed that the fleet was that of the capitan-pasha. The besieged were greatly depressed, but their constancy was unshaken.

Reshid now assumed the offensive with great vigour. He introduced a number of flat-bottomed boats into the lagoon, gained possession of the islands of Aghiosostis and Prokopanistos, which the Mesolonghiots had neglected to fortify, and completely invested the place both by sea and land. On the 28th of July he made a determined attack on the bastion Botzares, and on the 2d of August he renewed the assault by a still more furious attempt to storm the bastion Franklin, in which a breach had been opened by his artillery; but both these attacks were gallantly repulsed.

Before the assault on the bastion Franklin, Reshid offered terms of capitulation to the garrison of Mesolonghi. His offers were rejected, and, to revenge his defeat, he ordered Routsos and some other prisoners to be be-

headed before the walls. Reshid had expected to carry Mesolonghi by assault before the arrival of the Greek fleet, of whose approach he had been informed by the cruisers of the capitan-pasha before it was known to the besieged.

The Greek fleet, consisting of forty sail of the best ships which Greece still possessed, under the command of Miaoulis, Saktures, Kolandrutzos, and Apostales, was descried from Mesolonghi on the 3d of August. Next day the Othoman fleet manœuvred to obtain an advantageous position. The Hydriot squadron in the end succeeded in getting the weather-gage of the advanced ships of the Turks; but the Greeks, in spite of this success, could not break the line of the main division, which consisted of twenty-two sail. Three fire-ships were launched in succession against the capitan-pasha's flag-ship; but the Turks no longer entertained a senseless fear of these engines of attack, and they manœuvred so well that the blazing vessels drifted harmless to leeward without forcing them to break their line of battle. Khosreff was, nevertheless, so intimidated by the determined manner in which the Greeks directed their attacks against his flag, that he avoided a second engagement. He claimed the victory in this indecisive engagement merely because he had escaped defeat, and he made his orders to effect a prompt junction with the Egyptian fleet a pretext for sailing immediately for Alexandria. His cowardice left the flotilla of Reshid in the lagoon without support, and as the Greeks had captured one of the transports laden with powder and shells for the army before Mesolonghi, the besiegers were again inadequately supplied with ammunition for their mortars.

Miaoulis aided the Mesolonghiots in driving the Turks from all the posts they occupied in the lagoons, and in destroying their flotilla. Five of the flat-

bottomed boats were captured by the Greeks, who recovered the command of the whole lagoon.[1] The Greek fleet then sailed in pursuit of the capitan-pasha, leaving eight ships to keep open the communications between the besieged and the Ionian Islands, and to prevent any supplies being sent by sea to the besieging army. A. D. 1825.

Reshid was now placed in a very difficult position. He received his supplies of provisions with irregularity, and his stores of ammunition were so scanty that he could not keep up a continuous fire from his guns, and was compelled to abandon the hope of carrying the place by an artillery attack. He had no money to pay his troops, and was unable to prevent the Albanians from returning home, though he allowed all who remained double rations.[2] The besieged daily expected to hear that a Greek army had occupied the passes in the rear of Reshid, and felt confident that he would be forced to raise the siege at the approach of winter. If he persisted in maintaining his position, it was thought that his army must perish of want and disease. The armatoli of Romelia, who had quitted the Peloponnesus after their defeats at Navarin, were said to be marching into the mountains behind Lepanto, whose rugged surface is familiar to classic readers from the description which Thucydides has left us of the destruction of the Athenian army under Demosthenes.

Reshid weighed his own resources and estimated the activity of the Greek irregulars with sagacity. His guns could not render him much service, but he still believed that the spade would enable him to gain possession of Mesolonghi before winter. He set his

[1] Tricoupi, iii. 303, says seven.

[2] Tricoupi, iii. 305. Yet only twelve thousand rations were now issued daily in Reshid's camp.

army to raise a mound by heaping up earth, and this primitive work was carried forward to the walls of the place in defiance of every effort which the besieged made to interrupt the new mode of attack. So strange a revival of the siege operations of the ancients excited the ridicule of the Greeks. They called the work "the dyke of union," in allusion to the mound which Alexander the Great constructed at the siege of Tyre. The mound was commenced at about a hundred and sixty yards from the salient angle of the bastion Franklin, and it made an obtuse angle as it approached the place. It was from five to eight yards broad at the base, and so high as to overlook the ramparts of the besieged. By indefatigable perseverance, and after much severe fighting in the trenches, the Turks carried the mound to the ditch, filled up the ditch, and stormed the bastion Franklin. Even then they could not effect an entry into the place, for the Greeks had cut off this bastion from all communication with the rest of the defences, and they soon erected batteries which completely commanded it. The besieged then became the assailants, and after a desperate struggle they drove the Turks from their recent conquest. On the 31st of August all the ground they had lost was regained, and they prepared for a great effort against the mound. Several sorties were made in order to obtain exact knowledge of the enemy's trenches. At last, on the 21st of September, a great sortie was made by the whole garrison. The Turkish camp was attacked in several places with such fury that Reshid was unable to conjecture against what point the principal force was directed. He was in danger of seeing his batteries stormed and his guns spiked. The fighting was severe, but the Greeks carried the works that protected the head of the mound, and maintained possession of their conquest until they had levelled that

part of it which threatened their defences. While every spade in Mesolonghi was destroying the mound, bodies of troops cleared the trenches, and prevented the enemy from interrupting the work. As the Greeks had foreseen, rain soon rendered it impossible for Reshid to repair the damage his works had sustained. A. D. 1825.

The garrison of Mesolonghi received considerable reinforcements after the capitan-pasha's departure. At the end of September it still amounted to four thousand five hundred men, and was much more efficient than at the commencement of the siege. Hitherto the fire of the Turkish artillery had been so desultory and so ill directed, that not more than one hundred persons had been killed and wounded in the place. This trifling loss during a six months' siege induced the Greeks to form a very erroneous idea of the efficiency of siege-artillery, while the facility with which provisions and ammunition had been introduced inspired them with a blind confidence in their naval superiority. The only severe loss they had suffered had been in their sorties, and in these they had hitherto been almost invariably the victors.

The operations of the Greek army to the north of the Isthmus of Corinth were feeble, desultory, and unsuccessful. The leaders could not be prevailed upon to act in concert. Party intrigues, personal jealousies, and sordid avidity, prevented them from combining at a time when it was evident that a vigorous effort would have delivered Mesolonghi. Northern Greece was then occupied by a numerous body of armatoli. Even in the year 1830, after the losses sustained at Mesolonghi and Athens, Capodistrias assembled six thousand veterans belonging to this army.[1] By a

[1] Parliamentary Papers: Communications with Prince Leopold relating to the sovereignty of Greece; Count Capodistrias to Prince Leopold, 25th March (6th April) 1830, p. 42.

bold advance, the communications of Reshid with his resources in Arta, Previsa, and Joannina might have been cut off. The treason of Odysseus has been urged as an apology for the inactivity of the Romeliots at the opening of the campaign of 1825, but it ought to have excited them to increase their exertions, as it rendered their services more necessary. But very little patriotism was displayed this year by the armatoli, either before or after the treason of Odysseus.

Odysseus was a man of considerable ability, but he was too selfish to become a dangerous enemy to a national cause; and when he became openly a traitor, his career was soon terminated. He would not trust himself in the power of the Turks, and the Turks knew him so well that they would afford him no assistance unless he openly joined their army. In trying to overreach everybody he overreached himself, and was easily overpowered. On the 19th of April 1825 he surrendered himself a prisoner to Goura at Livanates.

The treason of Odysseus is the most celebrated instance of treachery among the Greeks during their Revolution. But it derives its importance more from the previous fame of the traitor, and from his tragic end in the Acropolis of Athens, than from the singularity and baseness of his conduct. Many chiefs of armatoli, who, like Odysseus, had been bred up in the service and imbibed the moral corruption of Ali of Joannina, felt like Albanian mercenaries rather than Greek patriots. Several committed acts of treason—Gogos, Varnakiottes, Rhangos, Zongas, Valtinas, and the Moreot captain Nenekos, were all as guilty as, some of them even more guilty than, Odysseus. Gogos was a far greater criminal, and his treachery on the field of Petta inflicted a deeper wound on Greece.

Odysseus never attached any importance to political independence and national liberty. His ambition was

to ape the tyranny of Ali in a small sphere. His conduct from the commencement of the Revolution testified that he had no confidence in its ultimate success. He viewed it as a temporary revolt, which he might render conducive to his own interests. He attempted at times to make use of popular feelings which he did not understand, and whose strength he was of course unable to estimate. His opinions prepared him to act the traitor, but he was so far from being a man of a daring character, that a prudent government might have retained him in its service, and found in him a useful instrument, for he possessed more administrative capacity than most of the Romeliot chiefs. Kolettes's influence caused Konduriottes's government to leave him without employment, and to stop the pay and rations of the soldiers who followed his banner. When he saw chiefs of inferior rank, who had previously served under his orders, named captains of districts, and observed that every soldier who quitted his band received a reward, he became alarmed for his personal safety. He believed that Kolettes designed to treat him as he had treated Noutzas and Palaskas, and fear made him a traitor. He opened a negotiation with the Turks, with the hope of securing to himself a capitanlik in Eastern Greece like those held by Gogos and Varnakiottes in Western Greece, but the Turks would not trust him unless he joined them openly. When forced to choose his side, it was fear of Kolettes which decided his conduct. A small body of Mussulman Albanians was then sent to his aid, but his movements had been long watched, and he was quickly surrounded by superior numbers. Goura, his former lieutenant, commanded his assailants, and to him he surrendered himself a prisoner. Goura did not deliver him up to the vengeance of the members of the government. He was kept prisoner in the Acropolis until the disastrous A. D. 1825.

measures of Konduriottes and Kolettes roused general indignation. Goura then feared that Odysseus might escape, and regain his former power. Interest prevailed over gratitude, and Odysseus was murdered on the night of 16th July. After the murder, his body was thrown from the Frank tower in the southern wing of the Propylæa, in order to give credit to the assertion that he perished by a fall in attempting to escape. Thus one of the most astute of the Greek chiefs fell a victim to the policy of a rude Albanian soldier whom he had raised to a high rank.[1] And the son of that Andrutsos, who first raised the standard of revolt against the Othomans in 1769, is the traitor at whose name the finger of scorn is pointed by every Greek. Odysseus perished like his patron and model, Ali of Joannina, a sacrifice to his own selfishness; and he will be execrated as long as the memory of the Greek Revolution shall endure.

On the 17th April 1825, Abbas Pasha crossed the Sperchius with two thousand men and two guns. The surrender of Odysseus, who had been expected to make a vigorous diversion, prevented this small force from advancing southward until the kehaya of Reshid marched into the heart of Etolia with about the same number of chosen Albanians. The kehaya routed the Greek captain Saphaka, who attempted to oppose his progress, occupied Vetrinitza, defeated the Greeks a second time at Pentornea, and entered Salona in triumph, where he was joined by Abbas Pasha at the end of May.

About the same time, the Romeliot troops, who had

[1] Tricoupi mentions that Goura tortured his benefactor to learn where his treasures were concealed, iii. 240. Odysseus fortified a cavern near Velitza (Tithorea), of which Trelawney, who married his sister, kept possession until he was severely wounded by Fenton and Whitcombe, who were suborned by agents of the Greek government to assassinate him. Tricoupi erroneously supposes this cavern to be the Corycian Cave, and quotes Pausanias, who proves the contrary.

abandoned the Morea after their defeat by Ibrahim, A. D. 1825
formed a camp at Dystomo, round which large bodies of Greek troops rallied. This force arrested the advance of the Turks, who were inferior in number. But anarchy prevailed among the Greek leaders, and prevented them from availing themselves of their superiority. Abbas Pasha was allowed to establish himself at Salona, and no attempt was made to raise the siege of Mesolonghi. The military operations of the Greeks in continental Greece during the whole campaign of 1825 were conducted in the same desultory and feeble manner as in the Peloponnesus.

Goura was commissioned by the Greek government to enrol six thousand veteran soldiers. He assumed the chief command at Dystomo, where the troops under his orders drew daily eleven thousand six hundred rations, though their number hardly ever exceeded three thousand men.[1] A trade in provisions was openly carried on both by the officers and the soldiers. They sold their surplus rations to the families of the peasants, whom patriotism had induced to abandon their villages rather than submit to the Turks.

While the advanced-guard of the army of Eastern Greece skirmished with the Turks at Salona, a body of troops under Karaïskaki and Djavellas marched into Western Greece. Karaïskaki threw himself into the rear of Reshid's position. Djavellas forced his way into Mesolonghi on the 19th of August.[2] The summer was consumed in trifling skirmishes, in struggles for booty, or in contests of military rivalry. The country was laid waste, and truth compels the historian to record that the cultivators of the soil suffered quite as much from the rapacity of their countrymen

[1] Compare Tricoupi, iii. 249, with Captain Humphrey's Journal, p. 312.
[2] Gordon, ii. 240, mentions that Djavellas entered Mesolonghi with only twenty-five men, yet he drew rations for one thousand.

who came to defend them, as from the Turks who came to plunder them.[1] The Turks occupied Salona until the 6th of November, when it is the immemorial custom of the Albanian and Turkish militia to return home, for the habits of the timariot system are still preserved.[2]

The victory which the garrison of Mesolonghi obtained over the besiegers on the 21st of September, convinced Reshid that he must think rather of defending his own position from the sorties of the Greeks than of prosecuting the siege. He had almost matured his plan when a vigorous sortie of the besieged, on the 13th of October, inflicted a severe loss on his army, and accelerated his retreat from the trenches. He immediately fortified the position which he had selected for his camp at the foot of Mount Zygos, and on the 17th of October withdrew the remains of his army to this new station. His cavalry enabled him to keep open his communications with Krioneri, where his supplies of provisions were usually landed. He now anxiously awaited the return of the capitan-pasha, and the reinforcements which Ibrahim Pasha was about to bring. But with all his vigour and ability, had the Greeks employed the superiority which they possessed at this time with skill, courage, and unanimity, his position might have been rendered untenable long before assistance could arrive. He had not now more than three thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry fit for service. The garrison of Mesolonghi was more numerous, and a considerable body of Greek troops under Karaïskaki and other captains had occupied

[1] The armatoli were truly *ἀρνῶν ἠδ' ἐρίφων ἐπιδήμιοι ἁρπακτῆρες*.

[2] The troops of the Othomans then took the field on St George's Day (5th May), after the horses of the spahis had eaten their green barley, and broke up their camp to return home on St Demetrius's Day (7th November), in order to superintend the cultivation of their property by their Christian tenants. It deserves notice that the spring is much later in Macedonia and Greece than in corresponding latitudes in Italy and Spain.

strong positions in his rear. Nothing but the irrecon- A. D. 1825.
cilable jealousies of the Greek chieftains and their military ignorance, which prevented their executing any combined operations, saved Reshid's army from destruction. The pasha remained for a month in this dangerous situation, liable to be attacked by an overwhelming force at any moment, but determined to persist in his enterprise—to take Mesolonghi, or perish before its walls.

The Greeks amused themselves with destroying the works of the besiegers; but their confidence in their ultimate success was so great that they executed even this triumphant labour with extreme carelessness. They also committed a blamable oversight in not transporting to Mesolonghi a supply of grain which had been collected in magazines on the western coast of the Morea, consisting of the produce of the land-tax from the rich plains of Elis and Achaia. The sea was open, and these supplies might have been removed without difficulty.

The Othoman fleet returned to Patras on the 18th of November, saved Reshid's army from starvation, and furnished him some reinforcements and ample supplies of ammunition. The Greek fleet, which ought to have engaged the Othoman in the waters of Patras, did not reach the entrance of the gulf until the capitan-pasha had terminated the delicate operation of landing stores at Krioneri.

A series of naval engagements took place, in which the Turks succeeded in baffling the attempts of the Greeks to cut off their straggling ships and to capture their transports. Both parties boasted of their success. The capitan-pasha kept open his communications with Patras and Krioneri. Miaoulis threw supplies into Mesolonghi, and kept open its communications with the Ionian Islands. The real victory remained with

the Turks; their fleet kept its station at Patras. The Greek fleet quitted the waters of Mesolonghi on the 4th December 1825, and returned to Hydra.

A new and more formidable enemy now appeared before Mesolonghi. The campaign in the Peloponnesus had proved that neither the courage of the armatoli nor the stratagems of the klephts were a match for the discipline and tactics of the Egyptians; and Ibrahim now advanced to attack the brave garrison of Mesolonghi, confident of success. He encountered no opposition in his march from Navarin to Patras. The pass of Kleidi was left unguarded, and he captured large magazines of grain which the collectors of the tenths had stored at Agoulinitza, Pyrgos, and Gastouni, and which ought either to have been previously transported to Mesolonghi or now destroyed. These supplies proved of great use to Ibrahim's army during the siege.[1]

On the 29th of November a council of war was held by the Othoman pashas at Lepanto, to settle the plan of their operations. The capitan-pasha, Ibrahim, Reshid, and Yussuf were present, and they engaged mutually to support one another as much as lay in their power, to act always with unanimity, and to prosecute the siege with vigour. They kept their promises better than the Greek chiefs usually kept theirs. Yussuf at this meeting pointed out the measures which had enabled him to defend Patras for nearly five years. He soon after quitted Greece, being raised to the rank of pasha of Magnesia as a reward for his prudence and valour.[2]

The month of December was employed by Ibrahim in forming magazines at Krioneri, and bringing up ammunition to his camp before Mesolonghi. Heavy

[1] Phrantzes, ii. 358, note.
[2] Gordon, ii. 244. Tricoupi, iii. 325.

rains rendered it impossible to work at the trenches. A. D. 1825.
The whole plain, from the walls of the town to the banks of the Fidari, was under water, or formed a wide expanse of mud and marsh. The Egyptian soldiers laboured indefatigably, and the order which prevailed in their camp astonished Reshid, who was said to have felt some irritation when he found that Ibrahim never asked him for any assistance or advice, but carried on his own operations with unceasing activity and perfect independence. A horrid act of cruelty, perpetrated by Reshid, was ascribed to an explosion of his suppressed rage. A priest, two women, and three boys, were impaled by his order before the walls of Mesolonghi, because they had conveyed intelligence to their relatives in the besieged town.[1]

The Greek government became at last sensible that it had too long neglected the defence of Mesolonghi. It had often announced that Reshid was about to raise the siege, and, believing its own sayings, it had neglected to do anything to force him to retreat. It now learned with surprise that Reshid's camp was well supplied with provisions; that the garrison of Mesolonghi was in want of ammunition; and that the Greek troops sent to cut off the supplies of the Turks were in danger of starvation. An attempt was made to raise money by selling national lands; but as these lands were already mortgaged to the English bondholders, and the sale of national lands was expressly prohibited by national assemblies, the bad faith of the members of the government was too apparent for Greeks to part with their money on such security. The conduct of the members of the executive body

[1] Gordon, ii. 253, and Tricoupi, iii. 331, both say that several children suffered. They were boys above twelve years of age. Children under that age would have been compelled to embrace Mohammedanism. Reshid, who was religious as well as inhuman, would have seized the opportunity of making forced converts had the law of Mohammed allowed it.

was in this case both impolitic and dishonest. It proved that they were dishonourable enough to violate every national engagement, and so incapable that they made a display of their bad faith without any profit. A sum sufficient to enable a Greek fleet to put to sea was soon raised by private subscription. Individual patriotism has generally displayed itself on every emergency in Greece, when not thwarted by the action of the government. Many Greeks who were not wealthy subscribed largely; ministers of state, shipowners, chieftains, and officials, who had enriched themselves with the produce of the English loans, or by farming taxes, endeavoured to conceal their wealth by their illiberality.[1]

The sums collected equipped twenty Hydriot and four Psarian ships. On the 21st of January 1826 these vessels, reinforced by three Spetziot brigs which had remained in the waters of Mesolonghi, forced the Turkish cruisers to retire under the guns of Patras, and enabled the besieged to communicate directly with the Ionian Islands, and lay in stores of provisions and ammunition for two months. The crews of the Greek ships were only paid in advance for a single month. The spirit of patriotism was not then powerful in the Albanian islands; and the Hydriot sailors, in order to escape being obliged to give their services to their country for a single hour gratuitously, sailed from

[1] Dr Howe, the well-known philanthropist of Boston, Mass., who was present, records the manner in which the people expressed their feelings when Professor Gennadios addressed an appeal to their patriotism at a public meeting in the square of Nauplia (*Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution*, p. 329):—"Gennadios threw down his purse. 'There is my all; I give it to my country as freely as I would to my child. I am ready to serve in any occupation for a year, and pay the whole salary I receive into the public treasury.' The crowd was moved to tears. Many voices were raised offering money. The public excitement forced the chiefs and rich men to come forward, though unwillingly, and a scornful laugh was raised as their names were called out." Compare the vauntings of Tricoupi, iii. 332. The letter of the President soliciting subscriptions is given in the Hydriot newspaper, Ὁ Φίλος τοῦ Νόμου, December 14 (28), 1825.

Mesolonghi, after remaining in its waters only a fort- A. D. 1826.
night.[1]

Three weeks after the departure of the Greek ships, Ibrahim commenced active operations. On the 25th of February he opened his fire from batteries mounting forty pieces of artillery, and on the 27th and 28th two unsuccessful attempts were made to storm the walls by the united forces of the Turks and Egyptians. The gallant resistance of the besieged convinced Ibrahim that it would cost too much to take the place by storm, unless he could attack it by sea as well as by land. He soon launched a flotilla of thirty-two flat-bottomed boats, and obtained the complete command of the lagoon. Vasiladi, the fort which commanded the entrance of the lagoon which leads from the sea directly to the town, was taken by storm on the 9th of March 1826, and Anatolikon capitulated on the 13th.

The Greeks now perceived that the progress of the besiegers, although not very rapid, would soon render the place untenable. The supplies of provisions received in January, added to what was then in the public magazines, ought to have furnished abundant rations to the whole population until the end of April; but these stores were wasted by the rapacity of the soldiery.[2] Ibrahim and Reshid contrived to be well informed of everything that was said or done within the walls of Mesolonghi, and they learned with pleasure that watchfulness and patience would soon force the Greeks to surrender the place or to die of hunger.

The moment appeared favourable for offering a cap-

[1] It is curious to read the accounts which were given of the deplorable condition of the Egyptians and Turks before Mesolonghi at this time in the Greek newspapers, and in the MS. journals of Philhellenes. The Arab regulars of Ibrahim's army in particular were supposed to be then enduring a series of calamities which would exterminate them in a few weeks.

[2] Gordon, ii. 267, states this in his usual candid manner:—"We have one reproach to address to the Suliot chiefs, and particularly to Nothi Botzares; it is, that, whenever things wore a favourable aspect, they did not bridle their incurable improvidence and love of peculation."

itulation, but the besieged rejected all negotiation with disdain. Sir Frederic Adam, the Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands, convinced that the loss of Vasiladi and Anatolikon rendered the fall of Mesolonghi inevitable, endeavoured to prevent farther bloodshed. He visited Krioneri in a British ship-of-war, and offered his mediation. But the two pashas were now sure of their prey, and as the Greeks refused to treat of a capitulation directly with their enemies, Sir Frederic was obliged to retire without effecting anything—an example of the folly of too much zeal in other people's business. As soon as he was gone, Ibrahim and Reshid sent a written summons to the garrison, pretending that the Greeks had expressed a wish to negotiate terms of capitulation. They offered to allow all the Greek troops to quit Mesolonghi on laying down their arms, and they engaged to permit the inhabitants who desired to leave the town to depart with the garrison; but they declared also, that all those who wished to remain should be allowed to retain possession of their property, and should enjoy ample protection for themselves and their families. To this summons the Greeks replied, that they had never expressed any wish to capitulate; that they were determined to defend Mesolonghi to the last drop of their blood; that if the pashas wanted their arms they might come to take them; and that they remitted the issue of the combat to the will of God.[1]

The only post in the lagoon of which the Greeks held possession, was the small islet of Klissova, about a mile from Mesolonghi, to the south-east. This post was defended by a hundred and fifty men under Kitzo Djavellas. The Greeks were advantageously posted,

[1] The summons was dated the 2d of April 1826. Both it and the reply of the Greeks are curious and characteristic documents. They are printed by Tricoupi, iii. 401, 402.

and protected by a low rampart of earth from the artillery of their assailants; while a low chapel, with an arched roof of stone, served them as a magazine and citadel. On the 6th of April the Albanians of Reshid attacked Klissova. The shallow water prevented even the flat-bottomed boats of the Turks from approaching close to the shore, so that the attacking party was compelled to jump into the sea and wade forward through the deep mud. While the gunboats fired showers of grape, the Greeks kept themselves hid under their earthen rampart; but as soon as the Albanians were in the water, they rose on their knees, and, resting their long guns on the parapet, poured such a well-directed volley on their enemies, that the foremost fell dead or wounded, and the rest recoiled in fear. Several officers were standing up in the boats directing the landing: they offered a conspicuous mark to the best shots among the Greeks, and most of them fell mortally wounded. The Albanians retired in confusion. A.D. 1826.

Ibrahim then ordered his regular troops to renew the attack. The result was similar; but the Egyptians were led back a second time to the attack, and again retreated under the deadly fire of the Greeks. Seeing the advantage which the defenders of Klissova derived from their position, Ibrahim ought to have abandoned the assault and kept the islet closely blockaded until he could bring up a few mortars. But he was eager to prove that his regulars were superior to the Albanians of Reshid. He therefore ordered Husseïn, the conqueror of Kasos, Sphakteria, and Vasiladi, to make a third attack. Husseïn led his men bravely on, but as he stood up in his boat giving orders concerning the formation of the storming parties, he was struck by a musket-ball, and fell down mortally wounded. The steady fire of the Greeks prevented the regulars from completing their formation. The men turned

and scrambled back into the boats in complete disorder. After this repulse the pashas drew off their troops. Five hundred men were killed or wounded in this vain attempt to storm a sandbank defended by a hundred and fifty good marksmen.

The victory of Klissova was the last success of the Greeks during the siege of Mesolonghi. Provisions began to fail, and rations ceased to be distributed to any but the men who performed service. Yet as relief by sea was hourly expected, the garrison remained firm. At last the Greek fleet made its appearance, but the hope it inspired was soon disappointed. The Turks were in possession of the lagoon, and Miaoulis arrived without any flat-bottomed boats to enable him to penetrate to Mesolonghi. A feeble attempt was made by the Hydriots on the 13th of April to penetrate into the lagoon by the channel of Petala; but it was easily repulsed, and never renewed. The naval skill of the Greeks no longer insured them the command of the sea, nor did they now possess the heroic enterprise which they had often displayed during the first years of the Revolution. They had refused to adopt any scientific improvements either in their ships or their artillery; the Turks had done both. Miaoulis entered the waters of Mesolonghi with the same ships as those with which he had combated Kara Ali; the Turkish fleet, which stood out of the Gulf of Lepanto to engage him, was very different in construction and armament from the fleets that sailed from Constantinople in 1821 and 1822. The Turks kept their line of battle, and held their position to windward of the Greeks, exchanging broadsides, and frustrating all the manœuvres of their enemy to bring on a general action or cut off straggling ships.

On the 15th of April Miaoulis found that the Turks had completely closed the communication with the

lagoon, and held their position between him and the shore. He attempted to throw their line into confusion by sending down a fire-ship on two frigates; but the exposed vessels tacked, kept the weather-gage, and allowed the blazing brulot to drift away to leeward and consume itself ineffectually. Fire-ships had ceased to be a terror to the Turks. The Greek fleet at this time consisted of only thirty sail, and the Turkish of sixty; but at the commencement of the war this disparity would have hardly enabled the Othomans to keep the sea. It now insured them a decided victory. Miaoulis, baffled and cut off from all communication with the besieged, was driven out to sea, and the besieged town was abandoned to its fate. The glory of the Greek navy was tarnished by the tameness with which it declined to close with the enemy, and retreated without an effort to emulate the heroism of the defenders of Mesolonghi. A. D. 1826.

When the Greek fleet departed, the magazines of Mesolonghi did not contain rations for more than two days. The garrison had now to choose whether it would perish by starvation, capitulate, or cut its way through the besiegers. It resolved to face every danger rather than surrender. The inhabitants who were unable to bear arms, the women, and the children, showed as much patience and courage in this dreadful situation as the veteran soldiers hardened in Turkish warfare. A spirit of Greek heroism, rare in the Greek Revolution—rare even in the history of mankind—pervaded every breast. After deliberate consultation in a numerous assembly, it was resolved to force a passage for the whole population through the besiegers. Many would perish, some might escape; but those who fell and those who escaped would be alike free. The plan adopted for evacuating the town was well devised; but its success was marred by several accidents.

About sunset on the 22d of April 1826 a discharge of musketry was heard by the besieged on the ridge of Zygos. This was a concerted signal to inform the chiefs in Mesolonghi that a body of fifteen hundred armatoli, detached from the camp of Karaïskaki at Platanos, was ready to attack the rear of the Turks and aid the sortie of the besieged. The garrison was mustered in three divisions. Bridges were thrown across the ditch, and breaches were opened in the walls. There were still nine thousand persons in the town, of whom only three thousand were capable of bearing arms. Nearly two thousand men, women, and children were so feeble from age, disease, or starvation, that they were unable to join the sortie. Some of the relations of these helpless individuals voluntarily remained to share their fate. The non-combatants, who were to join the sortie, were drawn up in several bodies, according to the quarters in which they resided, or the chiefs under whose escort they were to march. The Mesolonghiots formed themselves into a separate band. They were less attenuated by fatigue than the rest; but being collected from every quarter of the town, their band was less orderly than the emigrants from the country, who had been disciplined by privation, and accustomed to live and act together during the siege. Most of the women who took part in the sortie dressed themselves in the fustinello, like the Albanians and armatoli, and carried arms like soldiers; most of the children had also loaded pistols in their belts, which many had already learned how to use.

At nine o'clock the bridges were placed in the ditch without noise, and a thousand soldiers crossed and ranged themselves along the covered way. Unfortunately a deserter had informed Ibrahim of the projected sortie, and both he and Reshid, though they

gave little credit to the information that the whole population would attempt to escape, adopted every precaution to repulse any sortie of the garrison. When the non-combatants began to cross the bridges the noise revealed to the Turks the positions in which crowds were assembled, and on these points they opened a terrific fire. Crowds rushed forward to escape the shot. The shrieks of the wounded and the splash of those who were forced from the bridges were unnoticed; and in spite of the enemy's fire the greater part of the inhabitants crossed the ditch in tolerable order. The Mesolonghiots still lingered behind, retarded by their interests and their feelings. It was no easy sacrifice to quit their property and their relations. For a considerable time the garrison waited patiently for them under a heavy fire. At last the first body of the Mesolonghiots crossed the ditch, and then the troops sprang forward with a loud shout and rushed sword in hand on the Turks. A. D. 1826.

Never was a charge made more valiantly. The eastern division of the garrison, under Nothi Botzares, struggled forward to gain the road to Bochori; the central division, under Kitzos Djavellas, pushed straight through the enemy's lines towards the hills; and the western division, under Makry, strove to gain the road to the Kleisura. All three intended, when clear of the Turks, to effect a junction on the slopes of Zygos, where the road ascends to the monastery of St Simeon.

Almost at the moment when the garrison rushed on the Turks, that portion of the Mesolonghiots which was then on the bridges raised a cry of "back, back." Great part of the Mesolonghiots stopped, fell back, and returned into the town with the military escort which ought to have formed the rearguard of the sortie. The origin of this ill-timed cry, which weak-

ened the force of the sortie and added to the victims in the place, has excited much unnecessary speculation. It evidently rose among those who were in danger of being forced into the ditch. It was repeated so loudly that it created a panic.

The three leading divisions bore down all opposition. Neither the yataghan of Reshid's Albanians, nor the bayonet of Ibrahim's Arabs, could arrest their impetuous attack; and they forced their way through the labyrinth of trenches, dykes, and ditches, with comparatively little loss. Only some women and children, who could not keep up with the column as it rushed forward over the broken ground, were left behind. But for the information which had been given by the traitor, the greater part of the defenders of Mesolonghi would have escaped. In consequence of that information, Ibrahim and Reshid had taken the precaution to send bodies of cavalry to watch the roads leading to Bochori, St Simeon, and Kleisura. The horsemen fell in with Greek columns when they were about a mile beyond the Turkish lines, and were beginning to feel secure. The division of Makry was completely broken by the first charge of the cavalry. The others were thrown into confusion. All suffered severely, yet small bands of the garrison still kept together, and, by keeping up a continuous fire, enabled numbers of women and children to rally under their protection. At last the scattered remnants of the three divisions began to recover some order on reaching the slopes of Zygos, where the irregularities of the ground forced the cavalry to slacken the pursuit.

The fugitives prepared to enjoy a short rest, and endeavoured to assemble the stragglers who had eluded the swords of the horsemen. They thought that the fire they had kept up against the cavalry would draw down the fifteen hundred men of Karaïskaki's corps to

their assistance. While they were thus engaged in giving and expecting succour, a body of Albanians, placed in ambuscade by Reshid to watch the road to the monastery of St Simeon, crept to their vicinity unperceived, and poured a deadly volley into their ranks. Instead of friends to assist them, they had to encounter one thousand mountaineers, well posted, to bar their progress. The Greeks, surprised by unseen enemies, could do nothing but get out of the range of the rifles of the Albanians as far as possible. The Albanians followed and tracked them in order to secure their heads, for which the pashas had promised a high price. The loss of the Greeks was greater at the foot of the hills, where their own troops ought to have insured their safety, than it had been in forcing the enemy's lines and in resisting the charges of the cavalry. Most of the women and children who had dragged themselves thus far, were so exhausted that they were taken prisoners. A. D. 1826.

About midnight small parties of the garrison of Mesolonghi, and a few women and children, succeeded in reaching the post occupied by the Greek troops; but instead of fifteen hundred men they found only fifty, and only a very small supply of provisions to relieve their wants. Here they learned also, with dismay, that the camp at Platanos was a prey to the ordinary dissensions and abuses which disgraced the military classes of Greece at this period. The weary fugitives, in order to escape starvation, were soon compelled to continue their march to Platanos. Even there they obtained very little assistance from the chiefs of the armatoli; and when they had rested about a week, they resumed their journey to Salona. Many perished from wounds, disease, and hunger on the road. About fifteen hundred reached Salona during the month of May, straggling thither generally in small bands, and often by very circuitous roads, which they had followed

in order to procure food. Of these about thirteen hundred were soldiers; there were several girls in the number of those who escaped, and a few boys under twelve years of age.

As soon as Ibrahim and Reshid found that the greater part of the garrison had evacuated Mesolonghi, they ordered a general assault. Their troops occupied the whole line of the walls without encountering resistance. The Greek soldiers whom wounds or disease had prevented from marching, had established themselves in different buildings. The party which occupied the principal powder-magazine, when surrounded by the Turks, and summoned to surrender, set fire to the powder and perished in the explosion.

It was not until morning dawned that the Turkish officers allowed their men to advance into the interior of the town, though several houses near the walls had been set on fire during the night. A whole day was spent by the conquerors in plundering Mesolonghi. A second powder-magazine was exploded by its defenders, who perished with their assailants. A windmill, which served as a central depot of ammunition, was defended until the 24th of April, when its little garrison, having exhausted their provisions, set fire to the powder, preferring death to captivity.

The loss of the Greeks amounted to four thousand. Ibrahim boasted that the Turks had collected three thousand heads; and it is probable that at least one thousand perished from wounds and starvation beyond the limits which the besiegers examined. The nearest points where the fugitives could find security and rest, were Petala, Kalamos, and Salona. The conquerors took about three thousand prisoners, chiefly women and children. About two thousand escaped; for besides those who reached Salona, a few found refuge in the villages of Etolia, and some of the inhabitants of

Mesolonghi and of the surrounding country evaded the Turkish pursuit by wading into the lagoon, and ultimately reached Petala and Kalamos, where they received protection and rations from the British government. A. D. 1826.

Many deeds of heroism might be recorded. One example deserves to be selected. The Moreot primates have been justly stigmatised as a kind of Christian Turks; and, as a class, their conduct during the Greek Revolution was marked by ambition and selfishness. Yet a Moreot primate displayed a noble example of the purest patriotism at the fall of Mesolonghi. Papadiamantopulos of Patras, a leading Hetairist, was one of the members of the executive commission intrusted with the administration of Western Greece. In the month of February he visited Zante to hasten the departure of supplies. His friends there urged him to remain. They said that as he was not a soldier he could assist in prolonging the defence of Mesolonghi more effectually by remaining at Zante, to avail himself of every opportunity of sending over supplies, than by serving in the besieged town. But the noble old gentleman silenced every entreaty by the simple observation: "I invited my countrymen to take up arms against the Turks, and I swore to live and die with them. This is the hour to keep my promise." He returned to Mesolonghi, and died the death of a hero in the final sortie.[1]

The conduct of the defenders of Mesolonghi will awaken the sympathies of freemen in every country as long as Grecian history endures. The siege rivals that of Platæa in the energy and constancy of the besieged; it wants only a historian like Thucydides to secure for it a like immortality of fame.

[1] Gordon, i. 266, and Tricoupi, iii. 356, both mention the conduct of Papadiamantopulos with just praise.

CHAPTER III.

THE SIEGE OF ATHENS.

"August Athena! where,
Where are thy men of might, thy grand in soul?"

IBRAHIM'S OPERATIONS IN THE MOREA DURING 1826—RESHID'S OPERATIONS IN CONTINENTAL GREECE — COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF ATHENS, AND BATTLE OF KHAÏDARI—DEATH OF GOURA—GRIGIOTTES THROWS HIMSELF INTO THE ACROPOLIS — KARAÏSKAKI'S OPERATIONS TO RAISE THE SIEGE—FABVIER THROWS HIMSELF INTO THE ACROPOLIS—STATE OF GREECE DURING THE WINTER 1826-27 — EXPEDITIONS FOR THE RELIEF OF ATHENS UNDER GORDON, BURBAKI, AND HEIDECK—GENERAL SIR RICHARD CHURCH—LORD COCHRANE (EARL OF DUNDONALD)—ELECTION OF COUNT CAPODISTRIAS TO BE PRESIDENT OF GREECE—NAVAL EXPEDITION UNDER CAPTAIN HASTINGS —GREEK TRADERS SUPPLY RESHID'S ARMY WITH PROVISIONS—OPERATIONS OF CHURCH AND COCHRANE BEFORE ATHENS—MASSACRE OF THE GARRISON OF THE MONASTERY OF ST SPIRIDION — KARAÏSKAKI'S DEATH—DEFEAT OF SIR RICHARD CHURCH AT THE PHALERUM—EVACUATION OF THE ACROPOLIS —CONDUCT OF PHILHELLENES IN GREECE, ENGLAND, AND AMERICA—LORD COCHRANE'S NAVAL REVIEW AT POROS — SUFFERINGS OF THE GREEKS — ASSISTANCE SENT FROM THE UNITED STATES.

AFTER the conquest of Mesolonghi, the Othoman fleet returned to Constantinople, and the Egyptian to Alexandria. The Greeks, with their reduced naval strength, were therefore again left masters of the sea.

Ibrahim Pasha returned to the Morea in order to complete the conquest of his own pashalik. After reviewing his troops at Patras, he found himself compelled to open the campaign of 1826 at the head of only four thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry. With this insignificant army he marched against the Greeks, laid waste the fields of that part of the population of Achaia which had not submitted to his authority, and drove

the inhabitants into the inaccessible regions of Mount Chelmos, where the snow still lay thick on the ground. During this foray he captured many prisoners, and carried off large herds of cattle and innumerable flocks of sheep. A. D. 1826.

A small detachment was sent to reconnoitre the monastery of Megaspelaion; but at this time no attack was made on it. The monks imagined a miracle. They recounted that a high wall stood up before the Egyptian troops, and closed the road by which they endeavoured to reach the holy building. Terrified by this proof that God opposed their undertaking, they marched back to Kalavryta.[1]

From Kalavryta Ibrahim marched to Tripolitza. Near Karitena he was joined by considerable reinforcements from Modon. The summer was employed in a series of expeditions for laying waste the country and starving the population into submission. The crops being generally ready for the sickle, or already reaped, were either destroyed or carried off. Great quantities of grain were burned, and great quantities were transported to Tripolitza. From the 15th of May to the 14th of November 1826 the Egyptian troops carried on the work of destruction almost without interruption. Achaia, Elis, Arcadia, Messenia, and Laconia were devastated, villages were burned to the ground, cattle were driven away, and the inhabitants, when captured, were either shot or sold as slaves. The desolation produced was so complete, that during the following winter numbers of the peasantry, particularly women and children, died of actual starvation.

[1] The ecclesiastic Phrantzes boasts of his own belief in this miracle, which took place on the 7th May 1826. On the 6th July 1827, Ibrahim reconnoitred the monastery in person, and made an attack on it. The monks were prepared, and the monastery was garrisoned by Greek troops, who repulsed the attack, which Ibrahim did not renew. The monks were generally suspected of having entered into a secret arrangement with the Egyptian pasha, but Phrantzes assures us that this was not the case.—Phrantzes, ii. 441, note 1, and 495.

During the summer Ibrahim made two attempts to penetrate into Maina—the first from the pass of Armyros on the west side, the other from Marathonesi on the east coast. Both were repulsed by the Maniats, who availed themselves of the natural difficulties which the precipitous gorges of Mount Taygetus offer to the advance of an invader.

The military operations of Kolokotrones and the other Peloponnesian chiefs were conducted without union, vigour, or judgment. An abortive attempt had been made to surprise Tripolitza, while Ibrahim was absent besieging Mesolonghi.[1] After Ibrahim returned to the Morea, the faculties of Kolokotrones appeared to have been paralysed. The only success he obtained was carrying off a few mules from the Egyptian convoys, and recovering a small portion of the booty taken from the peasantry, which he employed to feed his own followers.

At the end of the year Ibrahim found his troops so worn out by fatigue and disease, that he was compelled to suspend his operations until he received fresh reinforcements from Egypt.[2] Mohammed Ali showed some hesitation in prosecuting the war against the Greeks at this time. He was watching the progress of the negotiations between the sultan and the courts of Great Britain and Russia, and he wished to learn whether his son would be allowed to complete the conquest of the Morea, and retain permanent possession of it, before expending more money in the undertaking.

In the mean time Reshid Pasha laboured strenuously to re-establish the sultan's authority in continental

[1] See a boasting extract from a despatch of Kolokotrones in Fabvier, *Histoire du Siège de Mesolonghi*, 331. The disorder that prevailed in the Greek armies is well described in the graphic dialect of the old klepht, as reported in Διήγησις Συμβάντων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φυλῆς, Ἀθῆν., 1846.

[2] See the plan of campaign proposed by Sir C. Napier in Appendix.

Greece. His road to fame and power lay in his absolute devotion to Sultan Mahmud's interests, and his faithful execution of the orders he received from the Porte. A. D. 1826.

During the month of June 1826 he fixed his headquarters at Mesolonghi, and many of the Greek chieftains submitted to him, and publicly recognised the sultan's authority. Rhangos, Siphakas, Dyovuniattes, Kontoyannes, and Andreas Iskos all owned allegiance to the Porte, accepted the rank of captains of armatoli, and forgot the heroism of the defenders of Mesolonghi.

As soon as the affairs of Western Greece were settled on a footing that promised at least a temporary security for the restoration of order, Reshid marched into Eastern Greece, occupied the passes over Œta, Knemis, Parnassus, and Parnes, strengthened the garrison of Thebes, and organised regular communications by land between Larissa and Chalcis in Eubœa. He entered Attica before the crops of 1826 were gathered in.

The exactions of Goura had exceeded those of Odysseus, for Odysseus, like his patron, Ali of Joannina, allowed no extortions but his own, while Goura permitted his mercenaries to glean after the harvest of his own rapacity had been gathered in. A great proportion of the Attic peasantry was driven to despair, and the moment Reshid's forces appeared in the Ratadema, or hilly district between Parnes and the channel of Eubœa, they were welcomed as deliverers. On advancing into the plain of Athens, they were openly joined by the warlike inhabitants of Menidhi and Khasia, who vigorously supported Reshid's government as long as he remained in Attica.

The contributions which Goura levied under the pretext of preparing for the defence of Attica were

exclusively employed for provisioning the Acropolis, and in garrisoning that stronghold with four hundred chosen mercenaries in his own pay. These men were selected from those whom the civil war in the Morea had inured to acts of tyranny, and they were taught to look to Goura and not to the Greek government for pay and promotion. The citizens of Athens were not allowed to form part of the garrison of their own citadel.

The Turks took possession of Sepolia, Patissia, and Ambelokepos without encountering serious opposition. On the 28th of June, Reshid arrived from Thebes, and established his headquarters at Patissia. His army did not exceed seven thousand men, but his cavalry, which amounted to eight hundred, were in a high state of efficiency, and he had a fine train of artillery, consisting of twenty-six guns and mortars. The siege of Athens was immediately commenced. The hill of the Museion was occupied, and batteries were erected at the little chapel of St Demetrius, and on the level above the Pnyx.

He soon obtained a brilliant victory over the Greeks. About four thousand armatoli had been concentrated at Eleusis. The Greek chiefs who commanded this army proposed to force their way into the town of Athens, and expected to be able to maintain themselves in the houses. Reshid divined their object, and forestalled them in its execution. On the night of the 14th of August he stormed the town, and drove the Athenians into the Acropolis, into which Goura could not refuse to admit them.

The Greek troops persisted in advancing from Eleusis, though they seem to have formed no definite plan. Their numbers were insufficient to hold out any reasonable probability of their being able to recover possession of Athens. The irregulars amounted to two

thousand five hundred under the command of Karaïs- A. D. 1826.
kaki, the regulars to one thousand five hundred under Fabvier. The Greek force crossed the mountains by a pathway which leaves the Sacred Way and the monastery of Daphne to the right, and took up a position at a farmhouse with a small tower called Khaïdari. Instead of pushing on to the Olive Grove, and stationing themselves among the vineyards, where the Turkish cavalry and artillery would have been useless, they awaited Reshid at Khaïdari. On the 20th of August the attack was made, and the Greeks were completely defeated. The two leaders endeavoured to throw the whole blame of the disaster on one another, and they succeeded in convincing everybody who paid any attention to their proceedings that both of them had displayed great want of judgment. Nobody suspected either of them of want of personal energy and daring, but both were notoriously deficient in temper and prudence.[1]

Karaïskaki soon regained his reputation with his own soldiers, by sending a large body on a successful foray to Skourta, where they captured a numerous herd of cattle destined for the use of the Turkish army.

Fabvier withdrew his corps to Salamis.

Reshid bombarded the Acropolis hotly for some time, but seeing that his fire did the besieged little injury, he attempted to take the place by mining. Though he made little progress even with his mines, he persisted in carrying on his operations with his characteristic perseverance.

A body of Greek troops, consisting of Ionians and Romeliots, made two unsuccessful attempts to relieve the besieged. The summer dragged on without anything

[1] The best account of this affair is by Friedrich Müller, *Denkwürdigkeiten aus Griechenland*, 17. See also Gordon, ii. 336.

decisive, when the death of Goura drew public attention to the dangerous position of the garrison and the neglect of the Greek government. The soldiers in the Acropolis manifested a mutinous spirit in consequence of the ineffectual efforts made to relieve them. Many succeeded in deserting during the night, by creeping unobserved through the Turkish lines. To prevent these desertions Goura passed the night among the soldiers on guard, and in order to secure the assistance of the enemy in preventing the escape of his men, he generally brought on a skirmish which put them on the alert. On the 13th of October, while exchanging shots with the Turkish sentinels, he was shot through the brain. His opponent had watched the flash of the powder in the touch-hole of Goura's rifle.[1]

A cry of indignation at the incapacity and negligence of the members of the Greek government was now raised both in Greece and the Ionian Islands. Greece had still a numerous body of men under arms in continental Greece, yet these troops were inactive spectators of the siege of Athens. General Gordon, who had recently returned to Greece, records the general opinion when he states that these troops were condemned to inaction by the bickerings of their leaders.[2] Some attempts were at last made to interrupt Reshid's operations. Fabvier advanced into Bœotia with the intention of storming Thebes; but being deserted by his soldiers, he was compelled to fall back without attempting anything. Reshid, who was well informed of every movement made by the Greeks

[1] Sourmeles, 164; Tricoupi, iv. 74. Goura's widow was killed, with ten female companions and attendants, three months later, by the roof of the Erechtheion falling in. The Athenian historian Sourmeles says that she was already betrothed to Grigiottes, by the persuasion of her intriguing brother Anastasios Loidorikes, who had induced her to lay aside her widow's weeds. He exclaims, Ἰδοὺ ἀπιστία γυναικὸς καὶ ἀναιδεῖα, p. 189.

[2] Gordon, ii. 343.

through the Attic peasants who acted as his scouts, sent forward a body of cavalry, which very nearly succeeded in occupying the passes of Cithæron and cutting off Fabvier's retreat to Megara. On his return, Fabvier was left by the Greek government without provisions; and attempts being made in the name of Karaïskaki and Niketas, perhaps without their authority, to induce his men to desert, he found himself obliged to withdraw the regular corps to Methana in order to prevent its dissolution.[1] A. D. 1826.

Karaïskaki advanced a second time to Khaïdari. This movement enabled Grigiottes to land unobserved in the Bay of Phalerum, near the mouth of the Cephissus, and to march up to the Acropolis, into which he introduced himself and four hundred and fifty men without loss.

As Athens was now safe for some time, Karaïskaki moved off to Mount Helicon, where a few of the inhabitants still remained faithful to their country's cause. He expected to succeed in capturing some of the Turkish magazines in Bœotia, and in intercepting the supplies which Reshid drew from Thessaly by the way of Zeituni.

The Acropolis was now garrisoned by about one thousand soldiers, but it was encumbered by the presence of upwards of four hundred women and children. The supply of wheat and barley was abundant, but the clothes of the soldiers were in rags, and there was no fuel to bake bread. Reshid, who determined to prosecute the siege during the winter, made arrangements for keeping his troops well supplied with provisions and military stores, and for defending the posts which protected his communications with Thessaly.

The Turks neglected to keep a naval squadron in the channel of Eubœa, though it would always have

[1] Friedrich Müller, 22.

found safe harbours at Negrepont and Volo. The Greeks were therefore enabled to transport a large force to attack any point in the rear of Reshid's army. It was in their power to cut off all the supplies he received by sea, and, by occupying some defensible station in the northern channel of Eubœa, to establish communications with Karaïskaki's troops on Mount Helicon, and form a line of posts from this defensible station to another of a similar kind on the Gulf of Corinth. Talanta and Dobrena were the stations indicated. But instead of attempting to aid the army, the Greek navy either remained idle or engaged in piracy. Faction also prevented a great part of the Greek army from taking the field, and the assistance which the Philhellenic committee in Paris transmitted to Greece was employed by its agent, Dr Bailly, in feeding Kolokotrones's soldiers, who remained idle in the Morea, without marching either against the Egyptians or the Turks. Konduriottes and Kolokotrones, formerly the deadliest enemies, being now both excluded from a place in the executive government, were banded together in a most unpatriotic and dishonourable opposition to a weak but not ill-disposed government, composed of nearly a dozen members, many of whom were utterly unfit for political employment of any kind.[1] Some feeble attempts were made to organise attacks on Reshid's rear; but each leader was allowed to form an independent scheme of operations, and to abandon his enterprise when it suited his convenience.

[1] General Gordon, who served under this executive, thought more favourably of it than the author of this work, who watched its proceedings as a volunteer under Captain Hastings. The General says, "The president, Zaimes, had considerable merit, and the government contained several men of fair talent and business-like habits," ii. 300. Their names were—Zaimes, president, Petrobey of Maina, A. Deliyannes, Tsamados, Hadji, Anarghyros, Monarchides, Tricoupi, Vlachos, Zotos, Demetrakopulos. This government removed from Nauplia, where it fell too much under the control of the Moreot military faction, to Egina, on the 23d of November 1826.

The command of one expedition was intrusted to Kolettes, a man destitute both of physical and moral courage, though he looked a very truculent personage, and nourished a boundless ambition. The feeble government was anxious to prevent his allying himself with Konduriottes and Kolokotrones, and to effect that object he was placed at the head of a body of troops destined to destroy the magazines of the Turks in the northern channel of Eubœa. Nobody expected much from a military undertaking commanded by Kolettes, but the selfish members of the executive body, as usual, consulted their personal and party interests, and not their country's advantage, in making the nomination. A. D. 1826.

Kolettes collected the Olympian armatoli who had been living at free quarters in Skiathos, Skopelos, and Skyros for two years. The agents of the French Philhellenic committees supplied the expedition with provisions and military stores, and Kalergy, a wealthy Greek in Russia, paid a considerable sum of money into its military chest. Kolettes's troops landed near Talanti in order to gain possession of the magazines in that town, but the Turks, though much inferior in number, defeated them on the 20th November 1826. The armatoli escaped in the ships, and Kolettes abandoned his military career, and returned to the more congenial occupation of seeking importance by intriguing at Nauplia.

Karaïskaki about the same time began active operations at the head of three thousand of the best troops in Greece. Though he was compelled to render all his movements subordinate to the manner in which his troops could be supplied with provisions, he displayed both activity and judgment. His object was to throw his whole force on the rear of Reshid's army, master his line of communications, and destroy his magazines. The diversion, which it was expected would be made

by Kolettes's expedition, would enable Karaïskaki's troops to draw supplies of provisions and ammunition from the channel of Eubœa through Eastern Locris, as well as from Megara and the Gulf of Corinth. The victory of the Turks at Talanti occurring before the Greek troops had entered Phocis, Karaïskaki determined to cut off the retreat of Mustapha Bey, who had defeated Kolettes, and proposed falling back on Salona. Both Turks and Greeks were endeavouring to be first in gaining possession of the passes between Mounts Cirphis and Parnassus. Karaïskaki sent forward his advanced-guard with all speed to occupy Arachova, and his men had hardly established themselves in the village, before they were attacked by a corps of fifteen hundred Mussulman Albanians. Mustapha Bey had united his force with that of Elmas Bey, whom Reshid had ordered to occupy Arachova and Budunitza, in order to secure his communications with Zeituni.

The beys endeavoured to drive the advanced-guard of the Greeks out of Arachova before the main body could arrive from Dystomo to its support, but their attacks were repulsed with loss. When Karaïskaki heard of the enemy's movements, he took his measures with promptitude and judgment. He occupied the Triodos with a strong body of men, to prevent the Albanians falling back on Livadea; and he sent another strong body over Mount Cirphis to take possession of Delphi, and prevent them from marching on to Salona. While the beys lingered in the hope of destroying the advanced-guard of the Greeks, they found themselves blockaded by a superior force. They were attacked, and lost the greater part of their baggage and provisions in the engagement. During the night after their defeat they made a bold attempt to escape to Salona by climbing the precipices of Parnassus, which the Greeks left unguarded. The darkness and their expe-

rience in ambuscades enabled them to move off from A. D. 1826.
the vicinity of Arachova unobserved, but a heavy fall of snow surprised them as they were seeking paths up the rocks. At sunrise the Greeks followed them. Escape was impossible, for the only tracks over the precipices which the fugitives were endeavouring to ascend, were paths along which the shepherd follows his goats with difficulty, even in summer. They were all destroyed on the 6th of December. Their defence was valiant, but hopeless; quarter was neither asked nor given. Many were frozen to death, but three hundred, protected by the veil of falling snow, succeeded in climbing the precipices and reaching Salona. The heads of four beys were sent to Egina as a token of victory.

Karaïskaki was unable to follow up this success; want of provisions, more than the severity of the weather, kept his troops inactive. Reshid profited by this inaction to strengthen his posts at Livadea and Budunitza. Part of the Greek troops at last moved northward to plunder his convoys, while the rest spread over the whole country to obtain the means of subsistence which the Greek government neglected to supply. The Turks intrenched themselves at Daulis. Omer Pasha of Negrepont at last attacked the Greek camp at Dystomo, and this attack compelled Karaïskaki to return and recall the greater part of his troops. After many skirmishes the Turks made a general attack on the Greeks at Dystomo on the 12th of February 1827, which terminated in their defeat. But the country was now so completely exhausted that Karaïskaki was compelled to abandon his camp and fall back on Megara and Eleusis, where the presence of his army was deemed necessary to co-operate in a direct attack on Reshid's force before Athens.

After Goura's death, several officers in the Acropolis

pretended to equal authority. Grigiottes was the chief who possessed most personal influence. All measures were discussed in a council of chiefs, and instability of purpose was as much a characteristic of this small assembly of military leaders as it was of the Athenian Demos of old. One of the chiefs, Makriyannes, who distinguished himself greatly when Ibrahim attacked the mills at Lerna, was charged to pass the Turkish lines, in order to inform the Greek government that the supply of powder was exhausted, and that the garrison was so disheartened that succour must be sent without delay. Makriyannes quitted the Acropolis on the 29th November 1826, and reached Egina in safety. His appearance awakened the deepest interest. He had distinguished himself in many sorties during the siege, and he was then suffering from the wounds he had received. His frank and loyal character inspired general confidence. The members of the executive government again felt the necessity of immediate action.

Colonel Fabvier, who had brought the regular corps into some state of efficiency at Methana, was the only officer in Greece at this time capable of taking the field with a force on which the government could place any reliance. He was not personally a favourite with the members of the executive body. They feared and distrusted him, and he despised and distrusted them. Fortunately the news of Karaïskaki's victory at Arachova rendered him extremely eager for immediate action. The fame of his rival irritated his jealous disposition and excited his emulation. He therefore accepted the offer to command an expedition for the relief of Athens with pleasure, and prepared to carry succour to the Acropolis with his usual promptitude, and more than his usual prudence.

Fabvier landed with six hundred and fifty chosen men of the regular corps in the Bay of Phalerum, about

midnight on the 12th December, 1826.[1] Each man carried on his back a leather sack filled with gunpowder. The whole body reached the Turkish lines in good order and without being observed. They were formed in column on the road which leads from Athens to the Phalerum, a little below its junction with the road to Sunium, and rushed on the Turkish guard with fixed bayonets, while the drums sounded a loud signal to the garrison of the Acropolis to divert the attention of the besiegers by a desperate sortie. Fabvier cleared all before him, leading on his troops rapidly and silently over the space that separated the enemy's lines from the theatre of Herodes Atticus, under a shower of grape and musket-balls. To prevent his men from delaying their march, and exchanging shots with the Turks, Fabvier had ordered all the flints to be taken out of their muskets. A bright moon enabled the troops of Reshid to take aim at the Greeks, but the rapidity of Fabvier's movements carried his whole body within the walls of the Acropolis, with the loss of only six killed and fourteen wounded. In such enterprises, where the valour of the soldier and the activity of the leader were the only qualities wanted to insure success, Fabvier's personal conduct shone to the greatest advantage. His shortcomings were most manifest when patience and prudence were the qualities required in the general. A. D. 1826.

His men carried nothing with them into the Acropolis but their arms, and the powder on their backs. Even their greatcoats were left behind, for Fabvier proposed returning to the vessels which brought him on the ensuing night. The garrison of the Acropolis was sufficiently strong, and any addition to its numbers would only add to the difficulties of its defence by increasing the number of killed and wounded, and exhausting the provisions. Unfortunately, most of the

[1] Friedrich Müller, 25.

chiefs of the irregular troops wished to quit the place and leave the regular troops in their place, and they took effectual measures to prevent Fabvier's departure by skirmishing with the Turks, and putting them on the alert whenever he made an attempt to pass their lines. It is also asserted with confidence, by persons who had the best means of knowing the truth, and whose honour and sagacity are unimpeachable, that secret orders were transmitted from the executive government at Egina to Grigiottes, to prevent Fabvier from returning to Methana.[1] This unprincipled conduct of the Greek government and the military chiefs in the Acropolis caused great calamities to Greece, for Fabvier's presence hastened the fall of Athens, both by increasing the sufferings of the garrison, and by his eagerness to quit a fortress where he could gain no honour. After the nomination of Sir Richard Church as generalissimo of the Greek troops, Fabvier's impatience to quit the Acropolis and resume his separate command at Methana was immoderate; and Gordon asserts that, had only Greeks been in the Acropolis, it might have held out until the battle of Navarin saved Greece.

Greece fell into the chronic state of political anarchy during the latter part of the year 1826, which perpetuated the social demoralisation that continued visibly to influence her history during the remainder of her struggle for independence. The executive body, which retired from Nauplia to Egina in the month of November, was the legal government; but its members were numerous, selfish, and incapable, and far more intent on injuring their rivals in the Peloponnesus, who established a hostile executive at Kastri (Hermione), than on injuring the Turks who were besieging Athens.

[1] This accusation is repeated by Gordon, ii. 400, who was on terms of intimacy with several members of the government.

Kolokotrones, who was the leader of the faction at Kastri, formed a coalition with his former enemy Konduriottes, and this unprincipled alliance endeavoured to weaken the influence of the government at Egina, by preventing Greece from profiting by the mediation which Great Britain now proposed as the most effectual means of saving the Greek people from ruin, and the inhabitants of many provinces from extermination. A. D. 1826.

The Treaty of Akerman, concluded between Russia and Turkey on the 6th of October 1826, put an end to the hopes which the Greeks long cherished of seeing Russia ultimately engaged in war with the sultan. But this event rather revived than depressed the Russian party in Greece, whose leading members believed that the emperor would now interfere actively in thwarting the influence of England. At the same time, the agents of the French Philhellenic committees displayed a malevolent hostility to British policy, and seized every opportunity of encouraging faction, by distributing supplies to the troops of Kolokotrones, who remained idle, and withholding them from those of Karaïskaki, who were carrying on war against the Turks in the field.[1]

The active strength both of the army and navy in Greece began to diminish rapidly about this time. The people in general lost all confidence in the talents and the honesty both of their military and political leaders. The bravest and most patriotic chiefs had fallen in battle. Two names, however, still shed a bright light through the mist of selfishness, Kanaris and Miaoulis, and these two naval heroes belonged to adverse parties and different nationalities. The Greek navy was unemployed. A small part of the army was in the field against the Turks; the greater part was engaged in collecting the national revenues, or extorting their

[1] Gordon, ii. 356.

subsistence from the unfortunate peasantry. The shipowners and sailors, who could no longer find profitable employment by serving against the Turks, engaged in an extensive and organised system of piracy against the ships of every Christian power, which was carried on with a degree of cruelty never exceeded in the annals of crime. The peasantry alone remained true to the cause of the nation, but they could do little more than display their perseverance by patient suffering, and never did a people suffer with greater constancy and fortitude. Many died of hunger rather than submit to the Turks, particularly in the Morea, where they feared lest Ibrahim should transport their families to Egypt, educate their boys as Mohammedans, and sell their girls into Mussulman harems.

The Philhellenic committees of Switzerland, France, and Germany redoubled their activity when the proceeds of the English loans were exhausted. Large supplies of provisions were sent to Greece, and assisted in maintaining the troops who took the field against the Turks, and in preventing many families in different parts of the country from perishing by starvation. The presence of several foreigners prevented the executive government at Egina from diverting these supplies to serve the ambitious schemes of its members, as shamelessly as Konduriottes's government had disposed of the English loans, or as Kolokotrones's faction at this very time employed such supplies as it could obtain. Colonel Heideck, who acted as the agent of the King of Bavaria; Dr Goss of Geneva, who represented the Swiss committees and Mr Eynard; Count Porro, a noble Milanese exile; and Mr Koering, an experienced German administrator,[1] set the Greeks an example of

[1] This singular man came to Greece with Dr Goss, who assisted him in escaping from the Continent on receiving his word of honour that he was not flying from any fear of criminal law: yet even Dr Goss never knew his real name. He was of great use to Dr Goss in organising the manner of distributing

prudence and good conduct by acting always in concord. A.D. 1826

Two Philhellenes, General Gordon and Captain Frank Abney Hastings, had also some influence in preventing the executive government at Egina from completely neglecting the defence of Athens.

General Gordon returned to Greece at the invitation of the government with £15,000, saved from the proceeds of the second loan, which was placed at his absolute disposal. He was intimately acquainted with the military character and resources of both the belligerents. He spoke both Greek and Turkish with ease, and could even carry on a correspondence in the Turkish language. His *History of the Greek Revolution* is a work of such accuracy in detail, that it has served as one of the sources from which the principal Greek historian of the Revolution has compiled his narrative of most military operations.[1] Gordon was firm and sagacious, but he did not possess the activity and decision of character necessary to obtain commanding influence in council, or to initiate daring measures in the field.

Captain Hastings was probably the best foreign officer who embarked in the Greek cause. Though calm and patient in council, he was extremely rapid and bold in action. He brought to Greece the first steam-ship, which was armed with heavy guns for the use of shells and hot shot; and he was the first officer who habitually made use of these engines of war at

the stores sent by the various committees, and he displayed a degree of administrative experience, and an acquaintance with governmental business, which could hardly have been acquired by service in an inferior position. To wealth or rank, even to the ordinary comforts of life, he seemed to have resigned all claim. Though of some use to Capodistrias, he was neglected by that statesman, who feared him as a Liberal; and he died of fever during the president's administration.

[1] Compare Gordon's *History of the Greek Revolution*, 2 vols. 8vo, 1832, with Σ. Τρικούπη Ἱστορία τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως, 4 vols., 1853. Any portion of the military operations of the Turkish armies will afford proof.

sea. At this time he had brought his ship, the Karteria, into a high state of discipline.

Mr Gropius, the Austrian consul at Athens, who then resided at Egina, was also frequently consulted by individual members of the executive body. His long residence in the East had rendered him well acquainted with the character and views of the Greeks and Turks, but his long absence from Western Europe had prevented him from acquiring any profound political and administrative views.

Mavrocordatos and Tricoupi were generally the medium through which the opinions of the foreigners who have been mentioned were transmitted to the majority of the members of the executive body. Mavrocordatos possessed more administrative capacity than any of his countrymen connected with the government at Egina; but the errors into which he was led by his personal ambition and his phanariot education had greatly diminished his influence. Tricoupi was a man of eloquence, but of a commonplace mind, and destitute of the very elements of administrative knowledge. These two men served their country well at this time, by conveying to the government an echo of the reproaches which were loudly uttered, both at home and abroad, against its neglect; and they assisted in persuading it to devote all the resources it could command to new operations for the relief of Athens.

It has been already observed, that the simplest way of raising the siege of Athens was by interrupting Reshid's communications with his magazines in Thessaly. The Greeks could easily bring more men into the field than Reshid, and during the winter months they commanded the sea. An intelligent government, with an able general, might have compelled the army before Athens to have disbanded, or surrendered at discretion, even without a battle; for with six thousand

men on Mount Parnassus, and a few ships in the northern and southern channels of Eubœa, no supplies, either of ammunition or provision, could have reached Reshid's army. The besiegers of Athens might also have been closely blockaded by a line of posts, extending from Megara to Eleutheræ, Phyle, Deceleia, and Rhamnus. This plan was rejected, and a number of desultory operations were undertaken, with the hope of obtaining the desired result more speedily. A. D. 1827

The first of these ill-judged expeditions was placed under the command of General Gordon. Two thousand three hundred men and fifteen guns were landed on the night of the 5th February 1827, and took possession of the hill of Munychia. Thrasybulus had delivered Athens from the thirty tyrants by occupying this position, and the modern Greeks have a pedantic love for classical imitation.[1] In spite of this advantage, Reshid secured the command of the Piræus by preventing the Greeks from getting possession of the monastery of St Spiridion, and thus rendered the permanent occupation of Munychia utterly useless.

While Gordon was engaged in fortifying the desert rock on which he had perched his men, the attention of the Turks was drawn off by another body of Greeks. Colonel Burbaki, a Cephaloniot, who had distinguished himself as a cavalry officer in the French service, offered to head a diversion, for the purpose of enabling Gordon to complete his defences. Burbaki descended from the hills that bound the plain of Athens to the west, and advanced to Kamatero near Menidi. He was accompanied by eight hundred irregulars; and Vassos and Panayotaki Notaras, who were each at the head of a thousand men, were ordered to support him, and promised to do so. Burbaki was brave and enthu-

[1] "Ὁ Θρασύβουλος κατελάβετο τὴν Μουνυχίαν λόφον ἔρημον καὶ κάρτερον."—*Diodorus*, xiv. 33.

siastic; Vassos and Notaras selfish, and without military capacity. Burbaki pushed forward rashly into the plain, and before he could take up a defensive position in the olive grove, he was attacked by Reshid Pasha in person at the head of an overwhelming force. Burbaki's men behaved well, and five hundred fell with their gallant leader. The two chiefs, who ought to have supported him with two thousand men, never came into action: they and their followers fled in the most dastardly manner, abandoning all their provisions to the Turks.

After this victory Reshid marched to the Piræus, hoping to drive Gordon into the sea. On the 11th of February he attacked the hill of Munychia. His troops advanced boldly to the assault, supported by the fire of four long five-inch howitzers. The attack was skilfully conducted. About three thousand men, scattered in loose order round the base of the hill, climbed its sides, covered by the steep declivities which sheltered them from the fire of the Greeks who crowned the summit. Several gallant attempts were made to reach the Greek intrenchments; but as soon as the Turks issued from their cover, they were received with such a fire of musketry and grape that they fled back to some sheltered position. A diversion was made by Captain Hastings, which put an end to the combat. He entered the Piræus with the Karteria under steam, and opened a fire of grape from his 68-pounders on the Turkish reserves and artillery. The troops fled, one of the enemy's guns was dismounted, and the others only escaped by getting under cover of the monastery. The Turkish artillerymen, however, nothing daunted, contrived to run out one of the howitzers under the protection of an angle of the building, and opened a well-directed fire of five-inch shells on the Karteria. Every boat belonging to the ship

was struck, and several shells exploded on board, so that Hastings, unable to remain in the Piræus without exposing his ship to serious danger, escaped out of the port. His diversion proved completely successful, for Reshid did not attempt to renew the attack on Gordon's positions. A. D. 1827

Reshid had some reason to boast of his success; and in order to give the sultan a correct idea of the difficulties with which he was contending, he sent to Constantinople the 68-lb. shot of the Karteria which had dismounted his gun, and a bag of the white biscuits from Ancona, which were distributed as rations to the Greek troops. At the same time he forwarded to the Porte the head of the gallant Burbaki and the cavalry helmet he wore.

The failure of the double attack on Reshid's front persuaded the Greek government to recommence operations against his rear. General Heideck was appointed to command an enterprise similar to that in which Kolettes had failed in the disgraceful manner previously recounted. But Oropos was selected as the point of attack instead of Talanti.[1] Oropos was the principal magazine for the supplies which the army besieging Athens received by sea. These supplies were conveyed to Negrepont by the northern channel, and sent on to Oropos in small transports. Heideck sailed from the Bay of Phalerum with five hundred men. The naval force, consisting of the Hellas frigate, the steam corvette Karteria, and the brig Nelson, was commanded by Miaoulis. On arriving at Oropos, the Hellas anchored about a mile from the Turkish battery; and Hastings, with the Karteria,

[1] An anecdote proving the folly of the Greek government deserves notice. Ten days before Heideck's expedition sailed, it was announced in the government Gazette that the executive body had resolved to send a body of troops to *surprise* the Turks at Oropos. Yet, after all, the Turks allowed themselves to be surprised. — Γενικὴ Ἐφημερὶς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 23 Φεβ. (6 March) 1827, p. 122, and MS. journal.

steamed to within musket-shot of the Turkish guns, silenced them with a shower of grape, and took possession of two transports laden with flour. One of the carcass shells of the Karteria's 68-pounders set fire to the fascines of the Turkish battery, destroyed the carriage of a gun, and exploded the powder-magazine. The evening was already dark, but Miaoulis urged Heideck to land the troops immediately and storm the enemy's position, or at least endeavour to burn down his magazines, while his attention was distracted by the fire in his battery. Heideck declined to make the attempt on account of the darkness, which the admiral thought favoured his attack. Next day the Greek troops landed in a disorderly manner, nor did Heideck himself put his foot on shore, or visit the Karteria, which remained at anchor close to the enemy's battery. The Turks, however, contrived to remove a gun, which they placed so as to defend their position from any attack on the side where the Greeks had landed. Nothing was done until, a body of cavalry arriving from Reshid's camp, Heideck ordered his men to be re-embarked, and sent them back to the camp at Munychia.

The conduct of Heideck on this occasion fixed a stain on his military reputation which was extremely injurious to his future influence in Greece. It furnished a parallel to the generalship of Kolettes, and encouraged the enemies of military science to express their contempt for the pedantry of tactics, and to proclaim that the maxims and rules of European warfare were not applicable to the war in Greece. It was in vain to point out to the Greeks, immediately after this unfortunate exhibition of military incapacity, that it was by gradually adopting some of the improvements of military science, and establishing some discipline, that the Turks were steadily acquiring the superiority both by sea and land.

Immediately after Heideck's failure, the affairs of Greece assumed a new aspect by the arrival of Sir Richard Church and Lord Cochrane. A. D. 1827

Sir Richard Church had commanded a Greek battalion in the British army, but had not risen to a higher rank than lieutenant-colonel in the service.[1] After the peace he had entered the Neapolitan service, where he attained the rank of lieutenant-general. He now came to Greece, at the invitation of the Greek government, to assume the command of the army. His popularity was great among the military chiefs, who connected his name with the high pay and liberal rations which both officers and men had received while serving in the Anglo-Greek battalion.

The prominent political as well as military position which Sir Richard Church has occupied for many years in Greece, and the influence which his personal views have exercised on the public affairs of the country, render it necessary for the historian to scrutinise his conduct more than once, both as a statesman and a general, during his long career. The physical qualities of military men exert no trifling influence over their acts. Church was of a small, well-made, active frame, and of a healthy constitution. His manner was agreeable and easy, with the polish of great social experience. The goodness of his disposition was admitted by his enemies, but the strength of his mind was not the quality of which his friends boasted. In Greece he committed the common error of assuming a high position without possessing the means of performing its duties: and it may be questioned whether he possessed the talents necessary for performing the duties well, had it been in his power to perform them at all.

[1] His services are thus given in *Hart's Army List* for 1859: Ferrol, 1800; Egyptian campaign, 1801; battle of Maida; Sicily and Calabria, and wounded at defence of Capri; capture of Ischia, 1809; severely wounded at St Maura.

As a military man, his career in Greece was a signal failure. His plans of operations never led to any successful result; and on the only occasion which was afforded him of conducting an enterprise on a considerable scale, they led to the greatest disaster that ever happened to the Greek army. His camps were as disorderly as those of the rudest chieftain, and the troops under his immediate command looked more like a casual assemblage of armed mountaineers than a body of veteran soldiers.

Shortly after his arrival, Sir Richard Church obtained from a national assembly the empty title of Archistrategos, or Generalissimo; and often, to win over independent chiefs to recognise this verbal rank, he sacrificed both his own personal dignity and the character of the office which he aspired to exercise. He succeeded in attaching several chiefs to his person, but he did so by tolerating abuses by which they profited, and which tended to increase the disorganisation of the Greek military system.

As a councillor of state, the career of Church was not more successful than as a general. His name was not connected with any wise measure or useful reform. Even as a statesman he clung to the abuses of the revolutionary system which he had supported as a soldier.

Both Church and the Greeks misunderstood one another. The Greeks expected Church to prove a Wellington, with a military chest well supplied from the British treasury. Church expected the irregulars of Greece to execute his strategy like regiments of guards. Experience might have taught him another lesson. When he led his Greek battalion to storm Santa Maura, his men left him wounded in the breach; and had an English company not carried the place, there he might have lain until the French could

take him prisoner. The conduct of the Greek regiments had been often disorderly; they had mutinied at Malta, and behaved ill at Messina. The military chiefs who welcomed him to Greece never intended to allow him to form a regular army, if such had been his desire. They believed that his supposed influence with the British Government would obtain a new loan for Greece, and for them high pay and fresh sources of peculation. A. D. 1827.

Sir Richard Church arrived at Porto Kheli, near Kastri, on the 9th of March, and was warmly welcomed by Kolokotrones and his faction. After a short stay he proceeded to Egina, where he found the members of the executive dissatisfied with his having first visited their rivals.

Lord Cochrane (Earl of Dundonald) arrived at Hydra on the 17th March. He had been wandering about the Mediterranean in a fine English yacht, purchased for him out of the proceeds of the loan in order to accelerate his arrival in Greece, ever since the month of June 1826.

Cochrane was a contrast to Church in appearance, mind, character, and political opinions. He was tall and commanding in person, lively and winning in manner, prompt in counsel, and daring but cool in action. Endowed by nature both with strength of character and military genius, versed in naval science both by study and experience, and acquainted with seamen and their habits and thoughts in every clime and country, nothing but an untimely restlessness of disposition, and a too strongly expressed contempt for mediocrity and conventional rules, prevented his becoming one of Britain's naval heroes. Unfortunately, accident, and his eagerness to gain some desired object, engaged him more than once in enterprises where money rather than honour appeared to be the end he sought.

Cochrane, with the eye of genius, looked into the thoughts of the Greeks with whom he came into close contact, and his mind quickly embraced the facts that marked the true state of the country, and revealed the extent of its resources. To the leading members of the executive body he hinted that the rulers of Greece ought to possess more activity and talent for government than they had displayed. To the factious opposition at Kastri he used stronger language. He recommended them, with bitter irony, to read the first philippic of Demosthenes in their assembly.[1] His opinions and his discourse were soon well known, for they embodied the feelings of every patriot, and echoed the voice of the nation. His influence became suddenly unbounded, and faction for a moment was silenced. All parties agreed to think only of the nation's interests. The executive body removed from Egina to Poros, and a congress was held at Damala, called the National Assembly of Trœzene.

The first meetings of the national assembly of Trœzene were tumultuous. Captain Hamilton fortunately arrived at Poros with his frigate the Cambrian. His influence with Mavrocordatos and the executive, the influence of Church with Kolokotrones and the Kastri faction, and the authority of Lord Cochrane over all parties, prevented an open rupture. Matters were compromised by the election of Count Capodistrias to be president of Greece for seven years. Lord Cochrane was appointed arch-admiral, and Sir Richard Church arch-general. As the national assembly could not invest them with ordinary power, it gave them extraordinary titles. As very often happens in political compromises, prospective good government was secured by the resolution to remain for a time without anything more than the semblance of a government.

[1] Tricoupi, iv. 122, gives a Greek translation of Cochrane's letter.

A commission of three persons was appointed to conduct the executive until the arrival of Capodistrias; and three men of no political talent and no party influence, but not behind any of their predecessors in corruption and misgovernment, were selected.[1] A. D. 1827.

The election of Capodistrias was proposed by Kolokotrones and the Russian party, in order to counterbalance the influence which England then exercised in Greece in consequence of the enlightened zeal which Captain Hamilton displayed in favour of Greek independence, and the liberal policy supported by the two Cannings.[2] A few men among the political leaders, whose incapacity and selfishness had rendered a free government impracticable, endeavoured to prevent the election of Capodistrias without success. Captain Hamilton observed a perfect neutrality, and would not authorise any opposition by an English party. Gordon's description of the scene on the day of the election is correct and graphic. He says the Anglo-Greeks hung down their heads, and the deputies of Hydra, Spetzas, and Psara walked up the hill to Damala with the air of criminals marching to execution.

It has been said already that the Turkish army before Athens drew the greater part of its supplies from Thessaly. These supplies were shipped at Volo during the winter, and forwarded by sea to Negrepont and Oropos. It was at last decided that an expedition should be sent to destroy the Turkish magazines and transports at Volo, and the command of the expedition was given to Captain Hastings. He sailed from Poros with a small squadron to perform this service.[3]

[1] Gordon gives an able and accurate account of the proceedings at Trœzene, ii. 364.

[2] George Canning, Prime Minister of England from March to August 1827, and Sir Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), Ambassador at Constantinople from 1825 to 1858.

[3] The steamer Karteria, the corvette Themistocles, Captain Raphael, the brig Ares, Captain (Admiral) Kriezes, and the schooners Panaghia and Aspasia.

The Gulf of Volo resembles a large lake, and few lakes surpass it in picturesque beauty and historical associations. Mount Pelion rises boldly from the water on its eastern side. The slopes of the mountain are studded with many villages, whose white dwellings, imbedded in luxuriant foliage, reflected the western sun as the Greek squadron sailed up the gulf on the afternoon of the 20th April 1827.

The fort of Volo lies at the northern extremity of the gulf, where a bay, extending from the ruins of Demetrius to those of Pagasæ, forms a good port. At the point near Pagasæ, on the western side of the bay, the Turks had constructed a battery with five guns. These guns crossed their fire with those of the fort, and commanded the whole anchorage. Eight transports were moored as close to the fort as possible. The Karteria anchored before the fort at half-past four in the afternoon, while the corvette and brig anchored before the five-gun battery. The Turks were soon driven from their guns. A few rounds of grape from the Karteria compelled them to abandon the transports, which were immediately taken possession of by the Greeks. Five of these vessels, which were heavily laden, were towed out of the port; but two, not having their sails on board, were burned; and the eighth, which the Turks contrived to run aground within musket-shot of their walls, was destroyed by shells. About nine o'clock a light breeze from the land enabled the Greek squadron to carry off its prizes in triumph.

After carefully examining every creek, Hastings quitted the Gulf of Volo on the 22d. On entering the northern channel of Eubœa he discovered a large brig-of-war and three schooners in a bight near the scala of Tricheri. This brig mounted fourteen long 24-pounders and two mortars. It was made fast head and

stern to the rocks, and planks were laid from its deck to the shore. A battery of three guns was constructed close to the bows, and several other batteries were placed in different positions among the surrounding rocks, so that the brig was defended not only by her own broadside and four hundred Albanian marksmen, but also by twelve guns well placed on shore. Hastings attempted to capture it by boarding during the night. The Greek boats moved silently with muffled oars, but when they had approached nearly within musket-shot, heaps of faggots blazed up at different places, casting long streams of light over the water, while at the same time a heavy fire of round-shot and grape proved the strength and watchfulness of the enemy. Fortunately the Turks opened their fire rather too soon, and Hastings was enabled to regain the Karteria without loss. A. D. 1827.

On the following day the attack was renewed from a distance in order to destroy the brig with hot shot, for the dispersed positions of the batteries, and the cover which the ground afforded to the Albanian infantry, rendered the grape of the Karteria's guns useless. Seven 68-pound shot were heated in the fires of the engine, brought on deck, and put into the guns with an instrument of the captain's own invention ; and as the Karteria steamed round in a large circle about a mile from the shore, her long guns were discharged in succession at intervals of four minutes. When the seven shot were expended, the Karteria steamed out of range of the enemy's fire to await the result. Smoke soon issued from the brig, and a great movement was observed on shore. Hastings then steamed near the land, and showered grape and shells on the Turks to prevent them from extinguishing the fire. A shell exploding in the brig gave him the satisfaction of seeing her abandoned by her crew. Fire at last burst

from her deck, and she burned gradually to the water's edge. Her guns towards the shore went off in succession, and caused no inconsiderable confusion among the Albanians; the shells from her mortars mounted in the air, and then her powder-magazine exploded. The Karteria lost only one man killed, a brave Northumbrian quartermaster, named James Hall, and two wounded.

Experience thus confirmed the soundness of the views which Hastings had urged the Greek government to adopt as early as the year 1823. It was evident that he had practically introduced a revolution in naval warfare. He had also proved that a Greek crew could use the dangerous missiles he employed with perfect security. Sixty-eight pound shot had been heated below, carried on deck, and loaded with great ease, while the ship was moving under the fire of hostile batteries. The Karteria herself had suffered severely in her spars and rigging, and it was necessary for her to return to Poros to refit.

In passing along the eastern coast of Eubœa, Hastings discovered that Reshid Pasha did not depend entirely on his magazines in Thessaly for supplying his army before Athens with provisions.

Several vessels were observed at anchor off Kumi, and a number of boats were seen drawn up on the beach. Though the place was occupied by the Turks, it was evidently the centre of a considerable trade. It was necessary to ascertain the nature of this trade. Hastings approached the shore, and a few Turks were observed escaping to the town, which is situated about two miles from the port. The vessels at anchor were found to be laden with grain, shipped by Greek merchants at Syra; and it was ascertained that both Reshid and Omar Pasha of Negrepont had, during the winter, purchased large supplies of provisions, forwarded

to Kumi by Greeks. Hastings found a brig under Russian colours and a Psarian schooner just beginning to land their cargoes of wheat. A large magazine was found full of grain, and other magazines were said to be well filled in the neighbouring town. About one-third of the grain on shore was transferred to the prizes taken at Volo. The Russian brig was not molested, but two vessels, fully laden with wheat, were taken to Poros, where they were condemned by the Greek admiralty court. On his return Hastings urged both Lord Cochrane and the Greek government to adopt measures for putting an end to this disgraceful traffic; but the attention of Lord Cochrane was called off to other matters, and there were some scoundrels who possessed considerable influence with the Greek government, and who profited by licensing this nefarious traffic. A. D. 1827.

Military operations were now renewed against the Turkish army engaged in the siege of Athens. Karaïskaki, after his retreat from Dystomo, established his force, amounting to three thousand men, at Keratsina, in the plain to the west of the Piræus. Repeated letters had been transmitted from the Acropolis, written by Fabvier and the Greek chiefs, declaring that the garrison could not hold out much longer.[1]

Sir Richard Church commenced his career as generalissimo by assembling an army at the Piræus of more than ten thousand, with which he proposed driving Reshid from his positions.[2] He caused, however, considerable dissatisfaction by hiring a fine armed schooner to serve as a yacht, and establishing his headquarters in this commodious but most unmilitary habitation.[3]

[1] Gordon, ii. 387.

[2] Church gives this number in his report on the massacre of the Turks who capitulated in the monastery of St Spiridion.—Lesur, *Annuaire Historique*, 1827.

[3] Gordon blames Church for remaining too much on board this schooner, and not exhibiting himself sufficiently to the troops, and also of being too fond

It was decided that the navy should co-operate with the army, so that the whole force of Greece was at last employed to raise the siege of Athens.

Lord Cochrane hoisted his flag in the Hellas, but continued to reside on board his English yacht, not deeming it prudent to remove his treasure, which amounted to £20,000, from under the protection of the British flag. He enrolled a corps of one thousand Hydriots to serve on shore, and placed them under the command of his relation, Lieutenant Urquhart, who was appointed a major in the Greek service. The enrolment of these Hydriots was a very injudicious measure. They were unable to perform the service of armatoli, and they were quite as undisciplined as the most disorderly of the irregulars. When landed at Munychia they excited the contempt of the Romeliot veterans, strutting about with brass blunderbusses or light double-barrelled guns. The army had also reasonable ground for complaint, for these inefficient troops received higher pay than other soldiers.

Lord Cochrane's own landing at the Piræus was signalised by a brilliant exploit. On the 25th of April, while he was reconnoitring the positions of the two hostile armies, a skirmish ensued. He observed a moment when a daring charge would insure victory to the Greeks, and, cheering on the troops near him, he led them to the attack with nothing but his telescope in his hand. All eyes had been watching his movements, and when he was seen to advance, a shout ran through the Greek army, and a general attack was made simultaneously on all the positions occupied by the Turks at the Piræus. The fury of the assault per-

of employing his pen, which was a very useless instrument with armatoli. Gordon himself set the fashion of generals keeping yachts in Greece; but Gordon lived on shore while he commanded at Munychia, and sent his yacht to Salamis. The inaccuracies contained in the published despatches of Sir Richard Church were caused by his isolation on board.

suaded the Mohammedans that a new enemy had taken the field against them, and they abandoned nine of their small redoubts. Three hundred Albanians threw themselves into the monastery of St Spiridion; the rest retired to an eminence beyond the head of the port. A. D. 1827.

The troops in the monastery were without provisions, and only scantily supplied with water. In a short time they must have attempted to cut their way through the Greek army, or surrendered at discretion. Unfortunately, it was determined to bombard the building and carry it by storm. In order to breach the wall of the monastery, the Hellas cannonaded it for several hours with her long 32-pounders. The building looked like a heap of ruins, and the Greek troops made a feeble attempt to carry it by storm, which was easily repulsed by the Albanians, who sprang up from the arched cells in which they had found shelter from the fire of the frigate.

Attempts were made next day to open negotiations with the Albanians, who it was supposed would be now suffering from hunger; but a Greek soldier who carried proposals for a capitulation was put to death, and his head was exposed from the wall; and a boat sent from Lord Cochrane's yacht with a flag of truce, was fired on, and an English sailor dangerously wounded. The frigate then renewed her fire with no more effect than on the previous day. The garrison found shelter in a ditch, which was dug during the night behind the ruins of the outer wall, and its courage was increased by observing the trifling loss which was caused by the tremendous fire of the broadside of a sixty-four gun frigate. The Turks, having now placed four guns[1] on the height to which they had retired on the

[1] Gordon, ii. 389. My own journal says only three. We both paid particular attention to the effect of the artillery. The hill is named Xypete in Colonel Leake's plan of Athens and its harbours.

25th, opened a plunging fire on the ships in the Piræus, and by a chance shot cut the main-stay of the Hellas.

There was little community of views between the lord high admiral and the generalissimo. Cochrane objected to granting a capitulation to the Albanians in the monastery, as tending to encourage obstinate resistance in desperate cases, and he reproached the Greek chiefs with their cowardice in not storming the building. The irregulars refused to undertake any operation until they gained possession of the monastery. There could be no doubt that a storming party, supported by a couple of howitzers, ought to have carried the place without difficulty. Church determined to make the attempt, and Gordon, who commanded the artillery, was ordered to prepare for the assault on the morning of the 28th of April.

In an evil hour the generalissimo changed his plans. Surrounded by a multitude of counsellors, and destitute of a firm will of his own, he concluded a capitulation with the Albanians, without consulting Lord Cochrane or communicating with General Gordon. Karaïskaki was intrusted with the negotiations. The Albanians were to retire from the monastery with arms and baggage. Several Greek chiefs accompanied them as hostages for their safety. But the generalissimo took no precautions for enforcing order, or preventing an undisciplined rabble of soldiers from crowding round the Mussulmans as they issued from the monastery. He must have been grossly deceived by his agents, for his report to the Greek government states "that no measures had been neglected to prevent the frightful catastrophe that ensued." Nothing warranted this assertion but the fact that Karaïskaki Djavellas, and some other chiefs, accompanied the Albanians as hostages.

As soon as Lord Cochrane was aware that the com-

mander-in-chief of the army had opened negotiations A. D. 1827.
with the Albanians, he ordered Major Urquhart to withdraw the Hydriots from their post near the monastery to the summit of Munychia.

The Albanians had not advanced fifty yards through the dense crowd of armed men who surrounded them as they issued from St Spiridion's, when a fire was opened on them. Twenty different accounts were given of the origin of the massacre. It was vain for the Mussulmans to think of defending themselves; their only hope of safety was to gain the hill occupied by the Turkish artillery. Few reached it even under the protection of a fire which the Turks opened on the masses of the Greeks. Two hundred and seventy men quitted the monastery of St Spiridion, and more than two hundred were murdered before they reached the hill. "The slain were immediately stripped, and the infuriated soldiers fought with each other for the spoil," as we are told by a conscientious eyewitness of the scene.[1]

This crime converted the Greek camp into a scene of anarchy. General Gordon, who had witnessed some of the atrocities which followed the sack of Tripolitza, was so disgusted with the disorder that prevailed, and so dissatisfied on account of the neglect with which he was treated, that he resigned the command of the artillery and quitted Greece. Reshid Pasha, on being informed of the catastrophe, rose up and exclaimed with great solemnity, "God will not leave this faithlessness unpunished. He will pardon the murdered, and inflict some signal punishment on the murderers."[2]

[1] Gordon, ii. 391.

[2] The author was serving as a volunteer on the staff of General Gordon, and accompanied him to join the storming-party on the 28th of April. It had been observed from Gordon's yacht, which was anchored in the Piræus, that communications passed between the Albanians and the Greeks during the whole morning. The Hydriots were also seen retiring to the summit of Munychia. As Gordon passed in his boat under the stern of Lord Cochrane's yacht, the

Nothing now prevented the Greeks from pushing on to Athens but the confusion that prevailed in the camp and the want of a daring leader. Some skirmishing ensued, and in one of these skirmishes, on the 4th of May, Karaïskaki was mortally wounded. His death increased the disorder in the Greek army, for he exercised considerable personal influence over several Romeliot chiefs, and compressed the jealousies of many captains, who were now thrown into direct communication with the generalissimo.

Karaïskaki fell at a moment favourable to his reputation. He had not always acted the patriot, but his recent success in Phocis contrasted with the defeats of Fabvier, Heideck, and Church in a manner so flattering to national vanity, that his name was idolised by the irregular troops. He was one of the bravest and most active of the chiefs whom the war had spared, and his recent conduct on more than one occasion had effaced the memory of his unprincipled proceedings

author prevailed on him to seek an explanation of what was going on. Cochrane said that he, as admiral, had refused to concur in a capitulation, unless the Albanians laid down their arms, and were transported as prisoners of war on board the fleet. He added, that he feared Church had concluded a capitulation. While this conversation was going on, the author was watching the proceedings at the monastery with his glass, and, seeing the Albanians issue from the building into the armed mob before the gates, he could not refrain from exclaiming, "All those men will be murdered!" Lord Cochrane turned to Gordon and said, "Do you hear what he says?" to which the general replied, in his usual deliberate manner, "I fear, my Lord, it is too true." The words were hardly uttered when the massacre commenced.

The author landed immediately to examine the effect of the frigate's fire on the monastery. He witnessed a strange scene of anarchy and disorder, and while he remained in the building two Greeks were killed by shot from the guns on the hill.

The Hydriots under Major Urquhart mutinied at being deprived of their share of the spoil. Lord Cochrane sent Mr Masson to pacify them with this message, "My reason for ordering the Hydriots to muster on Munychia was to remove the forces under my command from participating in a capitulation, unless the Turks surrendered at discretion. My objects were to preserve the honour of the navy unsullied, and at the same time to secure an equal distribution of the prize-money."

The author visited the yacht of the generalissimo shortly after, and found the staff on board in high dudgeon at what they called the treachery of the Greeks. He did not see the generalissimo. The feeling among the Philhellenes in the camp, and there were many officers of many nations, was amazement at the neglect on the part of the generalissimo.—*MS. Journal*, 28th April 1827.

during the early years of the Revolution; indeed, it seemed even to his intimate acquaintances that his mind had expanded as he rose in rank and importance. His military talents were those which a leader of irregular bands is called upon to employ in casual emergencies, not those which qualify a soldier to command the numerous bodies required to compose an army. He never formed any regular plan of campaign, and he was destitute of the coolness and perseverance which sacrifices a temporary advantage to secure a great end. In personal appearance he was of the middle size, thin, dark-complexioned, and haggard, with a bright expressive animal eye, which, joined to the cast of his countenance, indicated that there was gypsy blood in his veins. His features, while in perfect repose, wore an air of suffering, which was usually succeeded by a quick unquiet glance.[1] A. D. 1827.

Sir Richard Church now resolved to change his base of operations from the Piræus to the cape at the eastern end of the Bay of Phalerum. Why it was supposed that troops who could not advance by a road where olive-trees, vineyards, and ditches afforded them some protection from the enemy's cavalry, should be expected to succeed better in open ground, has never been explained.

On the night of the 5th May the generalissimo transported three thousand men, with nine field-pieces, to his new position, but it was nearly daybreak before the whole were landed. It was then too late to reach the Acropolis before sunrise, and the road lay over open downs. Gordon calls the operation "an insane project," and says that "if the plan deserves the severest censure, what shall we say to the pitiful method in which it was executed?"[2]

[1] Compare the characters of Karaïskaki by Gordon, ii. 393, and Tricoupi, iv. 151.

[2] A Philhellene who arrived from Ambelaki just in time to take part in the

Early dawn found the Greek troops posted on a low ridge of hills not more than half-way between the place where they had landed and the Acropolis. A strong body of Othoman cavalry was already watching their movements, and a body of infantry, accompanied by a gun, soon took up a position in front of the Greek advanced-guard. The position occupied by the Greeks was far beyond the range of any guns in the Turkish lines, but Sir Richard Church, who had not examined the ground, was under the erroneous impression that his troops had arrived within a short distance of Athens, and counted on some co-operation on the part of the garrison of the Acropolis. Had he seen the position, he could not have allowed his troops to remain on ground so ill chosen for defence against cavalry, with the imperfect works which they had thrown up. The advanced-guard had not completed the redoubt it had commenced, and the main body, with the artillery, could give no support to the advanced-guard.[1]

Reshid Pasha made his dispositions for a cavalry attack. They were similar to those which had secured him the victory at Petta, at Khaidari, and at Kamatero. He ascertained by his feints that his enemy had not a single gun to command the easy slope of a ravine that led to the crest of the elevation on which the advanced redoubt was placed. Two successive charges of cavalry were repulsed by the regular troops and the Suliots,

action, and who was one of the four who escaped, wrote a few days after :— "Believing that the object was to reach Athens by a *coup-de-main*, I was much surprised to find that the troops did not quit the seaside until near morning. Nevertheless they had some time to fortify themselves before they were attacked. Unfortunately, no disposition had been made, and the troops were dispersed without order."—*Letter of Lieut. Mylrbergh to Gen. Gordon*, dated 9th May 1827.

[1] The report of Sir Richard Church, printed in Lesur, *Annuaire Historique pour* 1827, App. 127, contains many inaccuracies. The author not only witnessed the engagement from his tent on the summit of Munychia, but he rode over the ground with Mr Gropius, the Austrian consul-general in Greece, who had also seen the battle, while the bones of the slain still remained unburied, and the imperfect intrenchments of the Greeks were exactly in the same state as on the morning of the attack. He then compared his notes and recollections with the known facts and the configuration of the ground.

who formed the advanced-guard of the Greek force. A. D. 1827
But this small body of men was left unsupported, while the Turks had collected eight hundred cavalry and four hundred infantry in a ravine, by which they were protected until they charged forward on the summit of the ridge. The third attack of the Turks decided the contest. The cavalry galloped into the imperfect redoubt. A short struggle ensued, and completed Reshid's victory. The main body of the Greeks fled before it was attacked, and abandoned the guns, which remained standing alone for a short interval before the Turkish cavalry took possession of them, and turned them on those by whom they had been deserted. The fugitives endeavoured to reach the beach where they had landed. The Turks followed, cutting them down, until the pursuit was checked by the fire of the ships.

Sir Richard Church and Lord Cochrane both landed too late to obtain a view of the battle. The approach of the Turkish cavalry to their landing-place compelled them to regain their yachts. Reshid Pasha, who directed the attack of the Turkish cavalry in person, was slightly wounded in the hand.

Fifteen hundred Greeks fell in this disastrous battle, and six guns were lost. It was the most complete defeat sustained by the Greeks during the course of the war, and effaced the memory of the rout at Petta, and of the victories gained by Ibrahim Pasha in the Morea. The Turks took two hundred and forty prisoners, all of whom were beheaded except General Kalergy, who was released on paying a ransom of 5000 dollars,[1] and who lived to obtain for his country

[1] Kalergy's leg was broken, and he was made prisoner by an Albanian bey. Reshid wished his head to be piled up with those of the other prisoners, but his captor insisted on receiving 5000 dollars before he would part with it, as Kalergy had promised him that sum. Fortunately the Turkish military chest was not in a condition to allow the pasha to purchase a single head at so high a price. The money was immediately raised among Kalergy's friends, and was remitted from St Petersburg as soon as Kalergy's uncle heard of his nephew's misfortune.

the inestimable boon of representative institutions by the Revolution of 1843, which put an end to Bavarian domination, and completed the establishment of the independence of Greece.

The battle of Phalerum dispersed the Greek army at the Piræus. Upwards of three thousand men deserted the camp in three days; and the generalissimo was so discouraged by the aspect of affairs, that he ordered the garrison of the Acropolis to capitulate.[1] Captain Leblanc, of the French frigate Junon, was requested to mediate for favourable terms, and was furnished with a sketch of the proposed capitulation. This precipitate step on the part of Sir Richard Church drew on him a severe reprimand from the chiefs in the Acropolis, who treated his order with contempt, and rejected Captain Leblanc's offer of mediation with the boast, that "we are Greeks, and we are determined to live or die free. If, therefore, Reshid Pasha wants our arms, he may come and take them." These bold words were not backed by deeds of valour.

Church abandoned the position of Munychia on the 27th of May, and the garrison of the Acropolis then laid aside its theatrical heroism. Captain Corner, of the Austrian brig Veneto, renewed the negotiations for a capitulation, and the arrival of the French admiral, De Rigny, brought them to a speedy termination. The capitulation was signed on the 5th of June. The garrison marched out with arms and baggage. About fifteen hundred persons quitted the place, including four hundred women and children. The Acropolis still contained a supply of grain for several months' consumption, and about two thousand pounds of powder, but the water was scarce and bad. There was no fuel

[1] Jourdain, *Mémoires Historiques et Militaires sur les Evènements de la Grèce depuis* 1822 *jusqu'au Combat de Navarin.* See also Tricoupi, iv. 160. Not much reliance can be placed either on the accuracy or the judgment of Jourdain, but he prints a few documents.

for baking bread, and the clothes of the soldiers were in rags. A. D. 1827.

The surrender of the Acropolis, following so quickly after the bombastic rejection of the first proposals, caused great surprise. The conduct of Fabvier was severely criticised, and the behaviour of the Greek chiefs was compared with the heroism of the defenders of Mesolonghi. The sufferings of those who were shut up in the Acropolis were undoubtedly very great, but the winter was past, and had they been inspired with the devoted patriotism of the men of Mesolonghi, they might have held out until the battle of Navarin.

The conduct of Reshid Pasha on this occasion gained him immortal honour. He showed himself as much superior to Sir Richard Church in counsel, as he had proved himself to be in the field. Every measure that prudence could suggest was adopted to prevent the Turks from sullying the Mohammedan character with any act of revenge for the bad faith of the Greeks at the Piræus. The pasha patrolled the ground in person, at the head of a strong body of cavalry, and saw that his troops who escorted the Greeks to the place of embarkation performed their duty.

The fall of Athens enabled Reshid to complete the conquest of that part of continental Greece which Karaïskaki had occupied; but the Turks did not advance beyond the limits of Romelia, and the Greeks were allowed to remain unmolested in Megara and the Dervenokhoria, which were dependencies of the pashalik of the Morea, and consequently within the jurisdiction of Ibrahim Pasha. Many of the Romeliot chiefs now submitted to the Turks, and were recognised by Reshid as captains of armatoli. In his despatches to the sultan he boasted with some truth that he had terminated the military operations with which he was intrusted, and re-established the sultan's authority in

all that part of continental Greece placed under his command, from Mesolonghi to Athens.

The interference of foreigners in the affairs of Greece was generally unfortunate, often injudicious, and sometimes dishonest. Few of the officers who entered the Greek service did anything worthy of their previous reputation. The careers of Norman, Fabvier, Church, and Cochrane, were marked by great disasters. Frank Hastings was perhaps the only foreigner in whose character and deeds there were the elements of true glory.

But it was by those who called themselves Philhellenes in England and America that Greece was most injured. Several of the steam-ships, for which the Greek government paid large sums in London, were never sent to Greece. Some of the field-artillery purchased by the Greek deputies was so ill constructed that the carriages broke down the first time the guns were brought into action. Two frigates were contracted for at New York; and the business of the contractors was so managed that Greece received only one frigate after paying the cost of two.

The manner in which the Greeks wasted the money of the English loans in Greece has been already recorded. It is now necessary to mention how the Greek deputies, and their English and American friends, misappropriated large sums at London and New York. It will be seen that waste and peculation were not monopolies in the hands of Greek statesmen, Albanian shipowners, and captains of armatoli and klephts. English politicians and American merchants had also their share.[1]

[1] Dr Home, *Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution*, 376, says, "The shameful waste of a large part of the loan, and the numerous peculations which were committed upon it, have not been fully exposed to the world; but enough has been exposed to show that the London Greek committee shamefully neglected its duty; that some of its members meanly speculated on the miseries of Greece; that others committed, what in men of lesser note would have been called

The grandest job of the English Philhellenes was purchasing the services of Lord Cochrane to command a fleet for the sum of £57,000, and setting apart £150,000 to build the fleet which he was hired to command. Lord Cochrane was engaged to act as a Greek admiral in the autumn of 1825. He went to reside at Brussels while his fleet was building, and arrived in Greece in the month of March 1827, as has been already mentioned, before any of the steam-ships of his expedition. Indeed, the first vessel, which was commenced at London by his orders, did not arrive in Greece until after the battle of Navarin. A.D. 1827

The persons principally responsible for this waste of money and these delays were Mr Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton; Mr Edward Ellice; Sir Francis Burdett; Mr Hume; Sir John Bowring, the secretary of the Greek Committee; and Messrs Ricardo, the contractors of the second Greek loan. Sir Francis Burdett was floating on the cream of Radicalism, and Lord Broughton was supporting himself above the thin milk of Whiggery by holding on vigorously at the baronet's coat-tails. Both these gentlemen, however, though they were guilty of negligence and folly, kept their hands pure from all money transactions in Greek bonds. The Right Honourable Edward Ellice was a contractor for the first Greek loan, but was not a bear, at least of Greek stock. In a letter to the *Times* he made a plain statement of his position in Greek affairs, and owned candidly that he had been guilty of "extreme indiscretion in mixing himself up with the Greek deputies and their affairs." What he said was no doubt perfectly true; but we must not overlook

fraud; and it is well known too that Orlando and Luriottes, the Greek deputies, proved themselves fools and knaves." A pamphlet, however, was published defending the Greek deputies, written by an Italian lawyer, Count Palma, who was afterwards a judge in Greece.—*Summary Account of the Steamboats for Lord Cochrane's Expedition:* London, 1826.

that it was not said until Greek affairs had ceased to discount the political drafts of the Whigs, and a less friendly witness might perhaps have used a stronger word than "extreme indiscretion." The conduct of Mr Hume and Sir John Bowring was more reprehensible, and their names were deeply imbedded in the financial pastry which Cobbett called "the Greek pie," and which was served with the rich sauce of his savoury tongue in the celebrated *Weekly Register*.[1] Where there was both just blame and much calumny, it is difficult and not very important to apportion the exact amount of censure which the conduct of each individual merited. The act which was most injurious to Greece, and for the folly of which no apology can be found, was intrusting the construction of all the engines for Lord Cochrane's steamers to an engineer (Mr Galloway), who failed to construct one in proper time. He contracted to send Captain Hastings' steamer, the Perseverance (Karteria), to sea in August 1825. Her engines were not ready until May 1826.[2]

When the Greeks were reduced to despair by the successes of Ibrahim Pasha, the government ordered the deputies in London to purchase two frigates of moderate size. With the folly which characterised all their proceedings, they sent a French cavalry officer to build frigates in America. The cavalry officer fell into the hands of speculators. The Greek deputies neglected to perform their duty. The president of the Greek Committee in New York, and a mercantile house also boasting of Philhellenic views, undertook the construction of two leviathan frigates.[3] The sum of £150,000 was expended before any inquiry was made.

[1] *Cobbett's Weekly Register*, vol. lx. Nos. 7, 8, and 10, Nov. and Dec. 1826.

[2] Compare Gordon, ii. 275.

[3] Gordon, ii. 275, says, On the western side of the Atlantic the Greeks were yet more infamously used by some of their pretended friends than on the eastern.

It was then found that the frigates were only half finished. The American Philhellenes who had contracted to build them became immediately bankrupts, and the Greek government, having expended the loans, would have never received anything for the money spent in America, had some real Philhellenes not stepped forward and induced the government of the United States to purchase one of the ships. The other was completed with the money obtained by this sale, and a magnificent frigate, named the Hellas, mounting sixty-four 32-pounders, arrived in Greece at the end of the year 1826, having cost about £200,000. A. D. 1827

Shortly after the defeat of Sir Richard Church at the Phalerum, Lord Cochrane assembled the Greek fleet at Poros. His first naval review was a sad spectacle of national disorganisation, and presented an unlucky omen of his future achievements. The ships of Hydra and Spetzas were anchored in the port; but before their Albanian crews would get their vessels under weigh, they sent a deputation to the arch-admiral asking for the payment of a month's wages in advance. They enforced their demand by reminding Lord Cochrane, with seamanlike frankness, that he had received funds on board his yacht for the express purpose of paying the fleet. His lordship replied, that he had already expended so much of the money intrusted to him in the abortive attempt to raise the siege of Athens, that he could only now offer the sailors a fortnight's wages in advance. This proposal was considered to be a violation of the seaman's charter in the Albanian Islands, and it was indignantly rejected by the patriotic sailors. In vain the arch-admiral urged the duty they owed to their country. No seaman could trust his country for a fortnight's wages. Without waiting for orders, the crews of the ships ready for sea weighed anchor and returned to Hydra and

Spetzas, from whence some of them sailed on privateering and piratical cruises. The spectacle of this dispersal of the Greek fleet, though humiliating, was impressive. The afternoon was calm, the sun was descending to the mountains of Argolis, and the shadows of the rocks of Methana already darkened the water, when brig after brig passed in succession under the stern of the Hellas, from whose lofty mast the flag of High Admiral of Greece floated, unconscious of the disgraceful stain it was receiving, and in whose cabin sat the noble admiral steadily watching the scene.

The whole of Greece was now laid waste, and the sufferings of the agricultural population were so terrible, that any correct description even by an eyewitness would be suspected of exaggeration. In many districts hundreds died of absolute starvation, and thousands of the diseases caused by insufficient nourishment. The islands of the Archipelago, which escaped the ravages both of friends and foes, did not supply grain in sufficient quantity for their own consumption. Poverty prevented the people from obtaining supplies of provisions under neutral flags.

During this period of destitution, which commenced towards the end of 1826, and continued until the harvest of 1828, the greater part of the Greeks who bore arms against the Turks were fed by provisions supplied by the Greek committees in Switzerland, France, and Germany. The judicious arrangements adopted by Mr Eynard at Geneva and Paris, and the zeal of Dr Goss, General Heideck, and Mr Koering in Greece, caused the limited resources at their disposal to render more real service than the whole proceeds of the English loans.

While the Continental committees were supporting the war, the Greek committees in the United States directed their attention to the relief of the peaceful

population. The amount of provisions and clothing sent from America was very great. Cargo after cargo arrived at Poros, and fortunately there was then in Greece an American Philhellene capable, from his knowledge of the people, and from his energy, honour, and humanity, of making the distribution with promptitude and equity. Dr Home requires no praise from the feeble pen of the writer of this History, but his early efforts in favour of the cause of liberty and humanity in Greece deserve to be remembered, even though their greatness be eclipsed by his more mature labours at home. He found able coadjutors in several of his countrymen, who were guided by his counsels.[1] Thousands of Greek families, and many members of the clergy and of the legislature, were relieved from severe privations by the food and clothing sent across the Atlantic. Indeed, it may be said without exaggeration that these supplies prevented a large part of the population from perishing before the battle of Navarin. A. D. 1827.

In the summer of the year 1827 Greece was utterly exhausted, and the interference of the European powers could alone prevent the extermination of the population, or their submission to the sultan.

[1] Mr or Colonel Miller, Dr Russ, and Mr Stuyvesant.

BOOK FIFTH.

FOUNDATION OF THE GREEK KINGDOM.

CHAPTER I.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION—BATTLE OF NAVARIN.

"Earth is sick,
And Heaven is weary of the hollow words
Which states and kingdoms utter when they talk
Of truth and justice."

CONDUCT OF RUSSIA—CONDUCT OF GREAT BRITAIN—CONGRESS OF VERONA—RUSSIAN MEMOIR ON THE PACIFICATION OF GREECE IN 1823—EFFECT OF THIS MEMOIR—TURKEY COMPLAINS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT—GREECE PLACES HERSELF UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ENGLAND—PROTOCOL OF THE 4TH APRIL 1826 FOR THE PACIFICATION OF GREECE—DESTRUCTION OF THE JANISSARIES—TREATY OF THE 6TH JULY 1827 FOR THE PACIFICATION OF GREECE—STATE OF GREECE IN 1827—VICTORY OF HASTINGS AT SALONA—BATTLE OF NAVARIN—GREEK SLAVES CARRIED OFF TO ALEXANDRIA—GREEK TROOPS CROSS INTO ARCARNANIA—HASTINGS TAKES VASILADI—DEATH OF HASTINGS—RUSSIA DECLARES WAR WITH TURKEY—FRENCH TROOPS COMPEL IBRAHIM TO EVACUATE THE MOREA.

WHEN the Greeks commenced the Revolution, they were firmly persuaded that Russia would immediately assist them. Many acts of the Emperor Alexander I. authorised this opinion, which was shared by numbers of well-educated men in Western Europe. But whatever might have been the wish of the emperor personally, policy prevailed over feeling. The sovereigns of Europe feared a general rising of nations. Monarchs

were alarmed by a panic fear of popular movements, A. D. 1827.
and the judgment of statesmen was disturbed by the conviction that cabinets and nations were pursuing adverse objects. There was a strong desire among a part of the Russian population to take up arms against the sultan in order to protect the Greeks, because they belonged to the same Oriental Church. But the conservative policy of the emperor, the selfishness of his ministers, and the power of his police, prevented any active display of Philhellenism in Russia.

Time rolled on. Year after year the Greeks talked with laudable perseverance of the great aid which Russia was soon to send them. Philhellenes from other nations arrived and fought by their side; large pecuniary contributions were made to their cause by Catholics and Protestants, but their coreligionaries of orthodox Russia failed them in the hour of trial. The cabinet of St Petersburg coolly surveyed the struggle, weighed the effect of exhaustion on the position of both the combatants, and watched for a favourable moment to extend the influence of Russia towards the south, and for an opportunity of adding new provinces to the empire.

The conduct of Great Britain was very different. The British cabinet was more surprised by the Greek Revolution, and viewed the outbreak with more aversion than any other Christian government. The events in Vallachia, and the assertions of the Hetairists in the Morea, made the rising of the Greeks appear to be the result of Russian intrigue. The immediate suppression of the revolt seemed therefore to be the only way of preventing Greece from falling under the protection of the Emperor Alexander, and of hindering Russia from acquiring naval stations in the Mediterranean. The British government consequently opposed the Revolution; but it had not, like that of Russia, the power to

coerce the sympathies of Britons. British Philhellenes were among the first to join the cause, and in merit they were second to none. The names of Gordon, Hastings, and Byron will be honoured in Greece as long as disinterested service is rewarded by national gratitude.

The habits of the English people, long accustomed to think and act for themselves in public affairs, enabled public opinion to judge the conduct of the Greeks without prejudice, and to separate the crimes which stained the outbreak from the cause which consecrated the struggle.

It is necessary, however, to look beyond the East in order to form a correct judgment of the policy of the cabinets of Europe with regard to the Greek Revolution. The equilibrium of the European powers was threatened with disturbance by a war of opinion. Two camps were gradually forming in hostile array, under the banners of despotism and liberty. The Greek question was brought prominently forward by the Continental press, because it afforded the means of indulging in political discussion without allusion to domestic administration, and of proclaiming that principles of political justice were applicable to Greeks and Turks which they dared not affirm to be applicable to the subjects and rulers in Christian nations.

The affairs of Greece were brought under discussion at the Congress of Verona in 1822. A declaration of the Russian Emperor, and the protocols of the conferences, proclaimed that the subject interested all Europe; but the view which the Congress took of the war in Greece showed more kingcraft than statesmanship. It was identified too closely with the democratic revolutions of Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. Yet so great was the fear of any extension of Russian influence in the East, that even the members of the

Holy Alliance preferred trusting to the chance of its suppression by the sultan rather than authorise the czar to interfere. A. D. 1827.

In the mean time, Russia persuaded France to undertake the task of suppressing constitutional liberty in Spain, as a step to a general concession of the right of one nation to interfere in the internal affairs of another when it suspects danger from political opinions.

The march of the French armies beyond the Pyrenees placed the cabinets of France and England in direct opposition. England replied to the destruction of constitutional liberty in Spain by acknowledging the right of the revolted Spanish colonies in America to establish independent states. George Canning delighted the liberals and alarmed the despots on the Continent by boasting in parliament that he had called a new political world into existence to redress the balance of the old. The phrase, though somewhat inflated, has truth and buoyancy enough to float down the stream of time. At the same time the British government adopted the energetic step of repealing the prohibition to export arms and ammunition, in order to afford the Spanish patriots the means of obtaining supplies and of resisting the French invasion.[1]

While the English cabinet was thus incurring the danger of war in the West, it exerted itself to prevent hostilities in the East. The ambassadors of England and Austria induced the sultan to take some measures to conciliate Russia in 1823. A note of the reis-effendi was addressed to the Russian government, announcing the speedy evacuation of the transdanubian principalities, and a desire to renew direct diplomatic relations between the sultan and the czar. After much tergiversation in the usual style of Othoman diplomacy, the Porte opened the navigation of the

[1] By an order in council, 26th February 1823.

Bosphorus to the Russian flag, and the Emperor Alexander sent a consul-general to Constantinople.[1]

From this time Russia began to take a more active part than she had hitherto taken in the negotiations relating to Greece. The activity of the Philhellenic committees alarmed the Holy Alliance. The success of the French in Spain encouraged the despotic party throughout Europe. Russia, availing herself adroitly of these feelings, seized the opportunity of resuming her relations with Turkey, and of laying before the European cabinets a memoir on the pacification of Greece.

The principal object of this document was the dismemberment of Greece, in order to prevent the Greek Revolution from founding an independent state. The statesmen of Russia, having watched dispassionately the progress of public opinion in the West, had arrived at the conclusion that if monarchs delayed much longer assuming the initiative in the establishment of peace between the Greeks and Turks, Christian nations might take the matter in their own hands. Russia naturally wished to preserve her position as protector of the Greeks, and to retain the honour of being the first Christian government that covered her coreligionaries with her orthodox ægis.

The Russian plan of pacification was calculated to win the assent of the Holy Alliance, by suppressing everything in Greece that appeared to have a revolutionary tendency. It proposed to retain the Greeks in such a degree of subjection to Turkey that they would always stand in need of Russian protection. It contemplated annihilating the political importance of the Greeks as a nation, by dividing their country into three separate governments. By creating powerful

[1] The notes relating to these negotiations are printed in *Archives Diplomatiques*, vi. 31, and Lesur, *Annuaire Historique*, 1823.

classes in each of these governments with adverse interests, it hoped to render any future national union impossible; and by allowing the sultan to keep Othoman garrisons in the Greek fortresses, the hostile feelings of the Greeks would be kept in a state of irritation, and they would continue to be subservient to Russia in all her ambitious schemes in the Turkish empire. The three governments into which Russia proposed to divide Greece, were to be ruled by native hospodars, and administered by native officials chosen by the sultan. The islands of the Egean Sea were to be separated from the rest of their countrymen, and placed under the direct protection of the Porte, with such a guarantee for their local good government as could be obtained by the extension of a municipal system similar to that which had existed at Chios, at Hydra, or at Psara.[1] A. D. 1827.

As a lure to gain the assent of the members of the Holy Alliance to these arrangements, Russia urged the necessity of preventing Greece from becoming a nest of democrats and revolutionists, by paralysing the political energy of the nation, which could easily be effected by gratifying the selfish ambition of the leading Greeks. Personal interest would extinguish national patriotism in Greece, as it had done at the Phanar, and in Vallachia and Moldavia.[2]

When the contents of this memoir became known, they caused great dissatisfaction both in Greece and Turkey.

[1] An extract from this memoir was published in 1824, and this extract is translated by Tricoupi, iii. 385; but a complete copy was printed in the *Courier de Smyrne*, 1828, Nos. 37 and 38. The hospodarats were — 1. Thessaly, with Eastern Greece; 2. Epirus and Western Greece; 3. The Morea with Crete. The islands which were to enjoy municipal governments are not enumerated.

[2] The expressions deserve to be quoted:—"Paralyser l'influence des revolutionaires dans toute la Grèce;" and "que la création de trois principautés Grecques, en diminuant l'étendue et les forces respectives de chacune de ces provinces, offre une nouvelle guarantée à la Porte: qu'elle offre enfin un puissant appât aux principales familles de la Grèce; et qu'elle pourra servir à les détacher des intérêts de l'insurrection."

The sultan was indignant that a foreign sovereign should interfere to regulate the internal government of his empire, and propose the dismemberment of his dominions as a subject of discussion for other powers. He naturally asked in what manner the Emperor Alexander would treat the interference of any Catholic sovereign in favour of Polish independence, or of the sultan himself in favour of Tartar Mohammedanism.

The Greeks were astonished to find the Emperor Alexander, whom they had always believed to be a firm friend, coolly aiming a mortal blow at their national independence. Their own confused notions of politics and religion had led them to infer that the orthodoxy of the czar was a sure guarantee for his support in all measures tending to throw off the Othoman yoke both in their civil and ecclesiastical government. They were appalled at the Machiavelism of a cabinet that sought to ruin their cause under the pretext of assisting it.[1]

Great Britain was now the only European power that openly supported the cause of liberty, and her counsels bore a character of vigour that commanded the admiration of her enemies. To the British government the Greeks turned for support when they saw that Russia had abandoned their cause. In a communication addressed to the British Foreign Secretary, dated the 24th August 1824, they protested against the arrangements proposed in the memoir, and adjured England to defend the independence of Greece and frustrate the schemes of Russia. This letter did not reach George Canning, who was then at the Foreign Office, until the 4th November, and he replied on the 1st of December. By the mere fact of replying to a

[1] The unpopularity of Russia was greatly increased by the expulsion of many Greek families from the dominions of the Emperor Alexander at this time. Some of these families were conveyed to Greece at a considerable expense by the Philhellenic committees of Switzerland.—Gordon, ii. 83.

communication of the Greek government, he recognised the right of the Greeks to secure their independence, and form a new Christian state. A. D. 1827.

Mr Canning's answer contained a distinct and candid statement of the views of the British cabinet. Mediation appeared for the moment impossible, for the sultan insisted on the unconditional submission of the Greeks, and the Greeks demanded the immediate recognition of their political independence. Nevertheless, the English minister declared that, if at a future period Greece should demand the mediation of Great Britain, and the sultan should accept that mediation, the British government would willingly co-operate with the other powers of Europe to facilitate a treaty of peace, and guarantee its duration. In the mean time Great Britain engaged to observe the strictest neutrality, adding, however, that as the king of England was united in alliance with Turkey by ancient treaties, which the sultan had not violated, it could not be expected that the British government should involve itself in a war in which Great Britain had no concern.[1]

The moderate tone of this state-paper directed public opinion to the question of establishing peace between the Greeks and the sultan. It also convinced most thinking men that the object of Russian policy was to increase the sultan's difficulties, not to establish tranquillity in Turkey. The British Parliament, in particular, began to feel that the English ambassador at Constantinople must cease to support many of the demands of Russia. The memoir of 1823, therefore, though able and well devised as a document addressed to cabinets and diplomatists, became a false step by being subjected to the ordeal of public opinion. The morality of nations was already better than that of

[1] For the letter of the Greek government, and Canning's answer, see Lesur, *Ann. Hist.*, 1824, p. 627. Tricoupi gives Canning's letter a wrong date, iii. 390.

emperors and kings. For a time all went on smoothly, and meetings of the ambassadors of the great powers were held at St Petersburg in the month of June 1824, to concert measures for the pacification of the East.

Early in the year 1824, the influence of England at Constantinople diminished greatly, in consequence of the public manifestations of Philhellenism. The sultan heard with surprise that the Lord Mayor of London had subscribed a large sum to support the cause of the Greeks; that Lord Byron, an English peer, and Colonel the Honourable Leicester Stanhope (Earl of Harrington), an officer in the king's service, had openly joined the Greeks; that the British authorities in the Ionian Islands granted refuge to the rebellious armatoli; and that English bankers supplied the insurgents with money. The sultan attributed these acts to the hostile disposition of the government. Neither Sultan Mahmud nor his divan could be persuaded that in a free country public opinion had a power to control the action of the executive administration in enforcing the law. The sultan could not be expected to appreciate what Continental despots refuse to understand—that English men legally enjoy and habitually exercise a right of political action for which they are responsible to society and not to government. In the year 1823, the sympathies of Englishmen, with all those engaged in defending the inalienable rights of citizens, were so strong, that the British government feared to act in strict accordance with the recognised law of nations. The people considered that the duties of humanity were more binding than national treaties. But as the ambassador at Constantinople could not urge popular feelings as an excuse for violating national engagements, the sultan had the best of the argument when he formally complained to the cabinets of Europe of the conduct of England to Turkey.

On the 9th April 1824, a strong remonstrance was presented to Lord Strangford, the English ambassador at Constantinople. The reis-effendi remarked, "that it was absurd to suppose that any government, whatever might be its form of administration, did not possess the power of preventing its subjects from carrying on war at their own good pleasure, and of punishing them for violating existing treaties between their own country and foreign governments." And the Othoman minister argued that, if such were the case, the peace of Europe, which the English government protested its anxiety to maintain, would be left dependent on the caprice of private individuals, for one state might say to another, "I am your sincere and loyal friend, but I beg you to rest satisfied with this assurance, and not to feel dissatisfied if some of my subjects sally out and cut the throats of yours." This candid and just remonstrance concluded by demanding categorically that British subjects should be prohibited from carrying arms against Turkey, and prevented from supplying the Greeks with arms, money, and ammunition.[1] A. D. 1827.

The British government was not insensible to the truth contained in this document. Colonel Stanhope was ordered home, and the Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands issued a proclamation prohibiting the deposit of arms, military stores, and money, destined for the prosecution of the war in Greece, in any part of the Ionian territory.

While diplomacy advanced with cautious steps towards foreign intervention, the events of the war moved rapidly in the same direction. The disastrous defeats of the Greek armies by the Egyptian regulars paralysed the government, and overwhelmed the nation with despair.[2] The navies of France and Austria assumed

[1] This curious document is printed in Lesur, *Ann. Hist.*, 1826, p. 649.
[2] Tricoupi, iii. 262.

a hostile attitude. The Emperor Alexander treated the independence of Greece as a mere political chimera, the delusion of some idle brain.[1] On the other hand, the recognition of all blockades established by the naval forces of Greece, the Philhellenic sentiments of Hamilton, the British commodore in the Levant, and the fame of George Canning's policy, all combined to make the Greeks fix their hopes of safety on England. On the 25th of August 1825, an act was signed by a vast majority of the clergy, deputies, primates, and naval and military chiefs of the Greek nation, placing Greece under the protection of the British government.[2] This act empowered the British cabinet to treat concerning the pacification of Greece with a degree of authority which it had not previously possessed; and George Canning now ventured to advocate the establishment of a Greek state, as the surest means of pacifying the East. He, like many other friends of Greece, believed that liberty would engender the love of justice, that the Greeks would become the allies of England from national sympathies, as well as from interest, and that, under a free and enlightened administration, the Greeks would enable political liberty and Christian civilisation to confer great benefits on the population of Eastern Europe and Western Asia. Russia would lose the power of making religious fanaticism an engine for producing anarchy in Turkey as a step to conquest, and perhaps the Greeks would emulate the career of English colonies, and, by rapid advances in population and industry, repeople and regenerate the desolate regions of European Turkey. Reasonable as these hopes were in the year 1825, the Greeks have allowed thirty-

[1] "Ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος χίμαιραν ἀπεκάλει τὴν ἀνεξαρτησίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος."—Tricoupi, iii. 270.

[2] Compare Gordon, who gives a translation of the document, ii. 283, and Tricoupi, who mentions previous endeavours to obtain the crown of Greece for a French prince, iii. 261, 272, 397.

five years to elapse without doing much to fulfil them. A. D. 1827.

Death arrested the vacillating career of Alexander I. in November 1825. For a moment Russia was threatened with internal revolution, but Nicholas was soon firmly seated on the throne by his energetic conduct. His stern and arrogant disposition soon displayed itself in his foreign policy; but his personal presumption and despotic pretensions encountered the petulant boldness and liberal opinions of George Canning, and an estrangement ensued between the Russian and British cabinets, greater than would have resulted solely from the divergency of their national interests.[1]

Mr Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), one of England's ablest diplomatists, arrived at Constantinople, as ambassador to the Porte, early in 1826, with the delicate mission of inducing the sultan to put an end to the war in Greece, and of preventing war from breaking out between Russia and Turkey. On his way to the Dardanelles he conferred with Mavrocordatos concerning the basis of an effectual mediation between the belligerents.[2] The result of this interview was that the National Assembly of Epidaurus passed a decree, dated 24th April 1826, authorising the British ambassador at Constantinople to treat concerning peace, on the basis of independent self-government for Greece, with a recognition of the sultan's suzerainty, and the payment of a fixed tribute.[3]

The pacification of Greece was now the leading object of British policy in the Levant. The Emperor Nicholas had rejected all mediation in his differences

[1] An instance of the haughty tone assumed by the Emperor Nicholas towards the British government, will be found in a despatch from Nesselrode to Lieven, dated 9th January 1827, printed in the *Portfolio*, iv. 267.

[2] The meeting took place at Hydra, 9th January 1826.

[3] The decree and instructions to the committee of the Assembly are given by Mamouka, iv. 94; the letter to Canning, iv. 132.

with Turkey, but the British cabinet was still anxious to secure unity of action between England and Russia on the Greek question. The Duke of Wellington was sent to St Petersburg for this purpose, and on the 4th April 1826 a protocol was signed, stating the terms agreed on by the two powers as a basis for the pacification of Greece. This protocol acknowledged the right of the Greeks to obtain from the Porte a solemn recognition of their independent political existence, so far as to secure them a guarantee for liberty of conscience, freedom of commerce, and the exclusive regulation of their internal government. This was a considerable step towards the establishment of national independence on a solid foundation.[1]

Unfortunately, the relations of the British government with the members of the Holy Alliance, and the Continental princes under their influence, were far from amicable during the year 1826. No progress could therefore be made in a negotiation in which the Porte could only be induced to make concessions by fear of a coalition of the Christian powers, and their determination to act with unity and vigour.

The royalists in Spain, under the protection of the French army of occupation, began to aid the despotic party in Portugal. The princess-regent at Lisbon, alarmed at the prospect of a civil war, claimed the assistance which England was bound to give to Portugal by ancient treaties. The occupation of Spain by foreign troops threatened Portugal with war; foreign assistance could alone prevent hostilities. A French army had destroyed liberty in Spain; an English army could alone preserve it in Portugal. Canning did not hesitate, and in December 1826 he announced in Parliament that six thousand British troops were ordered to Lisbon. All Europe was taken by surprise.

[1] *Parliamentary Papers;* and *Portfolio*, iv. 546.

The Emperor Nicholas, who had placed himself at the head of the despotic party on the Continent, was extremely irritated at this bold step in favour of constitutional liberty. A coolness ensued between the English and Russian cabinets, and the negotiations for the pacification of Greece were allowed to lag. On the other hand, the attitude assumed by the czar towards Turkey had previously become so menacing, that Sultan Mahmud yielded the points he had hitherto contested, and concluded the convention of Akermann on the 7th October 1826.[1] A. D. 1827.

But Sultan Mahmud had not trifled away his time during the year 1826. In the month of May he promulgated an ordinance reforming the corps of janissaries. His reforms were so indispensable for the establishment of order, that the great body of the Mohammedans supported them. But in the capital several powerful classes were interested in the continuance of the existing abuses. The janissaries took up arms to defend their privileges, which could only be maintained by dethroning the sultan. A furious contest ensued on the 14th June, but it was quickly terminated. Sultan Mahmud had foreseen the insurrection, and was prepared to suppress it. The sacred banner of Mohammed was unfurled, the grand mufti excommunicated the janissaries as traitors to their sovereign and their religion, and an overwhelming force was collected to crush them. Their barracks were stormed, the whole quarter they inhabited was laid in ashes, their corps dissolved, and the very name of janissary abolished. On the 13th of September 1826, tranquillity being completely restored at Constantinople, the sandjaksherif was furled and replaced in its usual sanctuary.

The convention of Akermann re-established Russian

[1] Lesur, *Ann. Hist.*, 1826, p. 100.

influence at the Porte. On the 5th of February 1827, Great Britain and Russia made formal offers of their mediation in the affairs of Greece, and proposed a suspension of hostilities. After many tedious conferences, the reis-effendi, in order to terminate the discussion, delivered to the representatives of the European powers at Constantinople a statement of the reasons which induced the sultan to reject the interference of foreign states in a question which related to the internal government of his empire.[1]

France was at this time engaged in a dispute with the dey of Algiers, which led to the conquest of that dependency of the sultan's empire. She now joined Great Britain and Russia in common measures for the pacification of Greece, and a treaty between the three powers was signed at London on the 6th July 1827.

This treaty proposed to enforce an armistice between the Greeks and Turks by an armed intervention, and contemplated securing to the Greeks a virtual independence under the suzerainty of the sultan.[2] An armistice was notified to both the belligerents. The Greeks accepted it as a boon which they had solicited; but the sultan rejected all intervention, and referred the Allies to the note of the reis-effendi already mentioned.

After the disastrous battle of Phalerum, it required no armistice to prevent the Greeks from prosecuting hostilities by land. Their army was broken up, and no military operations were attempted during the summer of 1827. Sir Richard Church moved about at the head of fewer troops than some chieftains, and many captains paid not the slightest attention to his orders. Fabvier shut himself up in Methana, sulky and discontented. The greater part of the Greek

[1] This document, dated 9th and 10th June 1827, is given in Lesur, *Ann. Hist.*, 1827, p. 99.

[2] For the treaty, see *Parliamentary Papers.*

chiefs, imitating the example of Kolokotrones, occupied themselves in collecting the public revenues in order to pay the personal followers they collected under their standard. The efforts of the different leaders to extend their territory and profits caused frequent civil broils, and the whole military strength of the nation was, by this system of brigandage and anarchy, diverted from opposing the Turks. While Greece was supporting about twenty thousand troops, she could not move two thousand to oppose either the Egyptians or the Turks in the field. The best soldiers in Greece were dispersed over the country collecting the means of subsistence, and the frontiers and the fortresses were alike neglected. Famine was beginning to be felt, and the soldiery, accustomed to waste, acted towards the peasantry in the most inhuman manner. The beasts of burden were carried off, and the labouring oxen devoured before the eyes of starving families.[1] Some districts of the Peloponnesus had submitted to Ibrahim Pasha during the winter of 1826, and one of the chiefs in the vicinity of Patras, named Demetrias Nenekos, now served actively against his countrymen.[2] A. D. 1827.

The exploits of the Greek seamen were not more patriotic than those of the Greek soldiers. Only a few, following the example of Miaoulis and Kanaris, remained indefatigable in serving their country; but the best ships and the best sailors of the naval islands were more frequently employed scouring the sea as pirates than cruising with the national fleet.[3] Lord Cochrane kept the sea with a small force. On the

[1] Admiral de Rigny tells us that the peasants were "*chassés, depouillés, pillés alternativement par les Turcs et par les palikares;*" and he mentions "ces îles de l'Archipel, où, dans chacune, une bande de pirates de terre *et de mer font la loi.*"—*Parliamentary Papers*, B, *Protocols at Constantinople*, p. 37.

[2] Compare Tricoupi, iv. 182.

[3] For the extent to which piracy was carried on, see Gordon, ii. 475; and Tricoupi confesses, iv. 248, that it was μοναδικὸν καὶ αἴσχιστον φαινόμενον ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τῶν ἐθνῶν.

16th of June he made an ineffectual attempt to destroy the Egyptian fleet at Alexandria. On the 1st of August, the high admiral in the Hellas, and Captain Thomas in the brig Soter, took a fine corvette and a large Tunisian schooner after a short engagement, and brought their prizes in safety to Poros, though pursued by the whole Egyptian fleet. On the 18th of September Lord Cochrane anchored off Mesolonghi with a fleet of twenty-three sail; but after some feeble and unsuccessful attempts to take Vasiladi, he sailed away, leaving Hastings to enter the Gulf of Corinth with a small squadron.

On the 29th of September Hastings stood into the Bay of Salona to attack a Turkish squadron anchored at the Scala, under the protection of two batteries and a body of troops. The Greek force consisted of the steam-corvette Karteria, the brig Soter, under the gallant Captain Thomas, and two gunboats, mounting each a long 32-pounder. The Turkish force consisted of an Algerine schooner, mounting twenty long brass guns, six brigs and schooners, and two transports. The Turks were so confident of victory that they prepared to capture the whole Greek force, and did not fire until the Karteria came to an anchor, fearing lest the attack might be abandoned if they opened their destructive fire too soon. Hastings anchored about five hundred yards from the enemy's vessels. While the Karteria was bringing her broadside to bear, the batteries on shore and the vessels at anchor saluted her with a heavy cannonade. When the Soter and the gunboats came up, they were compelled to anchor about three hundred yards further out than the Karteria. Hastings commenced the action on the part of the Greeks by firing his guns loaded with round-shot, in slow succession, in order to make sure of the range. He then fired hot shells from his long guns, and car-

cass-shells from his carronades. The effect was terrific.[1] A. D. 1827.
One of the shells penetrated to the magazine of the Turkish Commodore, who blew up. A carcass-shell exploded in the bows of the brig anchored astern the Commodore, and she settled down forward. The next broadside lodged a shell in the Algerine, which exploded between her decks, and she was immediately abandoned by her crew. Another schooner burst out in flames at the same time, and a hot shell, lodging in the stern of the brig which had sunk forward, she also was soon on fire. Thus, before the guns of the batteries on shore could inflict any serious loss on the Karteria, she had destroyed the four largest ships of the enemy. Captain Thomas and the gunboats soon silenced the batteries, and took possession of the Algerine schooner, which, however, the Greeks were unable to carry off, as she was discovered to be aground, and her deck was within the range of the Albanian riflemen on shore. Hastings steamed up, and endeavoured to tow her out to sea, but his hawsers snapped. The crews of the Soter and the gunboats succeeded by great exertion, and with some loss, in carrying off her brass guns, and in setting her and the remaining brig on fire. The other vessels, being aground close to the rocks which concealed the Albanian riflemen, could not be boarded, but they were destroyed with shells.

This victory at Salona afforded fresh proof of the value of steam and large guns in naval warfare. The terrific effect of hot projectiles, and the ease with which they were managed, astonished both friends and foes.

Ibrahim Pasha was at Navarin when he heard of

[1] Hot shells were used, though liable to greater deviation than shot, because it was feared that solid 68-lb. shot might pass through both sides of the enemy's ships.

the destruction of the squadron at Salona. He considered it a violation of the armistice proposed by the Allies and accepted by the Greeks, and he resolved to take instant vengeance on Hastings and Thomas, whose small force he hoped to annihilate with superior numbers.

Mohammed Ali was not less averse to an armistice than the sultan, but Ibrahim could not refuse, when the Allied admirals appeared in the Levant, to consent to an armistice at sea. Hastings's victory at Salona now, in his opinion, absolved him from his engagement, for it could not be supposed that the Allies would allow one party to carry on hostilities and hinder the other. Ibrahim therefore sent a squadron from Navarin with orders to enter the Gulf of Corinth and attack Hastings, who had fortified himself in the little port of Strava, near Perakhova. Sir Edward Codrington, the English admiral, compelled this squadron to return, and accused Ibrahim of violating the armistice. Candour, however, forbids us to overlook the fact that Ibrahim gave his consent to a suspension of hostilities by sea under the persuasion that the Greeks would not be allowed to carry on hostile operations any more than the Turks.

The measures adopted by the Allies to establish an armistice were, during the whole period of their negotiations, remarkable for incongruity. The Greeks accepted the armistice, and were allowed to carry on hostilities both by sea and land. The Turks refused, and were prevented from prosecuting the war by sea. Ibrahim avenged himself by burning down the olive-groves and destroying the fig-trees in Messenia. The Allied admirals kept his fleet closely blockaded in Navarin, where it had been joined by the capitan-pasha with the Othoman fleet. Winter was approaching, and the Allies might be blown off the coast, which

would afford the Turkish naval forces in Navarin an opportunity of slipping out and inflicting on Hydra the fate which had overwhelmed Galaxidi, Kasos, and Psara. To prevent so great a calamity, the Allied admirals resolved to bring their fleets to anchor in the great bay of Navarin, alongside the Egyptian and Othoman fleets. This resolution rendered a collision inevitable. A. D. 1827.

The bay of Navarin is about three miles long and two broad. It is protected from the west by the rocky island of Sphakteria, but is open to the south-west by an entrance three-quarters of a mile broad. The northern end of Sphakteria is separated from the cape of the mainland, crowned with the ruins of Pylos, by a channel only navigable for boats.[1] A small island called Chelonaki is situated near the middle of the port, about a mile from the shore.

The Turkish fleets were anchored in a line of battle forming two-thirds of a circle, facing the entrance of the port, and with the extremities resting on and protected by the fortress of Navarin and the batteries on Sphakteria. The ships were stationed three deep, so as to command every interval in the first line by the guns of the ships in the second and third lines. The first consisted of twenty-two heavy ships, with three fire-ships at each extremity. The second of twenty-six ships, including the smaller frigates and the corvettes. The third consisted of a few corvettes, and of the brigs and schooners which were ordered to assist any of the larger ships that might require aid. The whole force ranged in line of battle to receive the Allies amounted to eighty-two sail, and in this number there were

[1] Old Navarin, built on the ruins of Pylos, and called Avarinos, is said to have been built by the Avars when they ruled the Sclavonians, who colonised the Morea in the seventh century. For the ancient and modern topography of this district, see Leake's *Travels in the Morea*, Arnold's *Thucydides*, and the article Pylos, in Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*.

three line-of-battle ships and five double-banked frigates.[1]

The Allied force consisted of twenty-seven sail, and of these ten were line-of-battle ships and one a double-banked frigate.[2]

About half-past one o'clock, on the afternoon of the 20th October 1827, Sir Edward Codrington entered the harbour of Navarin, leading the van of the Allies in his flag-ship the Asia. A favourable breeze wafted the Allied ships slowly forward; while twenty thousand Turkish troops, encamped without the fortress of Navarin, were ranged on the slopes overlooking the port, like spectators in a theatre. The Turkish admirals, seeing the Allies advancing in hostile array,

[1] The Othoman and Egyptian fleets united comprised—

3	line-of-battle ships.
5	double-banked frigates.
22	frigates.
33	corvettes.
13	brigs and schooners.
6	fire-ships.
82	sail, mounting about 2000 guns.

A Tunisian squadron of three frigates and a brig anchored behind Chelonaki, but neither it nor the armed transports in the upper part of the bay took any share in the battle.

[2] The Allied fleet was thus composed—

	Line-of-battle.	Frigates.	Sloops of war.	Guns.
English Division, 11 sail,				456
	Asia, . . . 84	Glasgow, . 50	Rose, . 18	
	Genoa, . . . 74	Cambrian, 48	Brisk, . 10	
	Albion, . . 74	Dartmouth, 44	Philomel, . 10	
		Talbot, . 28	Mosquito, . 10	
			Stag (tender to Asia), 6	
French Division, 7 sail,				362
	Scipion, . . 74	Sirène, . 60	Alcyone, . 18	
	Breslau, . . 74	Armide, . 44	Daphne, . . 18	
	Trident, . . 74			
Russian Division, 8 sail,				452
	Azof, . . . 74	Constantine, 48		
	Hanhoute, . . 74	Provonay, 44		
	Ezekiel, . . 74	Elene, . 33		
	Alexander Nevsky, 74	Castor, . 32		
			Total guns, .	1270

made their preparations for the battle, which they knew was inevitable. Their great superiority in number gave them a degree of confidence in victory, which the relative force of the two fleets, in the character of the ships, did not entirely warrant. The greatest disadvantage of the Allies was that they were compelled to enter the port in succession, exposed to a cross-fire of the Turkish ships and the batteries of Sphakteria and Navarin. Fortunately for them, the guns on shore did not open their fire until the English and French admirals had taken up their positions. The imperfect artillery of the Turkish fleet, and the superiority of the Allies in the number of line-of-battle ships, as well as in discipline and science, were the grounds which were supposed to authorise the bold enterprise of the admirals. But there can be no doubt that a well-directed fire from the Turkish guns on shore might have destroyed the English and French flag-ships before the great body of the Allied fleet arrived to their assistance. A. D. 1827.

The first shot was fired by the Turks. The Allied admirals would willingly have delayed the commencement of the engagement until all their ships had entered the port, and ranged themselves in line of battle. But the breeze died away after a part of their squadrons anchored, and it was more than an hour before the first ship of the Russian division could reach its station. The battle was remarkable for nothing but hard fighting, which allowed a display of good discipline, but not of naval science. The fire of the Allies was steady and well directed; that of the Othomans and Egyptians irregular and ill directed, but kept up with great perseverance. The most difficult operation of the day was taking possession of and turning aside the Turkish fire-ships stationed at the extremities of the line. When the English and French admirals anchored, these fire-ships were to windward,

and a favourable opportunity was offered for using them with effect. The attempt was made to bear down on the flag-ships of the Allies, but it was frustrated by the skill and courage of Sir Thomas Fellowes of the Dartmouth, and of the officers and men of the brigs which were ordered on this duty. This battle, therefore, confirms the experience of the Othoman and Egyptian fleets in 1824, that fire-ships constructed on the Greek model require favourable circumstances and skill on the part of their crews, and some mismanagement or ignorance on the part of those assailed, to render them very efficient engines in naval warfare.

For about two hours the capitan-bey and the Egyptian admiral, Moharrem Bey, sustained the fire of the Asia and Sirène, but they then cut their cables and drifted to leeward. The victory was soon after secured by the Russian division under Count Heyden engaging the capitan-pasha, Tahir, whose squadron formed the starboard division of the Turkish line. The fire of the Allies now became greatly superior to that of their enemies, and the Turks abandoned several of their ships, and set them on fire. As evening approached, the scene of destruction extended over the whole port.

The Allies took every precaution to insure the safety of their ships during the night, which they were compelled to pass in the port amidst burning vessels drifting about in every direction. Every now and then fresh ships burst out into a mass of flames, and cast a lurid light over the water. The crews who had been fighting all day to destroy the ships of their enemies were compelled to labour all night to save their own.

Of the eighty-two sail of Turkish ships anchored in line of battle at noon, on the 20th of October 1827, only twenty-nine remained afloat at daylight on the following morning.[1]

[1] An Austrian officer, who visited Navarin shortly after the battle, reported

The loss of the Allies amounted to 172 killed, and 470 wounded. Several ships suffered so severely in their hulls and rigging as to be unfit to keep the sea. The greatest loss was sustained on board the flag-ships of the three admirals. A. D. 1827.

The English and Russian line-of-battle ships sailed to Malta to refit. The French returned to Toulon. Only the smaller vessels remained in the Levant to watch the proceedings of Ibrahim, whose courage was not depressed by his defeat.[1]

Ibrahim resolved not to abandon his position in the Morea. In order to relieve his force of the wounded, the supernumerary sailors, and the invalided soldiers, as well as to remove the Turkish families and Greek slaves who encumbered the fortresses, he embarked all these classes in the ships which escaped destruction. A fleet of fifty-two sail was prepared for sea, of which twenty-four were men-of-war present at the battle of Navarin. This fleet quitted Greece on the 22d December, and arrived safely at Alexandria, where it landed two thousand Greek slaves captured in the Morea.

Sir Edward Codrington was severely blamed for allowing this deportation of Christians, as he had been warned that Ibrahim contemplated the gradual removal of the whole Greek population from the Peloponnesus, and its colonisation by Mussulman Albanians and Arabs. This was indeed the only way in which the

the vessels then afloat to be—two line-of-battle ships, one double-banked frigate, five frigates, nine corvettes, and twelve brigs.

[1] The best accounts of the battle of Navarin are the official reports of the three admirals, published in the *London Gazette*, *Le Moniteur*, and the *Gazette of St Petersburg*. They may be compared with one another, and with a complete account of the battle, published at Naples, with a good plan—*Memoria intorna alla Battaglia di Navarino;* Napoli dalla Reale Tipografia della guerra: 1833. There is an account of what was seen by an officer on board the Talbot, in the *United Service Journal*, 1829, pt. i. 117. There is a plan of the port of Navarin, by Sir Thomas Fellowes. A MS. plan of the battle prepared by an English officer, was frequently copied in the Levant: it agrees very nearly with that published at Naples.

Egyptian pasha could complete and maintain his conquest. Sir Edward Codrington, considering that it was his duty to accelerate the evacuation of the Morea, did not think that his instructions warranted his assuming the responsibility of searching Turkish men-of-war as they were returning home. This, indeed, could not be done without a declaration of war; and even after the battle of Navarin, England did not declare war with the sultan, nor the sultan with England. The truth seems to be, that the naval force of the admiral was inadequate both to blockade the Egyptians and to protect British ships from the Greek pirates, who now attacked every merchantman that passed to the eastward of Cape Matapan. But it was the general opinion that Sir Edward Codrington fell into a very usual error of commanders-in-chief in the Mediterranean at that time, and both remained too much at Malta himself, and kept too many of his ships there. His judgment appears to have been misled by the severe censure cast on his conduct at Navarin, in the king's speech at the opening of parliament, in which his victory was termed "an untoward event."[1]

The destruction of the Othoman fleet made no change in the determination of Sultan Mahmud. The ambassadors at Constantinople again offered their mediation in vain, and, after reiterated conferences, they quitted the Turkish capital in December 1827.

The Greeks were allowed by the Allies to make every effort in their power to regain possession of the territory conquered by Reshid since the year 1825.

[1] Sir Edward Codrington was recalled for misapprehending his instructions, and for not disposing of his force so as to watch the movements of the Egyptian ships in Greece from the 21st November 1827 to 26th February 1828. See the Earl of Aberdeen's Letter, May 1828, with P.S., 4th June, in *Parliamentary Papers*, and *Documents relating to the Recall of Sir Edward Codrington in June* 1828, printed for private distribution, p. 21. See also the Instructions addressed to the admirals, annexed to the protocol of 15th October 1827, particularly the separate Instructions relative to the Egyptian forces, in the *Parliamentary Papers*.

But anarchy had reached such a pitch that the Greek government was powerless, and no army could be assembled. Sir Richard Church resolved, however, to establish himself at some harbour on the coast of Acarnania with the small body of men he could assemble, trusting to his being joined by the armatoli in continental Greece, whom the hostile demonstrations of the Allied powers might induce to throw off the Turkish yoke. At Church's invitation, Hastings sailed out of the Gulf of Corinth in the daytime, exposing the Karteria to the fire of the castles of Morea and Romelia, that he might transport the Greek troops to Acarnania. When he reached Cape Papas, after having exposed his ship to great danger in order to be in time at the rendezvous, he was obliged to wait ten days before the generalissimo made his appearance.[1] Church's movements had been retarded by the news that Achmet Pasha was on his march from Navarin to Patras with a reinforcement of two thousand men. The army of the generalissimo did not exceed fourteen hundred men, and it reached the coast in a state of destitution. The embarkation of this phantom of a military force was effected under the immediate superintendence of the officers of the Karteria, without any assistance from those of the army. The Greek troops were landed at Dragomestre, where they remained inactive, drawing their supplies from abroad. A. D. 1827.

Shortly after, another body of Greek troops crossed the Gulf of Corinth, and occupied the site of a Hellenic fortress on the mainland opposite the island of Trisognia, but remained as inactive as the division at Dragomestre. The peasantry showed themselves in

[1] Hastings lost two men killed and two wounded in passing the castles, but he succeeded in sinking an Austrian brig laden with flour, which had just broken the blockade, and was already under the guns of the batteries at Patras. Hastings passed the castles on the 18th of November, and Church arrived at Cape Papas on the 28th.

general to be hostile to the Greek soldiery, and kept the Turks well informed concerning every movement of the land and naval forces of Greece.

Hastings had no sooner transported the troops to Dragomestre than he resolved to attack the fort of Vasiladi, hoping that its conquest would enable the Greek army to besiege Mesolonghi. Ever since Lord Cochrane's failure in September, he had sought in his mind the best means of gaining possession of this key of the lagoons of Mesolonghi. Vasiladi is not more than one hundred yards in circumference, and its works rose only six feet above the water. The Karteria could not approach nearer than a mile and a quarter. Two attempts to throw shells into the place on different days failed, but on the 29th December 1827, the day being perfectly calm, the firing was renewed. The long guns of the Karteria threw shells at an elevation of 23°, and the third gun, pointed by Hastings himself, pitched its shell into the Turkish powder-magazine.[1] The explosion rendered the place untenable, and the boats of the Karteria arrived before the Turks could offer any resistance. The bodies of twelve men were found in the fort, and thirty-nine were taken prisoners.

These prisoners were taken on board the Karteria, but Hastings, who had been feeding his crew at his own expense for some time, resolved to put them on shore as soon as possible. He therefore informed the commandant of Vasiladi that a monoxylon (canoe of the lagoon) would convey him to Mesolonghi, to enable him to make arrangements for sending off flat-bottomed boats to land the prisoners without loss of time. The Mussulman, remembering the manner in which both Turks and Greeks had generally disposed of their cap-

[1] Memoir on the use of Shells, Hot Shot, and Carcass-Shells, from Ship Artillery, by Frank Abney Hastings, published by Ridgway in 1828, page 18.

tives, considered this to be a sentence to an honourable death. He supposed that he was to be taken to the nearest shore where he could receive burial after being shot, and he thanked Hastings like a brave man, saying that he was ready to meet death in any way his victor might order. The conversation passed through an interpreter, and Hastings being the last man on the quarter-deck to perceive that it was supposed to be his intention to murder his prisoner, the scene began at last to assume a comic aspect. The Turk was conducted to the gangway, where, seeing only a monoxylon, with one of his own men to receive him, he became conscious of his misunderstanding. He then turned back to Hastings, and uttered a few expressions of gratitude in the most dignified and graceful manner. The rest of the prisoners were landed on the following morning, and an interchange of presents took place. The Turk sending some fresh provisions on board the Karteria, and Hastings sending back some coffee and sugar. A. D. 1827.

Shortly after the battle of Navarin, Fabvier undertook an expedition to Chios, which ended in total failure.[1] The Greeks also made an effort to renew the war in Crete, but without success.[2]

After the arrival of Capodistrias in Greece, an attempt was made to revive the spirit of the irregular troops, but even the camp of Sir Richard Church continued to be a scene of disorganisation. The chieftains were everywhere intent on drawing as many rations as possible, and several of them made illicit gains by selling the supplies, which were furnished to Greece by Philhellenic societies, to men in the Turkish service. Sir Richard Church having imprudently given pass-

[1] Fabvier left Methana in October 1827, and raised the siege of Chios in March 1828. Gordon, ii. 450-473.

[2] The termination of the insurrection in Crete, and the gallant death of Hadji Mikhali on the 28th May 1828, are well recounted by Gordon, ii. 499.

ports to boats engaged in carrying on this trade in provisions with the districts in the vicinity of Patras, occupied by the troops of Ibrahim, became involved in an acrimonious correspondence with Captain Hastings, who, as the naval commander on the station, considered the proceeding as a gross violation of the rules of service, as well as of a naval blockade. It induced Hastings to get himself removed from the station, in order to make room for somebody who could agree better with the generalissimo. But in the month of May, Capodistrias induced him to accept the command of a small squadron in Western Greece, and he immediately resumed his former activity. His career was soon cut short. On the 25th of May he was mortally wounded in an attack on Anatolikon, and expired on board the Karteria. No man ever served a foreign cause more disinterestedly.[1]

Before delivering up the command of the Mediterranean fleet to his successor, Sir Pulteney Malcolm, Sir Edward Codrington concluded a convention with Mohammed Ali for the evacuation of the Morea by Ibrahim Pasha.[2] Before that convention was executed, the alliance of the three powers was threatened with

[1] The difficulties under which Hastings laboured during his career in Greece, belong rather to his biography than to Greek history; but a few words may be extracted from his correspondence to show how great they were. On the 7th January 1828 he wrote, "I am full of misery. I have not a dollar. I owe my people three months' pay, and five dollars a-head gratuity for the taking of Vasiladi. I have no provisions, and I have lost an anchor and chain." On the 16th he wrote again: "It has become an established maxim to leave this vessel without supplies. Dr Goss (agent of the Swiss committees) has just been at Zante, and has left three hundred dollars for the gunboat Helvetia, now serving under my orders, but not one farthing, no provisions, and not even a single word for me. Five months ago I was eight thousand dollars in advance for the pay of my crew, and since that time I have only received a thousand dollars from the naval chest of Lord Cochrane, and six hundred dollars from the military chest of Sir Richard Church, and this last sum is not even sufficient to pay the expenses incurred by the detention of our prizes to serve as transports for his army." See Biographical Sketch of Frank Abney Hastings in *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1845. Both Gordon and Tricoupi have done justice to the memory of Hastings, who was as distinguished for sincerity and truth in private life, as for ability and daring in war.

[2] *Parliamentary Papers*, C, Convention of Alexandria, 6th August 1828.

dissolution. England and France wished to preserve A. D. 1828.
the sultan's throne, as well as to establish the independence of Greece. Russia was even more eager to destroy the Othoman empire than to save Greece. Nicholas proposed to employ coercive measures by land, as the battle of Navarin had produced no effect. He wished to occupy Moldavia and Vallachia, and to invade Bulgaria, while the English and French fleets forced the Dardanelles. England and France rejected this proposal on the ground that it was more likely to involve Europe in a general war than to establish peace in the Levant. Russia then took advantage of some arbitrary conduct on the part of the sultan's government relative to the Black Sea trade, and of some violent expressions in an imperial proclamation of the Porte, to declare war with Turkey on the 26th April 1828.[1]

The alliance would have been dissolved had the Emperor Nicholas not retracted so much of his separate action as to consent to lay aside his character of a belligerent in the Mediterranean, and engage to act in that sea only as a member of the alliance, and within the limits traced by the treaty of the 6th July 1827.

The death of George Canning deprived British counsels of all their energy, and the measures adopted to coerce the sultan were timid, desultory, and dilatory.[2] A bold and prompt declaration of the concessions which the Allies were determined to exact in favour of the Greeks, would have been the most effectual

[1] The Hati-sherif, dated 20th December 1827, announcing sentiments of bitter animosity against Russia, is given in the *Parliamentary Papers.* Annex D, No. 2, to the protocol of the 12th March 1828.

[2] In the protocol of the 15th June 1828, Lord Aberdeen, with the diplomatic inaptitude which characterises the proceedings of Great Britain at this period, allowed the clauses to be inverted, and by this inversion the claim of Russia to an exceptional position with regard to Turkey was in some measure ratified. England, as protector of a Greek population in the Ionian Islands, ought to have insisted on equal rights. Russia was not driven from the claim she set up to an exceptional position until Sevastopol fell.

mediation. When Russia delared war with Turkey, England ought instantly to have recognised the independence of Greece, and proceeded to carry the treaty of the 6th July into execution by force. As France would in all probability have acted in the same manner, the consent of the sultan would have been gained, and a check might have been placed on the ambition of Russia by occupying the Black Sea with an English and French fleet.

The weakness of the British Cabinet allowed Russia to assume a decided political superiority in the East. On the Danube, where discipline gave her armies an immense advantage, and in the Black Sea, where the battle of Navarin had left the sultan without a fleet, she acted as a belligerent. But in the Mediterranean, where she was weak, and where she could only carry on hostilities at an enormous expense, she was allowed to conceal her weakness and economise her treasure by acting as a mediator.

With all the diplomatic successes of the Russian cabinet, the war of 1828–29 reflected little honour on the armies of the Emperor Nicholas. Though Turkey was suffering from a long series of rebellions and revolutions, which had in turn desolated almost every province of the Othoman empire; though the sultan had destroyed the janissaries, and had not yet formed a regular army; though his fleet had been annihilated at Navarin, and his finances ruined by the blockade of the Dardanelles, still under all these disadvantages Sultan Mahmud displayed an unexpected fertility of resources, and the Mussulmans in European Turkey something of their ancient energy. The desperate resistance the Russians met with at Silistria and Varna covered the Turks with glory. Two campaigns were necessary to enable the Russian armies to advance to Adrianople; and they reached that city so weak in

number that they did not venture to push on to Constantinople and dictate peace to Sultan Mahmud before the walls of his capital. Nevertheless, the victories of the Russians in Asia, and their complete command of the Black Sea, convinced the sultan that an attack on his capital would not be long delayed; and as Constantinople was inadequately supplied with provisions, and no troops could be assembled to fight a battle for its defence, Sultan Mahmud submitted to the terms of peace imposed on him. The treaty was signed on the 14th September 1829.[1] A. D. 1828.

The army of Ibrahim Pasha suffered great privations during the winter of 1827–28. Though no regular blockade of the ports in his possession was maintained either by the Greeks or the Allies, his army would have starved, or he would have evacuated the Morea, had he not succeeded in obtaining large supplies of provisions from the Ionian Islands, and particularly from Zante. About fifty Ionian boats, entirely manned by Greeks, were almost constantly employed for several months in carrying provisions to Ibrahim's troops in Greece.[2] But even with all the assistance supplied by the Ionians, the price of provisions was high, and the sufferings of the soldiers were great in the fortresses of Navarin, Modon, and Coron. At last these sufferings became intolerable.

In June 1828 about two thousand Albanians in garrison at Coron broke out into open mutiny, and after plundering the place marched out to return home. They concluded a convention with the Greek government, and Capodistrias ordered a body of Greek troops to escort them to the Isthmus of Corinth, from whence they marched along the coast of the Morea to the castle of Rhion. On entering that fort they murdered

[1] Lesur, *Annuaire Historique*, 1829.
[2] Codrington's despatch. *Documents relating to the Recall of V. A. Codrington*, p. 35.

the governor, and after resting a few days crossed the straits, marched hastily through the desolate plains of Etolia, and reached the frontier of Turkey in safety.

The utter exhaustion of Greece prevented even the government of Capodistrias from making any effort to expel the Egyptians from the Peloponnesus. The direct agency of the Allies could alone deliver the country.

The French government undertook to send an army to expel Ibrahim, for the mutual jealousies of England and Russia threatened otherwise to retard the pacification of Greece indefinitely. On the 19th July 1828 a protocol was signed, accepting the offer of France; and on the 30th August an army of fourteen thousand men, under the command of General Maison, landed at Petalidi in the Gulf of Coron. The convention concluded by Codrington at Alexandria had been ineffectual. It required the imposing force of the French general to compel Ibrahim to sign a new convention for the immediate evacuation of the Morea. The convention was signed on the 7th of September 1828, and the first division of the Egyptian army, consisting of five thousand five hundred men, sailed from Navarin on the 16th. Ibrahim Pasha sailed with the remainder on the 5th October; but he refused to deliver up the fortresses to the French, alleging that he had found them occupied by Turkish garrisons on his arrival in Greece, and that it was his duty to leave them in the hands of the sultan's officers.

After Ibrahim's departure, the Turks refused to surrender the fortresses, and General Maison indulged their pride by allowing them to close the gates. The French troops then planted their ladders, scaled the walls, and opened the gates without any opposition. In this way Navarin, Modon, and Coron fell into the hands of the French. But the castle of Rhion offered some resistance, and it was found necessary to lay

siege to it in regular form. On the 30th October the A. D. 1828
French batteries opened their fire, and the garrison surrendered at discretion.

France thus gained the honour of delivering Greece from the last of her conquerors, and she increased the debt of gratitude due by the Greeks by the admirable conduct of the French soldiers. The fortresses surrendered by the Turks were in a ruinous condition, and the streets were encumbered with filth accumulated during seven years. All within the walls was a mass of putridity. Malignant fevers and plague were endemic, and had every year carried off numbers of the garrisons. The French troops transformed themselves into an army of pioneers; and these pestilential medieval castles were converted into habitable towns. The principal buildings were repaired, the fortifications improved, the ditches of Modon were purified, the citadel of Patras reconstructed, and a road for wheeled carriages formed from Modon to Navarin. The activity of the French troops exhibited how an army raised by conscription ought to be employed in time of peace, in order to prevent the labour of the men from being lost to their country. But like most lessons that inculcated order and system, the lesson was not studied by the rulers of Greece.

CHAPTER II.

PRESIDENCY OF COUNT CAPODISTRIAS. JANUARY 1828 TO OCTOBER 1831.

"Unlimited power corrupts the possessor; and this I know, that where law ends, there tyranny begins."—LORD CHATHAM.

CHARACTER OF COUNT JOHN CAPODISTRIAS—FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AS PRESIDENT—HIS OPINIONS AND POLICY—ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY—FABVIER'S RESIGNATION—OPERATIONS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN GREECE—TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES—CIVIL ADMINISTRATION—VIARO CAPODISTRIAS—FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION—JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION—PUBLIC INSTRUCTION—NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ARGOS—PROTOCOLS OF THE THREE PROTECTING POWERS—PRINCE LEOPOLD OF SAXE-COBURG SOVEREIGN OF GREECE—HIS RESIGNATION—CAPODISTRIAS BECOMES A TYRANT—HOSTILITY TO THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS—TYRANNY OF CAPODISTRIAS—AFFAIR OF POROS—DESTRUCTION OF THE GREEK FLEET—SACK OF POROS—FAMILY OF MAVROMICHALES—ASSASSINATION OF CAPODISTRIAS.

THE struggle for independence unfolded some virtues in the breasts of the Greeks which they were not previously supposed to possess. But a few years of a liberty that was mingled with lawlessness could not be expected to efface the effects of old habits and a vicious nurture. National energies were awakened, but no national responsibility was felt by individuals, so that the vices of modern Greek society were in each class stronger than the popular virtues which liberty was endeavouring to nourish. The mass of the people had behaved well; but the conduct of political and military leaders, of primates and statesmen, had been selfish and incapable. This was deliberately proclaimed by the National Assembly of Trœzene in 1827, when

public opinion rejected all the actors in the Revolution as unworthy of the nation's confidence, and elected Count Capodistrias president of Greece on the 14th April 1827 for a period of seven years.[1] A. D. 1828.

The decree which conferred the presidency on Capodistrias declared that he was elected because he possessed a degree of political experience which the Othoman domination had prevented any native Greek from acquiring. Much was therefore expected at his hands. It is the duty of the historian not only to record his acts, but to explain why his performances fell short of the expectations of the Greek nation.

Capodistrias was fifty-one years of age when he arrived in Greece. He was born at Corfu. His ancestors had received a title of nobility from the Venetian republic, but the family was not wealthy, and the young count, like many Corfiot nobles, was sent to Italy to study medicine, in order to gain his livelihood.[2] In 1803 he commenced his political career, being appointed secretary to the newly created republic of the Ionian Islands; in 1807, when Napoleon I. annexed the Ionian Islands to the French empire, he transferred his services to Russia, where accident gained him the favour of the Emperor Alexander I.; and in 1815 he was employed in the negotiations relating to the treaty of Paris. At that time he exerted himself, and was allowed to employ all the influence of the Russian cabinet, to re-establish the Ionian republic; but Great Britain insisted on retaining possession of these islands, and of holding complete command over their government, as a check on Russian intrigues among the orthodox population of the Othoman empire. Capodistrias was consequently

[1] Mamouka, vii. 132, and ix. 97. The decree is sometimes dated 3d (15th) April, which was Easter Sunday. It was adopted on Saturday, but signed by many members on Sunday.

[2] Kolettes, Glarakes, Zographos, Rhodios, and many other Greeks who acted a prominent part during the Revolution, were doctors.

obliged to rest satisfied with the concession that the Ionian Islands were to be formed into a separate, but not an independent, state under the British crown, instead of being, like Malta, declared a dependency of the British empire. Capodistrias hoped that even this might be rendered subservient to his ambitious schemes. He affected great contempt for English dulness, and he hoped that English dullards might be inveigled into favouring his views in the East. He never forgave English ministers for foiling his diplomatic projects, and the rancorous malevolence of his nature led him into several grave political errors. He hated England like an Ionian, but he indulged and exhibited his hatred in a way that was very unlike a statesman.

The patriotism of Capodistrias was identified with orthodoxy and nationality, not with civil liberty and political independence. To the social progress of the bulk of the population in Western Europe during his own lifetime, he paid little attention, and this neglect prevented his observing the influence which public opinion already exercised on the general conduct of most cabinets. He overrated the influence of orthodoxy in the Othoman empire, and the power of Russia in the international system of Europe. All this was quite natural, for his experience of mankind had been acquired either in the confined and corrupt society of Corfu, or in the artificial atmosphere of Russian diplomacy.

Yet with all his defects and prejudices, Capodistrias was immeasurably superior to every Greek whom the Revolution had hitherto raised to power. He had many virtues and great abilities. His conduct was firm and disinterested; his manners simple and dignified. His personal feelings were warm, and, as a consequence of this virtue, they were sometimes so strong as to warp his judgment. He wanted the equanimity and imparti-

ality of mind and the elevation of soul necessary to make a great man. A. D. 1828.

The father of Capodistrias was a bigoted aristocrat, and his own youthful education was partly Venetian and partly Greek. His instruction was not accurate, nor was his reading extensive, so that, through the cosmopolite intellectual cultivation of his later years, his provincial ideas often peeped out. He generally used the French language in writing as well as speaking. He was indeed unable to write Greek, though he spoke it fluently. Italian was of course his mother tongue. For a statesman he was far too loquacious.[1] He allowed everybody who approached him to perceive that on many great political questions of importance in Greece, his opinions were vague and unsettled. At times he spoke as a warm panegyrist of Russian absolutism, and at times as an enthusiastic admirer of American democracy.

Before accepting the presidency of Greece, Capodistrias visited Russia, and obtained the approbation of the Emperor Nicholas. He arrived in Greece in the month of January 1828, and he found the country in a state of anarchy. The government had been compelled to wander from one place to another, and had rendered itself contemptible wherever it had appeared. In November 1826 it fled from Nauplia, and soon after established itself at Egina. In 1827 it removed to Poros. In consequence of a decree of the National Assembly of Trœzene, it returned to Nauplia, but its presence caused a civil war, and it went back to Egina.

The first measures of Capodistrias were prompt and judicious. He could not put an immediate stop to

[1] General Pellion says, "Tous ceux qui ont connu particulièrement Capodistrias savent que, parlant avec une étonnante facilité et parlant beaucoup, il se laissait parfois aller à des indiscrétions fort extraordinaires."—*La Grèce et des Capodistrias pendant l'Occupation Française de* 1828 *à* 1834. Tricoupi, who was the president's secretary, says, Ἐλάλει ἀλλὰ δὲν ἔγραφεν Ἑλληνιστί, iv. 247.

some of the grossest abuses in the army, navy, and financial administration, without assuming dictatorial power. The necessity of his dictatorship was admitted; and the manner by which he sought its ratification from the existing government and the representative body, was generally approved. To give his administrative changes a national sanction without creating any check on his own power, he established a council of state, called Panhellenion, consisting of twenty-seven members, divided into three sections, for the consideration of administrative, financial, and judicial business. Decrees of the president were to be promulgated on reports of the whole Panhellenion, or of the section to which the business of the decree related. Capodistrias announced that he would convoke a national assembly in the month of April, and the warmest partisans of representative institutions allowed that the state of the country rendered an earlier convocation impracticable.[1]

But after making these concessions to public opinion, Capodistrias began to display his aversion to any systematic restraint on his arbitrary powers. He violated the provisions of the constitution of Trœzene without necessity, and by his proceedings soon taught the liberal party to regard him as the representative of force and not of law. Yet a clear perception of his position and his interest would have shown him that his power could have no firm foundation unless it was based on the supremacy of right.

The opinions and the policy of Capodistrias during his presidency are revealed by Count Bulgari, another Greek, who was Russian minister in Greece, and who was understood to echo the president's sentiments, even if he did not, as was generally reported, write under his dictation. In a memoir on the state of

[1] Proclamation, dated 20th January 1828. Γενικὴ Ἐφημερίς, 25th January 1828.

Greece in 1828, the views of Capodistrias are thus stated: "It would be a strange delusion to believe seriously in the possibility of organising any government whatever in Greece upon purely constitutional principles, which require a general tendency of the people to political forms, as well as elements of civilisation which exist only in a few individuals. The president of Greece thought that it was the duty of the three powers to destroy the Greek Revolution by establishing a monarchical government, in order to put an end to the scandalous and sanguinary scenes which made humanity shudder."[1] These sentiments were repeated by the president both to foreigners and Greeks, and showed on many occasions his want of sympathy with the cause of national independence, as well as his aversion to political liberty. His language constantly insinuated, though he perhaps never directly asserted, that he was the only fit sovereign for Greece. He harped incessantly on the theme, that all the men previously engaged in public business were demoralised either by the Turkish yoke, or by revolutionary anarchy; and he asserted that no permanent improvement could take place in the condition of the Greeks until the living generation had passed away. He called the primates, Christian Turks; the military chiefs, robbers; the men of letters, fools; and the phanariots, children of Satan; and he habitually concluded such diatribes by adding, that the good of the suffering people required that he should be allowed to govern with absolute power. And perhaps nothing better could have happened to Greece, had it been possible for him to forget that he was a Corfiot, and that he had two or three stupid brothers at Corfu.[2]

A. D. 1828.

The presidency of Capodistrias lasted more than three

[1] *Parliamentary Papers.* Protocol of 22d March 1829, enclosure in annex C.
[2] Compare Tricoupi, iv. 285.

years and a half. It was not, therefore, want of time which prevented his laying the foundations of an administrative system, and adopting a judicial organisation. The Greeks possessed local institutions of great administrative value; but instead of making use of these institutions, he wasted much time in striving to undermine them. He argued that no political good could rest on a democratic foundation. To the reign of law he had a passionate antipathy. He sometimes spoke of the law as a kind of personal enemy to his dictatorship. He insisted that, to govern Greece well, his power must be exercised without limit or restraint, and that the law which subjected his arbitrary authority to systematic rules was in some degree a mere constitutional delusion. He forgot that he required the assistance of the law to prevent his own creatures from robbing him of the power he had assumed. Unfortunately for Greece, Capodistrias was a diplomatist and not a statesman. His plans of government were vaguely sketched in provisional laws. He never framed a precise code of administrative procedure, and, as a natural consequence of the provisional nature of his government, his ordinances were nullified by the agents charged to carry them into execution. While he ridiculed the liberal theories of the constitutions of Epidaurus and Trœzene, he did not perceive that his own acts were those of an administrative sciolist.

The president's attention was early directed to the anarchy that prevailed in the military forces of Greece. The extortions of the soldiery were wasting all those districts into which the Egyptians had not penetrated. The agricultural population was in danger of extermination. The armed men who extorted pay and provisions from the country were now the followers of military chiefs, not the soldiers of the Greek government. In order to form an army, it was necessary to

break the connection between the soldiers and their leaders, and to form corps in which both the inferior and superior officers should depend directly on the president for their authority, and in which the soldiers should look to him for their pay, subsistence, reward, and punishment. Of military affairs Capodistrias was utterly ignorant, and, as usual, he allowed his suspicious nature to neutralise the effect of his sagacity. From excessive jealousy of his personal authority, he refused to employ experienced soldiers in organising his army, and he made a vain attempt to direct the enterprise himself. A.D. 1828

Demetrius Hypsilantes had proved his inability for organising an army, and Sir Richard Church had never been able to introduce any discipline in his camps. Capodistrias appointed the first to command an army destined to reconquer Eastern Greece, and left the second at the head of the disorganised bands in Western Greece. Fabvier, who had proved himself a good disciplinarian, and had formed regular battalions under circumstances of great difficulty, was neglected and driven from Greece. Capodistrias had the weakness or the misfortune to name always the wrong man for every important place. His enemies accused him of fearing the right man in any office.

The consequence of the unmilitary president attempting to regulate the details of military organisation, was that the Greek army remained without either order or discipline. A few reforms were introduced, tending to enable the president to know how many men Greece had in the field, and to diminish the frauds committed in the distribution of rations; and this introduction of a regular system of mustering, paying, and provisioning the troops by the central government deserves praise, though it was a very small step towards the formation of a Greek army.

The circumstances in which the Greek soldiery were placed at this epoch of the Revolution afforded great facilities for the introduction of military discipline, and for the formation of an efficient national army of veteran troops. The soldiers had eaten up the substance of the agricultural population, and were themselves in danger of starvation. Capodistrias, holding in his hands the absolute disposal of all the supplies from abroad on which the troops were dependent for pay and rations, could command their obedience to any terms he might impose. The most powerful chieftains only maintained a few followers by seizing the public revenues. They were hated by the people for their extortions, envied by the mass of the soldiery for the benefits they conferred on a few, and in open hostility with the public interests. The arrival of Capodistrias annihilated their usurped power, and the chieftains who kept possession of the fortresses of Corinth, Nauplia, and Monemvasia, in defiance of the preceding government, were compelled to surrender those places into his hands.

A camp was formed at Trœzene, to which all the troops of continental Greece in the Morea were summoned, in order that they might receive their new organisation. The president appeared and promulgated his scheme for the formation of a national army. About eight thousand men, consisting in great part of the armatoli who had remained faithful to the Greek cause, were divided into eight regiments or chiliarchies. The chiliarchs or colonels, and the other officers of these regiments, were named by the president. Paymasters were also appointed, and a regular commissariat formed, so that an end was put to the previous system of trading in rations. The facility with which every reform was adopted by the soldiers, and their alacrity in preferring the position of government

troops to that of personal followers of individual chieftains, proved that the president might easily have effected much more than he attempted. A. D. 1828.

The new regiments were inspected by the president at Trœzene in February 1828. The men had the aspect of veteran soldiers; still the review presented a very unmilitary spectacle. The chiliarchies were only distinguished by being separate groups of companies. The different companies were ranged in various forms and figures, according to the fancies of their captains—some were spun out in single files, some were drawn up four deep, some seemed to form circles, and some attempted to form squares. At last the whole army was ranged in lines, straggling in disorder, and undulating in unmeaning restlessness. The review, if such a spectacle can be called by a military term, was a parade for the purpose of enabling the inexperienced eye of the president to count the companies and examine the men of whom they were composed.

At a later period Capodistrias attempted to carry his organisation a step farther. In the autumn of 1829, after the termination of the war against the Turks in continental Greece, he again mustered the chiliarchies at Salamis. His military counsellor was Colonel Gerard, a French officer, whom he had appointed inspector of the Greek army. The troops present did not exceed five thousand men, who were divided into twenty battalions, and each battalion was composed of four companies. The commanders of the new battalions were called taxiarchs, and the chiliarchs were now ranked as generals. Paymasters were appointed to each battalion, and commanders were deprived of all control over the military chests. Had Capodistrias, when he introduced this new organisation, settled the supernumerary officers who were

willing to become agriculturists on national lands, he might have broken up the system of farming the revenues of the country to military men, which the chieftains had introduced, and saved Greece from the calamity of nourishing in her breast a second generation of these vipers.

Demetrius Hypsilantes was appointed to command the chiliarchies formed at Trœzene, and he established a camp at Megara. But though he was at the head of eight thousand armatoli, and the Turks had not four thousand men in Eastern Greece, he remained for seven months in utter idleness. No attempt was made to drill the men, to instruct the companies in the manœuvres of light infantry, nor to teach the chiliarchies the tactics of an army. Capodistrias justly reproached Hypsilantes with his inactivity and incapacity; but he forgot that it was his own duty to frame systematic regulations for the discipline of the whole Greek army, and to transmit both to Hypsilantes and Church precise orders to carry these regulations into effect.

Amidst the military reforms of Capodistrias he neglected the regular troops. Yet he was well aware that this body formed the only corps on which the government could always rely. Indeed this fact contains the true explanation of his neglect. The regular corps was a body that from its nature would identify itself with the executive government of Greece. The semi-organised battalions of regulars were held in dependence on the personal will and favour of Count Capodistrias. The president wished everything in Greece to be provisional until he should be appointed president for life, or sovereign of the country. That he might have it in his power to revive the regular corps when he required its services, he revived the law of conscription passed by the Greek government

in 1825, and applied it to the islands of the Archipelago. The pay of Fabvier's corps had fallen ten months into arrear after the unfortunate expedition to Chios. Instead of paying these arrears, and retaining Fabvier's veterans under arms, he allowed them to disband themselves. These men were attached to Fabvier, and Capodistrias was jealous of Fabvier's influence. But as it was necessary to gain credit in Western Europe for a wish to form a regular army, the president pretended that it was necessary to apply the law of conscription in order to obtain men. In this case the conduct of the president was marked by excessive duplicity, for he knew well that it would have been more economical to retain the veterans of the regular corps by paying the ten months' arrears which were due to them, than to enrol new recruits; and he was not insensible to the folly of withdrawing active labourers from the cultivation of the soil in the only part of Greece where agriculture was pursued in security and with profit. As soon as Fabvier perceived that the military plans of the president were subordinated to personal schemes of ambition, he resigned his command, as has been already mentioned, and quitted Greece in May 1828.[1] A.D. 1828.

Hypsilantes, as has been said, passed the summer of 1828 at Megara. The Russian war compelled Reshid Pasha to leave continental Greece and Epirus almost destitute of troops, and he was threatened with an insurrection of the Albanian chieftains in his own pashalik of Joannina. In autumn the Greeks advanced to Lombotina, famous for its apples, and drove the Turks into Lepanto. Hypsilantes about the same time occupied Bœotia and Phocis, and on the 29th of November

[1] The law of conscription was put in operation by a circular addressed to the municipalities, Γενικὴ Ἐφημερὶς, 25th April 1828; yet in March 1830 the number of Capodistrias's regulars only amounted to two thousand two hundred and fifty.

the Turks in Salona capitulated, and the capitulation was faithfully observed by the Greeks. On the 5th of December Karpenisi was evacuated. A few insignificant skirmishes took place during the winter. The Turks were too weak to attempt anything, and the anarchy that still prevailed among the Greek chiefs prevented the numerical superiority of the Greek forces from being available.[1]

The army of Western Greece was not more active than that of Eastern during the summer of 1828. Capodistrias visited the camp of Sir Richard Church near Mytika, and he declared that, on inspecting the troops in Acarnania, he found less order than in those he had reviewed at Trœzene. This visit gave the president a very unfavourable opinion of the generalissimo's talents for organisation. In September the Greeks advanced to the Gulf of Arta, and occupied Loutraki, where they gained possession of a few boats. Capodistrias named Pasano, a Corsican adventurer, to succeed Hastings as commander of the naval forces in Western Greece. Pasano made an unsuccessful attempt to force the passage into the Gulf of Arta, but some of the Greek officers under his command, considering that he had shown both cowardice and incapacity in the affair, renewed the enterprise without his order, and passed gallantly under the batteries of

[1] Two examples of the condition of the Greek army may be cited:—"Dr Howe gave 12,000 lb. of beans to the Megarians to sow their fields. To-day a deputation informed him that the troops who had returned to Megara were cutting down all the young plants for salad, and the officers were feeding their horses on them. They solicited Howe to use his influence with the president to prevent the entire destruction of their crop."—MS. Journal, 20th February 1829. Captain Hane reports that a regular trade in provisions was carried on by some men with the Turks, and the supplies were drawn from Sir Richard Church's camp. Fabricius, who commanded the Helvetia, stopped a vessel laden with provisions attempting to reach Previsa, and as she had a passport signed by the generalissimo, he sent her to Dragomestre, where Sir Richard Church released her without waiting for a decision of the Admiralty Court. Hastings, on returning from Western Greece in 1828, complained of similar conduct. He wrote: "To conciliate the unprincipled chieftains, Church ruins the army."

Previsa.[1] This exploit secured to the Greeks the command of the Gulf of Arta. Pasano was recalled, and Admiral Kriezes, a Hydriot officer of ability and courage, succeeded him. The town of Vonitza, a ruinous spot, was occupied by the Greek troops on the 27th December 1828; but the almost defenceless Venetian castle did not capitulate until the 17th March 1829. The passes of Makrynoros were occupied in April. A. D. 1829.

Capodistrias, who had blamed both Hypsilantes and Church for incapacity, now astonished the world by making his brother Agostino a general.[2]

Count Agostino Capodistrias, besides not being a military man, was really little better than a fool; yet the president, blinded by fraternal affection, named this miserable creature his plenipotentiary in Western Greece, and empowered him to direct all military and civil business. The plenipotentiary arrived in the Hellas. On the 30th April 1829, the garrison of Naupaktos (Lepanto) capitulated, and was transported to Previsa. On the 14th May, Mesolonghi and Anatolikon were evacuated by the Turks.

Reshid Pasha escaped the mortification of witnessing the loss of all his conquests in Greece. His prudence and valour were rewarded with the rank of grand vizier, and he quitted Joannina to assume the command of the Othoman army at Shumla before the Turks evacuated continental Greece.

The war terminated in 1829. The Allied powers fixed the frontier of Greece by a protocol in the month of March. Yet the Turks would not yield possession of the places they still held in Eastern Greece, and some skirmishes ensued, in which a great deal of

[1] The Greeks lost one killed and three wounded.

[2] Tricoupi says, Ὁ κυβερνήτης ἐμέμφετο τὸν ἀρχιστράτηγον καὶ τὸν στρατάρχην ὡς ἀναξίους τῆς ὑψηλῆς θέσεώς των, iv. 342.

powder was wasted, and very little blood was shed.[1] A body of Albanians, under Aslan Bey, marched from Zeituni by Thermopylæ, Livadea, and Thebes, and reached Athens without encountering opposition. After leaving a small and select garrison in the Acropolis, Aslan Bey collected all the Turks in Attica and Bœotia, and commenced his retreat. But on arriving at the pass of Petra, between Thebes and Livadea, he found a body of Greek troops strongly posted to dispute the passage. The Turks, unable to advance, concluded a capitulation on the 25th of September 1829, by which they engaged to evacuate all Eastern Greece, except the Acropolis of Athens and the fort of Karababa on the Euripus. Thus Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes had the honour of terminating the war which his brother had commenced on the banks of the Pruth; and this action cherished in his mind the delusion that, as the representative of his brother Alexander, he was the right sovereign for Greece. As a military man, he was deficient in tactical knowledge and strategic capacity; as a statesman, he was utterly destitute of judgment; but his personal courage and private virtues command respect.

The civil administration of Capodistrias was founded on no organised system. He found the Greeks enjoying a degree of individual liberty, and exercising in their municipalities more independent political action than he had supposed existed on the continent of Europe; for his opinions concerning the internal administration of Switzerland, though he had resided there for some time, and laboured as a Russian diplomatist to secure its existence as an independent state, were very crude. In Greece he mistook the liberty he found existing for the cause of the anarchy that desolated the country, and this anarchy he considered to be a

[1] Tricoupi, iv. 365: Πολλὴ πυρόκονις ἐκάη, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον αἷμα ἐχύθη.

necessary consequence of the sovereignty of the people. A. D. 1829.
He determined to eradicate the municipal system, which appeared to him to have transfused the elements of revolutionary action into the frame of society; and he began to weaken the power of the municipalities, by converting the demogeronts into agents of the executive authority. To complete the destruction of revolutionary principles, he created a governmental police, and rendered its members responsible to him alone for the exercise of their powers. His plan of government was very simple, but really impracticable. He retained in his own hands the absolute direction of every branch of the public administration, declaring that nothing could be permanently settled concerning the internal organisation of the country until the three powers had decided its external position as an independent state. The real object was to render his services indispensable either as prime minister, hospodar, prince, or king.

Capodistrias divided the Morea into seven provinces, and the islands into six. These provinces were governed provisionally by thirteen extraordinary commissioners, to whom he intrusted great and ill-defined authority.[1] Immemorial usages, and old as well as new political institutions, were suspended, and the despotism of these Greek pashas was restrained by no published instructions, no fixed forms of proceeding, and by no judicial authority.

The evil effects of arbitrary power were soon visible. Ibrahim's conquests, the financial corruption of Konduriottes's government, and the military anarchy that succeeded, had paralysed the action of the municipalities. Instead of removing abuses and restoring their vigour, they were robbed of all independent action, even in the direction of their local affairs. The com-

[1] Γενικὴ Ἐφημερίς, 18th and 21st April 1828.

missioners of Capodistrias presided at the election of new demogeronts; and these newly-elected municipal magistrates were converted into subordinate agents of the president's minister of the interior. By this change in the local institutions of Greece, the way was prepared for their complete nullification by the Bavarians.

The operation of Capodistrias's government may be exemplified by citing the proceedings of Viaro Capodistrias, who was considered the most energetic of the extraordinary commissioners, and who governed the Western Sporades, which was the most important province in the islands. Viaro was the president's elder brother: he was a Corfiot lawyer. The confined experience gained in a corrupt semi-Venetian society was not counteracted by good sense and a benevolent heart: Viaro was sulky, obstinate, and insolent. Capodistrias cannot have been entirely blind to his brother's defects, for he drove him away from Russia, though he invited him to Greece.

While Capodistrias was a favourite minister of the Emperor Alexander, Viaro visited Russia, where he met with a very kind reception. For a moment the Corfiot lawyer indulged in visions of wealth and splendour, which were very soon dispelled by his diplomatic brother. One evening, after Capodistrias had waited on some members of the imperial family, he came back to Viaro, and addressed him to the following purport: "I have seen the emperor to-day, and I have just quitted several members of the imperial family. The emperor is ready to appoint you to an honourable place in his service; but I must tell you beforehand, that if you accept the offer, I shall immediately resign my place and return to Corfu. We are foreigners, and we could not both long retain office here. It is for

you to decide which of us ought to remain."[1] Viaro believed that he was capable of ruling an empire, but he felt that he could not instantly move with an unembarrassed step among the statesmen and princes of Russia if deprived of his brother's countenance. He therefore returned to Corfu. A. D. 1829.

A more confined sphere of action was opened to him in 1828, but he was intrusted with absolute power over the islands of Hydra, Spetzas, Poros, and Egina. The elevation was sufficient to turn his head. He arrogated to himself both legislative and judicial, as well as merely administrative, authority, within the bounds of his province, and he exercised the sovereign power he assumed in a very capricious manner. In virtue of his legislative power he fixed the rate of interest, and in virtue of his judicial he inflicted the penalty of confiscation for the violation of this provincial law. He arrested Greek citizens, and retained them in prison, without accusing them of any offence except dissatisfaction with his conduct. He appointed demogeronts without even going through the formality of a popular election; he superseded those elected by the people whenever they opposed his measures, and replaced them by his own nominees. He named judges without any warrant from the president; and when a primate of Livadea refused to obey a decision of these judges, he sent the primate to prison. He imposed taxes when he was in want of money, without any vote of the municipalities, or any authority from the central government. He ordered private letters to be stopped and opened; and he carried his imprudence and folly so far as to break open and read despatches addressed to the English naval

[1] This well-known anecdote will be found in *Mémoires Biographiques Historiques sur le Comte Jean Capodistrias*, par A. Papadopoulos Vretos, vol. i. p. 37.

officer on the station, though he was assured by Mr Gropius, the Austrian consul, that these despatches were official orders passing from one ship on the station to another, and which ought not to be passed through the health-office.

The friends of Capodistrias declared that many of the arbitrary acts of Viaro's administration proceeded from the misconduct of his subordinates. The inhabitants of Egina, believing this, appealed to the sense of justice of their extraordinary commissioner. They transmitted to him a petition complaining of the oppressive and corrupt conduct of the health-officer he had appointed. Viaro received the document at Poros, and immediately ordered his secretary, who remained at Egina, to call a meeting of the inhabitants to receive his answer. When the Eginetans were assembled, the secretary produced the petition, and asked them if that was the paper they had signed and transmitted to Viaro. They replied that it was. The secretary then announced to them that they were convoked to see their petition burned by order of Count Viaro Capodistrias, extraordinary commissioner of the president of Greece in the Western Sporades; and when the document was consumed, they were told that they had received a milder reply than they merited.

The acts of Viaro rendered him unpopular; his proclamations rendered him ridiculous. The Hydriots resisted some of his quarantine regulations, and when the quarantine to which he had subjected them expired, he addressed them thus—"Place your confidence in the providence of God and the forethought of your government; but beware of examining the acts or criticising the conduct of your rulers, for you may be led into error, and error may bring down calamity on your heads."

The folly of Agostino, and the tyranny of Viaro, would have ruined the president without the assistance

of any other Corfiots, but he brought over Mustoxidi, A. D. 1829.
a literary man of some merit, and Gennatas, a lawyer in good practice, to aid in exciting the jealousy of the Greeks, who had borne an active part in the Revolution, and considered themselves entitled to all the spoils of official employment.

Public opinion generally verifies the value of modern governments by the touchstone of finance. The presidency of Capodistrias was not remarkable either for the ability or the honesty of its financial administration. He found the collection and expenditure of the public revenues a mass of fraud and peculation. His overweening self-sufficiency prompted him to assume the whole task of cleansing the Augean stable, and he retained the supreme direction of the finance department in his own hands. His hostility to all constitutional forms prevented him from making use of publicity as a means of controlling subordinate and distant officials, over whose proceedings he could exercise no direct inspection. His admiration of the autocratic system of administration blinded him to the impossibility of applying it without a well-organised body of officials. His want of practical acquaintance with the details of financial business rendered all his schemes for reforming abuses unavailing; and, as in every other department, his extreme jealousy prevented him from employing men who possessed the practical knowledge in which he was deficient. The general conduct of the finance department was intrusted to a board composed of three members. But they were men who possessed little knowledge beyond that of experienced accountants. No payments were made for the service of any ministerial department without an order under the president's sign-manual. He reserved to himself the task of framing a new financial system for Greece. The consequence of this

determination to do everything was, that he neither effected any improvement, nor allowed others to propose any extensive reform.

The principal branch of the Greek revenues was the tenth of the annual produce of all cultivated land, and an additional rent of fifteen per cent on all Turkish property which had been declared national.[1] The Othoman system of farming the taxes was adhered to, and the revolutionary practice of letting large districts to primates and military chiefs, instead of committing the collection to the municipal authorities.

Capodistrias did not restrain the abuses of the farmers of the tenths.[2] He even employed the farming system as a means of strengthening his power. He favoured the chieftains whom he considered to be his personal partisans, and increased their influence by allowing them to farm large districts. By this means they maintained large bodies of military followers as tax-collectors, and the president considered these men as more completely under his personal influence than the soldiers of the government. This policy often led him to sacrifice national advantages to the tortuous schemes of personal ambition.

The receipts of the year 1829 exceeded 4,000,000 drachms, and the expense of three thousand regular troops amounted to only about 1,000,000. The sum of 3,000,000 would have been amply sufficient to

[1] The Greek revenues at this time were derived from the following sources:—

1°, The tenth of cultivated land, and 25 per cent on national property.
2°, The custom duties.
3°, The farming of salt-works and fisheries.
4°, Cattle-tax.
5°, Duties on houses, shops, and mills, on passports, and from quarantines.

[2] The island of Egina enjoyed more direct protection from Capodistrias than any part of Greece, yet the proprietors were often forced to leave ripe figs and grapes ungathered until they bribed the farmer of the taxes for permission to gather them. Cases often occurred in which a part of the crop was lost by the tax-gatherer delaying to visit any garden of which the proprietor refused to pay the composition which was demanded.

maintain an army of five thousand regulars, with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery. Now, as the expenditure of the civil government was only estimated at 300,000 drachms, it is evident that an able and honest administration might have laid the foundations of order in the army, and secured an impartial administration of justice by appointing well-paid judges. A man less occupied with diplomatic intrigues, Holy-Alliance policy, and foreign protocols, than Capodistrias, even though of far inferior ability, might, by giving his principal attention to the improvement of the condition of the agricultural population, have soon raised Greece to a flourishing position, and secured to himself a great historic name. A. D. 1829.

The administration of the customs was greatly improved. Under the inspection of Colonel Heideck, those of the Gulf of Argolis were raised from 20,000 to 336,000 drachms annually, without any increase of duties, and those of Syra were greatly increased.

A new monetary system was introduced, but it was unfortunately based on an erroneous theory, and carried into execution with a defective assay. The monetary relations of Greece indicated that the currency either of France or Austria ought to have been adopted as the standard of the Greek coinage, and there were strong theoretic and practical reasons for preferring the franc as the unit. Capodistrias, influenced by old commercial associations of Levant merchants, struck a new coin called a phœnix (which was afterwards termed a drachma by the Bavarian regency), as the unit of the Greek monetary system; but in place of making it equal in value to a franc, he made it one-sixth of the metallic value of a Spanish pillar dollar. Now, as the Spanish pillar dollar was a coin circulating in Levant for commercial purposes at an agio, it was clearly an error to base the monetary system on such a standard.

A defective assay also caused an error in the metallic value of the coinage issued by Capodistrias, and the phœnix was issued in small quantity.

A national bank was also established in name, but the title was intended to deceive Western Europe, not to facilitate banking operations in Greece. The so-called national bank was nothing more than a loan, opened at first by voluntary subscription. The misapplication of the name caused distrust in a mercantile society like that of Greece; and the president, finding his persuasion insufficient to induce many wealthy Greeks to deposit money in the national bank, used his political power to compel them to advance money to it. Government took possession of all the sums received; and before two months elapsed, Capodistrias himself candidly admitted to Captain Hastings that for the time the national bank was only a forced loan.

At a later period the president proposed an excellent financial measure to the national assembly of Argos, but, like too many of his good intentions, it was never carried into execution. The public accounts were ordered to be submitted to the supervision of a court of control at the end of every quarter.

The absence of any systematic administration of justice was the cause of great national demoralisation during the course of the Greek Revolution. Honest men ruined themselves by fulfilling their obligations; dishonest men repudiated even those pecuniary debts which they could have paid without inconvenience. To the people it appeared that honesty was not the best policy in pecuniary affairs, and the general tendency to financial dishonesty is, as the preceding pages have shown, deeply marked on the history of the Greeks. When Capodistrias arrived, the insecurity of life and property among the agricultural classes threatened the dissolution of society, and the Greeks

seemed in danger of becoming a nation of traders in towns and cities like the Jews. The desire to see the supremacy of justice firmly established was one cause of the election of Capodistrias to the presidency, and to the fervour with which he was welcomed on his arrival. He was selected by the almost unanimous voice of his countrymen as the only Greek capable of putting an end to the reign of injustice. Nothing in his political career exhibits his deficiencies as a statesman so strikingly as his failure to appreciate the value of a firm and impartial administration of justice. The career of a legislator lay before him. Had he seized the sword of justice and walked boldly forward, he would have soon marched at the head of the Greek nation; and courts, cabinets, and protocols would have found some difficulty in contesting his right to be the ruler of Greece. But he loved power more than justice; and yet by not loving justice he lost his hold on power. A.D. 1829.

The indifference of Capodistrias to the establishment of legal tribunals can only be explained by his love of absolute power. Soon after his arrival, he created a few justices and some minor courts to decide trifling questions. But no legal tribunals were established, and his extraordinary commissioners were allowed to exercise an exceptional and extensive legal jurisdiction, of which his brother Viaro took every possible advantage, and used with unrestricted licence. A decree organising civil and criminal tribunals, and establishing a court of review, at last appeared on the 27th August 1830.[1] Capodistrias attempted to excuse his delay by declaring that he had avoided doing anything to circumscribe the authority of the future sovereign of Greece—a futile assertion; for he well knew that by prolonging anarchy he had increased the difficulties in the way of

[1] Supplement to No. 73 of the Γενικὴ Ἐφημερίς, 10th September 1830.

establishing order. As long as Capodistrias had any prospect of retaining the government of Greece in his own hands, he wished to retain all judiciary authority in direct subordination to the executive, as in Russia; and he was adverse to the promulgation of fixed rules of procedure, and to the constitution of independent courts of law. The Corfiot lawyer, Gennatas, whom he appointed minister of justice, and to whom he intrusted the task of preparing the judicial organisation, was the instrument of his views rather from defective judgment than from malevolent intentions. The assembly of Argos declared that the president ought to render the judges irremovable, but neither Capodistrias nor Gennatas were of this opinion.[1] This good advice was rejected by Capodistrias, as it has been for more than a quarter of a century by King Otho. But Capodistrias, in the true spirit of despotism, conferred arbitrary powers on the police authorities, and created exceptional tribunals to judge political offences.[2]

Capodistrias made a great show of promoting education, but he did very little for facilitating public instruction, and nothing for improving the intellectual condition of the Greek clergy. Yet he affected to be a friend to knowledge, and he was sincerely devout. Political intrigue seems to have occupied all his thoughts, absorbed his time, and inspired all his actions during his presidency.

He built an immense orphan asylum at Egina, which was filled with children delivered from slavery and brought back from Egypt. It was from no fault of Capodistrias, perhaps, but the internal management of this establishment was ill regulated, and it did not prosper. The president ordered many schoolhouses to

[1] Decrees of the Assembly of Argos, No. 11, art. 7, 22d June 1829.

[2] See Πολιτικὴ καὶ Ἐγκληματικὴ Διαδικασια, published at Egina in 1830 pp. 11 and 110.

be built in different parts of Greece, but he had shown A. D. 1829.
so little forethought in the business, that many were soon converted into barracks for soldiers. In the towns, government did very little to promote public education, and the governors named by the president more than once prevented teachers from opening private schools. The education of the clergy was utterly neglected, and a race of priests remained, whose ignorance was a disgrace to the Orthodox Church, and who increased the national corruption. Capodistrias succeeded in deceiving the Liberals in France, Germany, and Switzerland, into a belief that he was labouring sincerely to improve public instruction, but his personal views are exemplified by two acts. He ordered the professor of Greek literature at Egina not to read the Gorgias of Plato with his pupils, and he made war on the press at Nauplia.[1]

The arbitrary conduct of the president created a constitutional opposition to his administration, and he found himself obliged to convoke a national assembly, in order to give a sanction to his dictatorial power. His popularity with the people in the Morea was very great, for his government had delivered them from the Egyptians, and established some better guarantees for the protection of life and property than had previously existed. In a freely-elected chamber of deputies he would have been sure of a large majority, but he wished to silence all opposition, and he adopted many violent and illegal measures to exclude every man whom he deemed a Liberal. In a number of districts where the character of his opponents seemed likely to insure their election, he proposed himself as a candidate; and after securing his own election, it was generally not difficult to obtain the nomination of one of his own partisans in his place.

[1] Thiersch, *De l'Etat Actuel de la Grèce*, i. 22 and 54; Tricoupi, iv. 291.

The national assembly of Argos was opened by Capodistrias in a Russian uniform on the 23d July 1829. The assembly ratified everything the president had done, and intrusted him with all the additional power he desired. Only the laws which he approved and recommended were passed. He did not venture to obtain his nomination to the presidency for life, for it would have been imprudent to take so important a step in the settlement of the government of Greece without the previous consent of the three allied powers. But he obtained an act of the assembly, declaring that the decisions of the conferences of London should not be held to be binding on Greece until they were ratified by the Greek legislature.[1] He trusted to his own diplomatic skill for rendering this law subservient to his schemes concerning the sovereignty of Greece.

The Panhellenion was replaced by a senate, but the organisation of this senate was left by the assembly entirely in the hands of the president. It was a consultative and not a legislative council, and its consent was not indispensable to any laws except those relating to the permanent disposition of the national lands.

Capodistrias was also empowered to name a regency in case of his death, which was to conduct the government until the meeting of a national assembly.

The proceedings of the national assembly of Argos were opposed to the free spirit of the national assemblies of the earlier period of the Greek Revolution. The principle of government nomination too often replaced the old usage of popular election, and tortuous ways were adopted instead of direct courses. Thus, in appointing the senate, sixty-eight names were submitted by the assembly to the president, who selected twenty-one of these candidates to be senators. The

[1] Γενικὴ Ἐφημερίς, No. 53, 30th July 1829.

senate was then completed by the addition of six members named by the president. A. D. 1829.

The establishment of two chambers to share the legislative power, was contemplated by the assembly, but the president was intrusted with the arrangements necessary for calling the legislature into existence.[1]

The excessive confidence of the deputies misled Capodistrias into the conviction that his power was irresistible, and from this time his conduct became more arbitrary, and his personal partisans more insolent.

The proceedings of the three protecting powers gave him great anxiety. He detested England, mistrusted France, and doubted the sentiments of the Russian cabinet, for he felt that he was not admitted to its secrets. The nomination of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (Leopold, king of the Belgians) to be sovereign of Greece, disappointed his hopes and irritated his feelings. He had laboured to convince Europe that he was the only man capable of organising a state in Greece. His ambition was legitimate. But his own double-dealing had prevented even Russia from assuming the responsibility of advocating his cause. Had his conduct not been marked by duplicity, and had he sought to attain his object by honest and legal measures, it is probable that he would have succeeded. Diplomacy is not in the habit of working miracles, and neither an Epaminondas nor a Washington was likely to arise among the semi-Venetian aristocracy of Corfu.

The three powers conducted their conferences at London in a slow and vacillating manner. The principles which ought to have regulated their proceedings were lucidly announced in a report drawn up by their representatives at Poros, on the 12th December 1828.[2]

[1] Γενικὴ Ἐφημερὶς, No. 53. The decree is dated 22d July (3d August) 1829

[2] *Parliamentary Papers*—Protocol of a conference of the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia, held at Poros 12th December 1828.

The measures then recommended were embodied in a protocol signed at London on the 22d March 1829, and were not very dissimilar from those which were ultimately adopted when Greece was declared a kingdom in 1832.[1] The frontier of the Greek state was drawn from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta. The annual tribute to the sultan was fixed at about £30,000. The Turks who had possessed land in Greece were allowed to sell their property. An hereditary sovereign was to be chosen by the three protecting powers, who, though he acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte, was to enjoy complete independence in all business relating to the political government and the internal administration. This plan, warmly supported by Sir Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), might have been carried into execution without delay, had the Earl of Aberdeen, who was then Foreign Secretary, been as well acquainted with the state of Turkey and Greece as Sir Stratford. Unfortunately the Earl of Aberdeen treated the question with diplomatic pedantry. While Capodistrias was intriguing, while Sultan Mahmud was fuming with rage, and while the population of Greece was perishing from misery, the English Foreign Secretary insisted on reserving to each of the Allied courts the right of weighing separately the objections which the indignant sultan might make to the proposed arrangements; and England and France sent ambassadors to Constantinople to open negotiations with the Othoman government.

In the mean time the success of Russia compelled the sultan to sign the treaty of Adrianople on the 14th September 1829; and an article in this treaty bound the sultan to adhere to the treaty of 6th July 1827 for the pacification of Greece, and to adopt the provisions

[1] Compare the Protocol of the 22d March 1829 with Annex A to the Protocol of the 26th April 1832.

of the protocol of the 22d March 1829.[1] The alarm of the sultan at the progress of the Russian army had induced him to make this concession a few days sooner to the ambassadors of England and France. On the 9th September the reis-effendi notified to them the sultan's adhesion to the treaty, and pledged himself to adopt all the decisions of the powers for carrying it into execution.[2] The Russians took advantage of the vagueness of this communication to exact a precise recognition of the protocol of the 22d of March in their treaty of peace, and in order to prevent the Porte from making use of its habitual tergiversations and delays, they bound the sultan to name a plenipotentiary for executing the stipulations of the protocol in conjunction with commissioners of the Allied powers. A. D. 1829.

The policy of the British cabinet received a severe rebuke. Great Britain had prevented France from establishing the pacification of Greece, by sending the French troops in the Morea to compel the Turks to evacuate continental Greece. France yielded to the counsels of Lord Aberdeen, and Russia profited by his lordship's blunder.

The courts of England and France felt humiliated by the position in which Russia had placed them. The sultan was obsequious; the Greeks were grateful. Capodistrias perhaps expected with secret tremulation to hear that he was named hospodar of the Morea. To give the negotiations a new turn, and neutralise the credit of Russia, a decisive step was taken in a different direction. By the protocol of 3d February 1830, Greece was declared an independent state, but the boon of independence was rendered a punishment by diminishing the extent of the country. A new frontier was drawn from the mouth of the Achelous to the mouth

[1] Lesur, *Annuaire Historique*, 1829. See the 10th article of the treaty.
[2] *Parliamentary Papers*, Annex B to Protocol of 3d February 1830.

of the Sperchius. Diplomatic ignorance could hardly have traced a more unsuitable line of demarcation. All Acarnania and a considerable part of Etolia were surrendered to the sultan. That part of the continent in which Greek is the language of the people was annexed to Turkey, and that part in which the agricultural population speaks the Albanian language was attached to Greece. With such a frontier it was certain that peace could only be established by force; yet the protocol declared that no power should send troops to Greece without the unanimous consent of the Allies. Lord Aberdeen's injudicious protocol concluded with a foolish paragraph, congratulating the Allied courts on having reached the close of a long and difficult negotiation.

The sovereignty of the diminished state was offered to and accepted by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg.[1] The Porte immediately accepted these arrangements. It was not blind to the advantage of retaining possession of Acarnania and great part of Etolia. On the other hand, Capodistrias availed himself of the unsuitable frontier to thwart the execution of the protocol. He was so sure of the nation's support, that he did not give himself any trouble to conceal his duplicity. He declared that the decree of the national assembly of Argos deprived him of the power of giving a legal sanction to the provisions of the protocol signed by the Allied powers. He pretended that he was placed in a position of great difficulty; that he feared to convoke a national assembly, as the deputies would either protest against the proceedings of the Allies, or violate their duty to their country and their instructions from their electors; but that he would accept the protocol on his own responsibility.[2] The

[1] *Parliamentary Papers.* Prince Leopold accepted the sovereignty on the 11th February 1830.

[2] *Parliamentary Papers,* Annex F, Protocol, 14th May 1830; Lesur, *Ann. Hist.,* 1829—Documents, p. 111.

ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia knew that he had drawn up the instructions of the electors to the deputies with his own hand, and they could not overlook the fact, that while he manifested extreme tenderness for the consciences of the deputies, he showed no hesitation in violating his own duty as president of Greece by setting aside a national decree, and accepting the protocol in an illegal manner, in order to obtain its repudiation, if it suited his convenience, at a later period. A. D. 1830.

Greece was so tortured by her provisional condition that the nomination of Prince Leopold was accepted by the people as a boon. Addresses of congratulation were spontaneously prepared. There was an outbreak of national enthusiasm; and many officials, believing that Capodistrias was sincere in the assurance which he gave in public, that he was anxious to give the new sovereign a cordial reception, signed these addresses. At first the president did not venture to oppose the general feeling, but he announced that previous approval of the government was necessary in order to give the addresses a legitimate character. Shortly after, he ventured to proclaim that every address which had not been submitted to the revision of the agents of his government previous to signature, emanated from obscure emissaries of the opposition. He was seriously alarmed at the eagerness to welcome the new sovereign in order to put an end to his own provisional administration. His devoted partisans alone knew his private wishes, and they endeavoured to prevent the spontaneous addresses from being signed, and delayed their transmission to the prince.[1] After the resignation of Prince Leopold, Capodistrias treated the signature of the spontaneous addresses as an act of

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, Annex C, Protocol, 26th July 1830; Circular to Civil Governors of Greece, dated 2d June 1830.

hostility to his government, and dismissed many officials who were innocent of any wish to join the opposition, but who had been misled by his own assurance into a belief that he wished the prince to receive a hearty welcome. In order to neutralise the effect of the popular demonstrations in the prince's favour, the civil governors in the provinces were ordered to prepare other addresses. Many of these were not circulated for signature until the resignation of Prince Leopold was known to Capodistrias, and several of them were antedated.[1]

From this period, the secret police, which had been gradually formed under the direction of Viaro and Gennatas, acquired additional power. It became, as in many countries on the continent of Europe, a terrible social scourge.[2] The preference which the great body of the people had shown for a foreign sovereign filled the heart of Capodistrias with rage. He could not repress his feelings, and even to strangers he often inveighed bitterly against the ingratitude of his countrymen.

Yet he endeavoured to persuade the world that the Greeks viewed the nomination of Prince Leopold with dissatisfaction, if not with absolute aversion, and he succeeded so far as to create an impression that the Greeks were at least divided in opinion. He alarmed Prince Leopold with the fear of meeting an unfavourable reception. He attempted to disgust the prince by suggesting the necessity of his changing his religion, though it was well known that the Greek clergy were as eager to welcome a Protestant sovereign as the laity.

[1] The address of the Psarians was signed at Egina on the 20th July, but it was dated 7th June. Capodistrias did not inform the prince that the addresses were ready to be transmitted to England until the 26th of July. He was then aware that the prince had resigned on the 21st of May.

[2] Thiersch, i. 27; Pellion, 177.

The condition of Greece at the time of Prince Leopold's nomination explains the proceedings of Capodistrias. Most of the ablest and most influential men had been driven from the public service, and excluded from the assembly of Argos. The senate was composed of the president's creatures. The government had not received a permanent organisation. No administration of justice gave a sure guarantee for life and property to private individuals. The people suspected that the country was retained in this provisional state to further the president's schemes of personal ambition. The nomination of Prince Leopold took Capodistrias by surprise, while he was preparing to convince Europe that the Greeks would not accept a foreign sovereign, and to persuade Liberals that the constitutional governments of England and France ought to admit the principle of popular election. He knew how to manage that universal suffrage should elect him sovereign of Greece. When he found his hopes baffled, and saw himself without any national support, he acted like a diplomatist, and not like a statesman. Instead of convoking a national assembly and adopting a national policy, he played a game of personal intrigue. He accepted the protocol to thwart its execution. He violated the law of Greece to keep the conduct of the negotiations in his own hands, and he deceived the prince with false representations. A. D. 1830.

Prince Leopold, on the other hand, acted imprudently in accepting the sovereignty of Greece before he had made up his mind to assume the immediate direction of the government. And his resignation, after having accepted the sovereignty, deserves severe reprobation. Princes can only be punished for trifling with the fortunes of nations by the judgment of history. The British government also acted most injudiciously, both in pressing him to accept, and in permit-

ting him to double about after accepting. The objections he made to the arrangements of the protocol ought to have warned Lord Aberdeen that the prince was not the man suitable for the contingency. Indeed, it seems strange that the unfriendly correspondence which preceded Prince Leopold's nomination did not awaken a deeper sense of the responsibility due to the suffering inhabitants of Greece in the breasts both of the prince and of the British ministers.

If Prince Leopold really believed, as he wrote to Lord Aberdeen on the 3d February 1830, "that he could imagine no effectual mode of pacifying Greece without including Candia in the new state," it was his duty to refuse the government of Greece until Candia formed part of his sovereignty. Yet he was content to give up Candia and accept the sovereignty on the 11th of the month. The Allies were fairly warned not to permit ulterior negotiations on questions concerning which they were determined to make no concessions, but they neglected the warning. In the correspondence between the British government and Prince Leopold, which was laid before parliament, the prince appears as a rhetorician and not a statesman, and as a diplomatist and not an administrator.[1]

Even the dark picture Capodistrias drew of the state of Greece, and the difficulties likely to await the prince on his arrival, did not warrant Prince Leopold's retiring from his engagement. But Prince Leopold all along trifled with the awful responsibility he had assumed. It was his duty, the moment he accepted the sovereignty of Greece, to invite some Greek who had acquired practical experience in public business during the Revolution, to attend his person and act as

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*—Communications with Prince Leopold relating to the sovereignty of Greece, particularly letters of Lord Aberdeen to Prince Leopold, 31st January 1830, and Prince Leopold to Lord Aberdeen, 3d February 1830.

secretary of state. He ought immediately to have summoned a council of state, of which he might have invited Capodistrias to name a few members. With constitutional advisers, Prince Leopold would have found all his difficulties vanish. The bad faith of Capodistrias in his dealings with the prince is proved by the simple fact that he did not immediately send to London such men as Glarakes, Rizos, Psyllas, and Tricoupi, for he had employed them all in high office, and knew that, whatever might be their deficiencies, they were men of education and personal integrity. The president may be excused for trusting party leaders like Mavrocordatos, Metaxas, or Kolettes; but when the prince asked for a confidential adviser, it was insulting Greece to send Prince Wrede, a young Bavarian, who had arrived in the country after the termination of the war, and who knew very little more of the social and political condition of Greece than the Greeks knew of his existence. Indeed, Capodistrias himself knew only that the man he sent was called Prince Wrede, and had been recommended to General Heideck. It would have been almost impossible, among the foreigners then in Greece, to have selected a person so utterly incompetent to furnish Prince Leopold either with information or counsel. Jealousy and duplicity, as usual, were too strong in the breast of Capodistrias to admit of his concealing them. A.D 1830.

Prince Leopold, after wearying the Allies and tormenting the English ministers with his negotiations, resigned the sovereignty of Greece on the 17th May 1830. Whether he would have gained in Greece the honour he has won as a wise ruler on the throne of Belgium, cannot be known; but when we reflect how many years of anarchy he would have saved the Greeks, it must be owned that he would have served humanity well by estimating more accurately than he

did estimate it the responsibilities he incurred when he accepted the sovereignty of Greece.

The position of Capodistrias had been changed, and his power was shaken, by the nomination of Prince Leopold, nor did he recover his equanimity on the prince's resignation. As often happens to successful intriguers, he found himself now embarrassed by his false pretences and provisional measures. He had told the Greeks that it was necessary to put an end to the Revolution. They re-echoed his own phrases, and clamoured for the establishment of permanent institutions; and, above all, for legal tribunals. Capodistrias was puzzled to find that the people to whom he looked for support, were thwarting his measures when they believed they were assisting him to gain popularity. The president's firmness was further shaken by the French Revolution of July 1830, which placed Louis Philippe on the throne of France. This event encouraged the members of the constitutional opposition in Greece to commence an open and systematic hostility to his arbitrary measures. Shortly after this, he was still further alarmed by the insurrection in Poland, which he feared would prevent Russia from supporting the principles of the Holy Alliance against England and France. He was now compelled to hear his conduct arraigned. He was reproached with perpetuating anarchy in Greece, and with calumniating the Greeks as enemies of order. His administrative capacity was called in question, and his misgovernment was pointed out. But the mass of the nation wished reform, not change of government; and even his illegal proceedings were submitted to with patience. Viaro, it is true, became every day more hateful on account of his insolence; Agostino every day more ridiculous on account of his vanity.

Henceforward the government of the president be-

came rapidly more tyrannical. Arrests were made without legal warrants. Spies were generally employed by men in office. Viaro, Mustoxidi, and Gennatas, collected round them a herd of Ionian satellites, who made a parade of the influence they exerted in the public administration. The partisans of Capodistrias began to believe that he would succeed in obtaining the presidency for life. Agostino, his younger brother, pretended to be his political heir. He acted the generalissimo of Greece, and formed a body-guard of personal dependants, who were better clothed and paid than the rest of the army. This conduct excited indignation among the veteran armatoli, who conceived a deep-rooted resentment against the whole Capodistrian family. A. D. 1830.

The Revolution established the liberty of the press, of which the Greeks had made a moderate and intelligent use. As early as 1824, political newspapers of different parties were published simultaneously at Mesolonghi, Athens, and Hydra. In 1825 the government found it necessary to establish an official gazette (Γενικὴ Ἐφημερίς) at Nauplia. Capodistrias silenced the press, and the Greeks, unable to discuss their grievances, resorted to force as the only means of removing them.

Polyzoides, a man of moderate opinions, a lawyer, and a Liberal, deemed the time favourable for the establishment of a political and literary newspaper of a higher character than any which had survived the hostility of the president's government. There is no doubt that he contemplated strengthening the Liberal party, and gaining proselytes to the constitution. His conduct was strictly legal. By the law of Greece the press was free; but to comply with the police exigencies of a suspicious government, copies of the prospectus of the new paper, which was called the *Apollo*, were sent to the minister of public instruction, and to the

president. Viaro, who acted as minister of justice, sent to inform the editor, that as no law existed regulating the publication of newspapers, the power of licensing their publication belonged to the government. The pretension was very Venetian, and in direct opposition to the law declaring the press to be free. Polyzoides resolved to obey the law; Viaro was determined to enforce his authority.

Early on the morning fixed for the publication of the *Apollo,* the chief of the police of Nauplia, followed by a strong guard, entered the printing-office and seized the press, then at work, without presenting any warrant. The editor sought redress from Viaro, and presented a petition to the senate, but his demands were neglected. It was evident that the will of Count Capodistrias was more powerful than the law of Greece. The president had himself inaugurated a new period of revolution. Men's minds were excited, and the Liberal party was irritated. The state of public affairs, both in Greece and on the continent of Europe, caused information to be eagerly sought after from other sources than the government papers, and the Greeks waited anxiously for the result of the contest between Capodistrias and the *Apollo.* A law circumscribing the liberty of the press was passed hurriedly through the senate. But while Viaro was pluming himself on his victory, the *Apollo* made its appearance at Hydra on the 31st March 1831, and its publication was continued under the protection of the Albanian municipality of that island until the assassination of Capodistrias.[1]

Maina had already resisted the president's authority. Hydra now called the legality of his proceedings in question. The president attempted to apologise for

[1] The *Apollo* was published twice a-week. While revising these pages, I have turned over the numbers of this paper, and I am surprised to find so much moderation and good sense in political articles written amidst the storm of party passions that then prevailed.

his arbitrary acts, by pleading the provisional nature of his government. His greatest fear was publicity. He felt that his motives would not bear investigation better than his deeds. He had succeeded in silencing the press abroad, and it now braved him at home. The *Courier* of Smyrna had criticised his measures with freedom, and published his edicts with severe comments. By the intervention of the Russian minister at Constantinople, he obtained from the Othoman government an order to the editor to abstain from criticising the conduct of the president of Greece.[1] A. D. 1830.

Capodistrias advanced in the path of tyranny; the Greeks prepared for open insurrection. Many persons were arrested on suspicion, and remained in prison without being accused of any offence or brought to trial.[2] Some just and more unjust accusations were made against men who disapproved of the president's conduct. Actions before provisional courts of judicature were commenced for official acts performed during the Revolution; yet no private individual was allowed to seek redress in the same courts for recent acts committed in violation of the president's own laws by the president's officials. Lazaros Konduriottes of Hydra, one of the most patriotic men in Greece, and one of the few whose public and private character was alike irreproachable, was accused of complicity with pirates. Several eminent men were exiled, and others only escaped the vexations of the police by seeking a voluntary banishment.[3] Judges were dismissed from office becaused they refused to transcribe and pronounce illegal sentences at the suggestion of

[1] *Courier de Smyrne*, 28th November 1830.

[2] Compare the picture of Greece drawn by Sir Stratford Canning in a Memorandum dated 28th December 1831, Annex A to Protocol of 7th March 1832.

[3] Men of different parties and discordant opinions were united in opposition to Capodistrias at this time: Hypsilantes, Mavrocordatos, Miaoulis, Konduriottes, Tombazes, Tricoupi, Klonares, Zographos, Pharmakides, Church, and Gordon.

Viaro. Klonares, a man of some legal knowledge, and of an independent character, was dismissed for signing one of the addresses to Prince Leopold which had not been submitted to the president's revision. Another judge publicly declared that he was driven from the bench because he refused to give an unjust decision in conformity with the desire of the Corfiot minister of justice. Sessines of Gastuni, the president of the senate, who had been raised to his high office on account of his servility, at last hesitated to support the tyranny of the president, and was instantly dismissed.

Extraordinary tribunals, which acted without fixed rules of procedure, whose members were destitute of legal knowledge, and removable at pleasure, and from whose judgments there was no appeal, were multiplied.

Insurrections followed. The president was particularly irritated by prolonged disturbances on the part of the students of Egina, because these disorders drew attention to his vicious system of public education, and demonstrated the falsehood of the reports he had caused to be circulated in Western Europe.

His difficulties were increased by the disorder in his financial administration. Many of his partisans in the Morea were alienated by his allowing Kolokotrones to enrol an armed band of personal followers, as in the worst times of the Revolution, and collect the cattle-tax. Kolokotrones, as might have been foreseen, acted the part of a military tyrant. He not only persecuted his own personal enemies, but allowed a similar licence to the brigands who followed his banner. Greece was relapsing into a state of anarchy, and several provinces were at last in open revolt.

Maina paid no taxes, and the Maniats were only prevented from plundering Messenia by the presence of the French troops. Hydra had constituted itself an

independent state, governed by its municipal magistrates. It collected the national revenues in several islands of the Archipelago, and maintained a part of the Greek fleet which espoused its cause. Syra, the centre of Greek commerce, made common cause with Hydra. Capodistrias had driven its merchants into open opposition, by attempting to fetter their trade with the restrictions of the Russian commercial system. A general cry was raised for the convocation of a national assembly, and the president perceived that he must either make concessions to regain his popularity, lay down his authority, or employ force to keep possession of his power. He chose the last, and instead of assembling the deputies of the nation, he commenced a civil war, trusting to the assistance of Russia for the means of crushing Hydra. A. D. 1831.

Some management was necessary to prevent the diplomatic agents of England and France in Greece from protesting against any employment of force. The president expected to succeed in re-establishing his authority in Syra without a contest, and the loss of Syra would undermine the power of Hydra; for the revenues of the customs were the principal resource of the opposition for the payment of their fleet. The best ships of Greece lay disarmed in the port of Poros, but Capodistrias had still a few ships at sea, and these might serve as a cover for obtaining succour to the Greek flag from the Russian admiral. The plan of making an attack, apparently with Greek ships, but in reality with Russian forces, was well devised, but it was betrayed to the Hydriots by one of the president's confidants. The Hydriots determined to anticipate the attack.

Kanaris, who was a devoted partisan of the president, commanded the corvette Spetzas, which was fully manned, and lay at anchor in the port of Poros.

The municipal government of Hydra ordered Miaoulis with two hundred sailors to hasten to Poros, and take possession of the ships and arsenal. The brave old admiral departed immediately with only about fifty men, accompanied by Antonios Kriezes as his flag-captain, and by Mavrocordatos as his political counsellor. On the night of the 27th July 1831 he seized the arsenal and the disarmed ships, and, hoisting his flag in the Hellas, summoned Kanaris on board. That officer, refusing to surrender the corvette to an order of the municipality of Hydra, was put under arrest, and a party of Hydriots took possession of his ship.

The character of Capodistrias seemed to undergo a revolution when he heard that he had lost his fleet and arsenal. He no longer talked of the blessings of peace, of his own philanthropic feelings, and of the duties of humanity. He declared that he would wash out the stain of rebellion in the blood of his enemies. He called the Hydriots a band of barbarians and pirates, who assailed his authority because it had arrested them in a career of crime and pillage. He now spoke of law, to implore its vengeance, and of justice, to assert that the leaders of the opposition ought all to die the death of traitors. His expressions and his manner breathed a fierce desire to gratify his personal revenge.

The news of Miaoulis's success reached Nauplia while the ministers of France and England, and the commanders of their naval forces, were absent. The Russian admiral, Ricord, who was at anchor in the port, was induced by Capodistrias to sail immediately to Poros with the ships under his command. At the same time, the president sent a battalion of infantry, two hundred regular cavalry, and a strong body of irregulars, by land, to assist in regaining possession of the town.

Admiral Ricord arrived and summoned Miaoulis A. D. 1831.
to surrender the arsenal and the ships in the port to the Greek government; but Miaoulis replied that the municipality of Hydra was the only legally constituted authority to which he owed obedience until the meeting of the national assembly. He therefore referred the Russian admiral to the authorities at Hydra, adding that he was resolved to retain possession of the fleet and arsenal as long as the municipality of Hydra left him in command. Ricord threatened to use force; Miaoulis retorted that he knew his duty as well as the Russian admiral.

Affairs remained in this position for several days, when the commanders of the French and English naval forces entered the port accidentally before returning to Nauplia.[1] They were consequently ignorant of the resolutions which might have been adopted by the residents of the Allied powers at Nauplia, and to prevent bloodshed they arranged with Ricord and Miaoulis that matters should remain in their actual condition until they should visit Nauplia and return with the decision of the Allies. It seemed at the time a strange proceeding, that both commanders should go to search for this decision, when the presence of one at least was required at Poros to watch the Russian admiral, who was guarding both the entrances into the port with a superior force, and could close them at any moment.

In the mean time, the residents of England and France, having returned to Nauplia, gave the president written assurances of the desire of their courts to maintain tranquillity in Greece under the existing government. But they excited the president's distrust by speaking of conciliation, by recommending the con-

[1] The French officer was Captain, afterwards Admiral, Lalande; the English, Captain, afterwards Admiral, Lord Lyons.

vocation of a national assembly, and by refusing to order their naval forces to co-operate with Admiral Ricord in attacking the Hydriots.

The Russian admiral did not wait the return of the French and English commanders to commence hostilities. On the 6th of August a boat of the Russian brig Telemachus, which was guarding the smaller entrance, prevented a vessel bringing provisions from Hydra from entering the port. An engagement took place, in which both parties lost a few men, but the Russians succeeded in compelling the vessel to return to Hydra.

As soon as Capodistrias found that the English and French residents declined countenancing his schemes of vengeance, he sent off pressing solicitations to the Russian admiral to lose no time in recovering possession of the Greek fleet; and to the officers of the troops on shore to occupy Poros at every risk. He then pretended to listen to the counsels of the residents, and promised to convoke a national assembly. Some days later a proclamation was issued, dated 1st (13th) August, convoking the assembly on the 8th (20th) September.[1]

The message of Capodistrias was received by Admiral Ricord as an order to attack Miaoulis, and his operations, in a military point of view, were extremely judicious. He formed a battery to command the town and the smaller entrance; and having by this cut off the communications of Miaoulis with a part of the Greek fleet, he ordered the Russians to take possession of the corvette Spetzas and a brig, which were anchored in Monastery Bay. At the same time the Greek troops attacked Fort Heideck, which was occu-

[1] The existence of this proclamation, however, was not known even at Nauplia until after the events of Poros. A translation will be found in *Lettres et Documents Officiels rélatifs au Derniers Evènements de la Grèce*, 123. This work was distributed in Paris by order of Mr Eynard of Geneva.

pied by Hydriots. The Russians and the president's troops were completely victorious. The corvette Spetzas was blown up, the brig was taken, and Fort Heideck was deserted by its garrison. A. D. 1831.

Miaoulis had now only thirty men on board the Hellas, and the other vessels under his orders were as ill manned.

On the day after the victory of the Russians, the inhabitants of Poros offered to capitulate, and it was arranged with Admiral Ricord that a hundred and fifty Greek regular troops should occupy the town, in order to save it from being plundered by the irregulars. During the night several vessels filled with the families of those who feared the vengeance of Capodistrias were allowed to pass the Russian squadron unmolested. On the 13th of August a hundred and fifty Greek regulars entered the town of Poros.

Admiral Ricord had promised to wait the return of Captains Lalande and Lyons. The Allied powers were bound by protocol to take every step relating to the pacification of Greece in concert. Miaoulis reposed perfect confidence in this arrangement until he was awakened from his security by the operations in Monastery Bay. And on the morning of the 13th August he observed that the Russian ships removed to stations which placed his ships under their guns. He sent an officer on board the Russian flag-ship to request Admiral Ricord to retain his previous position until the return of the French and English naval commanders, according to his promise; and he instructed the officer, in case the Russian admiral persisted in taking up a hostile position, to add that Miaoulis, though his crews were insufficient for defence, would destroy his ships rather than surrender them. Captain Phalangas was ordered to make a similar communication to Captain Levaillant of a French brig-of-war

which had just entered the port. Levaillant urged the Russian admiral to wait the return of Lalande and Lyons, but without success. Miaoulis inferred that something extraordinary, and not favourable to the views of Capodistrias, must have occurred to induce Ricord to violate his promise. He knew that the president's object in getting possession of the Greek fleet was to enable the Russians to re-establish his power at Syra and Hydra under cover of the Greek flag. To save his country, he resolved to destroy the ships which might serve as cover for attacking it. At half-past ten, just as the Russian admiral had taken up his new position, a terrific explosion was heard, which was almost instantaneously followed by a second. Thick columns of smoke covered the Greek ships, and when they cleared away, the magnificent frigate Hellas, and her prize, the corvette Hydra, were seen floating as wrecks on the water.[1] Miaoulis and their crews escaped in their boats to Hydra.

The troops of Capodistrias rushed into the town of Poros in defiance of the capitulation, and immediately took possession of the arsenal. They then commenced plundering the houses, as if the place had been a hostile city taken by assault after the most obstinate resistance. The inhabitants most hostile to the government of the president having carried off their movables to Hydra, only the innocent who trusted to Admiral Ricord's assurance of protection remained. They were pillaged of all they possessed, and treated with inhuman cruelty. On this occasion, both officers and men behaved in the most disgraceful manner; and the sack of Poros is an indelible stain on the conduct of the Greek army, on

[1] The letter of Capodistrias, printed in Mr Eynard's *Lettres et Documents*, p. 125, gives a correct account of the events at Poros, until he cuts short the narrative, on arriving at the catastrophe, by inserting a letter of Kanaris. This is one of the president's usual artifices of composition. He thus communicates the catastrophe without the necessity of alluding to the cause of the conduct of Miaoulis.

the character of Capodistrias, and on the honour of Admiral Ricord. The Russian admiral might easily have put a stop to the cruelties which were perpetrated under his eyes, yet for twenty-four hours he permitted every crime to be committed with impunity. Justice was powerless, unless when some Poriot slew a soldier to defend the honour of his family. The historian is not required to sully his pages with a record of the deeds of lust and rapine which were committed by the Greek troops, but his verdict must be pronounced, as a warning to evil-doers. There is no scene more disgraceful to the Greek character in the history of the Revolution; and horrible tales of pillage, rape, and murder, then perpetrated, long circulated among the people. Anecdotes of cruel extortion and base avidity were told of several officers. When all was over, the troops returned to Nauplia and Argos with horses stolen from the peasants of Damala, which were heavily laden with the plunder of Poros. A. D. 1831.

The sack of Poros sowed the seeds of disorder in the Greek regular corps, and ruined the reputation of Capodistrias. General Gerard endeavoured in vain to bring back the army to a sense of duty, by blaming the conduct of the troops at Poros with great severity. Rhodios, the minister of war, who was a creature of Capodistrias, protected the worst criminals, and deprived the reproaches of the French general of their influence. This conduct increased the insubordination which the licence at Poros had created.[1]

Capodistrias was soon alarmed to find that even his own partisans spoke with indignation of the conduct of the Russian admiral and of the Greek troops. His enemies proclaimed that, in his eagerness to revenge himself on Miaoulis, he had given up the innocent inhabitants of a Greek town to pillage and slaughter

[1] Pellion, 214.

To withdraw public attention from the sack of Poros, he was now anxious to talk of a national assembly. The meeting of that assembly was inevitable, but the elections were not likely to be effected without some fierce contests. The president openly acted as the unscrupulous chief of an unprincipled party; but an avenging fate was at hand. He had indulged his appetite for a bloody vengeance; he was now sacrificed as a victim to private revenge.

The distinguished part which several members of the family of Mavromichales acted at the commencement of the Revolution, has been recorded in the earlier pages of this work. The best men of the house fell in battle. Kyriakoules and Elias are names which Greece will always honour. Petrobey, the chief of the family, though a man of no political capacity, was viewed by Capodistrias with ignoble jealousy. He enjoyed considerable influence in Maina, and Maina possessed a considerable degree of political independence. Capodistrias believed that centralisation was the direct path to order, and it was certainly the quickest way of increasing his personal authority. The influence of the family of Mavromichales appeared to be the principal obstacle to the success of his plans in Maina, and he removed its members from every official position which they occupied at his arrival in Greece. His persecutions constituted them the natural champions of the provincial franchises and fiscal immunities of the Maniats.

The lawless liberty that reigned in Maina was extremely offensive to the despotic principles of Capodistrias. He found both bad habits and criminal practices more powerful than either the local or the national government. Murder was legalised by written contracts. Bonds signed by living individuals were shown to the president, in which the penalty, in case of non-fulfil-

ment, was a clause authorising the holder to murder the obligant, or two of his nearest relations. Capodistrias considered it to be his duty to put an end to a state of society so disgraceful to orthodox Christians in the nineteenth century. He imagined that the people of Maina would aid him in his honourable enterprise, not reflecting that the deeds of vengeance which excited his indignation were considered by the native population as a necessary restraint on a ferocious and faithless race, in a region and among a class where the law was powerless. Murder in Maina answered the same purpose as duelling in other countries where the state of society was less barbarous, and assassination was a privilege of Maniat gentility. A. D. 1831.

Personal jealousy made Capodistrias select the family of Petrobey as the scapegoats for the sins of Maina. The acts of rapine on shore and of piracy at sea which other Maniats committed were overlooked, and all the strength of the Greek government was employed to crush the detested house of Mavromichales.

During the celebration of Easter 1830, Janni, the brother of Petrobey, commonly termed the King of Maina, in company with one of the bey's sons, excited the people of Tzimova to revolt against the president's government. Many complaints had been laid before the Greek government against the acts of violence and extortion committed by this king of misrule, which he found it no easy matter to explain. He therefore declared himself the champion of the privileges of Maina, in order to evade answering for his own misdeeds. The people were in this way induced to make his cause their own. Janni Mavromichales seized the customhouse, and collected the public revenues in order to pay the men who took up arms. But this revolt was soon suppressed by the president, who persuaded George Mavromichales, the second son of

Petrobey, to hasten from Argos to Maina, with the assurance that all the disputes between the Greek government and the family of Mavromichales should be promptly and satisfactorily arranged if Janni would come in person to Nauplia. George believed Capodistrias; Janni believed George, and accompanied his nephew to the seat of government. The president soon violated his word. He put Janni under arrest, and ordered prosecutions to be commenced against both him and his son Katzakos, who had attempted to assassinate his own cousin Pierakos.

In the month of January 1831, Katzakos escaped from Argos, and about the same time Petrobey left Nauplia to return to Maina in General Gordon's yacht, which happened to sail for Zante. An insurrection had already broken out under the leading of Constantine, one of the bey's brothers. The yacht, not being able to touch at Maina, landed the bey at Katakolo, where he was immediately arrested, and sent back to Nauplia as a state prisoner. He was now detained on a charge of treason, and a committee of the senate, with Viaro for chairman, prosecuted the action against him. He was accused of inciting a rebellion in Maina, and of deserting his duty as a senator.[1] An extraordinary tribunal, with his prosecutor Viaro as president, was created to try him, and he was imprisoned as a criminal in Itch-kalé. About the same time Constantine Mavromichales was decoyed on board ship by Kanaris and carried to Nauplia, where he and George were placed under arrest.

Public sympathy was now strongly awakened in favour of the Mavromichales family. It was thought that Petrobey was severely treated, Constantine unfairly entrapped, and George unjustly detained. Con-

[1] The report of the committee is given in Eynard's *Lettres et Documents*, 127. It forms a general act of impeachment against the whole family.

stantine and George were allowed to walk about freely within the fortress of Nauplia, attended by two guards during the day. They were loud in their complaints. The mother of Petrobey, an old lady approaching her ninetieth year, petitioned the president to release the bey, who remained in prison untried. No proof could be found of his complicity in his brother's insurrection, and it was not a crime for a senator to quit Nauplia without a passport. It was reported that both the Russian minister Baron Rückmann and Admiral Ricord advised the president to release Petrobey. It is certain that Capodistrias consented to allow the prisoner to dine on board the Russian flag-ship at Admiral Ricord's invitation. It was generally supposed that this permission implied a pardon for past offences; and when Petrobey, on quitting Admiral Ricord's table, was conducted back to prison, even the partisans of the president were astonished at his conduct. It seems that Admiral Ricord had assured several persons that he would persuade the president to release the bey, and that his interference irritated Capodistrias, who became frequently peevish and changeable after the affair of Poros. Constantine and George were exasperated and alarmed by what they supposed to be a sudden and unfavourable change in the president's views. A. D. 1831.

Three days after Petrobey's visit to Admiral Ricord, at early dawn on the 9th October 1831, Capodistrias walked as usual to hear mass in the church of St Spyridion. As he approached the low door of the small church, he saw Constantine Mavromichales standing on one side and George on the other. He hesitated for a moment, as if he suspected that they wished to address him, and would willingly have avoided the meeting. But after a momentary pause, he moved on to enter the church. Before he reached

the door he fell on the pavement mortally wounded by a pistol-ball in the back of the head. In the act of falling he received the stab of a yataghan through the lungs, and he expired without uttering a word.

Two guards were in attendance on the Mavromichales, and two orderlies accompanied the president. The assassins attempted to save themselves by flight. The pistol of one of the orderlies wounded Constantine, who was overtaken and slain. His body was carried to the square, where it remained exposed naked to the insults of the populace for several hours. It was then dragged through the streets and thrown into the sea.

The whole town was alarmed by the report of the pistols; the news of the president's assassination spread instantaneously, and the whole population poured into the streets. Yet George Mavromichales succeeded in escaping into the house of the French resident, though at a considerable distance from the scene of the murder. A furious mob followed close at his heels, and demanded that he should be delivered up. His pursuers proclaimed themselves the avengers of blood, and threatened to force open the doors of the French residency and tear the assassin to pieces. Baron Rouen informed them that France must protect the refugee until a formal demand was made for his surrender to justice by the lawful authorities. In a few hours the demand was made; but to save the criminal from the vengeance of the people, it was found necessary to convey him to the insular fort of Burdjee. His guilt was unquestionable, the proof was incontestable. He was condemned by a council of war, and executed on the 22d of October.

Greece had been depraved by the tyranny of Capodistrias; she was utterly demoralised by his assassi-

nation. She exchanged the sufferings of illegality for the tortures of anarchy. A. D. 1831.

The name of Capodistrias remained for some time a party spell, but time has proved the avenger of truth. His talents, his eloquent state papers, and his private virtues, receive their merited praise; but with all his sophistry, his cunning insinuations, and false pretences, they proved insufficient to conceal the wrongs which his vicious system of administration inflicted on Greece.

CHAPTER III.

ANARCHY. 9TH OCTOBER 1831 TO 1ST FEBRUARY 1833

"In rank oppression, in its rudest shape,
The faction chief is but the sultan's brother,
And the worst despot's far less human ape."
Prophecy of Dante.

GOVERNING COMMISSION REFUSES TO GRANT A GENERAL AMNESTY — SECOND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AT ARGOS — ROMELIOT MILITARY OPPOSITION — AGOSTINO PRESIDENT OF GREECE — ROMELIOTS EXPELLED FROM ARGOS — SIR STRATFORD CANNING'S MEMORANDUM — ROMELIOTS INVADE THE MOREA — CONDUCT OF THE RESIDENTS—AGOSTINO EJECTED FROM THE PRESIDENCY—GOVERNING COMMISSION—STATE OF GREECE—ANARCHY—FRENCH TROOPS GARRISON NAUPLIA—DJAVELLAS OCCUPIES PATRAS—KOLOKOTRONES RALLIES THE CAPODISTRIANS — NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AT PRONIA — CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY IN ABEYANCE — INTRIGUES OF THE SENATE—MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS ARREST THE PROGRESS OF ANARCHY IN THE MOREA—CONDITION OF MESSENIA—POSITION OF KOLOKOTRONES AND KOLETTES—TRUE NATURE OF THE MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS IN GREECE NOT GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD — ATTACK ON THE FRENCH TROOPS AT ARGOS—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BAVARIAN DYNASTY.

THE assassination of Capodistrias destroyed the whole edifice of his government, which for some time had derived an appearance of stability from nothing but his talents and personal influence. The persons whom he had selected to act as his ministers and official instruments employed his name as their ægis, and rallied round his brother Agostino, who had been treated as the president's heir, from motives of flattery, at a time when no one contemplated the possibility of his ever succeeding to power.

The senate was filled with the most daring and

unprincipled partisans of the Capodistrian policy. A few hours after the president's murder it appointed a governing commission to exercise the executive power until the meeting of the national assembly. This commission consisted of three members—Count Agostino Capodistrias, Kolokotrones, and Kolettes. Agostino was named president. His incapacity, joined to the irreconcilable hostility between the other two members, induced the senate to believe that it could retain the powers of government in its own hands. The people judged more correctly, and prognosticated an approaching civil war. A general amnesty for political offences was instinctively felt to be the only means of preserving any degree of order. A few political leaders and military chieftains, who desired to fish in troubled waters, determined to frustrate all attempts at pacification. A large body of well-paid Moréot troops looked to Kolokotrones as their leader; a still larger number of the veteran soldiers of continental Greece, whose pay was in arrear, considered Kolettes as their political advocate. A. D. 1831.

The municipality of Syra made a vain endeavour to consign past contentions to oblivion by acknowledging the authority of the governing commission. The constitutionalists at Hydra made conciliatory proposals to the new executive. They asked for a general amnesty for all political offences except the assassination of the president, and they required that the governing commission should be increased to five members by the aggregation of two persons chosen from among the constitutionalists. These proposals were rejected with disdain. Count Agostino pretended that a national assembly could alone grant a general amnesty, and the members of the commission, in order to avoid receiving two colleagues, declared that they had no power to enlarge the executive body. The reply was evasive,

and felt to be insulting. The exiles only wished a guarantee against governmental prosecutions until the meeting of the national assembly, and they knew that the senate had the power to add to the body it had created.

The contest for absolute power by the Capodistrians, and for life and property as well as liberty by the constitutionalists, was now resumed with embittered animosity. Both parties saw that their safety could only be secured by the command of a devoted majority in the national assembly, and both prepared to secure success in the coming elections by force of arms. Hydra was kept closely blockaded by the Russian fleet.

The influence of the Capodistrians in the Morea gave them a considerable majority in the second national assembly at Argos; but they derived much of their authority as a party from the open support of the Russian admiral, Ricord. In some places, the Capodistrians, though they formed a minority, obtained the assistance of a military force, and held a meeting, in which they elected a deputy, in violation of every legal and constitutional form. Yet these deputies were received into the assembly, and their elections were declared valid. Both parties circulated atrocious calumnies against their opponents. The Capodistrians accused the French and English of being privy to the assassination of the president. Agostino boasted of his hatred to the French. He dismissed General Gerard from his command in the Greek army, and he intimated to General Gueheneuc, who commanded the French army of occupation in the Morea, that the financial condition of the country imposed on the Greek government the obligation of observing the strictest economy in paying foreigners. On receiving this intimation, the French general

immediately recalled all the French officers in the Greek service, in order to prevent their being dismissed in the same manner as General Gerard. The constitutionalists at Hydra spread a report that the murdered president had bribed six Hydriot traitors to assassinate the leaders of the opposition; and it was generally believed that Agostino and Admiral Ricord had sworn to send Miaoulis, and all the sailors who had taken part in the affair of Poros, to Siberia. A. D. 1831.

The proximity of Argos to the garrison of Nauplia and to the Russian fleet gave the Capodistrians the command of the town. The deputies of Hydra were not even allowed to land at Lerna, for it was considered to be the safest way to exclude opposition. Those of Maina were stopped at Astros. To prevent even a murmur of dissatisfaction with the actual government from being heard in the assembly, the senate named a commission, which was ordered to verify the election of each deputy before he was allowed to take his seat in the assembly. This unconstitutional proceeding was supposed to have been counselled by Russia, and awakened very general dissatisfaction even in the Capodistrian party.

The military chiefs of continental Greece came to the assembly as deputies from the districts in which they possessed local influence, or to which the majority of their followers belonged. They cared little for constitutional liberty, but they were now ready to join any opposition, unless they were allowed to receive the high pay and ample rations which were enjoyed by the followers of Kolokotrones and the other Capodistrian chiefs. Kolettes was in a position to assist them in their object, and they had not forgotten the liberality with which he had poured the proceeds of the English loans into their hands. Kolettes was not a babbler, like most Greek statesmen. The astute Val-

lachian could assume an oracular look and remain silent when he wished to conceal his thoughts. In the present case, his prudence led Agostino and his counsellors to suppose that he was intent on retaining his place in the executive body. But it was evident that a number of the continental chiefs would openly oppose the election of Agostino to the presidency of Greece, even though Kolettes might remain neutral. It was resolved to crush this opposition before it could make common cause with the constitutionalists. Several Romeliot captains belonged to the Capodistrian party; of these the most influential were the Suliot chief Kitzos Djavellas, and Rhangos, a captain of armatoli, who on one occasion, as has been already mentioned, joined the Turks.

The Romeliot chiefs came to Argos attended by bands of followers, who, according to the established usage of Greece, were supplied with rations by the government. In this way the partisans of Kolettes assembled about five hundred good soldiers at Argos. All these men had claims for arrears of pay, and most of them had individual grievances, which Capodistrias had neglected to redress. Kolettes warmly supported their claims, and assured them that he would do everything in his power to obtain justice. He was aware that he must unite his cause with theirs, for without their support his political influence would be annihilated. He was distrusted by Agostino, disliked by Admiral Ricord, and hated by Kolokotrones.

For some days before the opening of the assembly, the different factions employed their time in arranging their plans. Some individuals doubtless acted from patriotic motives, but the conduct of the majority of the Romeliots, as well as of the Capodistrians, was guided by self-interest and personal ambition.

The Romeliot chiefs, finding themselves in a

minority, demanded that the constitutional deputies who had met at Hydra should be allowed to take their seats in the assembly. This demand was rejected, on the ground that new deputies had been elected, and that these new elections had received the sanction of the commission named by the senate. The Romeliots then drew up a protest containing a declaration of their principles.[1] They characterised the nomination of the governing commission by the senate as an illegal act; they objected to the appointment of the commission to verify the elections of deputies by the senate as an unconstitutional infringement of the right of the national assembly; and they proclaimed their adhesion to the following principles and resolutions: That national union ought to precede the meeting of a national assembly; that the national assembly ought to verify the elections of its members, and appoint its own guard, as on former occasions. The order in which the constitutional rights of the nation were to be discussed was also fixed, and resolutions were proposed, relative to the choice of a sovereign and to the nature of the provisional government which was to act until his arrival. The attempt to interfere with the proceedings of the Allied cabinets displeased their diplomatic agents at Nauplia, and inclined them to favour Agostino and the Capodistrians. A. D. 1831.

The rival parties trusted more to force than to right. Each assumed that it was the national party, and two hostile assemblies were opened on the same day.

The deputies of the Capodistrian party, to the number of a hundred and fifty, met on the 17th of December 1831 in the church of the Panaghia, and, after taking the prescribed oath, walked in procession to the schoolhouse, which had been fitted up as the place

[1] Dated 18th (30th) November 1831.

of meeting for the national assembly. A strong guard, under the command of Kitzos Djavellas, and an escort of cavalry, under Kalergy, secured a public triumph to the Capodistrians. They met in security, elected their president, issued a proclamation, and proceeded to business.

The Romeliots were not strong enough to make any public display; but they also held their meeting, elected their president, and issued their proclamation. They called upon the residents of the Allied powers, as protectors of Greece, to enforce a general amnesty, and they invited the French troops in the Morea to occupy Argos to preserve order. The residents, knowing that neither party was disposed to obey the law or listen to the dictates of justice, allowed things to take their course.

On the 20th December, Agostino Capodistrias was elected president of Greece, and invested with all the authority which had been conferred on his murdered brother. He and Kolokotrones had already resigned their power as members of the governing commission named by the senate, into the hands of the national assembly. Kolettes, not recognising the Capodistrian assembly, and not having resigned his power, pretended to be the only man now entitled to conduct the executive government.

The Capodistrians feared that, if the Romeliots were allowed time to summon the deputies from Hydra and Maina to their aid, they might be strong enough to overthrow the government. To prevent this they resolved to expel the Romeliot chiefs from Argos before additional troops could arrive to reinforce Kolettes's partisans. Agostino Capodistrias, Admiral Ricord, Kolokotrones, Metaxas, and Djavellas all agreed that an immediate attack was necessary to insure victory. Once driven beyond the Isthmus of

Corinth, the Romeliots might be treated as lawless bands of brigands intent on plunder. A.D. 1831.

A Russian lieutenant named Raikoff, who had been promoted by Capodistrias to the rank of colonel, was summoned from Nauplia, with four guns and a company of artillerymen, to assist the government troops already in Argos. Raikoff was a warm partisan, and pretended to be a confidential agent of Russian policy. Strengthened by this reinforcement, the troops of Agostino attacked the Romeliots. A fierce civil war was carried on in the streets of Argos for two days, before the Romeliots, though inferior in number and ill supplied with ammunition and provisions, were expelled from the town and compelled to retreat to Corinth.

Sir Stratford Canning arrived at Nauplia to be a witness to these proceedings. The three powers had at last come to an agreement on Greek affairs, and selected a Bavarian prince to be king. Sir Stratford was on his way to Constantinople as English ambassador to obtain the sultan's recognition of the Greek kingdom, and he visited Nauplia to announce to the Greeks the arrangements which had been adopted by the Allies, and to prepare them to receive their king with order and unanimity. Sir Stratford found that Agostino was a fool utterly incapable of appreciating his position, and he counselled conciliatory measures, and urged the necessity of moderation, in vain. The empty head of the Corfiot was inflated with presumption. Before quitting Greece, Sir Stratford communicated to Agostino a memorandum on the state of the country, urging him in strong terms to terminate the civil war he had commenced.[1] Though the observations in this document produced no effect on the Greek government, and very little on the ulterior conduct of

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, Annex A to the Protocol of 7th March 1832. The memorandum is dated 28th December 1831.

Mr Dawkins, Baron Rouen, and Baron de Rückmann, the residents of the three Allied powers at Nauplia, yet they were so judicious that they made a deep impression on the ministers in conference at London. The anarchy in Greece threatened to render Sir Stratford's mission to the sultan useless; and he warned Agostino that, by destroying the houses of the peaceful inhabitants of Argos, and plundering their shops, as a prelude to a bloody intestine war, Greece proclaimed herself in the face of Europe to be unworthy of the independent position as a nation to which the Allied powers were endeavouring to elevate her. This memorandum was supported by formal notes of the residents, recommending Agostino to publish a general amnesty and convoke a free national assembly. But shortly after the departure of Sir Stratford from Greece, the residents ceased to insist on the measures they had advised; and Admiral Ricord, who had never moderated the violence of his language, continued to encourage the Capodistrians to push their attacks on the constitutionalists with vigour. He gave them hopes of being able to expel the French army of occupation from the Morea, and he pointed out to them the necessity of perpetuating their authority by forcing themselves on the new sovereign as ministers and senators. The position of the French troops who were protecting Messenia from being plundered by the Maniats was rendered so confined that they were obliged to drive the Capodistrian troops out of the town of Nisi, in order to keep open their communication with their headquarters at Modon, and secure a safe passage to the peasantry who brought provisions to their camp.

The political atmosphere of Europe was too troubled during the year 1831 to enable the Allies to give more than a casual glance at the affairs of Greece, whose unsettled condition was gradually destroying the im-

portance of the country in the solution of what states- A. D. 1832.
men called the Eastern question. The attention of Great Britain and France had been absorbed by the creation of the kingdom of Belgium; Russia had been occupied with the insurrection of Poland. But during the winter the condition of Europe became more tranquil, and the fate of Greece was again taken into consideration. On the 7th January 1832 a protocol was signed, authorising the residents at Nauplia to recognise the provisional government named by the national assembly, which, it was supposed, was a free meeting. On receiving this protocol, the residents, who knew that Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum was on its way to London, thought fit to recognise Agostino Capodistrias as president of Greece. On the 13th of February another protocol was signed, offering the throne of Greece to Prince Otho, a boy seventeen years old, the second son of the King of Bavaria.[1]

In the mean time the Romeliots were preparing to avenge their defeat at Argos. Their preparation went on slowly, until they heard that the Allies had chosen a king for Greece. They saw immediately that it was necessary to overthrow the government of Agostino, in order to have a share in welcoming the new monarch, and a claim to participate in the distribution of wealth and honours which would take place on the king's arrival.

After their retreat from Argos, the Romeliots formed a camp at Megara. The meeting, which arrogated to itself the title of a national assembly, met at Perachora, where it was strengthened by the arrival of the deputies from Hydra and Maina. Kolettes was supported by most of the eminent men in Greece. Konduriottes,

[1] Everything that can be urged in favour of this unfortunate choice will be found in Thiersch, *De l'Etat Actuel de la Grèce*, i. 308-314. Before the election, Thiersch, who was one of the prince's teachers, considered that it would be absolutely necessary for King Otho to join the Greek Church, i. 313.

Miaoulis, Mavromichales, and Mavrocordatos, and a respectable body of constitutional deputies, sanctioned his proceedings. But the Romeliots looked to arms and not to justice for victory. Constitutional liberty was a good war-cry, but military force could alone open the road to power. The numbers of armed men collected at Megara at last rendered an advance on Nauplia necessary to procure subsistence. Every effort that revenge, party zeal, and sincere patriotism could suggest, was employed to urge on the soldiers. Commissions were distributed with a lavish hand among the bravest veterans. Civilians were suddenly made captains. Kolettes and the military chieftains cared nothing for moral and political responsibility; their sole object was to conquer power, and about the means they were quite indifferent. Mavrocordatos and the constitutionalists felt that the recognition of Agostino's government by the residents cut off all hope of a general amnesty, a free national assembly, or a legal administration, without a decided victory of the Romeliots. It was thought that the residents would not venture to employ the forces of the Allies to support a government which had rejected their own advice as well as the warnings of Sir Stratford Canning. The Greek leaders knew that none of the residents possessed the firm character, any more than the enlightened views, of Sir Stratford, and it was inferred with diplomatic sagacity that the instructions received with the protocols of the 13th and 14th February 1832 would place the residents in a false position with their cabinets.[1] Their recognition of a government illegally constituted had rendered the pacification of Greece impossible without further violence. Agostino, less sagacious than the constitutionalists, believed that his

[1] Thiersch has published a letter in which Mavrocordatos examines the state of public affairs in Greece at this time with ability and moderation.—Vol. i. p. 327.

recognition by the residents was equivalent to a guarantee on the part of the Allied powers; and he expected to see the troops of France support him at the Isthmus of Corinth as decidedly as the fleet of Russia had supported his brother at Poros. A. D. 1832.

At this late hour the residents made a feeble attempt to avert a civil war. They invited the general commanding the French army of occupation to occupy the Isthmus of Corinth, and authorised Professor Thiersch, who had visited Greece as an unrecognised agent of the Bavarian court, to negotiate with the deputies and military chiefs at Perachora and Megara. Thiersch favoured the constitutional party. He had been long in communication with the Philhellenic committees on the Continent. In the year 1829 he had advocated the election of Prince Otho to the sovereignty of Greece, and he had communicated with the Bavarian court on the subject. The object of his present tour was understood to be, to prepare the minds of the Greeks for the choice of a Bavarian prince; and now, when Otho was elected king, he stepped forward as a diplomatic agent of Bavaria, and was treated as such both by the residents and by the leaders of all parties among the Greeks.

The prudence of the constitutionalists, and the passions of the military chiefs, rejected every arrangement based on the continuance of the presidency of Agostino and the ratification of the acts of the assembly by which he had been elected. The mission of Thiersch failed, and its failure rendered the position of Agostino untenable. Those who had hitherto supported him perceived that they had ruined their cause by placing too much power in his hands, and by attempting to prolong his authority beyond the legal majority of the king chosen by the protecting powers. Agostino determined to cling to power, but the rapid advance of

the Romeliots soon dispelled his hopes of Russian support and his visions of future greatness.

On the 6th of April the government troops stationed at the Isthmus of Corinth fled before the constitutionalists without offering any resistance. The heroes of the sack of Poros, the cavalry of Kalergy, and the generalship of Kolokotrones, the veteran commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian army, were unable to retard the advance of the invaders, who marched straight to Argos. The residents were now in an awkward and not very honourable position. By an extraordinary piece of good-luck, they were relieved from the foolish part they were acting. On the very day the Romeliot troops entered Argos, the protocol of the 7th March 1832 arrived at Nauplia, and they were instructed to carry out the principles of Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum. It was easy for them to treat their recognition of Agostino's presidency as a temporary expedient, adopted to avoid a civil war, until they received the definitive instructions now placed in their hands. The memorandum declared "that the interests of the Greeks, and the honour of the Allies, required a system of provisional government calculated to preserve the country from anarchy." This could, in the present crisis of affairs, only be attained by ejecting Agostino from the presidency.

On the 8th of April they addressed a vague diplomatic note to the president they had recognised, inviting him to contribute to the execution of the protocol of the 7th of March. Agostino, trusting to the secret aid of Admiral Ricord, replied with a request for a copy of the document to which they alluded, and which had not yet been officially communicated to the Greek government. The residents were alarmed at his endeavour to gain time, and, their own interests being at stake, they proceeded with great promptitude to

eject him from office. His incapacity secured them an easy victory in a personal interview. Without wasting their time in composing diplomatic notes, they walked to the government-house, while Agostino was still chuckling at his supposed victory over the diplomatists, entered his presence, and informed him without ceremony that he must immediately send his resignation to the senate. So far their conduct was extremely judicious, but they had not the clear heads which enable men to stop short in action at the precise limit of justice and prudence. In the spirit of diplomatic meddling, which involves nations in as much embarrassment as military ambition, they made the ejected president add a recommendation to the senate to appoint a commission of five persons to govern Greece until the king's arrival. Agostino was rendered amenable to their orders by a hint that any delay would produce a decree of the senate deposing him from the presidency. Convinced that his cause was hopeless, he wrote his resignation, and shortly after quitted Greece, with the body of his murdered brother, in a Russian ship. A. D. 1832.

The expedient of establishing peace by a diplomatic compromise, after allowing every passion which civil war excites to rage for three months, was a violation of common sense that could not prove successful. The same diplomatists had refused to prevent a civil war by enforcing a compromise before the opening of the assembly at Argos; yet they now imagined that their interference would avert anarchy. The Romeliot troops paid very little attention to these manœuvres. They were resolved to reap the fruits of their victory, and it was not by naming a commission in which a hostile senate would be able to secure a majority that this end could be attained. Foreign interference rarely saves a nation from the direct consequences of its own

vices, and anarchy was the natural result of the repeated illegalities which every party in Greece had committed.

The conduct of the residents deserves reprehension. They evidently thought more of concealing their own incapacity and inconsistency than of serving the cause of the Greeks, in the measures they adopted for carrying the protocol of the 7th of March into execution. They established a phantom of government, which they knew would be unable to pacify the country, because it appeared to them to offer the political combination least at variance with their own proceedings. Had they endeavoured to act in accordance with the laws and institutions of Greece, it is possible that they might have failed in preventing the Greeks from falling into a state of anarchy, but they would have saved themselves from all reproach. When the senate first assumed illegal powers, it was the duty of the residents to refuse to recognise its illegal acts. In the present crisis, had they paid any attention to the constitution of Greece, even as established by Capodistrias, they would have recommended the representation of both parties in the senate, and avoided the incongruity of composing an executive government of two hostile factions. The Russian resident wished the senate to remain unaltered, as it consisted entirely of Russian partisans, andwas completely under the guidance of Admiral Ricord. But the English and French residents knew that its composition rendered the pacification of Greece impossible. The English resident, however, moved partly by jealousy of French influence, and partly by distrust of Kolettes's character, adopted the Russian policy concerning the immutability of the senate.

In conformity with the suggestion conveyed in the resignation of the presidency by Agostino, the senate

named five persons whom the residents indicated as a governing commission. When the Romeliots heard the names that were pleasing to the diplomatists, they treated the election with contempt, and marched forward to attack Nauplia. The fortress was impregnable, but they had many stanch partisans within its walls, and expected to enter without much difficulty. The senate was terrified; the residents had again thrust themselves into a false position. It was necessary to effect a new diplomatic compromise, and for this purpose Kolettes was invited to confer with the diplomatists at the house of the French resident. A. D. 1832.

On the 10th of April, Kolettes rode into Nauplia in triumph. He had now the nation, the army, the senate, and the three protecting powers at his feet. Unfortunately for the Greeks, with all his talents as an intriguer, he had neither the views of a statesman nor the principles of a patriot. He had climbed to the elevation of a Cromwell or a Washington, and he stood in his high position utterly incompetent to act with decision, and prevented by his own absolute incapacity from serving either the constitutional cause or the interests of the Romeliot troops who had raised him to power.

Fourteen days were consumed in diplomatic shuffling and personal intrigues before the names of a new governing commission were finally settled. It was then composed of seven members, and not of five, as recommended by the residents. The constitution of Greece was grossly violated by this election; for the senate, at the instigation of the diplomatists, persisted in investing the governing commission with the executive power until the king's arrival, though both by law and invariable practice that power could only be conferred until the meeting of a national assembly, when it

required to be ratified or reconstituted by a decree of the representatives of the nation. The object of the Capodistrians was to prevent the national assembly electing a president of the constitutional party. They even succeeded in paralysing the action of the constitutionalists in the governing commission, by enacting that the presence of five members was necessary to give validity to its decisions. Now, as there were two stanch Capodistrians in the commission, and one constitutional member, who was too ill to attend, it was evident that the two Capodistrians could arrest the action of the executive authority at any crisis by preventing a decision. Three members of the commission, Kolettes, Konduriottes, and Zaimes, were supposed to represent the constitutional opposition to the Copodistrian system; but the residents and the leading Capodistrians were aware that Zaimes was already a renegade. Two members were recognised to be the representatives of the Romeliot troops—Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes and Kosta Botzares.[1] Two members, as has been said, were stanch Capodistrians—Metaxas and Koliopulos or Plapoutas. This executive commission had a cabinet composed of seven ministers, who were all constitutionalists; but with the exception of Mavrocordatos, they were men without administrative knowledge, mere rhetoricians, who could clothe commonplace thoughts in official Greek. Even Mavrocordatos was misplaced as minister of finance. These ministers were severely blamed for accepting office without fixing a day for the meeting of the national assembly, and without insisting that the power of

[1] Hypsilantes expressed his repugnance to become a member of this commission in strong terms, and his observations exhibit good sense and patriotism, but he was persuaded by his friends to withdraw his objections. He was already suffering from the disease which soon after terminated his life. His letter is given by Thiersch, i. 369. In mentioning the nomination of Kosta Botzares, Thiersch observes that the Romeliot Greeks still regarded the Albanian tribe of Suliots with jealousy.—Vol. i. p. 381.

the governing commission should terminate when the assembly met. Their friends excused their neglect of constitutional principles by pleading the power of the residents; but those who scanned their political lives with attention, observed that they frequently contrived to advance their own interests by sacrificing the cause they adopted.[1] A. D. 1832.

Public opinion demanded the immediate convocation of a national assembly. To save the country from anarchy it was necessary to reconstitute the senate, according to the principles of conciliation laid down in Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum, and it might have been found necessary to throw the responsibility of maintaining order on Kolettes by creating him dictator. But the residents, the Russian admiral, the senate, and the ministers in office, were all opposed to the meeting of a national assembly.

The Capodistrian party soon recovered from its defeat. It succeeded in retaining possession of a considerable portion of the revenues of the Morea, and received active support from Admiral Ricord. The Romeliots, after overthrowing Agostino's government, daily lost ground. The commission of seven was either unable or unwilling to reward their services. The soldiers soon determined to reward themselves. They treated the election of the commission as a temporary compromise, not as a definitive treaty of peace, and they marched into different districts in the Morea, to take possession of the national revenues as a security for their pay and rations. Wherever they established themselves, they lived at free quarters in the houses of the inhabitants.

The financial administration of Mavrocordatos was

[1] Christides was Minister of the Interior, and General Secretary of State; Mavrocordatos, of Finance; Tricoupi, of Foreign Affairs; Zographos, of War; Balgares, of the Marine; Klonaris, of Justice; and Rizos Neroulos, of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction.

not calculated to moderate the rapacity of the troops. The governing commission raised money by private bargains for the sale of the tenths, and the proceeds of these anticipated and frequently illegal sales were employed to reward personal partisans, and not to discharge the just debts due to the soldiers for arrears of pay. A small sum judiciously expended would have sent many of the Romeliot troops to their native mountains, where, as peace was now restored, they would have willingly returned, had they been able to procure the means of cultivating their property. The troops were neglected, while favoured chieftains were allowed to become farmers of taxes, or were authorised to collect arrears due by preceding farmers. These proceedings gave rise to intolerable exactions. The chieftains often paid their followers by allowing them to extort a number of rations from the peasantry, and defrauded them of their pay. Some drew pay and rations for a hundred men without having twenty under arms. Numbers of soldiers were disbanded, and roved backwards and forwards, plundering the villages, and devouring the sheep and oxen of the peasants. Professor Thiersch informs us that the bands of Theodore Grivas on the side of the constitutionalists, and of Thanasapulos on the side of the Capodistrians, spread terror wherever they appeared by their exactions and cruelty.[1] Eight thousand Romeliots were at this time living at free quarters in the Morea, and it was said that they levied daily from the population upwards of twenty thousand rations. The governing

[1] Grivas had taken into his pay a body of Mussulman Albanians. Compare Thiersch, i. 71, 121, 123, 182. "Les capitaines presque sans exception gardaient l'argent pour eux, et les troupes restèrent dans l'ancien état d'exinanition," p. 123. "Les plus grands désordres apparurent à la vente des dimes, où il y eût un commérage de captaines, de primats, de haut employés, et pour ainsi dire des compagnies organisées qui pénétrèrent même dans quelques ministères et jusqu'au milieu du gouvernement," p. 182. It must be remembered that Professor Thiersch is the panegyrist of Kolettes and a partisan of the Romeliots.

commission solicited pecuniary advances from the three protecting powers, pretending that they would employ them for alleviating the misery of the people; but the Allies wisely refused to advance money, which they saw, by the misconduct of the government, would have been wasted in maintaining lawless bands of personal followers in utter idleness. A. D. 1832.

The position of the two hostile parties soon became clearly defined. The greater part of the Morea adhered to the Capodistrian party, as the surest means of obtaining defence against the exactions of the Romeliot soldiery. Several Moreot primates and deputies, who had hitherto acted with the constitutionalists, now abandoned the cause of the governing commission. Even in Romelia the Capodistrians possessed a rallying-point at Salona, where Mamoures maintained himself with a strong garrison. In the Archipelago, Tinos continued faithful to the Capodistrians, and served as a refuge for the officials of the party who were expelled from the other islands. Spetzas and Egina were also prevented from acknowledging the authority of the governing commission by ships of war commanded by Andrutzos and Kanaris.

All liberated Greece was now desolated by anarchy. Long periods of maladministration on the part of the government, and a cynical contempt for justice and good faith on the part of the civil and military leaders, had paralysed the nation. The Revolution, to all appearance, had been crowned with success. The Turks were expelled from the country, and Greece formed an independent state. Yet Greece was certainly not free, for the people were groaning under the most cruel oppression. The whole substance of the land was devoured by hosts of soldiers, sailors, captains, generals, policemen, government officials, tax-gatherers, secretaries, and political adventurers, all living idly at the

public expense, while the agricultural population was perishing from starvation.

Evil habits, and the difficulty of procuring the means of subsistence, may form some excuse for the rapine of the soldiery, but no apology can be offered for the conduct of the members of the governing commission and of the ministry, who increased the miseries of the people by their malversations, or countenanced the dishonesty of their colleagues by retaining office. Honour as well as patriotism commanded every man who had a sense of duty, either to put a stop to the devastation of the country or resign his place as a ruler or a minister. The tenacity with which those who called themselves constitutionalists clung to office has fixed an indelible stain on their own political character, and destroyed the confidence of the Greek people in the honesty of public men. When Mavrocordatos, Tricoupi, Klonares, and Zographos, abandoned the cause of civil liberty, they destroyed all trust in the good faith of the statesmen of the Greek Revolution. The immediate effect of their misconduct was to constitute Theodore Kolokotrones, the veteran klepht, the champion of the people's rights.[1]

Before the constitutional ministers had been a month in office, their weakness had increased the insubordination of the military classes, and their misconduct had

[1] Alexander Soutzos echoes the popular feeling in a poem written in August 1832 :—

Βωμοὺς εἰς τὴν διχόνοιαν 'στα πάθη των ὑψωνουν
Καὶ τοὺς δεσπότας των μ' αἰσχρὰς μωρίας δικαιώνουν.
Στὴν δεξιάν της φέρουσα σύνταγμα καὶ νόμους
'Η 'Αναρχία μὲ κραυγὰς περιπατεῖ στοὺς δρόμους,
Πολιτικοί, Πολεμικοὶ μ' ἀναίδειαν μεγάλην,
'Ωσὰν οἱ λύκοι χαίρονται εἰς τὴν ἀνεμοζάλην,
'Αρπάζουν τὰς προσόδους μας, γυμνώνουν τὸν λαόν μας,
Καὶ ἀπειθὲς καὶ ἄτακτον τὸ στρατιωτικόν μας
Σὰν ἀφρισμένο ἄλογον τοῦ βασταγμὸν δὲν ἔχει, &c.

He also satirises the high officials for their desertion of the cause of constitutional liberty. One of them speaks thus :—

Το σύνταγμά μας κύριε;—τὸ σύνταγμα ἂς χορεύῃ
Μήπως τὸ πανδρευθήκαμε; εἰς τί μᾶς χρησιμεύει;

alienated their own partisans to such a degree, that A. D. 1832.
they found it necessary to invite the French troops to occupy Nauplia and Patras, as the only means of securing their personal safety and the prolongation of their power.

On the 19th of May 1832 General Corbet entered Nauplia; but at Patras the governing commission was not so fortunate as to obtain French assistance, and that place fell into the hands of the Capodistrians.

The loss of Patras was caused by gross negligence on the part of Zographos, the minister of war. Ignorant of official business, and absorbed in personal intrigues, he left the Greek troops without instructions concerning their future conduct. The regular troops in garrison at Patras had supported the Capodistrians while in power, but they were disposed to obey the government, and not to follow the personal fortunes of any president. The hostility of Kolettes to the regular corps was notorious, and, through the neglect of Zographos, both the officers and men at Patras were easily persuaded by the partisans of Russian influence that it was the intention of the governing commission to disband the regular troops. While brooding over this report, which threatened them with the loss of a large amount of arrears of pay, they heard that French troops were invited to garrison Patras. They concluded that they were cheated by the minister of war, and betrayed by the governing commission. As long as they remained in garrison at Patras they were sure of being regularly supplied with rations and clothing, and of obtaining from time to time advances of pay; but once expelled from the town, they believed that they would be allowed to starve. The Capodistrians formed a strong party in the town, and they availed themselves of the excited feelings of the soldiers to declare, that regular troops who delivered a fortress like Patras to foreigners would render

themselves guilty of treason. The constitutionalists had accused Capodistrias of selling Greece to the Russians; the Capodistrians now accused the constitutionalists of selling Nauplia and Patras to the French. The regular troops mutinied, deposed their commanding officer, who refused to sign a manifesto justifying their revolt, and invited Kitzos Djavellas, who was then at Vostitza, to assume the chief command at Patras.

Djavellas, who had retreated from the Romeliots, was at the head of about five hundred irregulars, and he was looking out for a position in which he could maintain his followers, and defend himself against the attacks of the Kolettists. He hastened to Patras, and entered it before the arrival of the French. When they made their appearance, Djavellas transmitted to their commanding officer a formal protest against the authority of the governing commission, and he refused to obey the order to admit the French troops into the fortress. The French commander, considering that it was the object of the Allies to maintain order and not to enforce the authority of any party, immediately retired, and the residents, who wished to avoid bloodshed, left Djavellas in peaceable possession of Patras.[1] Thus, by the incapacity of Zographos and the decision of Djavellas, the Capodistrians remained in possession of the commercial town of Patras, and of the fortresses of Rhion and Antirhion, with the command of the entrance into the Gulf of Corinth, until the arrival of King Otho.

This success emboldened the enemies of Kolettes. A great part of the Morea, and several districts of con-

[1] Thiersch has printed the correspondence of Djavellas. It must not be supposed that the letters were really written by the Suliot chief, who could hardly write a common note. Like most of the military documents of the Revolution, they were composed by a secretary. Nothing has falsified the history of the Greek Revolution more than the ambitious eloquence of pedantic secretaries.

tinental Greece, refused to admit the officials named by the governing commission. The demogeronts, wherever they were supported by the people, assumed the management of public as well as local business. They had been appointed by Capodistrias. They feared anarchy more than despotism, and they naturally sought protection from the military leaders of the Capodistrian party. The greater part of Arcadia and Achaia resisted the authority of the governing commission, while Argolis, Corinthia, and Laconia, generally acknowledged its power. Messenia and Elis were the scenes of frequent civil broils. In Phocis the Capodistrians maintained their ascendancy. A. D. 1832

Kolokotrones, who held the rank of commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian militia, stepped forward as the defender of the local authorities against the central government. His personal interest, his party-connections, and his hatred of Kolettes, determined his conduct. Had he acted from patriotic motives, he would have caught inspiration from the high national position into which accident had thrust him. The agricultural population was alarmed, and the astute old klepht seized the favourable moment for uniting his cause with the cause of the people, but his confined views and innate selfishness prevented his employing the power thus placed at his disposal for the general good.

Kolokotrones called the Peloponnesians to arms, and pronounced the proceedings of the governing commission to be illegal, in a proclamation dated the 22d June 1832.[1] Metaxas and Plapoutas had informed him that they had secured the co-operation of Zaimes in paralysing the action of the executive government. The Russian admiral had prompted him to proclaim

[1] The original proclamation is printed by Gennaios Kolokotrones, in a work entitled Διάφορα ἔγγραφα καὶ ἐπιστολαὶ ἀφορῶντα τὰς κατὰ το 1832 συμβάσας κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀνωμαλίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, p. 214. Thiersch gives a translation, i. 395.

that the senate was the only legitimate authority in existence. The residents remained silent. Griva, the most lawless of the Romeliot chiefs, advanced without orders from the governing commission, and occupied Tripolitza at the head of a thousand men. The Capodistrians were already prepared to encounter the invaders of the Morea, and Gennaios Kolokotrones, who had more military courage, though less political sagacity than his father, had already formed a camp at Valtetzi.

The tide of success now flowed in favour of the Capodistrians. The advance of Griva was stopped. Elias Mavromichales was repulsed in his attempts to gain a footing in the rich plain of Messenia. The Capodistrians under Kalergy made a bold attempt to seize the mills at Lerna, but the attempt was defeated, though it was openly favoured by the Russian admiral. Civil war recommenced in many districts, and bands of troops, who recognised no government, plundered wherever they could penetrate.

The prudence of Kolokotrones, whom age had rendered more of a politician than a warrior, might have led him to avoid engaging in open hostilities against a government acknowledged by the protecting powers, on the eve of the king's arrival, had he been allowed to remain in undisturbed possession of the profits which he drew from his office as commander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus. But the members of the governing commission forced him into resisting their authority by appointing Theodore Griva to the chief command in the districts of Leondari and Phanari. The occupation of these places by the Kolettists would have rendered Kolokotrones little better than a prisoner in Karitena.

Amidst these scenes of anarchy a national assembly met at Pronia. The members of the governing com-

mission, the ministers in office, the senators, the resi- A. D. 1832.
dents of the Allied powers, and the Russian admiral, were all hostile to the meeting. But a general amnesty before the king's arrival was necessary for pacifying the country, and a general amnesty could not be proclaimed without the sanction of a national assembly. It was also indispensable to obtain the assent of the nation to the election of the king chosen by the Allies. A national assembly could not therefore be entirely dispensed with, though it was feared that a national assembly would abolish the senate and choose a new executive government. Had a national assembly met immediately after the nomination of the governing commission, a civil war might have been avoided by the election of a senate, in which both the constitutionalists and Capodistrians, the Romeliots and the Moreots, the Hydriots, the Spetziots, and the Psarians, might have been duly represented, and in which local interests might have moderated factious passions. But the intrigues of Greek politicians and foreign diplomatists delayed the meeting for three months, and when it took place, old passions had been rekindled with fiercer animosity by fresh injuries. The violence of faction now exposed the corruption of political society in Greece, without a veil, to the examination of strangers. All ties were torn asunder in the struggle to gratify individual selfishness. The Suliots, Djavellas and Botzares, fought on different sides. Hydriot primates were found who deserted the cause of Hydra. The only great political body into which patriotism was likely to find an entrance, was the national assembly, and even there its voice was in great danger of being overpowered by party zeal. The illegal position and arrogant assumptions of the senate caused much animosity ; the residents of the three powers were dis-

trusted, because they appeared in league to support the illegal powers of the senate.

As soon as the assembly of Pronia met, a majority determined to abolish the senate, though it was openly supported by the residents. Many members believed that, as the residents had tamely submitted to the armed opposition of Djavellas at Patras, and had regarded with indifference the renewal of the civil war by Griva, Kolokotrones, and Kalergy, they would offer no opposition to the abolition of the senate. The diplomatists, however, regarded the senate with peculiar favour. They had made use of it to eject Agostino from the presidency, and to create a new government. Its very illegality made it a useful instrument, should it be necessary to employ force to establish King Otho's authority, for its abolition would always be a popular measure, and might serve as a pretext for the assumption of absolute power. On the other hand, the national assembly was considered to be doubly dangerous, because it was legally invested with great power, and not likely to be guided by the suggestions of foreign diplomatists in making use of that power.

Such was the state of Greece and the condition of parties when the national assembly of Pronia commenced its sittings. Nothing presaged that it would be able to establish order in the country.[1]

[1] Professor Thiersch asserts that he could have restored order had he been furnished with 100,000 dollars. The assertion only proves that he knew very little of arithmetic. It would not have sufficed to obtain the evacuation of the Morea by one-half of the Romeliot irregulars who were plundering the peasantry. He says, "Il y avait bien un moyen de sortir encore d'embarras. Je devais me mettre à la tête des affaires, et commencer le gouvernement du roi," vol. i. 167. Had the worthy professor done so, in all probability he would have prevented King Otho from coming to Greece. He is a perfect Wagner the *famulus* in politics.

> "Wie nur dem Kapf nicht alle Hofnung schwindet
> Der immerfort an schalem zenge klebt,
> Mit gier'ger hand nach Gehätzen gräbt
> Und froh ist wenn er Regenwürmer findet."

The assembly commenced its sittings on the 26th of July 1832. On the 1st of August it passed a decree proclaiming a general amnesty, and on the 8th it ratified the election of King Otho; but on the same day it abolished the senate. Of the legality of this measure there was no doubt, and had it occurred immediately after the expulsion of Agostino, it might have tranquillised Greece. Prudence now suggested that its abolition had become impolitic, since the residents had become its advocates; and the majority of the assembly would have acted judiciously, had it only reformed the existing senate on the principle of Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum. The constitutionalists formed a large majority in the assembly, and they were irritated by the conduct of the Greek ministers who had deserted the constitutional cause. The senate was composed of Capodistrians, and it was adopting active measures to increase the violence of the civil war which was desolating the country. The governing commission and the Greek ministers took part with the senate against the representatives of the nation; and the residents, taking advantage of this conduct on the part of the executive, protested against the decree of the national assembly, asserting that it was a violation of the principles of the pacification they pretended to have established. A. D. 1832.

Large bodies of Romeliot troops were quartered in the village of Aria, at a short distance beyond Pronia. The soldiers beset the gates of Nauplia and the doors of the assembly every morning clamouring for pay. The governing commission promised to pay their arrears; but it failed to keep its promise. The ministers were accused of this violation of the public faith in order to produce the catastrophe which ensued, and their friends and the senators incited the soldiers to demand payment from the national assembly. On the

26th August the soldiers of Grigiottes burst into the hall of the assembly, dragged the president from his seat, insulted and ill-treated many deputies, and carried off the president and several deputies, as hostages for the payment of their arrears, to their quarters at Aria. This disgraceful riot put an end to the last national assembly in revolutionary Greece.[1]

This scene of military violence forms an important event in the history of Greece. It prolonged the revolutionary state of the country for eleven years, by placing constitutional liberty in abeyance. It threw the people into an unquiet and dangerous temper, by sweeping away those free institutions which had infused energy into the nation during its struggle for independence. The executive power was made the prize of a successful faction. The central government was not established on a legal basis, and the military chiefs ceased to acknowledge its control. Eleven years of Bavarian domination was the expiation of the violence committed at Pronia.

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes died in the month of August. About the same time, a deputation, consist-

[1] Papadopulos Vretos, an Ionian, was then Baron de Rückmann's doctor. He tells us that he dined with the Russian resident the day after the dissolution of the assembly. After dinner, the English resident, Mr Dawkins, called and narrated the following occurrence, which makes the Ionian infer that the British cabinet destroyed the liberty of Greece. He makes the English resident say, "As I was riding out yesterday with Griffith" (his secretary, who spoke Greek well), "we were surrounded by a crowd of filthy palikaria, shouting and gesticulating like demons. All spoke at the same time, and all appeared to be delivering set speeches, so that the road was an oratorical pandemonium. When I could find an opportunity to make myself heard, I asked Griffith what was the play they were acting for our private edification. After many vain efforts he obtained a partial hearing. The soldiers declared they had no bread, no clothes, and no money. It would have been superfluous for them to have told any one who looked at them that they were without credit. I saw that instantly. They wished my Excellency to take their case into consideration and provide for their wants. I stated to them that my functions did not allow me to become their commissary; but, pointing with my whip to the hall of the national assembly, I said, that I believed there were many persons in that building who possessed great experience as commissaries and paymasters. They seized my hint with wonderful alacrity, and set off running and whooping like wild Indians. Griffith and I took a long ride, and when we returned in the evening we heard of the great event of the day."—*Melanges Politiques*, p. 23.

ing of three members, two of whom were members of the governing commission, was sent to Munich with addresses of congratulation to the kings of Greece and Bavaria.[1] The commission was thus left incomplete, for the presence of five members was required to give validity to its acts. Yet on this occasion the residents did not protest against the virtual dissolution of the executive government of Greece. Greece surely stood in greater want of a legal executive than of an illegal senate; but the diplomatists looked on with indifference, while the governing commission committed suicide. A. D. 1832.

Greece was now without any legal central authority. The senate had been abolished by the national assembly, and the national assembly had been dissolved by the soldiery. The senate made the protest of the foreign diplomatists a ground for prolonging its existence. Three places in the governing commission were vacant; two had been occupied by constitutionalists, one by a Capodistrian. The senate attempted to violate the terms of the pacification sanctioned by the residents, and named three Capodistrians. George Konduriottes, the president, resisted this pretension, but, possessing neither the talents nor the energy necessary for carrying on a contest with the senate, he withdrew to Hydra. Only three members of the government now remained at Nauplia—Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas—and they claimed the whole executive power. It was generally felt that chance had made as good a selection as it was possible to make under the circumstances. The senate yielded at last to public opinion, and passed a decree investing these three men with the whole executive power.

But the intrigues of Admiral Ricord soon determined a majority of the senators to repudiate this

[1] Kosta Botzares, Plapoutas, and Admiral Miaoulis.

decree, and all Greece was astonished by the strange intelligence that seven senators had secretly quitted Nauplia. On the 21st November these seceders were joined at Astros by the president, Tsamados, and two additional members, and met by Kolokotrones with a body of Moreot troops. Ten of the thirteen senators who had signed the address to the King of Bavaria were now present. They had carried with them the government printing-press, and they issued proclamations annulling the decree which had invested Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas with the executive power until the king's arrival. Trusting to the military force of the Capodistrian party under Kolokotrones, and to the support of the Russian admiral, the seceders assumed the executive authority.

On this occasion, Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas acted with sense and courage. They took prompt measures to secure order and maintain their authority within the walls of Nauplia. Beyond the fortress they were powerless. The residents recognised them as the legal government, and the French garrison placed their persons in security.

The senate, having failed to produce a revolution, sought revenge by increasing the existing anarchy. It appointed a military commission to govern Greece, consisting of several powerful chiefs. Kolokotrones, Grigiottes, Djavellas, and Hadgi Christos, Moreots and Romeliots, Albanians and Bulgarians, formed an alliance, and leagued together. Anarchy reached such a pitch, that the minister of war, Zographos, informed the minister of finance, Mavrocordatos, that it was impossible to obtain an exact account of the numbers of the soldiers who were drawing pay and rations. Of the number of men actually under arms he had no idea.[1]

[1] *Rapport des Ministres*, 28th November 1832; Thiersch, i. 448.

At first sight the conduct of the seceding senators A. D. 1832
looks like the proceedings of maniacs; but the Capodistrians had never abandoned the scheme of Agostino, and they still hoped, by seizing the forcible direction of the administration in the greater part of the Morea, to compel the regency which would govern Greece during the king's minority, to purchase their support by appointing them senators for life. The Russian admiral supported them in their desperate schemes, while the Russian resident, remaining passive, was at liberty to disavow their proceedings in case of failure. It is needless to follow these abortive intrigues further. The senators, finding that they had no chance of obtaining effectual support from the Greeks, adopted the extraordinary expedient of endeavouring to procure assistance from Russia, by naming Admiral Ricord president of Greece. This act of treason and folly proves the justice with which Capodistrias had been reproached for selecting his senators from the most ignorant and unprincipled political adventurers. Some persons have supposed that there was malice as well as folly in the conduct of the senators; and that, though they were eager to proclaim that they preferred Russian protection to Greek independence, they also intended to hint to Admiral Ricord that it was his interest and the interest of other Russian agents to purchase her silence in order to throw a veil over many intrigues.

Amidst the general anarchy, the commission of seven generals was unable to place any restraint on the soldiery. The men under arms no longer obeyed their officers, but formed bands like wolves, hunting for their prey under the boldest plunderer. A veil may be dropped on their proceedings. But it is of some importance to explain in what manner a part of the Morea escaped their ravages.

The revival of the municipal institutions of the

Morea at this period has been already mentioned. The weakness of the government relieved the local authorities from the incubus of a tyrannical central administration, which had been imposed on them by Capodistrias. The exigencies of the time forced them to act without waiting for the initiative of ministers and the orders of prefects. The condition of the country and the agitation of the people again made the municipal authorities feel that they were responsible to their fellow-citizens, by whom they were supposed to be elected. They were often called upon to make arrangements for quartering and feeding troops, who came to defend or plunder the country, as circumstances might determine. They were compelled to collect the public revenues to meet these demands; to arm strong bodies of peasantry, and to form alliances with neighbouring municipalities, in order to check the rapacity of the soldiery. Their difficulties induced them to look to Kolokotrones for assistance, whose military force was so far inferior to that of the Romeliots as to render it imperative on him to form an alliance with the people. His office as commander-in-chief in the Morea, and his personal relations with most of the local magistrates chosen during the administration of Capodistrias, pointed him out as the natural defender of the agricultural population. The difficulty was to make the old klepht feel that it was his interest to protect and not to plunder; that his robberies must be confined to the central administration; and that he must aid and not command the local authorities. The end was partially attained, and in many districts the demogeronts acquired sufficient power to protect their municipalities against the military chiefs of the Capodistrian faction, and to repulse the attacks of the Romeliot troops.

The governing commission and the constitutional

ministers forfeited their claim to the allegiance of the Greeks, by their neglect to restrain the exactions of the Romeliots, who had raised them to power. Strangers had a better opportunity of observing the evil effects of their misconduct in Messenia than in other parts of the country, as the presence of the French army of occupation enforced neutrality within certain limits, and yet left free action to the rival factions in its immediate vicinity. A. D. 1832

Great part of the rich plain which extends from Taygetus to Ithome was national property. Statesmen and chieftains, Romeliots and Moreots, were eager to become the farmers of the public revenues. The bey of Maina and the whole of his ambitious and needy family aspired to quarter themselves, with all their Maniat adherents, in this rich province. The native peasantry and the opponents of the Mavromichales were alike hostile to the pretensions of the Maniats. Party intrigues were carried on in every village, and no province was more tormented by the incessant strife which makes the municipal administration of the Greeks a field for the exhibition of strange paroxysms of selfishness. Some of the demogeronts allied themselves with Kolokotrones; some discontented citizens formed connections with the family of Mavromichales.

The presence of a French garrison at Kalamata complicated the politics of the municipal authorities in Messenia. Their local interests and personal feelings favoured the French, who had protected them from being plundered by the Maniats, and who afforded them a profitable market for their produce. But the Capodistrian faction, excited by Kolokotrones and Admiral Ricord, were indefatigable in calumniating and intriguing against the French. The officers commanding the Kalamata sought to tranquillise the

people, by inviting the peasantry to pursue their labours, and by assuring the demogeronts of their readiness to assist in maintaining order in the neighbourhood of their encampment. But the partisans of Kolokotrones pointed to the neutrality proclaimed by the residents at Nauplia, and to the retreat of the French troops from Patras, as proofs that the French could not interfere in the internal administration of Messenia. The French were accused of being constitutionalists like the Maniats, and the agricultural population feared the lawless conduct of the adherents of the family of Mavromichales. Kolokotrones had already convinced many that he was acting sincerely as the protector of the people. To him, therefore, the demogeronts of most of the villages in Messenia turned for support.

Niketas came with a small body of chosen troops to protect the agricultural population from an invasion of the Maniats. The Mavromichales were not deterred by these preparations for defence. They had claims on the governing commission for their long opposition to Capodistrias, which they did not think were entirely cancelled by the assassination of the president. They pretended that they were entitled to be the tax-gatherers of Messenia, and their followers were eager to exchange the black bread of the lupin-meal, which formed their hard fare in Kakovouli, for the wheaten cakes and roast lambs.[1]

Elias Mavromichales, called Katzakos, invaded the district between the lower ridges of Taygetus and the Pamisus more than once at the head of three or four hundred men. But his progress was always arrested by Niketas, who was a better soldier, and who, in addition to his superior skill in partisan warfare, was sup-

[1] Kakovouli, or the land of evil counsel. The lupins are ground after the pulse has been long steeped in water to extract some injurious matter. The bread is black, hard, and bitter.

ported by the whole of the population in the plain capable of bearing arms. The approach of the Maniats caused excessive terror, and the alarm was justified by their conduct. The French troops at Kalamata saw more than one Greek village suddenly attacked and plundered by the modern Spartiates, as the Maniats termed themselves. The armed men descended from their mountains attended by numbers of women, whose duty it was to carry off the booty. These women were seen by the French returning, carrying on their back bundles of linen, bedding, and household utensils, and driving before them asses laden with doors, windows, and small rafters.[1] Niketas, however, invariably succeeded in driving Elias and his Maniats back into the mountains. A. D. 1832.

Arrangements were ultimately adopted which put an end to these devastating forays of the Maniats. Niketas placed himself at the head of a band of veterans, and moved about from village to village watching the slopes of Taygetus, and taking care that the armed peasantry should always be informed where they were to join him in case of any attack. The demogeronts were in this way enabled to provide the supplies of money and provisions necessary for the defence of the district, and the agricultural population was not prevented from cultivating the land.

Kolokotrones and Kolettes were the two great party leaders at this time, but neither possessed the talents necessary to frame, nor the character necessary to pursue, a fixed line of policy. Accident alone determined their political position, and made the first, though a partisan of despotic power, the defender of liberal institutions, and the second, though calling himself a constitutionalist, a tyrant, and the enemy of a national assembly. Like their partisans, they had no honest

[1] Pellion, 316.

convictions, and they drifted up and down with the current of faction without an effort to steer their course according to the interest of Greece. Kolettes came into the Morea to establish constitutional liberty. His followers plundered the country, and dispersed the national assembly. Kolokotrones was the instrument of the Capodistrians and the Russians to perpetuate despotic power. His position compelled him to become the champion of order and liberty.

There is no doubt that though many arbitrary and unjust acts could be cited against Kolokotrones and Djavellas, yet greater security for life and property existed in the provinces over which their authority extended, than in the provinces which submitted to the governing commission. But it is certain that this result was obtained by the accidental revival of national institutions, and not by the patriotism or the wisdom of the leaders of the Capodistrians. The military chiefs on both sides were equally rapacious; the political leaders equally ignorant, selfish, and corrupt. Honest men of both parties kept aloof from the public administration.

Both Greeks and foreigners had praised the municipal organisation of Greece which existed under the Turkish domination; and it undoubtedly tended to check in some degree the evils which resulted from the excessive fiscal rapacity of the Othoman government. Yet it could do but little to protect the people from injustice; for the municipal magistrates were responsible to their Othoman rulers, not to those who elected them, or to the law of the land, for the exercise of their authority. It made Greeks the instruments of Othoman oppression, and in this way it introduced a degree of demoralisation into the local administrations, which the Revolution failed to eradicate. It may be truly said that this vaunted institution never protected the

liberties of the people except by accident. The law had no power to restrain the selfishness of the local magistrates. The primates employed the municipalities, like the Turks, as fiscal engines for their own convenience. The military chiefs were the enemies of every species of order and organisation. The torpid ministers, the literary enthusiasts, and the intriguing politicians, who acted an important part during the Revolution, allowed the local institutions to be destroyed, and they had not the capacity necessary for organising an efficient central administration. A. D. 1833.

At the end of the year 1832 Greece was in a state of almost universal anarchy. The government acknowledged by the three powers exercised little authority beyond the walls of Nauplia. The senate was in open rebellion. The Capodistrians under Kolokotrones and Djavellas had never recognised the governing commission. A confederation of military chiefs attempted to rule the country, and blockaded the existing government.

The commission of three members, which exercised the executive power, alarmed at the prospect of being excluded from power before the king's arrival, implored the residents to invite the French troops to garrison Argos. Four companies of infantry and a detachment of artillery were sent from Messenia by General Gueheneuc to effect this object. In the mean time, General Corbet, who commanded at Nauplia, detached two companies and two mountain-guns to take possession of the cavalry barracks at Argos, in order to secure quarters for the troops from Messenia. The town was filled with irregular Greek soldiery, under the nominal command of Grigiottes and Tzokres. These men boasted that they would drive the French back to Nauplia, and that Kolokotrones would exterminate those who were advancing from Messenia. The prudent precautions

of the French officers prevented the troops being attacked on their march, and the whole force united at Argos on the 15th of January 1833.

On the following day the French were suddenly attacked. The Greeks commenced their hostilities so unexpectedly, that the colonel of the troops, who had arrived on the preceding evening, was on his way to Nauplia to make his report to General Corbet when the attack commenced. The French soldiers who went to market unarmed were driven back into the barracks, and a few were killed and wounded. But the hostile conduct of the Greek soldiery had prepared the French for any sudden outbreak, and a few minutes sufficed to put their whole force under arms in the square before their quarters. The Greek troops, trusting to their numbers, attempted to occupy the houses which commanded this square. They were promptly driven back, and the streets were cleared by grape-shot from the French guns. The Greeks then intrenched themselves in several houses, and fired from the windows of the upper stories on the French who advanced to dislodge them. This species of warfare could not long arrest the progress of regular troops. The French succeeded in approaching every house in succession with little loss. They then burst open the doors and windows of the lower story, and, rushing up-stairs, forced the armatoli and klephts to jump out of the windows, or finished their career with the bayonet. In less than three hours every house was taken, and the fugitives who had sought a refuge in the ruined citadel of Larissa were pursued and driven even from that stronghold.

Never was victory more complete. The French lost only forty killed and wounded, while the Greeks, who fought chiefly under cover, had a hundred and sixty killed, and in all probability a much greater number

wounded. Grigiottes was taken prisoner, but was soon released. A Greek officer and a soldier accused of an attempt at an assassination were tried, condemned, and shot.[1] A. D. 1833.

While the Greek troops were plundering their countrymen and murdering their allies, the three protecting powers were labouring to secure to Greece every advantage of political independence and external peace.

A treaty was signed at Constantinople on the 21st July 1832, by which the sultan recognised the kingdom of Greece, and ceded to it the districts within its limits still occupied by his troops, on receiving an indemnity of forty millions of piastres, a sum then equal to £462,480.[2] The Allied powers also furnished the king's government with ample funds, by guaranteeing a loan of sixty millions of francs. The indemnity to Turkey was paid out of this loan.[3]

The Allied powers also secured for the Greek monarchy an official admission among the sovereigns of Europe, by inviting the Germanic Confederation to recognise Prince Otho of Bavaria king of Greece, which took place on the 4th October 1832.[4] The protectors of Greece have often been reproached for the slowness of their proceedings in establishing the independence of Greece; yet when we reflect on the anarchy that prevailed among the Greeks, the difficulties thrown in their way by Capodistrias, the desertion of Prince Leopold, and the small assistance they received from Bavaria, we ought rather to feel surprise that they succeeded at last in establishing the Greek kingdom.

[1] Compare Pellion, 363; Lacour, *Excursions en Grèce*, 260. Both had access to official accounts, and yet they differ in their statements of the French loss.

[2] *Parliamentary Papers*, Annex A to Protocol of 30th August 1833.

[3] Each of the three powers guaranteed a separate series of bonds for twenty millions of francs, or £781,273, 6s. 8d. sterling. The contract between the Greek government and the house of Rothschild was signed 12th January 1833. The loan was effected at 94, interest at 5 per cent.

[4] *Klübers Quellensammlung zu dem öffentlichen Recht des Teutschen Bundes.* Fortsetzung, 1832, p. 75.

The King of Bavaria concluded a treaty of alliance between Bavaria and Greece on the 1st November 1832. He engaged to send 3500 Bavarian troops to support his son's throne, and relieve the French army of occupation. This subsidiary force was paid from the proceeds of the Allied loan; for Bavaria had neither the resources, nor, to speak the truth, the generosity, of France.[1] A convention was signed at the same time, authorising Greece to recruit volunteers in Bavaria, in order that the subsidiary force might be replaced by German mercenaries in King Otho's service.[2]

On the 16th January 1833, the veterans of the Greek Revolution fled before a few companies of French troops; on the 1st of February King Otho arrived at Nauplia, accompanied by a small army of Bavarians, composed of a due proportion of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers.[3] As experience had proved that there were no statesmen in Greece capable of governing the country, it was absolutely necessary to send a regency composed of foreigners to administer the government during King Otho's minority. The persons chosen were Count Armansperg, M. de Maurer, and General Heideck.

The Bavarian troops landed before the king. Their tall persons, bright uniforms, and fine music, contrasted greatly to their advantage with the small figures and well-worn clothing of the French. The numerous

[1] The French government was desirous of obtaining the joint guarantee of King Louis of Bavaria to the loan, in order to facilitate the progress of the measure through the French Chambers. But King Louis refused, alleging that neither the state of his finances nor the interests of Bavaria allowed him to aid his son in raising money for Greece. Yet he took care that his son should expend large sums of Greek money in Bavaria without any advantage to Greece.—*Klübers Pragmatische Geschichte der Nationalen und Politischen Wiedergebarts Griechenlands*, p. 509.

[2] The treaty is printed in the Greek Government Gazette, Ἐφημερὶς τῆς Κυβερνήσεως, No. 18; the convention in No. 20, 1833.

[3] King Otho embarked at Brindisi on board the English frigate Madagascar, commanded by Captain (Lord) Lyons, on the 15th January 1833, and was joined at Corfu by a fleet of transports bringing the Bavarian troops from Trieste.

mounted officers, the splendid plumes, the prancing horses, and the numerous decorations, crosses, and ornaments of the new-comers, produced a powerful effect on the minds of the Greeks, taught by the castigation they had received at Argos to appreciate the value of military discipline. A. D. 1833.

The people welcomed the king as their saviour from anarchy. Even the members of the government, the military chiefs, and the high officials, who had been devouring the resources of the country, hailed the king's arrival with pleasure; for they felt that they could no longer extort any profit from the starving population. The title, however, which the Bavarian prince assumed—Otho, by the grace of God, King of Greece—excited a few sneers even among those who were not republicans; for it seemed a claim to divine right in the throne on the part of the house of Wittelspach. But every objection passed unheeded; and it may be safely asserted that few kings have mounted their thrones amidst more general satisfaction than King Otho.

CHAPTER IV.

BAVARIAN DESPOTISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION. FEBRUARY 1833 TO SEPTEMBER 1843.

" What! shall reviving thraldom again be
The patched-up idol of enlightened days?
Shall we who struck the lion down—shall we
Pay the wolf homage? "

LANDING OF KING OTHO—THE REGENCY, ITS MEMBERS AND DUTIES—ROYAL PROCLAMATION — ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES — MILITARY ORGANISATION —CIVIL ADMINISTRATION—MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS — FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION—MONETARY SYSTEM — JUDICIAL ORGANISATION — THE GREEK CHURCH, REFORMS INTRODUCED BY THE REGENCY—SYNODAL TOMOS—MONASTERIES — PUBLIC INSTRUCTION — RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESS—ROADS — ORDER OF THE REDEEMER—QUARRELS IN THE REGENCY—KOLOKOTRONES'S PLOT—ARMANSPERG INTRIGUE—ARMANSPERG'S ADMINISTRATION—BAVARIAN INFLUENCE—DISPUTES WITH ENGLAND—ALARMING INCREASE OF BRIGANDAGE—INSURRECTIONS IN MAINA AND MESSENIA—BRIGANDAGE IN 1835—GENERAL GORDON'S EXPEDITION—INSURRECTION IN ACARNANIA—OPINIONS OF LORD LYONS AND GENERAL GORDON ON THE STATE OF GREECE—BRIGANDAGE CONTINUES—KING OTHO'S PERSONAL GOVERNMENT—ATTACKS ON KING OTHO IN THE ENGLISH NEWSPAPERS—CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION OF 1843—REVOLUTION—OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION—CONCLUSION.

KING OTHO quitted the English frigate which conveyed him to Greece on the 6th February 1833. His entry into Nauplia was a spectacle well calculated to inspire the Greeks with enthusiasm.

The three most powerful governments in Europe combined to establish him on his throne. He arrived escorted by a numerous fleet, and he landed surrounded by a powerful army.[1] King Otho was then seventeen

[1] Twenty-five ships of war and forty-eight transports were anchored in the bay of Nauplia, and three thousand Bavarian troops had already landed.

years old.[1] Though not handsome, he was well grown, A. D. 1833.
and of an engaging appearance. His countrymen spoke favourably of his disposition. His youthful grace, as he rode towards his residence in the midst of a brilliant retinue, called forth the blessings of a delighted population, and many sincere prayers were uttered for his long and happy reign. The day formed an era in the history of Greece, nor is it without some importance in the records of European civilisation. A new Christian kingdom was incorporated in the international system of the West at a critical period, for the maintenance of the balance of power in the East.

The scene itself formed a splendid picture. Anarchy and order shook hands. Greeks and Albanians, mountaineers and islanders, soldiers, sailors, and peasants, in their varied and picturesque dresses, hailed the young monarch as their deliverer from a state of society as intolerable as Turkish tyranny. Families in bright attire glided in boats over the calm sea amidst the gaily decorated frigates of the Allied squadrons. The music of many bands in the ships and on shore enlivened the scene, and the roar of artillery in every direction gave an imposing pomp to the ceremony. The uniforms of many armies and navies, and the sounds of many languages, testified that most civilised nations had sent deputies to inaugurate the festival of the regeneration of Greece.

Nature was in perfect harmony. The sun was warm, and the air balmy with the breath of spring, while a light breeze wafted freshness from the sea. The landscape was beautiful, and it recalled memories of a glorious past. The white buildings of the Turkish town of Nauplia clustered at the foot of the Venetian fortifications and cyclopean foundations that crown its

[1] King Otho was born on the 1st June 1815.

rocky promontory. The mountain citadel of Palamedes frowned over both, and the island fort of Burdjee, memorable in the history of the Revolution, stood like a sentinel in the harbour. The king landed and mounted his horse under the cyclopean walls of Tyrinthus, which were covered with spectators. The modern town of Argos looked smiling even in ruin, with the Pelasgic foundations and medieval battlements of the Larissa above. The Mycenæ of Homer was seen on one side, while on the other the blue tints and snowy tops of the Arcadian and Laconian mountains mingled in the distance with the bluer waters of the Egean.

Enthusiasts, who thought of the poetic glories of Homer's Greece, and the historic greatness of the Greece of Thucydides, might be pardoned if they then indulged a hope that a third Greece was emerging into life, which would again occupy a brilliant position in the world's annals. Political independence was secured : peace was guaranteed : domestic faction would be allayed by the equity of impartial foreigners, and all ranks would be taught, by the presence of a settled government, to efface the ravages of war, and cultivate the virtues which the nation had lost under Othoman domination. The task did not appear to be very difficult. The greater part of Greece was uninhabited. The progress of many British colonies, and of the United States of America, testify that land capable of cultivation forms the surest foundation for national prosperity. To insure a rapid increase of population where there is an abundant supply of waste land, nothing is required but domestic virtue and public order. And in a free country, the rapid increase of a population enjoying the privilege of self-government in local affairs, and of stern justice in the central administration, is the surest means of extending a nation's power. The dreamer, therefore, who allowed visions of the in-

crease of the Greek race, and of its peaceful conquests over uncultivated lands far beyond the limits of the new kingdom, to pass through his mind as King Otho rode forward to mount his throne, might have seen what was soon to happen, had the members of the regency possessed a little common-sense. The rapid growth of population in the Greek kingdom would have solved the Eastern question. The example of a well-governed Christian population, the aspect of its moral improvement, material prosperity, and constant overflow into European Turkey, would have relieved European cabinets from many political embarrassments, by producing the euthanasia of the Othoman empire. A. D. 1833.

Prince Otho of Bavaria had been proposed as a candidate for the sovereignty of Greece before the election of Prince Leopold. It was then urged that, being young, he would become completely identified with his subjects in language and religion.[1] But the Allies rejected him, thinking that a man of experience was more likely to govern Greece well, than an inexperienced boy of the purest accent and the most unequivocal orthodoxy. Eloquent and orthodox Greeks had not distinguished themselves as statesmen; and though they might be excellent teachers of their language and ecclesiastical doctrines, they had given no proof of their being able to educate a good sovereign.

The resignation of Prince Leopold, and the refusal of other princes, at last opened the way for King Otho's election, and he became King of Greece under extremely favourable circumstances. King Louis of Bavaria was authorised to appoint a regency to govern the kingdom until his son's majority, which was fixed to be on the 1st June 1835, at the completion of his twentieth year.[2]

[1] Thiersch, i. 308-313. See note, vol. ii. p. 257 of this work.
[2] Treaty of 7th May 1832, Art. ix. x.

The regency was invested with unlimited power, partly through the misconduct of the Greeks, and partly in consequence of the despotic views of King Louis. The liberality of the three powers supplied the regents with an overflowing treasury. It has been already stated that the regency was composed of three members, Count Armansperg, M. de Maurer, and General Heideck. Count Armansperg was named president. Mr Abel, the secretary, was invested with a consultative voice, and appointed supplemental member, to fill any vacancy that might occur. Mr Greiner was joined to the regency as treasurer, and director of the finance department. Not one of these men, with the exception of General Heideck, had the slightest knowledge of the condition of Greece.

Count Armansperg enjoyed the reputation of being a very liberal man for a Bavarian nobleman at that time. He had been minister of finance, and he filled the office of minister of foreign affairs when the first attempt was made to obtain the sovereignty of Greece for King Otho. His ministerial experience and his rank rendered him well suited for the presidency of the regency, which gave him the direction of the foreign relations of the kingdom, and, what both he and the countess particularly enjoyed, the duty of holding public receptions and giving private entertainments. The count's own tact, aided by the presence of the countess and three accomplished daughters, rendered the house of the president the centre of polished society and of political intrigue at Nauplia. It was the only place where the young king could see something of the world, and meet his subjects and strangers without feeling the restraint of royalty, for M. de Maurer lived like a niggard, and General Heideck like a recluse.

M. de Maurer and Mr Abel were selected for their offices on account of their sharing the political opinions

of Count Armansperg.[1] Maurer was an able jurist, but he was destitute both of the talents and the temper required to form a statesman. He knew well how to frame laws, but he knew not how to apply the principles of legislation to social exigencies which he met with for the first time. On the whole, he was a more useful and an honester man than Count Armansperg, but he was not so well suited by the flexibility of his character to move among Greeks and diplomatists, or to steer a prudent course in a high political sphere. A. D. 1833.

Both Armansperg and Maurer took especial care of their own personal interests before they gave their services to Greece. They bargained with King Louis for large pensions on quitting the regency, and they secured to themselves ample salaries during their stay in Greece. Count Armansperg expended his salary like a gentleman, but the sordid household of M. de Maurer amused even the Greeks.

General Heideck was the member of the regency first selected. He had resided in the country, and had been long treated as a personal friend by the King of Bavaria. King Louis was well aware that, though Heideck was inferior to his colleagues in political knowledge, he was more sincerely attached to the Bavarian dynasty, and his majesty always entertained some misgivings concerning the personal prudence or the political integrity of the other members. Heideck, during his first visit to Greece, had acquired the reputation of an able and disinterested administrator. As a member of the regency, he paid little attention to anything but the organisation of the army; and he rendered himself unpopular by the partiality he showed

[1] Mr Abel, after his return to Bavaria, became a violent partisan of the ultramontane party, fought a duel with Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein, and succeeded his adversary as minister of the interior. He held that office from 1838 to 1847, when Lola Montes caused the ultramontane party to be ejected from power.

to the Bavarians, on whom he lavished rapid promotion and high pay, while he left the veterans of the Revolution without reward and without employment. He was accused of purchasing popularity at Munich by wasteful expenditure in Greece, and of doing very little to organise a native army when he had ample means at his disposal.

The members of the regency were men of experience and strangers. It was natural to count on their cordial co-operation during their short period of power. Yet the two leading members, though they had been previously supposed to be political friends, were hardly installed in office before they began to dispute about personal trifles. Mean jealousy on one side, and inflated presumption on the other, sowed the seeds of dissension. Count Armansperg, as a noble, looked down on Maurer as a pedant and a law-professor. Maurer sneered at the count as an idler, fit only to be a diplomatist or a master of ceremonies. Both soon engaged in intrigues to eject their colleagues. Maurer expected that, by securing a majority of votes, he should be able to induce the King of Bavaria to support his authority. Armansperg, with more experience of courts, endeavoured to make sure of the support of the three protecting powers, whose influence, he knew, would easily mould the unsteady mind of King Louis to their wish. The cause of Greece and the opinions of the Greeks were of no account to either of the intriguers, for Greek interests could not decide the question at issue. It would probably have been the wisest course at the beginning to have sent a single regent to Greece, and to have given him a council, the members of which might have been charged with the civil, military, financial, and judicial organisation of the kingdom; though it must be confessed that no wisdom could have foreseen that two Bavarian statesmen would surpass the

Greeks in "envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness." A. D. 1833.

Count Armansperg galled the pride of Maurer by an air of superiority, which the jurist had not the tact to rebuke with polite contempt. Maurer was impatient to proclaim publicly that the title of president only conferred on the count the first place in processions and the upper seat at board meetings, and he could not conceal that these things were the objects of his jealousy. The count understood society better than his rival. When strangers, misled by the fine figure and expression of Maurer, addressed him as the chief of the regency, the lawyer had not the tact to transfer the compliments to their true destination, and win the flatterers by his manner in doing so, but he left time for the president to thrust forward his common-looking physiognomy with polished ease, vindicate his own rights, and extract from the abashed strangers some additional outpouring of adulation. The Countess of Armansperg increased the discord of the regents by her extreme haughtiness, which was seldom restrained by good sense, and sometimes not even by good manners. She was so imprudent as to offend Heideck and Abel as much as she irritated Maurer. It is necessary to notice this conduct of the lady, for she was her husband's evil genius in Greece. Her influence increased the animosity of the Bavarians, and prolonged the misfortunes of the Greeks.

The position of the regency was delicate, but not difficult to men of talent and resolution. A moderate share of sagacity sufficed to guide their conduct. Anarchy had prepared an open field of action. It was necessary to create an army, a navy, a civil and judicial administration, and to sweep away the rude fiscal system of the Turkish land-tax. We shall see how the Bavarian regency performed these duties.

The first step was to put an end to the provisional system of expedients by which Capodistrias and his successors had prolonged the state of revolution. It was necessary to make the Greeks feel that the royal authority gave personal security and protection for property, since their loyalty reposed on no national and religious traditions and sympathies. It required no philosopher in Greece, when King Otho arrived, to proclaim "that all the vast apparatus of government has ultimately no other object or purpose but the distribution of justice; and that kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, officers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers, and privy councillors, were all subordinate in their end to this part of the administration."[1] The reign of anarchy coming after the despotism of Capodistrias, had enabled the people to feel instinctively that, in order to secure good government, it was indispensable that the laws and institutions of the kingdom should be more powerful than the will of the king and the action of government.

The second step was to prepare the way for national prosperity, by removing the obstacles which prevented the people from bettering its condition. There was no difficulty in effecting this, since uncultivated land was abundant, and the Allied loan supplied the regency with ample funds. The system of exacting a tenth of the agricultural produce of the country kept society beyond the walls of towns in a stationary condition. Its immediate abolition was the most certain method of eradicating the evils it produced. Relief from the oppression, of the tax-collector, even more than from the burden of the tax, would enable the peasantry to cultivate additional land, and to pay wages to agricultural labourers. An immediate influx of labourers would arrive from Turkey, and the increase of the

[1] Hume's *Essay of the Origin of Government.*

population of Greece would be certain and rapid. One-tenth would every year be added to the national capital. The regency required to do nothing but make roads. The government of the country could have been carried on from the customs, and the rent of national property. The extraordinary expenses of organising the kingdom would have been paid for out of the loan. The regency did nothing of the kind; it retained the Turkish land-tax, neglected to make roads, spent the Allied loan in a manner that both weakened and corrupted the Greek nation, and left the great question of its increase in population and agricultural prosperity unsolved. A. D. 1833.

The members of the regency complained that the want of labour and capital impeded the success of their plans of improvement; yet they seemed to have overlooked the fact that if they had abolished the tenths, the people would easily have procured both labour and capital for themselves. Labour was then abundant and cheap in Turkey; capital in the hands of Greeks was abundant in every commercial mart in the Mediterranean. Yet the Bavarians talked of establishing agricultural colonies of Swiss or Germans, and of inviting foreign capitalists to found banks. It may be confidently asserted that the Greek monarchy would have realised the boast of Themistocles, and rapidly expanded from a petty kingdom to a great state, had the regency swept away the Turkish land-tax, and left the agricultural industry of Greece free to make its own career in the East.

On the day of the king's landing, a royal proclamation was issued, addressed to the Greek nation; the ministers in office were confirmed in their places, and the senate was allowed to expire, without notice, of the wounds it had inflicted both on itself and its country.

The royal proclamation was nothing more than a collection of empty phrases, and it disappointed public expectation by making no allusion to representative institutions nor to the constitution. It revealed clearly that the views of the Bavarian government were not in accordance with the sentiments of the Greeks. The silence of the regency on the subject of the Greek constitution was regarded as a claim on the part of King Otho to be an absolute monarch. The omission was generally blamed; but the acknowledged necessity of investing the regency with legislative power, in order to enable it to introduce organic changes in the administration, prevented any public complaint. It caused the Greeks, however, to scrutinise the measures of the Bavarians with severity, and to regard the members of the regency with distrust. The King of Bavaria had solemnly declared to the protecting powers that the individuals selected to govern Greece during his son's minority "ought to hold moderate and constitutional opinions;" the Greek people had therefore an undoubted right to receive from these foreign statesmen a distinct pledge that they did not intend to establish an arbitrary government.[1] The distrust of the Greeks was increased, because the omission in the royal proclamation was a deliberate violation of a pledge given by the Bavarian minister of foreign affairs, when the object of King Louis was to win over the Greeks to accept his son as their king. The Baron de Gise then declared that it would be one of the first cares of the regency to convoke a national assembly to assist in preparing a definitive constitution for the kingdom.[2] The royal word, thus pledged, was guaranteed by a proclamation of the three protecting powers,

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, Annex A to Protocol of 26th April 1832.

[2] The letter of Baron de Gise, dated 31st July 1832, is printed in *Recueil des Traités, Actes, et Pièces concernans la Fondation de la Royauté en Grèce et le Tracé de ses Limites* (Nauplie, 1833), p. 62.

published at Nauplia, to announce the election of King Otho. In this document the Greeks were invited to aid their sovereign in giving their country a definitive constitution.[1] They answered the appeal of the Allies on the 15th of September 1843. A.D. 1833.

The oath of allegiance demanded from the Greeks was simple. They swore fidelity to King Otho, and obedience to the laws of their country.

The first measures of the regency had been prepared at Munich, under the eye of King Louis. In these measures too much deference was paid to the administrative arrangements introduced by Capodistrias, which he himself had always regarded as of a provisional nature; and the modifications made on the Capodistrian legislation were too exclusively based on German theories, without a practical adaptation to the state of Greece. The King of Bavaria had little knowledge of financial and economical questions, and he had no knowledge of the social and fiscal wants of the Greek people. He thought of nothing but the means of carrying on the central administration, and in that sphere he endeavoured honestly to introduce a well-organised and clearly defined system. The laws and ordinances which the regency brought from Bavaria would have required only a few modifications to have engrafted them advantageously on the existing institutions. Their great object was to establish order and give power to the executive government.

The armed bands of personal followers which had enabled the military chiefs to place themselves above the law, to defy the government, and plunder the people, were disbanded. A national army was created. The scenes of tumultuous violence and gross peculation which General Heideck had witnessed in the Greek armies, had made a deep impression on his mind.

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, Annex D to Protocol of 26th April 1832.

Warned by his experience, the regency arrived with an army capable of enforcing order; and it fortunately found the Greek irregulars so cowed by the punishment they had received from the French at Argos, that they submitted to be disbanded without offering any resistance. It must not, however, be concealed, that the regency abused the power it acquired by its success. Bavarian officers, who possessed neither experience nor merit, were suddenly promoted to high military commands, many of whom made a short stay in Greece, and hardly one of whom bestowed a single thought on the future condition of the country.

The national army soon received a good organisation in print.[1] In numbers it was unnecessarily strong. Upwards of five thousand Bavarian volunteers were enrolled in the Greek service before the end of the year 1834, and almost as many Greek troops were kept under arms. This numerous force was never brought into a very efficient condition. Faction and jobbing soon vitiated its organisation. The regency was ashamed to publish an army-list. Promotion was conferred too lavishly on young Bavarians, while Greeks and Philhellenes of long service were left unemployed. It was a grievous error on the part of General Heideck to omit fixing the rank and verifying the position and service of the Greek officers who had served during the Revolution, by the publication of an official army-list while the personal identity of the actors in every engagement was well known.

The bold measure of disbanding the irregular army was a blow which required to be struck with promptitude and followed up with vigour in order to insure success. It is idle to accuse the regency of precipitancy and severity, for something like a thunderbolt could alone prevent an organised resistance, and a

[1] Ἐφημερὶς τῆς Κυβερνήσεως, 1833, Nos. 5, 6, and 7.

hurricane was necessary to dissipate opposition. The whole military power created by the revolutionary war, and all the fiscal interests cherished by factious administrations, were opposed to the formation of a regular army. Chieftains, primates, ministers, and farmers of the taxes were all deprived of their bands of armed retainers before they could combine to thwart the Bavarians as they had leagued to attack the French. A. D. 1833.

The war had been terminated in the Morea by the arms of the French; in Romelia by the negotiations with the Porte: but the Greek soldiers, instead of resuming the occupations of citizens, insisted on being fed and paid by the people. When not engaged in civil war they lived in utter idleness. The whole revenues of Greece were insufficient to maintain these armed bands, and during the anarchy that preceded the king's arrival they had been rapidly consuming the capital of the agricultural population. In many villages they had devoured the labouring oxen and the seed-corn. Nevertheless, the wisest reform could not fail to cause great irritation in several powerful bodies of men. Unemployed Capodistrians, discontented constitutionalists, displaced Corfiots, and Russian partisans, all raised an angry cry of dissatisfaction. Sir Richard Church committed the political blunder of joining the cause of the anarchists. His past position misled him into the belief that the irregulars were an element of military strength. His own influence over the military depended entirely on personal combinations. His declared opposition to the military reforms of the regeny persuaded Count Armansperg that the difficulty of transforming the personal followers of chiefs into a national army was much greater than it was in reality. Count Armansperg had approved of disbanding the irregulars, when that measure was decided on at

Munich, and he concurred in the necessity of its immediate execution after the regency arrived at Nauplia. Yet, when he listened to the observations of Sir Richard Church, and counted the persons of influence opposed to reform, he became anxious to gain them to be his political partisans. He was sufficiently adroit as a party tactician to perceive that the Greeks were in that social and moral condition which leads men to make persons of more account than principles, and he saw that intriguers of all factions were looking out for a leader. His ambition led him to make his first false step in Greece on this occasion. He listened with affected approval to interested declamations against the military policy which put an end to the reign of anarchy. And, from his imprudent revival of the semi-irregular bands at a subsequent period, it seems probable that in his eagerness to gain partisans he gave promises at this time which he found himself obliged to fulfil when he was intrusted with the sole direction of the government. The opposition of Sir Richard Church to measures which were necessary in order to put an end to anarchy, and the selfish countenance given to this opposition by Count Armansperg, entailed many years of military disorder on Greece, and were a principal cause of perpetuating the fearful scourge of brigandage, which is its inevitable attendant.

The sluggishness of the Bavarian troops formed a marked contrast with the activity of the French during their stay in Greece. Though the French soldiers were in a foreign land, with which they had only an accidental and temporary connection, they laboured industriously at many public works for the benefit of the Greeks, without fee or the expectation of reward. At Modon they repaired the fortifications, and built large and commodious barracks. At Navarin they

reconstructed great part of the fortifications. They formed a good carriage-road from Modon to Navarin, and they built a bridge over the Pamisos to enable the cultivators of the rich plain of Messenia to bring their produce at every season to the markets of Kalamata, Coron, Modon, and Navarin.[1] The Bavarians remained longer in Greece than the French; they were in the Greek service, and well paid out of the Greek treasury, but they left no similar claims on the gratitude of the nation. A. D. 1833.

The civil organisation of the kingdom was based on the principle of complete centralisation. Without contesting the advantages of this system, it may be remarked that in a country in which roads exist it is impracticable. The decree establishing the ministry of the interior embraced so wide a field of attributions, some necessary and some useful, others superfluous and others impracticable, that it looks like a summary for an abridgment of the laws and ordinances of the monarchy.[2] A royal ordinance, not unlike a table of contents to a comprehensive treatise on political economy, subsequently annexed a department of public economy to this ministry.[3] These two decrees, when read with a knowledge of their practical results, form a keen satire on the skill of the Bavarians in the art of government.

The kingdom was divided into ten provinces or nomarchies, whose limits corresponded with ancient or natural geographical boundaries. It is not neces-

[1] Maurer, *Das Griechische Volk in öffentlicher, kirchlicher und privat-rechtlicher Beziehung*, ii. 11. This work, written by the ablest member of the regency, is the best authority for the acts of the Greek government during 1833 and 1834, but it is full of personal prejudice and spite.

[2] *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 14, dated 15th April 1833.

[3] *Government Gazette*, 1834, No. 18, dated 11th May 1834. Maurer gives us, very unnecessarily, the information that this ordinance was copied from the legislation of other countries. It speaks of introducing a system of canalisation in a country where wells are often wanting, and of rendering the rivers, which flow only "by the muses' skill," navigable.—*Das Griechische Volk*, ii. 98.

sary to notice the details of this division, for, like most arrangements in Greece, it underwent several modifications.[1] Prefects, called nomarchies, and sub-prefects, called eparchs, had been already trained to the service by Capodistrias, and no difficulty was found in introducing the outward appearance of a regular and systematic action of the central government over the whole country.

With all their bureaucratic experience, the members of the regency were deficient in the sagacity necessary for carrying theory into practice where the social circumstances of the people required new administrative forms. Their invention was so limited that when they were unable to copy the laws of Bavaria or France they adopted the measures of Capodistrias. In no case were these measures more at variance with the political and social habits of the Greeks than in the modifications he made in their municipal system. This system, whatever might have been its imperfections, was a national institution. It had enabled the people to employ their whole strength against the Turks, and it contained within itself the germs of improvement and reform. Its vitality and its close connection with the actions and wants of the people had persuaded Capodistrias that it was a revolutionary institution. He struck a mortal blow at its existence, by thrusting it into the vortex of the central administration.

The regency virtually abolished the old popular municipal system, and replaced it by a communal organisation, which permitted the people only a small share in naming the lowest officials of government in the provinces. The people were deprived of the power of directly electing their chief magistrate or demarch.

[1] *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 12. A new division was established by Count Armansperg, *Government Gazette*, 1836, No. 28; and this division was again changed by King Otho, *Government Gazette*, 1838, No. 24.

An oligarchical elective college was formed to name three candidates, and the king selected one of these to be demarch. The minister of the interior was invested with the power of suspending the demarchs from office, as an administrative punishment. In this way, the person who appeared to be a popular and municipal officer was in reality transformed into an organ of the central government. Demarchs were henceforth compelled to perform the duties of incompetent and corrupt prefects, and serve as scapegoats for their misdeeds. The system introduced by the regency may have its merits, but it is a misnomer to call it a municipal system.[1] A. D. 1833.

To render municipal institutions a truly national institution and a part of the active life of the people, it is not only necessary that the local chief magistrate should be directly elected by the men of the municipality; but also that the authority which he receives by this popular election should only be revoked or suspended by the decision of a court of law, and not by the order of a minister or king. To render the people's defender a dependent on the will of the central administration, is to destroy the essence of municipal institutions. The mayor or demarch must be respon-

[1] *Government Gazette*, 1834, No. 3. Maurer boasts that the object of the municipal law was to constitute the demarchies as moral beings. He ought to have foreseen that it would render the demarchs very immoral subjects, ii. 117. In the *Parliamentary Papers* relative to Greece in 1836, there is a despatch of Sir Edmund Lyons claiming for Armansperg the authorship of the law, which is described as "founded on very liberal principles, and placing the administration of the affairs of the municipalities entirely in their own hands, and establishing the principle of election on the most liberal and extended scale." It is evident that Lyons was grossly deceived, and this despatch is valuable as illustrating the boldness and the falsehood of Armansperg's assertions. Abel was the principal author of the law, and Parish asserts that Armansperg opposed it as too republican. It deprived the people of the right of electing their chief magistrate. It rendered that chief magistrate dependent on the minister of the day, and not responsible for the due execution of his functions to the law alone. Compare *Additional Papers relative to the Third Instalment of the Greek Loan*, p. 37, and *Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece*, by H. H. Parish, Esq., late Secretary of Legation to Greece, p. 314 and 326.

sible only to the law; and the control which the minister of the interior must exercise over his conduct must be confined to accusing him before the legal tribunals when he neglects his duty.

The decrees organising the ministry of the interior and the department of public economy, proved that the regency was theoretically acquainted with all the objects to which enlightened statesmen can be called upon to direct their attention; but its financial administration displayed great inability to employ this multifarious knowledge to any good practical purpose. The fiscal system of the Turks was allowed to remain the basis of internal taxation in the Greek kingdom. Indeed, as has been already observed, whenever the Bavarians entered on a field of administration, in which neither administrative manuals nor Capodistrias's practice served them as guides, they were unable to discover new paths. This administrative inaptitude, more than financial ignorance, must have been the cause of their not replacing the Turkish land-tax by some source of revenue less hostile to national progress. Where a bad financial system exists, reform is difficult, and its results doubtful. Entire abolition is the only way in which all the evils it has engendered in society can be completely eradicated. So many persons derive a profit from old abuses, that no partial reform can prevent bad practices from finding a new lodgment, and in new positions old evil-doers can generally continue to intimidate or cheat the people. To make sure of success in extensive financial changes, it is necessary to gain the active co-operation of the great body of the people, and this must be purchased by lightening the popular burdens. The greatest difficulty of statesmen is not in preparing good laws, but in creating the machinery necessary to carry any financial laws into execution without oppression.

It is always difficult to levy a large amount of direct taxation from the agricultural population without arresting improvement and turning capital away from the cultivation of the land. The decline of the agricultural population in the richest lands of the Othoman empire, and, indeed, in every country between the Adriatic and the Ganges, may be traced to the oppressive manner in which direct taxation is applied to cultivated land. The Roman empire, in spite of its admirable survey, and the constant endeavours of its legislators to protect agriculture, was impoverished and depopulated by the operation of a direct land-tax, and the oppressive fiscal laws it rendered necessary. The regency perhaps did not fully appreciate the evil effects on agriculture of the Turkish system; it was also too ignorant of the financial resources of Greece to find new taxes; and it was not disposed to purchase the future prosperity of the monarchy by a few years of strict economy.[1] A. D. 1833.

The fiscal measures of the regency which had any pretension to originality were impolitic and unjust. They were adopted at the suggestion of Mavrocordatos, who had the fiscal prejudices and the arbitrary principles of his phanariot education as a Turkish official.

Salt was declared a government monopoly; and in order to make this monopoly more profitable, several salt-works which had previously been farmed were now closed. This measure produced great inconvenience

[1] Without entering on the question of the comparative advantages of direct and indirect taxation, which often depend more on national circumstances than political science, it must be mentioned that the Greek peasantry and small proprietors were averse to commuting the tenths paid in kind for a fixed annual rate in money. They feared that they would be obliged to borrow money, and thus subject themselves to the evil of debt, and become serfs of the money lenders. The produce was always ready when it could be demanded; the money, they said, would always be demanded by the government officials when it was not ready, and then some ally of the official would appear to lend the sum demanded by the state at an exorbitant interest. Here we see how direct taxation in an agricultural community produces the evil of debts, which forms a political feature in ancient history.

in a country where the difficulties of transport presented an insuperable barrier to the formation of a sufficient number of depots in the mountains. The evils of the monopoly soon became intolerable,—sheep died of diseases caused by the want of salt, the shepherds turned brigands, and, at last, even the rapacious Bavarians were convinced that the monopoly required to be modified.[1]

The evils resulting from the salt monopoly were far exceeded by an attempt of the regency to seize all the pasture-lands belonging to private individuals as national property. In a ministerial circular, Mavrocordatos ordered the officials of the finance department to take possession of all pasture-lands in the kingdom, declaring "that every spot where wild herbage grows which is suitable for the pasturage of cattle is national property," and that the Greek government, like the Othoman, maintained the principle "that no property in the soil, except the exclusive right of cultivation, could be legally vested in a private individual." This attempt to found the Bavarian monarchy in Greece on the legislative theories of Asiatic barbarians, whom the Greeks had expelled from their country, could not succeed. But the property of so many persons was arbitrarily confiscated by this ministerial circular, that measures for resisting it were promptly taken. A widespread conspiracy was formed, and several military chiefs were incited to take advantage of the prevalent discontent, and plan a general insurrection. Government was warned of the danger, and saw the necessity of cancelling Mavrocordatos's circular. But many landed proprietors were deprived of the use of their pasture-lands by the farmers of the revenue for more than a year. The cultivation of several large

[1] Maurer, *Das Griechische Volk*, ii. 290.

estates were abandoned, and much capital was driven away from Greece.[1] A. D. 1833.

Though Mavrocordatos made an exhibition of extraordinary fiscal zeal at the expense of the people, he is accused by M. de Maurer of dissipating the national property, by granting titles to houses, buildings, shops, mills, and gardens, to his political allies and partisans, after the king's arrival, without any legal warrant from the regency, and without any purchase-money being paid into the Greek treasury. In short, with continuing the abuses which had disgraced the administration of the constitutionalists while they were in league with Kolettes, and acting under the governing commission.[2]

It would be a waste of time to enumerate the financial abuses which the regency overlooked or tolerated. They allowed the frauds to commence which have ended in robbing the nation of the most valuable portion of the national property, the English bondholders of the lands which were given them in security, and the greater part of those who fought for the independence of their country, of all reward. The regency showed itself as insensible to the value of national honesty as the Greek statesmen of the Revolution, and the progress of the country has been naturally arrested in this age of credit by the dishonesty of its rulers. By the repudiation of her just debts, Greece has been thrown entirely on her internal resources, and, after nearly thirty years of peace, she remains without roads, without manufactures, and without agricultural improvements.

[1] It is remarkable that Maurer, in his work on the administration of the regency, omits all mention of this important measure. The *suppressio veri* fixes a large share of its responsibility on him and his colleagues. There is no doubt that it created the aversion which has ever since been shown by wealthy Greeks in England, France, and Germany to making purchases of land in the Greek kingdom. Parish, *Diplomatic History*, p. 231; *The Hellenic Kingdom and the Greek Nation*, a pamphlet, 1836, p. 64.

[2] Maurer, *Das Griechische Volk*, ii. 286.

The monetary system of the Greek kingdom was a continuance of that introduced by Capodistrias, but the phœnix was now called a drachma. The radical defect of this plan has been already pointed out, and the value of the Spanish pillar dollar, on which it had been originally based, was daily increasing throughout the Levant. An accurate assay of these dollars at the Bavarian mint had proved that their metallic value exceeded the calculation of Capodistrias, and the drachma was consequently coined of somewhat more value than the phœnix, in order to render it equal to one-sixth of the dollar. The metal employed in the Greek coinage was of the same standard of purity as that employed in the French mint. It seems strange that the regency overlooked the innumerable advantages which would have resulted to Greece from making the coinage of the country correspond exactly with that of France, Sardinia, and Belgium, instead of creating a new monetary system.[1]

The highest duty the regency was called upon to fulfil was to introduce an effective administration of justice. M. de Maurer was a learned and laborious lawyer, and he devoted his attention with honourable zeal to framing the laws and organising the tribunals necessary to secure to all ranks an equitable administration of justice. Had he confined himself to organising the judicial business, and preparing a code of laws for Greece, he would have gained immortal honour.

The criminal code and the codes of civil and criminal procedure promulgated by the regency are excellent. In general, the measures adopted for carrying the judicial system into immediate execution ex-

[1] 1.1168 drachmas equal a franc, and 28.12 drachmas an English sovereign. The drachma is divided into 100 lepta; and the Greek coins are—two of gold, 40 and 20 drachmas; four of silver, 5, 1, ¼, and ½ drachma; and four of copper, 10, 5, 2, and 1 lepton. For observations on the system of Capodistrias, see vol. ii. p. 215.

hibited a thorough knowledge of legal administration. By Maurer's ability and energy the law was promptly invested with supreme authority in a country where arbitrary power had known no law for ages. His merit in this respect ought to cancel many of his political blunders, and obtain for him the gratitude of the Greeks.[1] It has been the melancholy task of this work to record the errors and the crimes of those who governed Greece much oftener than their merits or their virtues. It is gratifying to find an opportunity of uttering well-merited praise. A. D. 1833.

Some objections have been taken to the manner in which primary jurisdictions were adapted to the social requirements of a rural population living in a very rude condition, and thinly scattered over mountainous districts; but the examination of these objections belongs to the province of politics, and not of history.

It is necessary to point out one serious violation of the principles of equity in the judicial organisation introduced by the regency. In compliance with the spirit of administrative despotism prevalent in Europe, the sources of justice were vitiated whenever the fiscal interests of the government were concerned, by the creation of exceptional tribunals to decide questions between the state and private individuals; and these tribunals were exempted from the ordinary rules of judicial procedure. Thus the citizens were deprived of the protection of the law precisely in those cases where that protection was most wanted, and the officials of the government were raised above the law. The proceedings of these exceptional tribunals caused such general dissatisfaction, that they were abolished after

[1] For the criminal code, see *Government Gazette*, 1834, No. 3—it bears date the 30th December 1833;—for the organisation of the tribunals and notarial offices, No. 13; for the code of criminal procedure, No. 16; and for the code of civil procedure, No. 22. The German originals of these laws are printed in Maurer's work, *Das Griechische Volk*, iii. 304, 849.

the Revolution of 1843, and an article was inserted in the constitution of Greece prohibiting the establishment of such courts in future.[1]

The Greek Revolution broke off the relations of the clergy with the patriarch and synod of Constantinople. This was unavoidable, since the patriarch was in some degree a minister of the sultan for the civil as well as the ecclesiastical affairs of the orthodox. It was therefore impossible for a people at war with the sultan to recognise the patriarch's authority. The clergy in Greece ceased to mention the patriarch's name in public worship, and adopted the form of prayer for the whole orthodox Church used in those dioceses of the Eastern Church which are not comprised within the limits of the patriarchate of Constantinople.

When Capodistrias assumed the presidency, an attempt was made by the patriarch and synod of Constantinople to bring the clergy in Greece again under their immediate jurisdiction. Letters were addressed to the president and to the clergy, and a deputation of prelates was sent to renew the former ties of dependency. But Capodistrias was too sensible of the danger which would result to the civil power from allowing the clergy to become dependent on foreign patronage, to permit any ecclesiastical relations to exist with the patriarch. He replied to the demands of the Church of Constantinople by stating that the murder of the patriarch Gregorios, joined to other executions of bishops and laymen, having forced the Greeks to throw off the sultan's government in order to escape extermination, it was impossible for liberated Greece to recognise an ecclesiastical chief subject to the sultan's power.[2]

Capodistrias found the clergy of Greece in a deplor-

[1] Art. 101.

[2] *Correspondance du Comte Capodistrias, Président de la Grèce,* publiée par E. A. Bétant, l'un de ses Secretaires. Genève, 1839. 4 vols. Vol. ii. 153.

able condition, and he did very little for their improvement. The lower ranks of the priesthood were extremely ignorant, the higher extremely venal. Money was sought with shameless rapacity; and Mustoxidi, who enjoyed the president's confidence, and who held an official situation in the department of ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction, asserts that simony was generally practised.[1] The bishops annulled marriages, made and cancelled wills, and gave judicial decisions in most civil causes. They leagued with the primates in opposing the establishment of courts of law during the Revolution; for they derived a considerable revenue by trading in judicial business; while the primates supported this jurisdiction, because the ecclesiastics were generally under their influence. Capodistrias, in spite of this opposition, deprived the bishops of their jurisdiction in civil causes, except in those cases relating to marriage and divorce, where it is conceded to them by the canons of the Greek Church. Against this reform the mitred judges raised indignant complaints, and endeavoured to persuade their flocks that the orthodox clergy was suffering a persecution equal to that inflicted on the chosen people in the old time by Pharaoh. A. D. 1833.

Capodistrias also endeavoured to obtain from the bishops and abbots, inventories of the movable and immovable property of the churches and monasteries under their control, but without success. Even his orders, that diocesan and parish registers should be kept of marriages, baptisms, and deaths, were disobeyed, though not openly resisted. Mustoxidi expressly declares that the opposition to these beneficial measures proceeded from the selfishness and corruption of the Greek clergy, who would not resign

[1] *Renseignemens sur la Grèce et sur l'administration du Comte Capodistrias, par un Grec témoin oculaire des faits qu'il rapporte.* Paris, 1833, p. 30.

the means of illicit gain. They knew that if regular registers of marriages, births, and deaths were established, the fabrication of certificates to meet contingencies would cease, and the delivery of such certificates was a very lucrative branch of ecclesiastical profits. Bigamy and the admission of minors into the priesthood would no longer be possible; and it was said that they were sources of great gain to venal bishops. Capodistrias failed to eradicate these abuses from the Church in Greece; for Mustoxidi declares, that if he had amputated the gangrened members of the priesthood, very little of the clerical body would have remained.[1]

The ecclesiastical forms of the regency were temperately conducted. An assembly of bishops was convoked at Nauplia to make a report on the ecclesiastical affairs of the kingdom. Its advice was in conformity with the wishes of those in power, rather than with the sentiments of a majority of the bishops; for political subserviency has been for ages a feature of the Eastern clergy. On the 4th August 1833, a decree proclaimed the National Church of Greece independent of the patriarch and synod of Constantinople, and established an ecclesiastical synod for the kingdom.[2] In doctrine, the Church of liberated Greece remained as closely united to the Church at Constantinople as the patriarchates of Jerusalem or Alexandria; but in temporal affairs it was subject to a Catholic king instead of a Mohammedan sultan. King Otho was invested with the power of appointing annually the members of the synod.[3] This synod was formed on

[1] *Renseignemens sur la Grèce et sur l'administration du Cte Capodistrias*, 35.

[2] *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 23. Thirty-four bishops signed the Declaration of Independence.

[3] Maurer, with the candour which confers value on his vain-glorious volumes, tells us, that King Otho succeeded, in ecclesiastical affairs, as in all other authority, to the rights of the sultan. This information explains one of the causes of his arbitrary proceedings, and the oblivion of the Revolution.—*Das Griechische Volk*, ii. 160.

the model of that of Russia; but in accordance with the free institutions of the Greeks, it received more freedom of action. A. D. 1833.

When the important consequences which may result from the independence of a church in Greece filled with a learned and enlightened clergy are considered, the success of the regency in consummating this great work is really wonderful. The influences of Russia and the prejudices of a large body of the Greeks were hostile to reform; but the necessity of a great change in order to sweep away the existing ecclesiastical corruption was so strongly felt by the enlightened men in liberated Greece, that they were determined not to cavil at the quarter from which the reformation came, nor to criticise the details of a measure whose general scope they approved. Those, however, who had thwarted the moderate reforms of Capodistrias were not likely to submit in silence to the more extensive reforms of the Bavarians. An opposition was quickly formed. Several bishops were sent from Turkey into Greece as missionaries to support the claims of the patriarch to ecclesiastical supremacy. They were assisted by monks from Mount Athos, who wandered about as emissaries of superstition and bigotry. Russian diplomacy echoed the outcries of these zealots, and patronised the most intriguing of the discontented priests. Yet the Greek people remained passive amidst all the endeavours made to incite it to violence.

In the month of December 1833, the regency published an ordinance, declaring that the number of bishoprics in Greece was to be ultimately reduced to ten, making them correspond in extent with the nomarchies into which the kingdom was divided. This measure was adopted at the recommendation of the synod. In the mean time, forty bishops were named by royal authority to act in the old dioceses, and when

these died the sees were to be gradually united, until ten only remained.[1] The synod was reproached with subserviency for proposing this law, which was generally disapproved.

A reaction in favour of renewing ecclesiastical relations with Constantinople soon manifested itself. Death diminished the number of the bishops, and the synod named by King Otho had not the power of consecrating an orthodox bishop, so that when the Revolution of 1843 occurred, many sees were vacant. The constitutional system did as little for some years to improve the Church as preceding governments. But the Greek people did not remain indifferent to the revival of religious feeling, which manifested itself in every Christian country about this period. Among the Greeks the ideas of nationality and Oriental orthodoxy are closely entwined. The revival of religious feeling strengthened the desire for national union, and a strong wish was felt to put an end to the kind of schism which separated the free Greeks from the flock of the patriarch of Constantinople.

Secret negotiations were opened, which, in the year 1850, led to the renewal of amicable relations. The patriarch and synod of Constantinople published a decretal of the Oriental Church, called a Synodal Tomos, which recognised the independence of the Greek Church, under certain restrictions and obligations, which it imposed on the clergy. Much objection was made to the form of this document, particularly to the assumption that the liberties of the National Church required the confirmation of a body of priests notoriously dependent on the Othoman government, and which might soon be filled with members aliens to the Greek race. Two years were allowed to pass before the Greek government accepted the terms of peace

[1] *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 38.

offered by the Church of Constantinople. In 1852 a law was adopted by the Greek Chambers, enacting all the provisions of the Synodal Tomos, without, however, making any mention of that document. By this arrangement the independence of the Church of Greece was established on a national basis, and its orthodoxy fully recognised by the patriarch and synod of Constantinople.[1] A. D. 1833.

The re-establishment of monastic discipline, and the administration of the property belonging to ecclesiastical foundations, called for legislation. War had destroyed the buildings and dispersed the monks of four hundred monasteries. Many monks had served as soldiers against the infidels; but a much greater number lived on public charity, mixing with the world as mere beggars and idlers. The respect for monachism had declined. It was neither possible nor desirable to rebuild the greater part of the ruined monasteries; but it was necessary to compel the monks to retire from the world and return to a monastic life. It was also the duty of the government to prevent the large revenues of the ruined monasteries from being misappropriated. The regency suppressed all those monasteries of which there were less than six monks, or of which the buildings were completely destroyed, by a royal ordinance of the 7th October 1833.[2] The number thus dissolved

[1] A volume hostile to the *Synodal Tomos*, which contains much sound reasoning, with some unnecessary theological violence, was published by a learned ecclesiastic, the archimandrit Pharmakides. It is entitled, Ὁ Συνοδικὸς Τόμος ἢ περὶ ἀληθείας. For the *Tomos*, see p. 37.

[2] The ordinance of 1833 was framed on the report of the synod, and a catalogue of the 412 monasteries suppressed was annexed to the report, which is dated 19th (31st) August 1833. This document, which would be of great historical and topographical interest, has not been printed, and it is said not to exist in the archives of the ministry of ecclesiastical affairs. A work entitled Τὰ Μοναστηριακα, published in 1859 by Mr Mamouka, under-secretary of state in the ecclesiastical department, and editor of the *Acts of the Greek National Assemblies*, contains the measures adopted with regard to the existing monasteries. There is a third class of monasteries, which possess considerable estates in Greece, concerning which it is difficult to procure information:—viz., those of Mount Athos, of the Holy Sepulchre, and of Mount Sinai.

amounted to four hundred and twelve, and the property which fell into the hands of the government was very great. One hundred and forty-eight monasteries were re-established, and two thousand monks were recalled to a regular monastic life. The surviving nuns were collected into four convents. The lands of the suppressed monasteries were farmed like other national property, and they were so much worse cultivated by the farmers of the revenue than they had been formerly by the monks, that the measure created much dissatisfaction. The ecclesiastical policy of the regency in this case received the blame due to its financial administration. As far as regards the treatment of the monasteries, no conduct of foreigners, however prudent, could have escaped censure.

Much has been done in Greece for public instruction since the arrival of King Otho. The regency, however, did little but copy German institutions, and so many changes have been subsequently made, that the subject does not fall within the limits of this work. The regeneration of Greek society, by a wiser system of family education than seems at present to be practised, will doubtless one day supply the materials for an interesting chapter to some future historian of Greek civilisation.

The regency did not establish an university, and King Otho never showed any love for learning. Much dissatisfaction was manifested at the delay; and in the year 1837 the Greeks took the business into their own hands, with a degree of zeal which it would be for their honour to display more frequently in other good causes. A public meeting was held, and all parties united to raise the funds necessary for building an university by public subscription. The court yielded slowly and sullenly to the force of public opinion. The royal assent was extorted rather than given to the

measure, but after an interval the king himself became a subscriber, and sycophants called the university by his name. A. D. 1833.

In a country divided as Greece had long been by fierce party-quarrels, it was natural that every measure of the government should meet a body of men ready to oppose it. The liberty of the press could not fail to give a vent to much animosity, and the restoration of legal order by the regency resuscitated the liberty of the press, which Capodistrias had almost strangled. Four newspapers were established at Nauplia, and the measures of the regency were examined with a good deal of freedom. Many of the criticisms of the press might have been useful to the regency from their intelligence and moderation, and from the intimate knowledge they displayed concerning the internal condition of the country. Though the regency paid little attention to these articles, it allowed those in which ignorance and violence were exhibited to ruffle its equanimity. The liberty of the press was declared by the two liberals, Armansperg and Maurer, to be of little value to the Greeks, unless the press could be prevented from blaming the conduct and criticising the measures of their rulers. Most of the Bavarians were galled by frequent allusions to the magnitude of their pay, and the trifling nature of their service. They demanded that the press should be silenced. The wishes of the members of the regency coincided with these demands. The spirit of Viaro Capodistrias again animated the Greek government.[1]

The regency did not venture to establish a censor-

[1] The four newspapers published at Nauplia were *Athena*, *Helios*, *Chronos*, and *Triptolemos*. The Greek press did not then use more violent language concerning any member of the regency than Maurer afterwards used against his colleague, Armansperg. But "it is one of the conditions of bad governors to give heed to what they hear said of them, and to take ill that which, if it had been said, they had better not have heard," as Ferdinand the Catholic told other regents.—See Help's *The Spanish Conquest of America*, i. 182.

ship. It was, however, determined to suppress the newspapers most opposed to the government by indirect legislation. In the month of September 1833 several laws were promulgated regulating the press, and police regulations were introduced worthy of the Inquisition in the sixteenth century.[1] Printers, lithographers, and booksellers, were treated as men suspected of criminal designs against the state, and placed under numerous restrictions. The editors of newspapers and periodicals were compelled to deposit the sum of five thousand drachmas in the public treasury, to serve as a security in case they should be condemned to pay fines or damages in actions of libel. As the interest of money at Nauplia was then one and a half per cent per month, it was supposed that nobody would be found who would make the deposit. The end of the law was attained, and all the four political newspapers immediately ceased. By this law another liberal ministry in Greece became bankrupt in reputation. The want of public principle and conscientious opinions among Greek statesmen, is manifested by the names of the ministers which appear attached to these ordinances against the liberty of the press. They are Mavrocordatos, Kolettes, Tricoupes, Psyllas, and Praïdes.

To counteract the bad impression produced by the restraints put on the liberty of the press, the Greek government pretended to be seriously occupied in improving the material condition of the people. Starving the mind and stuffing the body is a favourite system with tyrants. The Bavarians, however, only stuffed the Greeks with printed paper. A royal proclamation was published announcing that the regency was about to construct a net-work of roads.[2] A plan was adopted

[1] *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 29. 1, Concerning printers, lithographers, and booksellers. 2, Concerning the press. 3, Concerning criminal abuses of the press.

[2] *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 29. More than a quarter of a century has

by which every part of the kingdom would have found ready access to the Ionian and Egean seas, and its execution was absolutely necessary to improve the country. The whole of the roads proposed might easily have been completed in about ten years, had the Bavarian volunteers and the Greek conscripts worked at road-making with as much industry as the French had done while they remained in Greece. King Louis of Bavaria declared that the Bavarians would confer benefits on Greece without being a burden on the country. The greatest benefit they could have conferred would have been to construct good roads and stone bridges. They neglected to do this, and, in direct violation of their king's engagement to the protecting powers, they rendered themselves an intolerable burden.[1] A. D. 1833.

Enough has been now said of the legislative and administrative measures of the regency.

On the 1st of June 1833 they decorated the monarchy with an order of knighthood, called the order of the Redeemer, in commemoration of the providential deliverance of Greece.[2] The order was divided into five classes. From an official list, published a few weeks before the termination of Count Armansperg's administration as arch-chancellor, it appears that the grand cross had been conferred on forty-nine persons, exclusive of kings and members of reigning families. Among these there were only three Greeks and one Philhellene. The names of Kanaris, Mavrocordatos, Gordon, and Fabvier, are not in the list, which it is

now elapsed, yet the roads from Athens to Chalcis and from Athens to Corinth are unfinished, and many roads are in a worse condition than they were under the Turks.

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*, Annex A to Protocol of 26th April 1832.

[2] *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 29. The following number contains patterns for the embroidery of the uniforms of civil officials. Ministers and nomarchs were forced to send to Munich and Paris for their coats, and when they first made their appearance in their new clothes, it was evident that they had sent very bad measures. Most of them looked as if they had starved since their coats were ordered.

impossible to read without a feeling of contempt for those who prepared it. The subsequent destiny of the order has not been more brilliant than its commencement. French ministers have obtained crosses in great numbers for unknown writers, and Bavarian courtiers and German apothecaries have been as lucky as French savants. While it was lavished on foreigners who had rendered Greece no service, it was not bestowed on several Greeks who had distinguished themselves in their country's service.[1]

Before recounting the quarrels of the regency, it is necessary to say a few words more concerning the characters of the men who composed it.

Count Armansperg came to Greece with the expectation of being able to act the viceroy. He aspired to hold a position similar to that of Capodistrias, but neither his feeble character nor his moderate abilities enabled him to master the position. He might have given up the idea had he not been pushed forward by the countess, who possessed more ambition and less wisdom than her husband.[2] Armansperg selected Maurer and Abel as his colleagues, knowing them to be able and hard-working men, and believing that he should find them grateful and docile. Armansperg never displayed much sagacity in selecting his subordinates, and he soon found to his dismay that Maurer and Abel were men so ambitious that he could neither lead nor drive them. Without losing time he set about undermining their authority.

The merits of Maurer are displayed in his legislative measures; his defects are exposed in his book on Greece. His natural disposition was sensitive and touchy; his sudden elevation to high rank turned his head. He

[1] The Greek Almanac of 1837 gives a list of 594 Knights of the Redeemer. Of these 374 are Bavarians and foreigners, 154 Greeks, and 24 Philhellenes. The rest are emperors, kings, princes, &c.

[2] Maurer, ii. 56.

could never move in his new sphere without a feeling of restraint that often amounted to awkwardness. He wished to save money, and he did so; but he felt that his penuriousness rendered him ridiculous. His want of knowledge of the world was displayed by the foolish manner in which he attempted to obtain the recall of Mr Dawkins, the British resident in Greece, because Mr Dawkins thought Count Armansperg the better statesman. His ignorance of Greece is certified by his informing the world that it produces dates, sugar, and coffee.[1] A. D. 1833.

Mr Abel was an active and able man of business, but of limited bureaucratic views; rude, bold, and sincere.

The opinions of General Heideck were not considerd to be of much value, but his support was important, for it was known that his conduct was regulated by what he conceived to be the wish of the King of Bavaria.

The merits of the different members of the regency may be correctly estimated by the condition in which they placed the departments of the state under their especial superintendence. Until the 31st of July 1834, the departments of justice, military affairs, and civil administration, were directed by Maurer, Heideck, and Abel; and they laid the foundations of an organisation which has outlived the Bavarian domination, and forms a portion of the scaffolding of the constitutional monarchy of Greece, as established after the Revolution of 1843. The department of finance was intrusted to Armansperg, and he retained his authority for four years, yet he effected no radical improvements. He found and left the department a source of political and social corruption. It was not until the end of the year 1836, and then only when forced by the protecting powers and the King of Bavaria, that he published any

[1] Maurer, ii. 310.

accounts of the revenue and expenditure of his government, and the accounts published were both imperfect and inaccurate.[1]

The policy of the regency did little to extinguish party spirit and personal animosity among the Greeks. Indeed, both the members of the regency and the foreign ministers at Nauplia did much to nourish the evil passions excited by the reign of anarchy. Armansperg was a partisan of English influence; Maurer and Abel, strong partisans of France. Russia, having no avowed partisan among the Bavarians, maintained her influence among the Greeks by countenancing the Capodistrian opposition, protecting the monks and clergy from Turkey, and the adventurers from the Ionian Islands, and flattering the ambition of Kolokotrones. The French minister protected Kolettes and the most rapacious of his friends, because they were supposed to be devoted to the interests of France. England made a pretence of supporting a constitutional party, but her friends were chiefly remarkable for their frequent desertion of the cause of the constitution.

The regency excluded Kolokotrones and the senators, who had attempted to welcome King Otho with a civil war, from all official employment. But the unpopularity of several measures enabled these excluded Capodistrians to raise a loud if not a dangerous opposition, and they availed themselves with considerable skill of the liberty of the press, as long as the regency allowed them to enjoy it. At the same time they formed a secret society called the Phœnix, to imitate the Philiké Hetairia, and pretended to be sure of Russian support.

[1] Maurer, who, it must be owned, is a prejudiced witness, says, that as long as Armansperg could make Greiner work at official details, he did nothing but loll on his sofa and read the chapter on the French Revolution in Rotteck's *Universal History*, or ride out and then take his siesta. His colleagues, who could not obtain from him a budget, reproached him at their board meetings with his inactivity.—*Das Griechische Volk*, ii. 319, 519; Parish, *Diplomatic History*, 296; *Government Gazette*, 1836, Nos. 61, 65, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92.

Kolokotrones had addressed a letter to Count Nesselrode, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, on the state of Greece, while residing on board Admiral Ricord's flag-ship, just after King Otho's arrival. Count Nesselrode replied to that letter on the 11th July 1833, and numerous copies of this reply were now circulated among the discontented.[1] It was appealed to as a proof that the Russian cabinet would support a Capodistrian insurrection, and cover the insurgents with its powerful protection as heretofore. A petition to the Emperor Nicholas was signed, praying his Imperial Majesty to employ his powerful influence to obtain the immediate recall of the regency, and the declaration of King Otho's majority. The proposal showed great boldness in a party which, when it elected Agostino president of Greece, had proposed that King Otho should be considered a minor until he completed his twenty-fourth year. A cry was raised in favour of orthodoxy and liberty in many parts of Greece, and brigandage began simultaneously to revive. Measures were concerted for a general outbreak, and the Capodistrians, with Kolokotrones as their leader, expected to play over again the drama which the constitutionalists, with Kolettes at their head, had enacted in 1832. They miscalculated the state of public opinion. They had no longer the municipalities and the people in their favour. A. D. 1833.

Simultaneously with this conspiracy, a minor plot was going on, called the Armansperg intrigue; and in the end this little snake swallowed up the great serpent. The conspirators in the minor plot only wished to get quit of Maurer and Heideck, and to make Armansperg sole regent. Dr Franz, an interpreter of the regency, who had allied himself closely with the partisans of Count Armansperg, circulated petitions to the King of

[1] Count Nesselrode's letter is printed in Parish's *Diplomatic History*, p. 274.

Bavaria, praying for the recall of the other members of the regency. The existence of these petitions was revealed to Maurer, Heideck, and Abel, by a Greek named Nikolaïdes, and by the Prince Wrede, whom Capodistrias had formerly selected as a fit person to lay the state of Greece before Prince Leopold. Wrede was admitted to the councils of the Capodistrians, though it is not probable that he was treated with implicit confidence. He appears, however, to have obtained some knowledge of their plans for a general insurrection. Dr Franz was arrested, but, to prevent the necessity of publishing Count Armansperg's connection with his intrigues, and revealing the dissensions in the regency, he was shipped off to Trieste without trial.[1] It was soon ascertained that several persons of the Armansperg faction were connected both with the minor plot and the great conspiracy.

Maurer was easily persuaded that the two were identical. He was so infatuated as to believe that Armansperg was privy to a conspiracy for obtaining his own exile. The papers of Franz proved Armansperg's participation in a shameful intrigue; the revelations of spies afforded satisfactory evidence that many of the intriguers were also conspirators. In the mean time a trifling disturbance in Tinos frightened the regency into proclaiming martial law.[2]

The general insurrection of the Capodistrians was prevented by the arrest of Kolokotrones, Plapoutas, Djavellas, and several other influential men of the party, in different places on the 19th September 1833.[3] Maurer now displayed the rage of a tyrant: he forgot both law and reason in his eagerness to inflict the severest punishment on Kolokotrones. Those who spoke with him were reminded of the fury of Capo-

[1] Ἀθηνᾶ, No. 141, 23d August 1833.
[2] *Government Gazette*, 1833. Nos. 28 and 31.
[3] Ἀθηνᾶ, No. 146, 9th September 1833.

districts when he heard that Miaoulis had seized the Greek fleet at Poros. The Greeks did not consider an abortive conspiracy a very serious offence. Violence had been so often resorted to by all parties, that it was regarded as a natural manner of acquiring and defending power. No political party had paid much respect either to law or justice, but very different conduct was expected from M. Maurer. The worst aspect of the conspiracy was the revival of brigandage, which was evidently systematic. But it was not easy to procure evidence of the complicity of the leading conspirators with the crimes of the brigands. Kolokotrones and Plapoutas were tried for treason, and, by a strained application of the law, and an unbecoming interference of the executive power with the course of justice, they were found guilty and condemned to death. The sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life; but a complete pardon was granted to both criminals on King Otho's majority.[1] A. D. 1833.

The quarrels in the regency now became the leading feature of the Greek question, not only in Greece, but at the courts of Munich, London, Paris, and St Petersburg.[2] The improvement of Greece was utterly forgotten. There can be no doubt that Armansperg's vanity persuaded him that Dr Franz, in the petitions circulated among the Greeks, had given the King of Bavaria excellent advice. He now saw the advantage which Maurer's violent persecution of Kolokotrones afforded him, and he profited by it. Maurer was as ambitious as Armansperg, but less prudent. In vain the Greek ministers, who respected his talents, endeavoured to moderate his vehemence. Several resigned rather than sanction the trial of Kolokotrones on evi-

[1] The act of accusation against Kolokotrones and Plapoutas is given by Parish, 270. It is more like a party statement than a legal document.

[2] See Maurer's notice of these quarrels, ii. 53, 56, 93.

dence, which appeared to them insufficient. It may be mentioned, in order to convey some idea of the manner in which public business was carried on at this time, and the contempt with which the Greek ministers allowed themselves to be treated by the Bavarians, that the arrests, which took place on the 19th of September 1833, were made by order of the regency, without holding a cabinet council, and without the knowledge of the ministers of the interior and of justice. When Psyllas, the minister of the interior, remonstrated with Maurer on the arbitrary manner in which he was proceeding, Maurer became so indignant that he threatened the minister with a legal prosecution for neglecting his duty in not discovering a conspiracy known to so many Greeks. The ministry was modified by the infusion of additional servility. Mavrocordatos was removed to the foreign office, and a young Greek recently arrived from Germany, Theochares, was appointed minister of finance, in which office he was a mere cipher. Schinas, an able and intriguing sycophant of the phanariot race, became Maurer's minister of ecclesiastical affairs. Kolettes was now all-powerful in the ministry.[1]

Maurer, Heideck, Abel, and Gasser, the Bavarian minister at the Greek court, formed an alliance with M. Rouen, the French minister, and prepared for a direct attack on Armansperg, in which they felt sure of a signal victory. Armansperg, on the other hand, was vigorously supported by Mr Dawkins, and still more energetically by Captain (Lord) Lyons, who commanded H.M.S. Madagascar. The count had a not inconsiderable party among the Greeks and Bavarians. The Russian minister, Catacazy, and the whole body of the Capodistrians, assisted his cause by their hostility to Maurer and Kolettes. In general the

[1] *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 34.

Greeks watched the proceedings of both parties with anxiety and aversion, fearing a renewal of civil war and anarchy. A. D. 1833.

Armansperg laid his statement of the nature of the dissensions in the regency before the King of Bavaria. Maurer wasted time in attacking Dawkins, who had roused his personal animosity as much by satirical observations as by thwarting the policy of the regency.[1] Dawkins was accused of representing the proceedings of Maurer and his friends as being too aristocratic, too revolutionary, and too Russian, all in a breath. People said that, though the accusation looked absurd, it might be true enough; and they expressed a wish to hear how Dawkins applied his epithets to the measures he criticised. An envoy was sent to persuade Lord Palmerston to recall Dawkins: a worse pedant, and a man less likely to succeed than Michael Schinas, could not have been selected. He soon found that he had travelled to London on a fool's errand.

The great attack on Count Armansperg was directed against what Maurer probably supposed was the most vulnerable part of a man's feelings. No disputes had occurred among the members of the regency while they were carving their salaries and allowances out of the Greek loan. No one then suggested that both political prudence and common honesty demanded the most rigid economy of money which Greece would be one day called upon to repay. On the 10th October 1832, Armansperg, Maurer, and Heideck, held a meeting at Munich, at which, among other shameful misappropriations of Greek funds, they added nearly £4500 to Count Armansperg's salary, in order to enable him to give dinners and balls to foreigners and phanariots.[2]

[1] Maurer supplies ample evidence of his own readiness to listen to spies and talebearers. The phrases, *es ging die Rede, es ging die Sage, eines Tages kam, wie ich aus sehr guter Quelle weiss*, and such eavesdropping, abound in his work.

[2] We must not forget that the Bavarians were dividing the spoil of Greece

Nemesis followed close on their crime. The count's dinners and balls destroyed Maurer's peace of mind, and to regain it he sought to deprive the count of his table-money. At last, in the month of May 1834, the majority of the regency deprived the president of what was called the representation fund, and reduced his extra pay to a sum which, if it had been originally granted, would have been considered amply sufficient, but now the conduct of the majority was so evidently the result of personal vengeance, that its meanness created a strong feeling in Armansperg's favour.

Both parties awaited a decision from Munich. The state of Greece was assuming an alarming aspect; brigandage was reviving in continental Greece on an alarming scale; and the protecting powers felt the necessity of putting an end to the unseemly squabbling which threatened to produce serious disturbances. The British government advised the King of Bavaria to recall Maurer and Abel. The Russian cabinet gave the same advice. The King of Bavaria adopted their opinion, and resolved to leave Count Armansperg virtually sole regent. His decision arrived in Greece on the 31st July 1834, and it fell on Maurer and Abel like a thunderbolt. They were ordered to return instantly to Bavaria; and in case they showed any disposition to delay their departure, authority was given to Count Armansperg to ship them off in the same summary manner in which Dr Franz had been sent to Trieste. Maurer was replaced by M. Von Kobell, a mere nullity, whose name only requires to be mentioned, because it appears signed to many ordinances affecting the welfare of the Greeks.[1] Heideck was allowed to remain, but he was

before the loan contract was signed. The signature did not take place until 1st March 1833. Maurer's explanation of his conduct is given in his work, ii. 529.

[1] *Government Gazette*, 1834, No. 25. Maurer gives the following account of his successor: "Herr von Kobell nachdem er denn auf einmal wieder credit

ordered to sign every document presented to him by the president of the regency. During the remainder of his stay in Greece he occupied himself with nothing but painting. The Greeks saw Maurer and Abel depart with pleasure, for they feared their violence; but at a later period, when they discovered that Count Armansperg was neither as active an administrator nor as honest a statesman as they had expected, they became sensible of the merits of the men they had lost.[1] A. D. 1834.

Count Armansperg governed Greece with absolute power from August 1834 to February 1837. He held the title of president of the regency until King Otho's majority on the 1st June 1835, when it was changed to that of arch-chancellor, which he held until his dismissal from office.[2] His long administration was characterised by a pretence of feverish activity that was to produce a great result at a period always very near, but which never arrived. Like Capodistrias, he was jealous of men of business, and insisted on retaining the direction of departments about which he knew nothing, in his own hands. He wasted his time in manœuvres to conceal his ignorance, and in talking to foreign ministers concerning his financial schemes and his projects of improvement. On looking back at his administration, it presents a succession of temporary expedients carried into execution in a very imperfect manner. He had no permanent plan and no consistent policy. In one district the Capodistrians were allowed to persecute the constitutionalists, and in another the Kolettists domineered over the Capodistrians. Bri-

gefunden, seine bedeutenden Schulden bezahlt, eine Lotterie collecte für seine beide Töchter erhalten, einen seiner. . . . . Söhne im Cadetten corps untergebracht hatte, a. s. w., eilte nach Griechenland, nicht um dort zu arbeiten und dem Lande nutzlich zu seyn."—*Das Griechische Volk*, ii. 535. It may be doubted whether any of the Greek newspapers suppressed by Maurer ever equalled the ribaldry of this passage, deliberately penned and published.

[1] Maurer gives instances of Armansperg's political dishonesty, ii. 60, 61.

[2] *Government Gazette*, 1835, June, No. 1; 1837, No. 4.

gandage increased until it attained the magnitude of civil war, and the whole internal organisation of the kingdom, introduced by the early regency, was unsettled.

The nomarchies and eparchies were called governments and sub-governments (dioikeses). The army was disorganised, and the rights of property were disturbed and violated. Public buildings were constructed on land belonging to private individuals, without the formality of informing the owner that his land was required for the public service. Ground was seized for a royal palace and garden, and some of the proprietors were not offered any indemnification, until the British government exacted payment to a British subject in the year 1850. In order to prevent the members of the Greek cabinet from intriguing against his authority, like Maurer and Abel, the arch-chancellor took care that all the ministers should never be able to speak the same language; and he deprived the cabinet of all control over the finance department, by keeping the place of minister of finance vacant for a whole year.[1] His lavish expenditure at last filled all Greece with complaints, and alarmed the King of Bavaria.

Count Armansperg's inconsiderate proceedings forced him to solicit from the protecting powers the advance of the third series of the Allied loan. Russia and France demanded some explanation concerning the expenditure of that part of the first and second series which had been paid into the Greek treasury. The accounts presented by Count Armansperg were not considered satisfactory. The British government took a different view of the count's explanations. Lord Palmerston supported his administration warmly, and applied to Parliament, in 1836, for power to enable

[1] *The Hellenic Kingdom and the Greek Nation*, a pamphlet (London, 1836), p 76.

the British government to guarantee its proportion of the third instalment of the loan without the concurrence of the other powers.[1] A. D. 1836.

Sir Edmund (Lord) Lyons had succeeded Mr Dawkins as English minister at the Greek court. He supported Count Armansperg with great zeal and activity. But the Greek government was pursuing a course which every day rendered the count more unpopular.

In the month of May 1836, King Otho left Greece in search of a wife, and during his absence, which lasted until the beginning of the following year, Count Armansperg was viceroy with absolute power.[2] His authority was supported by an army of 11,500 men, of whom 4000 were Bavarians. Money had now become more abundant in Greece, and several editors of newspapers, having made the necessary deposit in the treasury, resumed the publication of their journals. The opposition of the press again alarmed the Bavarians, and the count resolved to attempt to intimidate the editors by government prosecutions. The *Soter* was selected as the first victim, and very iniquitous preparations were made to insure its condemnation. Two judges were removed from the bench, in the tribunal before which the cause was brought, immediately before the trial. This tampering with the course of justice created vehement discontent, but it secured the condemnation of the editor. The punishment inflicted on the delinquent, however, was not likely to silence the patriotic, for it enabled them to gain the honours of martyrdom at a very cheap rate. The editor was fined two thousand drachmas, and

[1] *Parliamentary Papers* relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, 1836; Parish, *Diplomatic History*, p. 301; *Parliamentary Debates*; and *Annual Register*.

[2] The ordinance investing Armansperg and his motley cabinet with power is dated 5th May.—*Government Gazette*, 1836, No. 18.

condemned to a year's imprisonment. The arch-chancellor's triumph was short. An appeal was made to the Areopagus, and the sentence of the criminal court was annulled.[1] As might have been expected, the attacks of the press became more violent and more personal.

Count Armansperg's recall was caused by the complete failure of his financial administration. The King of Bavaria selected the Chevalier Rudhart to replace him, still believing that the Greeks were not yet competent to manage their own affairs. On the 14th of February 1837, King Otho returned to Greece with Queen Amalia, the beautiful daughter of the Grand Duke Oldenburg.[2] M. Rudhart accompanied him as prime minister. The views of Rudhart were those of an honest Bavarian. He had studied European politics in the proceedings of the Germanic diet, and he contemplated emancipating King Otho from the tutelage of the three protecting powers by Austrian influence. Had the thing been feasible, he possessed neither the knowledge nor the talents required for so bold an enterprise. The Greeks and Bavarians were already ranged against one another in hostile parties. Sir Edmund Lyons seized the opportunity of avenging the slight put upon his mission, by keeping him in ignorance of Armansperg's recall. He connected the opposition of the British cabinet to the nomination of Rudhart, with the hostility of the Greeks to the Bavarians, and animated them to talk again of constitutional liberty. Rudhart claimed as a right the absolute power which Maurer and Armansperg had silently assumed. In one of his communications to

[1] For the sentence condemning the editor, see supplement to the *Courrier Grec*, 6th September 1836; and for the decision of the Areopagus, the Ἀθηνᾶ, 10th October 1836.

[2] *Government Gazette*, 1837, No. 4. King Otho was married on the 22d November 1836.

the British minister, he declared that he exercised arbitrary power by the express order of King Otho, and that the King of Greece, in placing the royal authority above the law, exercised a right for which he was responsible to no one.[1] This assertion was so directly at variance with the promises of the King of Bavaria, and the assurances which the three protecting powers had given to the Greeks, that Sir Edmund Lyons was furnished with good ground for attacking the policy of the Bavarians. He pushed his attacks to the utmost verge of diplomatic license; and Rudhart, who defended a bad cause without vigour and promptitude, soon found it necessary to resign.[2] He held office for ten months, and was succeeded by Zographos, who was then Greek minister at Constantinople. A. D. 1833.

From this time the nominal prime minister was always a Greek; the war department was the only ministry henceforth occupied by a Bavarian; but Bavarian influence continued to direct the whole administration until the revolution in 1843. From 1833 to 1838, during a period of five years, the Greeks had exercised no control over their government, which received its guiding impulse from Munich. Those who ruled Greece were responsible to the King of Bavaria alone for their conduct in office. It is not surprising, therefore, that Greece was ill-governed; yet something was done for the good of the country. The early period of the regency was marked by the introduction of a system of administration which put an end, as if by enchantment, to the most frightful anarchy that ever desolated any Christian country in modern times. Many wise laws were enacted, and some useful measures were carried into execution promptly and thoroughly. The

[1] Parish, *Diplomatic History*, 402.

[2] See a letter of Sir E. Lyons to Chevalier Rudhart; Parish, *Diplomatic History*, Appendix, 218; Lesur, *Annuaire Historique, Documens.* Rudhart resigned on the 20th December 1837.

errors committed were probably fewer, and the good results produced much greater, than could have been obtained by any cabinet composed solely of Greeks. Deficient as Maurer, Armansperg, and Rudhart might be in the qualities of statesmen, as administrators they were far superior to any Greeks who could have been placed in the position they held. It is certain that they erred greatly from ignorance of the institutions of Greece, and it must be acknowledged that they often sacrificed the interests of the Greeks to the interests of the Bavarians in Greece; but Kolokotrones, Mavrocordatos, Konduriottes, and Kolettes, had all proved themselves more unprincipled, and quite incapable of governing the country.

In considering what the Bavarians did, it is well to reflect on what they might have done. The three powers had guaranteed the inviolability of the Greek territory; there was therefore no need of any military force to defend the country against the Turks. Greece only required the troops necessary to repress brigandage and enforce order. The navy of Greece had almost entirely disappeared, and the only maritime force required was a few vessels to prevent piracy. On the other hand, a very great expenditure on roads, ports, packet-boats, and other means of facilitating and cheapening communications, was absolutely necessary to improve the condition of the agricultural population, and give strength to the new kingdom. The population was scanty, and the produce of agricultural labour was small, even when compared with the scanty population. At the same time the demand for agricultural labour was so partial and irregular, that at some short periods of the year it was extremely dear; and though good land was abundant, extensive districts remained uncultivated, because the expense of bringing the produce to market would have consumed all profit. Something

would have been done for the improvement of the country by constructing the roads indicated by the government as necessary, when the regency destroyed the liberty of the press; but instead of carrying this wise plan into execution, the resources of Greece were consumed in equipping a regiment of lancers, in military and court pageantry, in building royal yachts and a monster palace. The consequence of neglecting roads and packets was that brigandage and piracy revived. The Allied loan was wasted in unnecessary expenditure. The whole surplus labour and revenue of Greece was consumed for many years in unproductive employments. A considerable army was maintained, merely because Greece was called a kingdom; and a navy was formed for no purpose apparently but that the ships might be allowed to rot. A. D. 1833.

The state of the Levant from 1833 to 1843 was extremely favourable to the progress of Greece. The affairs of the Othoman empire were in a very unsettled state, and the Christian population had not yet obtained the direct interference of the Western powers in their favour. Thousands of Greeks were ready to emigrate into the new kingdom, had they seen a hope of being able to employ their labour with profit, and invest their savings with security. The incapacity of the rulers of Greece, and the rude social condition of the agricultural population, perpetuated by retaining the Othoman system of taxing land, allowed this favourable opportunity for rapid improvement to escape.

The three protecting powers have been blamed for not appropriating the proceeds of the loan to special objects, and for not enforcing the construction of some works of public utility. But this was perhaps impossible. Neither King Louis of Bavaria nor the Emperor Nicholas would have consented to submit the public expenditure to the control of a representative assembly

in Greece; and neither France nor England could have made special appropriation of funds for the benefit of the country, without requiring the existence of some constitutional control over the Bavarians on the part of the Greek people. It is, however, extremely probable that all parties, taking into consideration the manner in which the English loans had been expended, considered the members of the regency more competent and more inclined to check malversation than any Greeks who could have been found. Examples of activity, intelligence, eloquence, courage, and patriotism, were not wanting among the Greeks; but the Revolution produced no individual uniting calm judgment and profound sagacity with unwearied industry and administrative experience. It did not produce a single man deserving to be called a statesman.

After M. Rudhart's resignation the office of president of the council of ministers was filled by a Greek; but the president was only nominally prime minister, for King Otho really governed by means of a private cabinet. The Greek ministers were controlled by Bavarian secretaries attached to each department with the title of referendaries. Greeks were found servile enough to submit to this control, and to act the part of pageant ministers. The proceedings of the government grew every year more arbitrary. The king was a man of a weak mind, and not of a generous disposition. The flatterers who surrounded him appear to have persuaded him that the Greek kingdom was created for his personal use, and his political vision rarely extended beyond his capital. In the greater part of the kingdom the creatures of the court ruled despotically. The police kept men in prison without legal warrants; and torture was inflicted both on men and women merely because they were suspected of having furnished brigands with food. The press was

prosecuted for complaining that Greece was deprived of her constitutional liberties. A.D 1833.

The English minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, complained of injuries inflicted on British and Ionian subjects. His reclamations were left long unanswered, and remained for years unredressed. Attempts were made to obtain his recall; and when they failed, he was personally and publicly insulted at the Greek court in a manner that compelled him to exact ample satisfaction.

During a theatrical representation at the palace, the British minister was left, by an oversight of the master of the ceremonies, without a seat in the court circle, and allowed to stand during the whole performance in a position directly in view of the king and queen, who seemed rather to enjoy the sight as the most amusing scene in the court comedy. Such conduct could not be overlooked. The minister of foreign affairs was compelled to make a very humble apology by express order of the king, and the Bavarian baron who acted as master of the ceremonies was shipped off to Trieste in the same summary manner as Dr Franz and M. Maurer had been. This severe lesson prevented open acts of insult in future; but the animosity of the court to the person of Sir Edmund Lyons was shown in minor acts of impertinence. On one occasion his groom was carried off by the gendarmes from his residence, and kept all night in prison on a charge of squirting water on a passer-by. These miserable disputes gradually alienated England and Greece, and victory over the court of Athens in such contests certainly reflected little honour on the diplomacy of Great Britain. A tithe of the energy displayed by Sir Edmund Lyons and Lord Palmerston in humiliating King Otho, and in adjusting questions of etiquette, would have settled every pending demand for justice on the part of British and Ionian subjects. Years of wrangling

between the two courts might have been spared.[1] Greece would not have been rendered contemptible by her determined denial of justice, and England would not have been rendered ridiculous by employing a powerful fleet to collect a small debt from the Greek nation, when it was only due by the Greek government.[2] France also would not have exhibited her jealousy of England, by advising the Greek government to resist demands which, when her protection was solicited, she compelled Greece not only to pay as just, but also to record the fact that she had for years resisted these just demands in a solemn convention.[3]

While the quarrels with the English minister kept the Greek court in a state of irritation, the nation was suffering from brigandage, and secret societies and orthodox plots were again attempting to excite the people to revolt.

The disbanding of the irregular troops, and the refusal of the regency to pay the armed followers of the chieftains who assembled round Nauplia at the king's arrival for the purpose of intimidating his government, suddenly deprived many soldiers of the means of subsistence. Great disorder naturally ensued. The transition from anarchy to order could not be effected in a day by human strength or human wisdom. Bands of irregulars, who had lived for several years at free quarters and in absolute idleness, were neither disposed to submit to any discipline nor to engage in any useful employment. Severe treatment was unavoidable, but prudence was necessary in enforcing mea-

[1] On the 11th May 1839, the Greek government delivered to all the foreign missions at Athens, except the British, a lithographed exposition in reply to the reclamations of the British government.

[2] The British fleet seized private ships and cargoes at sea without a declaration of war. This may be internationally legal, but is unquestionably unjust.

[3] M. Thouvenel counselled resistance in February. Baron Gros, in April 1850, recommended the Greek government to acknowledge its injustice.—*Parliamentary Papers respecting the Demands made upon the Greek Government—Farther Correspondence*, p. 346.

sures of severity. During the latter years of the Re- A. D. 1833.
volution the armed bands had separated their cause from that of the people. They pretended to have rights more extensive than the rest of the nation, and they exercised these rights by plundering their fellow-citizens. During the anarchy that followed the assassination of Capodistrias, Mussulman Albanians had been introduced into the Peloponnesus as allies of the Romeliot armatoli, and many villages had been sacked by these mercenaries.[1]

The early regency carried the disbanding of the irregulars into effect with so much vigour that the whole of these disorderly bands were expelled from the Peloponnesus, and during the summer of 1833 the greater part was driven to choose between entering the regular army or crossing the frontier into Turkey.

The state of the Othoman empire was singularly favourable to the project of relieving Greece from her disorderly troops. The sultan's army had been defeated at Koniah by the Egyptians under Ibrahim Pasha on the 21st of December 1832, and a Russian army arrived at Constantinople soon after to protect Sultan Mahmud's throne. The Christians in European Turkey expected to witness the immediate dissolution of the Othoman empire. The Mussulman population in Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia was extremely discontented with the fiscal arrangements and measures of centralisation adopted by the sultan and several districts were in open rebellion. A large portion of the irregular troops who quitted Greece

[1] Thiersch, i. 71. Almost every traveller who ventured to make even the smallest excursion in Greece during the winter of 1832-3 was plundered. Professor Ross was robbed near Marathon, and Mr Wordsworth fell into the hands of brigands on Mount Parnes, was wounded, and only escaped being detained for ransom in consequence of a severe snow-storm. He says: "For several months the entrance into the Peloponnesus from continental Greece has been rendered impassable for travellers by the violence of the military bandits."—*Athens and Attica*, p. 254; compare pp. 22, 49, 227, 242, and 255 first edition.

found employment in consequence of the local disturbances in Turkey, and they laid waste a considerable part of Epirus and Thessaly, as they had previously ravaged a part of the Peloponnesus.

As early as the month of May 1833, a strong body of Greeks, having crossed the frontier, joined a number of unpaid Albanian soldiers in the pashalik of Joannina, and surprised the town of Arta, which had successfully resisted the attacks of the Greeks during the Revolution. For three days these lawless bands remained masters of the town, which they plundered without mercy. Neither age, sex, nor religion served to protect the inhabitants. Every act of cruelty and brutality of which man can be the perpetrator or the sufferer was inflicted on persons of both sexes and of every class. Torture, too sickening to describe, was employed to compel women and children to reveal where money and jewels were concealed. When gorged with booty, lust, and cruelty, these bandits quitted Arta, gained the mountains, and separated into small bands in order to evade pursuit and obtain the means of subsistence until they could plan some fresh exploit. The fame of the sack of Arta allured the greater part of the disbanded irregulars across the frontier, and relieved the Bavarians from a dangerous struggle.

The state of Albania became still more disturbed towards the end of the year 1834, and many of the Greek armatoli and irregulars formed alliances with the municipalities of Christian districts, which secured to them permanent employment. Had Count Armansperg employed the respite thus obtained with prudence, order might have been firmly established in Northern Greece; but his frequent changes of policy and indecisive measures produced a series of political insurrections, and revived brigandage as an element of society in Greece.

Piracy was suppressed at sea by the assistance of the Allies. In the spring of 1833 upwards of one hundred and fifty pirates were captured and brought to Nauplia for judgment. Many of these were irregular troops, who had seized large boats and commenced the trade of pirates. A. D. 1834.

In 1834 an insurrection occurred in Maina, which assumed the character of a civil war. It was caused by a rash and foolish measure of the regency. Ages of insecurity had compelled the landlords in the greater part of Greece to dwell in towers capable of defence against brigands. These towers were nothing more than stone houses without windows in the lower story, and to which the only access was by a stone stair detached from the building, and connected, by a movable wooden platform, with the door in the upper story. In Maina these towers were numerous. The members of the regency attributed the feuds and bloodshed prevalent in that rude district to the towers, instead of regarding the towers as a necessary consequence of the feuds. The members of the regency appear to have imagined that the destruction of all the towers in Greece would insure the establishment of order in the country. In the plains this was easily effected. Peaceful landlords were compelled to employ workmen to destroy their houses instead of employing workmen to repair them. The consequence was, that fear of the attacks of disbanded soldiers and avowed brigands drove most wealthy landlords into the nearest towns, and many abandoned the agricultural improvements they had commenced.

In Maina the orders of the regency were openly opposed. Every possessor of a tower, indeed, declared that he had no objections to its destruction, but he invited the government to destroy every tower in Maina at the same time, otherwise no man's life and property

would be secure. Some chiefs affected to be very loyal, and very eager for the destruction of towers. Bavarian troops were marched into the country to assist these chiefs in destroying their own and their enemies' towers. The appearance of the Bavarians induced the majority of the Maniat chiefs to form a league, in order to resist the invaders. The people were told that the foreigners came into the mountains to destroy the monasteries, imprison the native monks in distant monasteries, and seize the ecclesiastical revenues for the king's government. Several skirmishes took place. A Bavarian officer, who advanced rashly into the defiles with part of a battalion, was surrounded, cut off from water, and compelled to surrender at discretion. The victorious Maniats stripped their prisoners of their clothing, and then compelled the Greek government to ransom them at a small sum per man. This defeat dissolved the belief in the invincibility of regular troops, which had been established by the daring conduct of the French at Argos.

The regency could not allow the war to terminate with such a defeat. Fresh troops were poured into Maina, strong positions were occupied, the hostile districts were cut off from communications with the sea, and money was employed to gain over a party among the chiefs. A few towers belonging to the chiefs most hostile to the government were destroyed by force, and some were destroyed with the consent of the proprietors, who were previously indemnified. Partly by concessions, partly by corruption, and partly by force, tranquillity was restored. But the submission of Maina to the regency was only secured by withdrawing the Bavarian troops, and forming a battalion of Maniats to preserve order in the country. Maurer asserts that the Maniats converted their towers into ordinary dwellings: anybody who visits Maina, even

though a quarter of a century has elapsed, will see A. D. 1834.
that his assertion is inaccurate.[1]

Other insurrections occurred in various parts of Greece; but those of Messenia and Arcadia in 1834, and of Acarnania in 1836, alone deserve to be mentioned on account of their political importance.

The insurrection in Messenia occurred immediately after the recall of Maurer and Abel, but would have broken out had they remained. Count Armansperg was so helpless as an administrator, in spite of his eagerness to govern Greece, that he was at a loss to know what measures he ought to adopt, and allowed himself to be persuaded by Kolettes to call in the services of bands of irregulars. Large bodies of men, who had just begun to acquire habits of industry, were allured to resume arms, with the hope that Kolettes would again be able to distribute commissions conferring high military rank, as in the civil wars under Konduriottes and against Agostino. Years of military disorganisation, and its concomitant—an increase of brigandage—were the immediate results of Count Armansperg's imprudence.

The leaders of the insurrection in Messenia and Arcadia were friends of Kolokotrones and Plapoutas, men who had been connected with the Russian plot, and who were in some degree encouraged to take up arms by the supposed favour with which Count Armansperg had viewed the intrigues of Dr Franz. Their project was to extort from the regency the instant release of Kolokotrones and Plapoutas, and to secure for themselves concessions similar to those accorded to the Maniats.

The commencement of the insurrection was in Arcadia. In the month of August 1834, considerable bodies of men assembled in arms at different places.

[1] *Das Griechische Volk*, ii. 509.

Kolias Plapoutas, a man without either influence or capacity, presuming on his relationship with the two imprisoned klephtic chiefs, assumed the title of director of the kingdom, and issued a proclamation demanding the convocation of a national assembly. Other leaders proclaimed the abolition of the regency and the majority of King Otho.

Kolias Plapoutas, at the head of four hundred men, attempted to arrest the eparch of Arcadia at Andritzena without success. Captain Gritzales, who had collected about three hundred men in the villages round Soulenia, was more successful at the commencement of his operations. He made prisoners both the nomarch of Messenia and the commandant of the gendarmerie in the town of Kyparissia.[1] A third body of insurgents, consisting of the mountaineers from the southern slopes of Mount Tetrazi, defeated a small body of regulars, and entered the plain of Stenyclerus as victors.

Kolettes, into whose hands Armansperg, in his panic, had thrust the conduct of government, because he held the ministry of the interior, even though he had been a stanch partisan of Maurer, resolved to use his power in such a way as to have little to fear from the count's enmity when the insurrection was suppressed. He determined, therefore, to restore some of his old political allies, the chiefs of the irregular bands of Northern Greece, again to power. Had he allowed the Bavarian troops and the Greek regulars to suppress the insurrection, which they could have effected without difficulty, he would have strengthened the arbitrary authority of Armansperg, whom he well knew was at heart his implacable enemy. Kolettes was himself under the dominion of many rude prejudices. To his dying

[1] Kyparissia is called by the modern Greeks Arkadia, but the ancient name has been revived in the official nomenclature of the kingdom to avoid confusion.

day he considered the military system of Ali of Joan- A. D. 1834.
nina as the best adapted for maintaining order in Greece. On this occasion, therefore, he repeated, as far as lay in his power, the measures by which he had overpowered the Moreot primates and the Moreot klephts under Kòlokotrones in 1824. Several Romeliot chiefs of his party were authorised to enrol bands of veterans, and with these personal followers, who required no preparation and no magazines, as they lived everywhere by the plunder which they extorted from the Greek peasantry, Kolettes expected to crush the insurrection before the regular troops could arrive. The irregulars were, however, as usual, too slow in their movements.

General Schmaltz, a gallant Bavarian colonel of cavalry, was appointed commander-in-chief of the royal army. He soon encompassed the insurgents with a force of two thousand regulars and about three thousand irregulars. The rebels, who never succeeded in assembling five hundred men at any one point, fought several well-contested skirmishes, but they were soon dispersed and their leaders taken prisoners.[1] Count Armansperg did not treat the rebels with severity. He knew that they were more likely to join his party than the Kolettists by whom they had been defeated. Perhaps he also feared that a close examination of their conduct might throw more light than was desirable on the connection that had grown up between the Capodistrian conspiracy and the Armansperg intrigue. In six weeks tranquillity was completely re-established. But for many months bands of irregular soldiery continued to live at free quarters in the plain of Messenia. Kolettes felt himself so strongly supported by the Romeliot chiefs, and by French in-

[1] The *Soter* newspaper, during the month of August 1834, O.S., notices the principal events of this insurrection.

fluence, that he conceived great hopes of being named prime minister on King Otho's majority; but he was defeated by the influence of Great Britain at the court of Bavaria. Armansperg, as has been already mentioned, was named arch-chancellor, and Kolettes was sent to Paris as Greek minister.

The insurrection of 1834 was no sooner suppressed than the Bavarians became alarmed at the power which Kolettes had acquired. The irregular bands which had been recalled into activity were slowly disbanded, and the chiefs saw that fear alone had compelled Count Armansperg to resort to their services. The policy of suddenly recalling men to a life of adventure and pillage, who were just beginning to acquire habits of order, could not fail to produce evil consequences. Hopes of promotion, perfect idleness, and liberal pay, were suddenly offered to them; and when they fancied that, by a little fighting and a few weeks marching, they had attained the object of their hopes, they found that they were again to be disbanded and sent back to learn the hard lessons of honest industry. Many of them determined that Greece should soon require their services. It was not possible to produce a popular insurrection at any moment, but there was no difficulty in organising a widespread system of brigandage. A project of the kind was quickly carried into execution.

During the winter of 1834 and the spring of 1835 brigandage assumed a very alarming aspect. Several Bavarians were waylaid and murdered.[1] Government money was captured, even when transmitted under strong escorts; and government magazines, in which the produce of the land-tax was stored, were plundered. In the month of April the intrigues of the military

[1] *Reise durch alle Theile des Königreiches Griechenland in* 1834-1835, *von* Dr Fiedler, vol. i. pp. 146, 159.

chiefs alarmed the agricultural population to such a degree that several districts in Western Greece petitioned the prefects to be allowed to enrol national guards, to whom they engaged to guarantee three months' pay from the municipal funds. By this means they expected to retain the irregulars in their native districts, and to insure their protection in case of attacks by strangers. To this anomalous and temporary expedient Count Armansperg gave his consent. A. D. 1835.

But as the summer of 1835 advanced, the disorders in continental Greece increased. Numerous bands of brigands, after laying a number of villages under contribution, from the mouth of the Sperchius to the banks of the Achelous, concentrated upwards of two hundred men in the district of Venetico, within six miles of Lepanto. A Bavarian officer of engineers was taken prisoner with the pioneer who accompanied him, and both were murdered in cold blood. The house of Captain Prapas, an active officer of irregular troops and a chief of the national guards in Artolina, was burned to the ground during his absence, and his flocks were carried off. In the month of May, the house of Captain Makryiannes, near Simau, was destroyed, and seven members of his family, including his wife and two girls, were cruelly murdered. An attack was shortly after made on the house of Captain Pharmaki, an officer of irregulars of distinguished ability and courage, who was living within a few hundred yards of the walls of Lepanto. Pharmaki was severely wounded, and one of his servants was killed; but he beat off the brigands, and prevented them from setting fire to his house. For six weeks every day brought news of some new outrage, but Count Armansperg turned a deaf ear to all complaints. He assured the foreign ministers that the accounts which reached them were greatly exaggerated, and that he had adopted

effectual measures for restoring order. In reality, he neglected the commonest precautions, and left entirely to the nomarchs and commanders of troops in the disturbed districts the care of taking such measures as they might think necessary. The count was absorbed with the intrigues which ended in persuading King Otho, whose majority occurred on 1st June 1835, to prolong the absolute power which he had exercised as regent with the title of arch-chancellor.

The first step of the arch-chancellor was to send Kolettes to Paris as Greek minister. While Kolettes remained minister of the interior, it was thought that he encouraged, or at least tolerated, the extension of brigandage, and looked with secret satisfaction at the supineness of the regency. General Lesuire, the Bavarian minister of war, was also accused of regarding the disorders that prevailed with indifference, though from very different motives. Brigandage furnished Kolettes with arguments for reviving the system of chieftains with personal followers, and to Lesuire it supplied arguments against intrusting the Greeks with arms, and for increasing the number of Bavarian mercenaries in the king's service. The accounts which the Greek government received of the conduct of the irregulars enrolled by Kolettes's authority during the insurrection of Messenia, persuaded the minister of war that these troops differed from the brigands only in name. It is certain that he kept both the Greek and German regular battalions in high order; but he neglected the irregular corps in a way that afforded them some excuse for the exactions they committed. A battalion of irregulars, under Gardikiotes Grivas, was left without pay and clothing at a moment when it was disposed to take the field against the brigands, and might have prevented their incursion to the walls of Lepanto. The scanty pensions of

the Suliots at Mesolonghi were allowed to fall into arrear. A number of veteran armatoli, to whom pensions had been assigned on condition of their residing at Lepanto and Vrachori, were completely neglected, and were so discontented with the conduct of the government, that when the house of Pharmaki was attacked, and the firing was heard in the whole town of Lepanto, not one would move from the walls to assist that gallant chief. The landed proprietors and the peasantry were almost as much irritated at the neglect shown by the government as the starving soldiers. Loud complaints were made that the population in the provinces was left without defence, while Armansperg was lavishing crosses of the Redeemer on diplomats, and pay and promotion on Bavarians whose service in Greece had been confined to marching from Nauplia to Athens, when the king removed his capital from the first of these cities to the second. A. D. 1835.

As soon as Armansperg's intrigues were crowned with success, he got rid of Lesuire as well as Kolettes, and General Schmaltz became minister of war. About the same time Mr Dawkins was recalled, and Sir Edmund Lyons was named British minister at King Otho's court. At the recommendation of Sir Edmund, Armansperg named General Gordon to the command of an expedition which was sent to clear Northern Greece of brigands. Gordon was not attached to any political party: he distrusted Kolettes, and had little confidence in Armansperg; but he knew the country, the people, and the irregular troops, as well as any man in Greece.

On the 11th of July he left Athens with his staff; and after visiting Chalcis, in order to make himself fully acquainted with the state of the troops of which he had assumed the command, he formed his plan of operations. His measures were judicious, and they

were executed with energy. A body of regular troops was sent forward from Chalcis by Thebes, Livadea, and Salona, to Loidoriki, whither Gordon proceeded, following the shore of the channel of Eubœa to the mouth of the Sperchius. He stopped a couple of days at Patradjik (Hypate) to post the troops necessary to guard the passes on the frontier, and then descended by the defiles of Oeta and Korax to Loidoriki, where he was joined by the regulars from Chalcis. By this rapid march he effectually cleared all Eastern Greece of brigands. They all moved westward, for they saw that if any of them remained in Phocis they would have been hunted down without a chance of escape.

At Loidoriki, Gordon divided the force under his orders into three divisions. It was much more difficult to drive the brigands westward from the Etolian mountains than it had been to clear the more open districts in Eastern Greece. One division of the army kept along the ridge of the mountains which bound the Gulf of Corinth to the north. The centre, with the general, marched into the heart of the country, through districts cut by nature into a labyrinth of deep ravines, and descended to Lepanto from the north-east, after passing by Lombotina and Simon. The right division moved up northward to Artolina, in order, if possible, to cut off the brigands from gaining the Turkish frontier.

The principal body of the brigands, consisting of one hundred and thirty, maintained its position in the immediate vicinity of Lepanto for six weeks, and it continued to levy contributions from the country round until the general arrived at Loidoriki. It then broke up into several small bands, and, picking up its outlying associates, gained the Turkish frontier by following secluded sheep-tracks over the Etolian mountains. The national guards, which the communities in the

provinces of Apokuro and Zygos had taken into their pay, as soon as they were sure of effectual support from the troops under Gordon, commenced dislodging the brigands from their positions between the Phidari (Evenus) and the Achelous. A. D. 1835.

From Lepanto, Gordon marched to Mesolonghi and Vrachori. The officers under his orders found no difficulty in clearing the plains of Acarnania, and when this was effected, he followed the rugged valley of Prousos to Karpenisi, where he arrived on the 11th of August. The arrangements he had adopted for securing to the Suliots and the veterans at Lepanto and Vrachori the regular payment of their pensions, and the good conduct of the detachments of regulars which he sent to support the local magistrates, insured active co-operation on the part of the native population. The spirit of order, which the neglect of the royal government had almost extinguished, again revived.

In one month after quitting Athens, tranquillity was restored in the whole of continental Greece. But as about three hundred brigands had assembled within the Turkish territory, and marched along the frontier with military music, it seemed that the difficulty of protecting the country would be greater than that of delivering it. The general's Oriental studies now proved of as great value to Greece as his military activity and geographical knowledge. He opened a correspondence with the pasha at Larissa; and the circumstance of an Englishman commanding the Greek forces, and of that Englishman not only speaking Turkish fluently, but also writing it like a divan-effendi, contributed more than a sense of sound policy, to secure the co-operation of the Turkish authorities in dispersing the brigands.

In the month of October Gordon's mission was terminated, and he was ordered to resume his duties at Argos, as commander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus.

The brigands in Turkey had dispersed, but it was known that many had retired to Agrapha, where they were protected by Tzatzos, the captain of armatoli, and it was supposed that Tzatzos had not taken this step without the connivance of the derven-pasha. Gordon warned the Greek government that brigandage would soon recommence, unless very different measures were adopted from those which Count Armansperg had hitherto pursued, both in his civil and financial administration. And he completely lost the count's favour by the truths which he told in a memoir he drew up on the means of suppressing the brigandage, and maintaining tranquillity on the frontier.

The insecurity which prevailed near the Turkish frontier, even though brigandage had for a moment ceased, is strongly illustrated by the closing scene of Gordon's sojourn in the vicinity. Before quitting Northern Greece he wished to enjoy a day's shooting. On the 5th October he went with a party of friends to Aghia Marina. The brigands, who lay concealed on both sides of the frontier, had official friends, and were well informed of all that happened at Lamia. They were soon aware of Gordon's project. A band lay concealed in the thick brushwood that covered the plain, but did not find an opportunity of attacking him on the road. Soon after sunset the house he occupied was surrounded while the party was at dinner, but the alarm was given in time to allow the sportsmen to throw down their knives and forks, seize their fowling-pieces, and run to the garden-wall in front of the building. By this they prevented the brigands from approaching near enough to set fire to the house. A skirmish ensued, in which the assailants displayed very little courage. The firing brought a party of royal troops from Stelida to the general's assistance, but the

obscurity of the night favoured the escape of the brigands, and on the following morning all traces of them had disappeared.[1] A. D. 1836.

The lavish expenditure of Count Armansperg brought on financial difficulties at the end of 1835, and both Russia and France considered his accounts and his explanations so unsatisfactory, that they refused to intrust him with the expenditure of the third series of the loan.[2] The state of Greece was represented in a very different manner by the foreign ministers at the court of Athens. The King of Bavaria, hoping to learn the truth by personal observation, paid his son a visit. He little knew the difficulty which exists in Greece of acquiring accurate information, or of forming correct conclusions, from the partial information which it is in the power of a passing visitor to obtain, even when that visitor is a king. Truth is always rare in the East, and Greece was divided into several hostile factions, who were the irreconcilable enemies of truth. On the 7th of December 1835, the King of Bavaria arrived at Athens, where he was welcomed by the council of state with the assurance that his son's dominions were in a state of profound tranquillity, and extremely prosperous. His majesty was not long in Greece before he perceived that the councillors of state were not in the habit of speaking the truth.

In the month of January 1836, the brigands, who had remained quiet for a short time, reappeared from their places of concealment, and those who had found an asylum in Turkey began to cross the frontier in small bands. Not a week passed without their plundering some village. Accounts reached Athens of the

[1] General Gordon gave the following account of this affair in a private letter:—"Drosos Mansolas" (afterwards minister of the interior) "showed a degree of courage and coolness very uncommon in a Greek logiotatos. He behaved much better than his gun, which burst at the first discharge."

[2] Compare Parish, *Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece*, p. 296, and *Annuaire Historique Universelle pour* 1835, p. 480.

unheard-of cruelties they were daily committing to extort money, or to avenge the defeats they suffered during the preceding year. Party spirit and official avidity had at this time so benumbed public spirit in the capital of Greece, that even the Liberal press paid little attention to the miseries of the agricultural population. The peasantry were neglected, for they had no influence in the distribution of places, honours, or profits. In the month of February, however, the evil increased so rapidly, and reached such an alarming extent, that it could no longer be overlooked even by Count Armansperg. Six hundred brigands established themselves within the Greek kingdom, ravaging the whole valley of the Sperchius with fire and sword.[1]

An insurrection broke out at this time in Acarnania, which had its sources in the same political and social evils as brigandage. It is peculiarly interesting, however, from affording some insight into the political history of Great Britain as well as Greece. Lord Palmerston persuaded the British government that it was for the interest of Great Britain to support the administration of Count Armansperg. This could only be done effectually by furnishing him with money; and to induce Parliament to authorise the issue of the third instalment of the loan, papers were presented to both Houses, proving that the Greek government was in great need of money. But when the want of money was clearly proved, it was objected that the want complained of was caused by lavish expenditure and gross corruption; and it was even said that Count Armansperg's maladministration was plunging Greece back into the state of anarchy from which the early regency had delivered the country. Additional papers were then presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary (which had been all along in his hands), to

[1] Ἀθηνᾶ, (Greek newspaper), 4-16 February 1836.

prove that Greece was in a most flourishing condition, A. D. 1836.
and that the prosperity she was enjoying was the direct result of the Count's administration.[1] The history of the insurrection is the best comment on these adverse statements.

The leaders of the insurrection in Acarnania were officers of the irregular troops who had distinguished themselves in the revolutionary war. Demo Tzelios, who commanded one body of insurgents, proclaimed that the people took up arms against Count Armansperg and the Bavarians, not against the king and the government. Nicolas Zervas, another leader, demanded the convocation of a national assembly. A third party displayed the phœnix on its standard, and talked of orthodoxy as being the surest way to collect the Capodistrians and Ionians in arms against the government at Athens. All united in proclaiming the constitution, and demanding the expulsion of the Bavarians. The people took no part in the movement.

Demo Tzelios entered Mytika without opposition, but was defeated at Dragomestre. Mesolonghi had been left almost without a garrison. The folly of the government was so flagrant, in the actual condition of the country, that the proceeding looked like treachery. The insurgents made a bold attempt to gain possession of that important fortress by surprise, but they were bravely repulsed by the few troops who remained in the place, and by the inhabitants, who regarded the insurgents as mere brigands. The rebels, though repulsed from the walls of Mesolonghi, were nevertheless strong enough to remain encamped before the place and to ravage the plain for several days.[2]

[1] Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, 1836; and Additional Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, presented to both Houses, August 1836.

[2] Ἀθηνᾶ, 12th (24th) February 1836. See also an account of this attack on Mesolonghi in Dr Fiedler's *Reise durch alle theile des Königreiches Griechenland*, i. 150.

These events produced a panic at Athens. Men spoke of the pillage of the Morea in 1824, when Konduriottes was president, of the sack of Poros by the troops of Capodistrias, and of the anarchy caused by Kolettes and the constitutionalists in 1832. Fortunately for Greece, the presence of the King of Bavaria prevented a renewal of these calamities. His majesty enabled the Greek government to procure money. Count Armansperg having rejected the plans proposed by General Gordon for averting a renewal of brigandage, was in this emergency again induced to practise the lessons he had learned from Kolettes in suppressing the insurrection of Messenia. Chieftains were allowed to enrol irregular troops, and reconstitute bands of personal followers. Kitzos Djavellas, Theodore Griva, Vassos, Mamourès, and Zongas were empowered to raise two thousand men, and to march against the insurgents. These bands of irregulars were followed by large bodies of regular troops. With these forces the country was cleared of insurgents and brigands without difficulty. Gordon had pointed out the operations by which Northern Greece can always be swept of enemies by a superior force in about a month. Before the end of May the last remains of the insurrection were trodden out in Acarnania, and all the large bands of brigands were again driven into Turkey. Sir Richard Church then made a tour of military inspection, to establish order, redress grievances, and pacify the people. On the 30th May Sir Edmund Lyons wrote from Athens to Lord Palmerston: "No inroads have been made on the frontier since the end of April, and tranquillity has prevailed throughout the country. General Church is still in Western Greece, and his reports of the loyal feelings of the inhabitants are extremely satisfactory."

Others, however, took a very different view of the

state of the country. The accounts given of the condition of Greece were so discordant, and the reports published in Western Europe were so variously coloured by personal feelings and party spirit, that some notice of this discordance is necessary, in order to show the reader how the streams of politics meander into the river of history. A. D. 1836.

The late Lord Lyons was a warm supporter of Count Armansperg, and appears to have received all the statements of the count with implicit confidence. On the 24th February 1836, Lyons wrote to Lord Palmerston that "the communes in Greece have the entire direction of their own affairs; the press is unshackled; the tribunals are completely independent; private property is scrupulously respected; the personal and religious liberty of the subject is inviolable."[1] Yet not one of these assertions was true.[2] While Sir E. Lyons was writing this despatch, the people of Athens were reading in the Greek newspaper of the morning an account of the attack on Mesolonghi, and an announcement that the insurgents remained unmolested in their camps in Western Greece, while on the frontier brigandage was making gigantic progress.[3] In the month of May, General Gordon, who took a view of the state of Greece totally different from that taken by Lord Lyons, resigned his command in the Peloponnesus, and before returning to England wrote to a friend at Athens: "From what I know of the state of the Peloponnesus, and the rapid and alarming increase of organised brigandage, I fear this will be but a melancholy summer. I am assured, and believe, that lately several captive robbers have bought themselves off. Faction is extremely busy, and crime enjoys impunity. Add

[1] *Parliamentary Papers*—Additional Papers, 1836, p. 39.
[2] Compare pp. 832, 849, 865, 873 of this volume.
[3] Ἀθηνᾶ, 12th (24th) February 1836. Ἠλησταὶ αὐξάνει μὲ γιγαντιαῖα Βήματα.

to this Church and his heroes (*hoc est oleum adde camino*), and we have a pretty picture. The bandits are now plundering in Romelia with crowns in their caps."[1] Many brigands were enrolled in the bands which the irregular chieftains were authorised to form in the spring of 1836; and after the dismissal of Count Armansperg, Lord Lyons himself complained that one of these amnestied robbers had been seen at a ball, given by a foreign minister at Athens to the King and Queen of Greece.[2]

The disturbed state of Greece can be proved by better evidence than that of a British minister at King Otho's court, or of a British officer in his service. It can be proved by facts which no party prejudices can distort. From the year 1833 to the year 1838, military tribunals were constantly sitting to deal out punishment to insurgents or brigands. To strangers who visited Greece, and who examined the events that occurred, instead of trusting to the reports they heard, it seemed that martial law was the only law by which King Otho was able to dispense even a modicum of justice to a great number of his unfortunate subjects.[3]

During the interval between the dismissal of Count Armansperg and the final expulsion of the Bavarians

[1] This last observation alludes to Count Armansperg having granted an amnesty to several of the chiefs of brigands whom Gordon had driven out of Greece in 1835, and to one who had taken part in the attack made on the General at Aghia Marina.

[2] An example of the different aspect which Greece presented to the British minister, and to an observant British traveller, will be found by comparing the *Parliamentary Papers* of 1836 with Colonel Mure's *Journal of a Tour in Greece in* 1838. Lord Lyons writes in 1836—"I denied that the peasantry were impoverished, or that they wore sheep-skins." Yet Colonel Mure in 1838, even in the town of Livadea, remarks that the students "reclined, squatted, romped, and reposed upon their shaggy goat-skin cloaks or hairy capotes, which protected them from the storm by day, and formed their mattress and bedding by night."

[3] The following proclamations of martial law will be found in the *Government Gazette*, 1833, No. 28; 1834, No. 28; 1835, first series, No. 12; second series, No. 3; 1836, No. 6. This last military tribunal was established in February 1836, and sat until June 1837. Various amnesties were granted by Count Armansperg, which furnished a supply of criminals for tribunals of a more regular kind at a later period.

in 1843, several trifling insurrections broke out in the Peloponnesus; and continental Greece continued to be tormented by bands of brigands, who committed horrid atrocities. In a single year more than one hundred persons presented themselves to the public prosecutors, who had been tortured or mutilated by brigands and pirates. Men had lost their noses and ears; women and children had been tortured with indescribable cruelty, in order to force them to reveal where their husbands and their fathers were concealed.[1] No traveller passed through the country without seeing traces of their misdeeds. Colonel Mure found brigandage the subject of conversation at every khan he visited in 1838, and he fell in with victims of the brigands, with gendarmes pursuing brigands, or with brigands themselves, in every part of Greece.[2] Even Attica suffered severely from their ravages; shepherds were repeatedly murdered, and the landed proprietors feared to visit their estates. A. D. 1839.

Several chiefs of robbers maintained themselves in the vicinity of Athens for years, and it was naturally supposed that they had found the means of obtaining powerful political protection.[3] A singular scene, which occurred when two famous brigands were led out to be executed, confirmed the general belief in some official complicity.

On the 5th of August 1839, Bibisi and Trakadha, who had been tried and condemned to death, were ordered to be executed in the vicinity of Athens. The

[1] Dr Fiedler says: "Die Landräuber sind schon keine menschen mehr, aber die Seeräuber sind noch viel teuflischer. Es würde zu empörend sein ihre Schandthaten zu beschreiben."—ii. 46.

[2] *Journal of a Tour in Greece*, by William Mure of Caldwell, vol. i. p. 241; vol. ii. 2, 137, 144, 147, 186, 209, 257, 259, 274, 286, and 291. Compare also *Reise durch alle theile des Königreiches Griechenland in den Jahren* 1834 *vis* 1837, vol. i. 146, 159, 165, 182, 192, 193, 198; ii. 45.

[3] The first of these local brigands who gained distinction in Attica was named Burduba. After committing several atrocious murders, he was pardoned and enrolled in the municipal guard, but he was soon slain by the relations of one of his victims.

executioner was assassinated at the Piræus a few days before, and a new executioner was engaged to decapitate the criminals. An immense crowd was assembled to witness the death of men who were as much admired for their daring as they were feared and hated for their cruelty. The two brigands were surrounded by a strong guard of soldiers. The executioner ascended the scaffold on which the guillotine was placed. After waiting long for orders, he slowly commenced his work, but after some further delay, he fainted, or pretended to faint, and his powers of action could not be sufficiently restored to enable him to stand. The prefect wished to find another executioner, but the municipal authorities would give him no assistance. The populace began to enjoy the comedy they witnessed, instead of the tragedy they had expected to see. A reprieve was called for, and from the foot of the gallows the prefect was persuaded to despatch a message to King Otho asking for a reprieve, which, under the circumstances, it was impossible for his majesty to refuse.[1] Bibisi was condemned to imprisonment for life. As usually happens in Greece, both he and Trakadha were soon allowed to escape. They recommenced their robberies in the neighbourhood of Athens. At last they ventured to rob within sight of the royal palace. The court and the Greek ministers were roused from their habitual lethargy. A price was put on Bibisi's head, and he was soon shot by a gendarme, who had himself been a brigand. Trakadha perished even sooner. But brigandage continued to exist in Attica, and to flourish in the greater part of Greece for many years; and pages might be filled with accounts of robberies, murders, torturing, mutilation, and worse atrocities committed in every part of Greece.[2]

[1] Ἀθηνᾶ, 26th July 1839.

[2] The recent work of Mr Senior gives some account of the extent to which brigandage continued in 1855.

The evils of brigandage fell chiefly on the agricultural population, and neither the court, the Bavarians, nor the Greek ministers, appear to have paid any attention to the condition and the sufferings of the agricultural classes. The want of roads confined intercourse and material improvement to the sea-coast and the neighbourhood of commercial towns. The greater part of Greece, cut off from all hope of bettering its condition, remained in a barbarous and stationary condition. A. D. 1839.

King Otho became his own prime minister after the resignation of Mr Rudhart. His majesty possessed neither ability, experience, energy, nor generosity; consequently he was neither respected, obeyed, feared, nor loved; and the government grew gradually weaker and more disorganised. Yet he pursued one of the phantoms by which abler despots are often deluded. He strove to concentrate all power in his own hands. It never occurred to him that it was more politic to perform the duty of a king well, than to perform the business of half-a-dozen government officials with mechanical exactitude. King Otho observed but a very small portion of the facts which were placed directly before him; he was slow at drawing inferences even from the few facts he observed, and he was utterly incapable of finding the means of reforming any abuse from his own administrative knowledge or the resources of his own mind.

The king counted on his sincere desire to be the monarch of a prosperous and powerful nation for being able to govern the Greeks, and he expected that his personal popularity and his king-craft would prevent insurrections and suppress brigandage. Unfortunately he took no measures to root out the social evils that caused the one, or the political evils that produced the other. The king could form no firm resolutions himself, and he reposed no confidence in his ministers.

They were indeed not worthy of much, for both Bavarians and Greeks displayed far more eagerness to obtain ministerial portfolios, than zeal in performing the duties of the offices with which they were intrusted. King Otho observed the meanness of their intrigues and the selfishness of their conduct. He distrusted the Bavarians, because he perceived that they looked to Munich for their ultimate reward; and he despised the Greeks, because they were always ready to abandon the principles they avowed when he offered them either place or profit. With these feelings he attempted to govern without the advice of his ministers; and he only assembled cabinet councils in order to obtain the formal ratification of measures already prepared in his own closet. Even his majesty's commands were often communicated to his ministers by private secretaries. To insure complete subserviency, no minister was allowed to remain very long in office, and men were usually selected without influence or ability, and frequently without education.[1]

During the personal government of King Otho, a singular event envenomed the disputes which had arisen between Lord Lyons and the Greek court during Mr Rudhart's administration. The affair has always remained enveloped in mystery, but its effects were so important that the fact requires notice, though it eludes explanation. It placed the British minister in direct personal hostility to the sovereign at whose court he was accredited, and it was the principal cause of the

[1] Count Armansperg taught King Otho to form cabinets of ministers who could not communicate in a common language. He had often two ministers who could only speak Greek, and one who could speak nothing but German. But King Otho carried many things farther in the wrong direction than his arch-chancellor. The following is the copy of a letter written by a minister of foreign affairs, who held office during delicate negotiations with Lord Palmerston. It may be said to consist of eighteen words, twelve of which are strangely mis-spelt:—

Κυριε, 'σας εδοπιο κατα ὑψιλιν ἐπίταγιν τις. A. M τις Βασίλισις οτοι αβριον τρίτιν εις τας 7½ μ.μ. θελοι σᾶς δεχθοι η A. M ἡ βασίλισα.

bitter animosity that King Otho has ever since shown to England. A. D. 1839.

A Greek newspaper which King Otho was said to read with particular pleasure, thought fit, in an unlucky hour, to insert extracts from an English pamphlet, ridiculing the condition of a nation that was governed by a young queen. A reply appeared in the *Morning Chronicle*, observing that it was fortunate for Great Britain that the only reproach which could be made to the sovereign was that she was young. Time would too soon remove the reproach, but the article in the Greek newspaper was in very bad taste in a country where the sovereign was reproached with being incompetent to govern. The *Morning Chronicle* then asserted that a certificate had been signed by several Bavarians, then members of King Otho's household, declaring that his majesty was incapable of governing his little kingdom. The Bavarian consul at Athens was an Englishman, and he considered it his duty to step forward and contradict the correspondent of the *Morning Chronicle*. The anonymous writer defended his veracity, reiterated his assertion, and added that the document was dated in the year 1835, and was signed by Dr Wibmer, King Otho's physician, Count Saporta, the marshal of the royal household, Baron Stengel and Mr Lehmaier, private secretaries to the king, and members of his private council or camarilla. This rejoinder was widely circulated, and caused a loud outcry at Athens. The Greek newspapers declared that their king had been grossly insulted and calumniated, either by the English or the Bavarians, or by both. In order to tranquillise the public, and throw the whole odium on the English, Dr Wibmer, Baron Stengel, and Mr Lehmaier, published a declaration, asserting that they had never signed any such certificate.[1] But in

[1] Ἀθηνᾶ, 1839, No. 632. The declaration is dated 23d July 1839.

the mean time it was reported that an indirect communication had been made to the courts of Greece and Bavaria that, in case of further discussion, the document would be published in the *Morning Chronicle*. It is certain that a short time after publishing their declaration, Wibmer, Stengel, and Lehmaier, suddenly resigned their offices, and returned to Bavaria. The precise nature of the mysterious certificate remained a secret.

But whatever the document might be, since it was signed in 1835, during Count Armansperg's administration, it was inferred that it could only have become known to foreigners by having been treacherously communicated to the count's friend, Lord Lyons, and having, through the imprudence of Lord Lyons, fallen into the hands of some person who made use of it to gratify a private spite. The wound given was severe, and the press never allowed it to heal. Even English diplomatists and officials were so imprudent as to be constantly harping on the question of the mysterious certificate.

As years rolled on, the misgovernment of King Otho became more intolerable. The agricultural population remained in a stationary condition. They were plundered by brigands, pillaged by gendarmes, and robbed by tax-collectors. They had to bear the whole burden of the conscription, and pay heavy municipal taxes; yet their property was insecure, and no roads were made. The Bavarians reproached Capodistrias with having neglected to improve the Turkish system of levying the land-tax, to construct roads and bridges, and to establish security for persons and property.[1] The Greeks now reproached the Bavarians with similar neglect. A remedy was required, and the people, having long patiently submitted to the despotic authority of the

[1] Thiersch, i. 57.

Bavarians, now began to clamour for a constitutional government. The first step to a free government was the expulsion of the Bavarians, and all parties in Greece agreed to unite their strength for this object. The administrative incapacity of King Otho's councillors disgusted the three protecting powers as much as their arbitrary conduct irritated the Greeks. A. D. 1843.

England and Russia supported the parties who demanded constitutional government. Nationality was so interwoven with orthodoxy, and orthodoxy appeared to be so completely under Russian control, that the establishment of a constitutional and national government was supposed by the cabinet of St Petersburg to be the surest means of rendering Greece subservient to the schemes of the Emperor Nicholas in the East. The Capodistrians carried their designs further than the Russian cabinet, for they proposed dethroning King Otho. For several years great exertions had been made to arouse the orthodox prejudices of the Greeks, and hopes were entertained that a revolution would afford an opportunity of placing the crown of Greece on the head of an orthodox prince. But when the time came, no orthodox prince fitter to govern Greece than King Otho could be found.

The English party acted under the guidance of Lord Lyons, who for several years had been the firm advocate of liberal measures, and a return to a constitutional system.

France still proposed what Louis Philippe and his ministers called a policy of moderation. The French minister in Greece was instructed to recommend the Greek government to improve the provincial councils and the municipal administration. The evils against which the people complained were defects in the central administration, consequently the advice of France was futile.

The destruction of the representative system, the annihilation of independent action in the municipal authorities, the low state of political civilisation, the still lower state of political morality, and the general lassitude which follows after a great national exertion, would in all probability have enabled King Otho and the Bavarians to rule Greece despotically for some years more, had not Great Britain and Russia publicly called upon the king's government to remedy the financial embarrassments in which it was involved. The Russian minister warned King Otho that he must prepare to pay the interest of the Allied loan. The king determined to augment his revenues in order to meet the demands of the Allies, and in the year 1842 he made some administrative changes which rendered his government more oppressive. A law regulating the custom duties was adopted, which caused so much discontent among the mercantile classes, and so many complaints, that the government was compelled to modify it by a new law before it had been many months in operation.[1]

The Russian cabinet expected that King Otho, when threatened with a constitution, would have thrown himself on its support; but finding that its counsels were neglected, the emperor made a peremptory demand for immediate payment of the interest due on the Allied loan.[2] The menacing tone of this demand was interpreted by the orthodox party to authorise the friends of Russia to adopt revolutionary measures. But to insure the approbation of the Emperor Nicholas, the partisans of Russian influence considered it necessary to give the movement as much as possible a religious character, and they made it their object to replace

[1] This law is translated in Lesur, *Annuaire Historique*, 1842. The modification took place in 1843.

[2] An extract from the Russian note is given in Lesur, *Annuaire Historique*, 1843. It was dated 23d February (7th March) 1843. See *Documens*.

the catholic Otho by an orthodox prince. As orthodoxy was in no danger, and no orthodox king was forthcoming, the direction of the revolution passed into the hands of the constitutionalists, who demanded a definite political object, the convocation of a national assembly. A. D. 1843.

The union of the orthodox and constitutional factions was absolutely necessary, in order to give a popular movement any chance of success. This was easily effected, for both desired the immediate expulsion of the Bavarians: the orthodox party was not unfavourable to the convocation of a national assembly, and the constitutional party felt no disposition to defend King Otho, had a better sovereign been proposed as his successor. It may be observed that both parties were destitute of leaders possessing any political talent.

The British government had long advocated liberal institutions, but Lord Palmerston was no longer in office, and some doubt was entertained whether the Tories would not openly oppose a revolutionary movement. The friends of constitutional liberty brought on a discussion in the House of Commons on the 15th August 1843, which proved that all parties in England considered the Greeks entitled to representative institutions. Lord Palmerston said: "I hope that her Majesty's ministers will urge strongly upon the King of Greece the necessity of his giving a constitution to his people in redemption of the pledge given by the three powers in 1832, and repeated by Baron Gise, his father's counsellor." And Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, after alluding to the financial condition of Greece, continued: "Russia, France, and England have made strong representations likewise on other matters, connected with the necessity of giving satisfaction to the just wishes of the people. I must abstain at present from any more

direct allusion on this subject, but I can assure the house that many points alluded to by the noble lord have not been overlooked." These were solemn warnings given in the face of all Europe; but King Otho refused to listen to the voice of nations, and remained loitering with fatuity on the brink of a precipice.[1]

A revolution being inevitable, all parties agreed that it ought to commence at Athens, and that King Otho should be compelled to dismiss all the Bavarians in the Greek service, to acknowledge the constitution, and to convoke a national assembly for its revision. The orthodox party consented that these points should be those mooted at the commencement of the revolution, being convinced that the king's pride would induce him to reject the first. But, at all events, they felt so sure of commanding a majority in a national assembly, that they believed it would be in their power to declare the throne vacant, and to proceed to elect a new king the moment they could find a suitable orthodox candidate.

On the day preceding the revolution, the court obtained authentic information of the conspiracy. Orders were given to arrest General Makryiannes and many of the leaders; but it was already too late. The gendarmes who surrounded Makryiannes's house did not invest it until after dark, and they did not attempt to make the arrest until midnight, hoping to surprise several leaders at the same time. Their movements had been watched, and a strong body of conspirators had introduced themselves unobserved

[1] That a revolution was considered inevitable both in England and Greece is proved by an article in *Blackwood's Magazine* for September 1843, "The Bankruptcy of Greece;" and a letter from Athens, dated 5th September, and published in the *Morning Post* of the 23d, announces the approaching revolution in terms which indicate that its information was derived from the Russian party. It says, that "the Greeks have so fully made up their minds to put an end to the Bavarian dynasty as to be resolved not even to accept a constitution at the hands of King Otho."

into the house. When the gendarmes approached they were warned off, and when they summoned the general to surrender, and attempted to force an entry, they found everything prepared for defence. A few shots were exchanged, and the gendarmes were repulsed, carrying off one man killed and another wounded. A. D. 1843.

The garrison of Athens had been drawn up to support the gendarmes. General Vlachopulos, once a stanch adherent of Mavrocordatos, now a devoted courtier, was minister of war. He had been trained by the camarilla to do nothing without orders, and he was not a man to seize the moment for independent action. He did not put himself at the head of the troops, and thus the only chance of stemming the torrent of the revolution was lost.

As soon as the shots which proclaimed that General Makryiannes's house was attacked were heard, General Kalergy, the inspector of cavalry, rode into the barracks where the troops were drawn up. On his arrival a preconcerted shout was raised, "Long live the constitution!"—*ζήτω τὸ Σύνταγμα.* Kalergy immediately assumed the command, and marched the whole garrison to the royal palace. And at the same time, with the prudence which he constantly displayed in great emergencies, and which contrasted with his extreme imprudence on ordinary occasions, he sent out strong patrols to maintain order, and stop the cry of "Death to the Bavarians!" which the friends of orthodoxy and brigandage attempted to raise.

King Otho was waiting in his palace with his usual apathetic patience to receive the news that the numerous arrests ordered by the minister of war had been made. That of Makryiannes was to have served as a signal for the others; and his majesty had hardly received the information that the gendarmes had been

defeated, when the garrison of the capital, with Kalergy at its head, appeared under the palace windows. General Hess, who was the Bavarian military counsellor in the camarilla, was by the king's side. A Bavarian aide-de-camp was despatched to bring up the artillery and drive the rebellious troops from the square before the palace with grape-shot. The king counted on the devotion of Captain Botzares, a son of the brave Marko, who had been educated in Bavaria. The guns soon arrived, but they galloped to the position assigned them by Kalergy amidst shouts of "Long live the constitution!" The question now lay between Greek liberty and Bavarian despotism.

The king showed himself at one of the lower windows of the palace. Kalergy informed his majesty that all Greece appealed to him to fulfil the promises given when he was elected King of Greece, that the people should be governed constitutionally. A low conversation ensued, which was indistinct to those nearest, but the attitude of Kalergy indicated dissent. The king turned to the troops, and exclaimed in a loud voice, "Retire to your quarters." Kalergy swamped the royal order by calling "Attention!" and, with a deferential air, veiling a tone of satire, observed to the king, "The troops expect your majesty's orders through me, and they will wait patiently for your royal decision in their present position." It was now announced that deputies from the council of state were appointed to lay the wishes of the nation before his majesty.

The council of state was a creation of Count Armansperg. It was an imitation of the senate of Capodistrias, and it had no more claim to be regarded as a representation of the Greek people than that body. Many of the members were insignificant and ignorant men, but all were eager to retain the high place into

which fortune had intruded them. They met, at the requisition of the conspirators, when Kalergy marched to the palace. The phanariots and courtiers in the body endeavoured to gain time, and tried to raise a long discussion. They knew that the constitution would send them back to their former nullity. The murmurs of the constitutionalists assembled outside the place of meeting at last put an end to all discussion, and the council of state pledged itself to support the constitution. Andreas Londos, Rhigas Palamedes, and Andreas Metaxas, were deputed to wait on the king and advise his majesty to dismiss the Bavarians, appoint a new ministry, and convoke a national assembly. A. D. 1843.

Morning dawned before this deputation reached the palace. King Otho was in no hurry to receive the men who composed it. He still counted on effectual support from the German ministers at his court, and his immediate object was to afford them time to take some step in his favour. The deputation was at last received, but while the king was treating with its members, he was endeavouring to open a communication with his own creatures in the council of state, who, he thought, might now be sufficiently numerous to pass a new resolution in his favour.

His majesty's delay was beginning to exhaust the patience of the constitutionalists, and those most hostile to his person began to display their feelings. The greater part of the population of Athens was assembled in the extensive square before the palace. The troops occupied only a small space near the building. Children were playing, boys were shouting, and apprentices were exclaiming that the king was acting with Bavarian precipitancy, which had long been a byword with the Greeks for doing nothing. Men were exhibiting signs of dissatisfaction, and

talking of the departure of Agostino from Nauplia under circumstances not very dissimilar.

Suddenly a few carriages arrived in quick succession: they contained the foreign ministers.[1] A faint cheer was raised as the Russian and English ministers appeared; but in general the people displayed alarm, remained silent, or formed small groups of whisperers. At this moment it was fortunate for Greece that Kalergy was at the head of the troops. On that important day he was the only leading man of the movement who was in his right place. He had the good sense to declare to the foreign ministers that they could not enter the palace until the deputation of the council of state had terminated its interview, and received a final answer from his majesty. The representatives of the three Allied powers being made acquainted with the demands of the deputation, acquiesced in this arrangement on receiving from Kalergy the assurance that his majesty's person should be treated with the greatest respect. The ministers of Russia, England, and France departed, deeming that their presence might tend to prolong the crisis and increase the king's personal danger. The Austrian and Prussian ministers thought the field was clear for action on their part, and they resolved to act energetically. They insisted on seeing the king. They used strong language, and made an attempt to bully Kalergy, who listened with coolness, and then quaintly observed that he believed diplomatic etiquette required them to follow the example of their *doyen*, the Russian envoy, and that common sense suggested to him that it would be prudent for them to act like the representatives of the three protecting powers.

When King Otho learned that the German diplo-

[1] The *doyen* of the *corps diplomatique* was M. Catacazi, the Russian envoy; Lord Lyons (then Sir Edmund) was English minister, M. Piscatory was French minister, Baron Prokesch d'Osten was Austrian minister, and Count Brassier de St Simon was Prussian minister.

matists had been unable to penetrate into his palace, he saw that it was necessary to abandon absolute power in order to preserve the crown. Without any further observation he signed all the ordinances presented to him; and on the 15th of September 1843, Greece became a constitutional monarchy. The Bavarians were dismissed from his service; a new ministry was appointed, and a national assembly was convoked. A. D. 1843.

That national assembly met on the 20th of November 1843, and terminated its work on the 30th of March 1844, when King Otho swore obedience to the constitution which it had prepared.

It is not the business of the historian of Greece under foreign domination to judge this constitution. It is only necessary for him to record the fact that it put an end to the government of alien rulers, under which the Greeks had lived for two thousand years. Its merits and defects belong to the history of Greece as a constitutional state; and perhaps more than one generation must be allowed to elapse before they can be examined with the light of experience. Still, before closing this record of the deeds by which the Greeks established their national independence, it is necessary to notice some shortcomings in this charter of their political liberty.

The constitution of 1844 is a compilation from foreign sources, and not the production of the national mind. Greece had no Lycurgus to make laws for the attainment of theoretic excellence, nor any Solon to devise remedies for existing social evils. National wants and national institutions were alike overlooked. The municipal system which Capodistrias had defaced, and which Maurer had converted into an engine for riveting the fetters of centralisation on the local magistrates, was neither revived as a defence for the

people's rights, nor adapted to aid the progress of Greek society.

The section of the constitution which determines the public rights of the Greek citizen, omits all reference to those rights in his position as an inhabitant of a parish, and as a member of a municipality and provincial district. Indeed, the interests of the citizen, in so far as they were directly connected with his locality and his property, were completely neglected, and only his relations with the legislature and the central government were determined.

The spirit of imitation also introduced some contradictions into the constitution of Greece extremely injurious to the cause of liberty. Universal suffrage was adopted for choosing members of the legislature, while the chief magistrates in the municipalities were selected by the king from three candidates chosen by an oligarchical elective body. As far as the rights of the citizens in municipalities were concerned, all the evils of the Capodistrian and Bavarian systems were left without reform. The municipalities remained in servile dependence on the king, the ministers of the day, and the prefects of the hour. The demarch was not directly elected by the people, and the minister of the crown exercised a direct control over the budget of the demarchy. Yet the people, though not allowed to elect their own local chief, were nevertheless intrusted with the election of deputies to the lower legislative chamber. And this introduction of universal suffrage in the institutions of Greece was completely exceptional, for a property qualification was retained for the electors who appointed provincial councillors. A system tending more directly to perpetuate maladministration in the municipalities, nullity in the provincial councils, and corruption in the chamber of deputies, could not have been devised. Individual

responsibility was destroyed, the influence of the court was extended, and the power of faction increased. A. D. 1843.

The constitution of Greece opens the section of the public rights of citizens with an article which figures in most modern constitutions since the French constitution of 1793.[1] It declares that all Greeks are equal in the eye of the law. In many of the constitutions in which a similar article appears, it is a direct falsehood: in the constitution of Greece it is not strictly true. The Greeks who framed the constitution knew that the phrase was introduced in France originally to enable the people to boast of an equality which the French, at least, have never enjoyed. To render all the citizens equal before the law, something more is necessary than to say that they are so. The legislation which would insure equality must render every individual, whatever be his rank or official station, responsible for all his acts to the persons whom those acts affect. The law must be equal for all, and superior to all. Neither a minister of police, a general, nor an admiral, any more than a prefect, must be permitted to plead official duty for any act as an excuse for not answering before the ordinary tribunals of the country. No officer of government must be allowed to escape personal responsibility by the plea of superior orders. The sovereign alone can do no wrong. There can be no true liberty in any country where administrative privileges exempt officials from the direct operation of the law, as it affects every other citizen of the state and as it is administered by the ordinary tribunals of the country. The Greeks did not lay down this principle in their consititution; they preferred the nominal equality of France to the legal equality of English law.

The two most influential leaders in the national

[1] A translation of the Greek constitution is given in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1841—"Correspondence relative to recent events in Greece."

assembly were Mavrocordatos and Kolettes. Both endeavoured to preserve every official privilege introduced by Capodistrias and the Bavarians, for the purpose of placing the agents of the government above the law of the land. It was only through the support which Lord Lyons gave to a small party of deputies, that Mavrocordatos was induced to insert an article in the constitution expressly forbidding the re-establishment of the exceptional tribunals which Capodistrias, the regency, and King Otho, had used as instruments of fiscal extortion and illegal oppression. The abolition of the exceptional tribunals then in existence was declared in another article of the constitution.[1] The opposition which the leading statesmen of Greece made even to this tame protest against the illegal and unconstitutional proceedings of past governments, presaged that they were not likely to prove either active or intelligent artificers of the institutions still required in order to establish the civil and political liberties of the Greeks on a firm foundation. But the living generation had accomplished a great achievement. The future destinies of the Greek race were now in the hands of the citizens of liberated Greece.

Before finally releasing the reader who has followed the author through the preceding pages, it may not be altogether unnecessary to look back at the origin of the Greek Revolution, and examine how far it has been crowned with success, or in what it has failed to fulfil the expectations of reflecting men. A generation has already passed away; most of the actors in the drama are dead; the political position of Greece itself has changed; so that a cotemporary may now view the events without passion, and weigh their consequences with impartiality.

[1] Compare Articles 89 and 101.

The Greek Revolution was not an insurrectional movement, originating solely in Turkish oppression. The first aspirations for the delivery of the orthodox church from the sultan's yoke were inspired by Russia; the projects for national independence by the French Revolution. The Greeks, it is true, were prepared to receive these ideas by a wave in the element of human progress that had previously spread civilisation among the inhabitants of the Othoman empire, whether Mussulman or Christian. A. D. 1843.

The origin of the ideas that produced the Greek Revolution explain why it was pre-eminently the movement of the people; and that its success was owing to their perseverance, is proved by its whole history. To live or die free was the firm resolve of the native peasantry of Greece when they took up arms; and no sufferings ever shook that resolution. They never had the good fortune to find a leader worthy of their cause. No eminent man stands forward as a type of the nation's virtues; too many are famous as representatives of the nation's vices. From this circumstance, the records of the Greek Revolution are destitute of one of history's most attractive characteristics: it loses the charm of a hero's biography. But it possesses its own distinction. Never in the records of states did a nation's success depend more entirely on the conduct of the mass of the population; never was there a more clear manifestation of God's providence in the progress of human society. No one can regard its success as the result of the military and naval exploits of the insurgents; and even the Allied powers, in creating a Greek kingdom, only modified the political results of a revolution which had irrevocably separated the present from the past.

Let us now examine how far the Greek Revolution has succeeded. It has established the independence of

Greece on a firm basis, and created a free government in regions where civil liberty was unknown for two thousand years. It has secured popular institutions to a considerable portion of the Greek nation, and given to the people the power of infusing national life and national feelings into the administration of King Otho's kingdom. These may be justly considered by the Greeks as glorious achievements for one generation.

But yet it must be confessed that in many things the Greek Revolution has failed. It has not created a growing population and an expanding nation. Diplomacy has formed a diminutive kingdom, and no Themistocles has known how to form a great state out of so small a community. Yet the task was not difficult: the lesson was taught in the United States of America and in the colonial empire of Great Britain. But in the Greek kingdom, with every element of social and political improvement at hand, the agricultural population and the native industry of the country have remained almost stationary. The towns, it is true, are increasing, and merchants are gaining money; but the brave peasantry who formed the nation's strength grows neither richer nor more numerous; the produce of their labour is of the rudest kind; whole districts remain uncultivated; the wealthy Greeks who pick up money in foreign traffic do not invest the capital they accumulate in the land which they pretend to call their country; and no stream of Greek emigrants flows from the millions who live enslaved in Turkey, to enjoy liberty by settling in liberated Greece.

There can be no doubt that the inhabitants of Greece may, even in spite of past failures, look with hope to the future. When a few years of liberty have purged society from the traditional corruption of servitude, wise counsels may enable them to resume their progress.

But the friends of Greece, who believed that the

Revolution would be immediately followed by the multiplication of the Greek race, and by the transfusion of Christian civilisation and political liberty throughout all the regions that surround the Egean Sea, cannot help regretting that a generation has been allowed to pass away unprofitably. The political position of the Othoman empire in the international system of Europe is already changed, and the condition of the Christian population in Turkey is even more changed than the position of the empire. The kingdom of Greece has lost the opportunity of alluring emigrants by good government. Feelings of nationality are awakened in other Oriental Christians under Othoman domination. The Greeks can henceforth only repose their hopes of power on an admission of their intellectual and moral superiority. The Albanians are more warlike; the Sclavonians are more laborious; the Roumans dwell in a more fertile land; and the Turks may become again a powerful nation, by being delivered from the lethargic influence of the Othoman sultans. A. D. 1843.

The Othoman empire may soon be dismembered, or it may long drag on a contemptible existence, like the Greek empire of Constantinople under the Paleologues. Its military resources, however, render its condition not dissimilar to that of the Roman empire in the time of Gallienus, and there may be a possibility of finding a Diocletian to reorganise the administration, and a Constantine to reform the religion. But should it be dismembered to-morrow, it may be asked, what measures the free Greeks have adopted to govern any portion better than the officers of the sultan? On the other hand, several powerful states and more populous nations are well prepared to seize the fragments of the disjointed empire. They will easily find legitimate pretexts for their intervention, and they will certainly obtain a tacit recognition of the justice of their pro-

ceedings from the public opinion of civilised Europe, if they succeed in saving Turkey from anarchy, and in averting such scenes of slaughter as Greece witnessed during her Revolution, or as have recently occurred in Syria.

It is never too late, however, to commence the task of improvement. The inheritance may not be open for many years, and the heirs may be called to the succession by their merit. What, then, are the merits which give a nation the best claim to greatness? Personal dignity, domestic virtue, truth in the intercourse of society, and respect for justice, make nations powerful as surely as they make men honoured. But I wander too far from my subject; so, instead of moralising further, I shall conclude with the words of the old English song—

> "Only the actions of the just
> Smell sweet and blossom in the dust.'

APPENDIX.

[The two papers which follow have been added to show the manner in which able officers urged the Greeks to avail themselves of naval and military science. Captain Hastings, the author of the first paper, never obtained any important command; and though he introduced great practical changes in naval warfare, and fell, "dying in Greece and in a cause so glorious," he has missed gaining a name.

Sir Charles Napier, who gave the second paper to the writer of this work, has won imperishable fame on a wider and more glorious field than the Greek Revolution. The name of Hastings hardly finds a place in the history of Greece; that of Napier will live for ever in the history of England.]

I.

Memorandum by Frank Abney Hastings, Esq., on the use of Steamers armed with heavy guns against the Turkish Fleet. Communicated to Lord Byron in 1823, and laid before the Greek Government, with some modification, in 1824.

Firstly, I lay down as an axiom that Greece cannot obtain any decisive advantage over the Turks without a decided maritime superiority; for it is necessary to prevent them from relieving their fortresses and supplying their armies by sea.

To prove this it is only necessary to view the state of the Greek armies, and that of their finances.

They are destitute of a corps of artillery, of a park of artillery, of a corps of engineers, and of a regular army. With all these wants, I ask, how is it possible to take a fortress but by famine? This, however, is difficult, even if the sea was shut against the Turks; for, from the state of the Greek finances, and the formation of the army,

troops can scarcely remain long enough before a place furnished with a formidable garrison, and tolerably supplied with provisions, to reduce it. However, famine is the only resource, and it is by that alone that the fortresses now in the hands of the Greeks have been reduced.

The localities of the country are also such, and the difficulty of moving troops so great, that, without the aid of a fleet, all the efforts of an invading army would prove fruitless. But on the contrary, were an invading army followed by a fleet, I fear that all the efforts of the Greeks to oppose it would be ineffectual. The question stands thus, Has the Greek fleet hitherto prevented the Turks from supplying their fortresses, and is it likely to succeed in preventing them? I reply, that Patras, Negrepont, Modon, and Coron have been regularly supplied, and Mesolonghi twice blockaded.

Is it likely that the Greek marine will improve, or that the Turkish will retrograde? The contrary is to be feared. We have seen the Greek fleet diminish in numbers every year since the commencement of the war, while that of the Turks has undeniably improved, from the experience they have gained in each campaign. Witness the unsuccessful attempts with fire-ships this year (1823). The Turks begin to find fire-ships only formidable to those unprepared to receive them.

Is the Greek fleet likely to become more formidable? On the contrary, the sails, rigging, and hulls are all getting out of repair; and in two years' time thirty sail could hardly be sent to sea without an expense which the Greeks would not probably incur.[1]

We now come to the question, How can the Greeks obtain a decisive superiority over the Turks at sea? I reply, By a steam-vessel armed as I shall describe. But how is Greece to obtain such a vessel? The means of Greece are much more than amply sufficient to meet this expenditure. However, there are various reasons which it is not necessary to detail, but which would probably prevent the Greek government from adopting the plan. It therefore becomes necessary to ascertain how such a vessel might be equipped without calling on the Greek government to contribute directly. If proper statements were made to the Greek committee in England, I think it might be induced to bear some part of the expense. I will contribute £1000 on the condition that I have the command, and that the vessel is armed in the manner I propose. If this does not form a sufficient fund, I think that the deficiency may be made up by a loan; a guarantee being given that a certain portion—say one-half of all prizes

[1] The English loan had not yet been obtained.

—shall be applied to the payment of the interest and the extinction of the debt. The same proportion would be set apart to meet the expenses of the vessel, so that the Greek government might be called upon to bear no other expenses but the wages of the crew.

I shall now explain the details of the proposed armament, and the advantages which I think would result from it. It would be necessary to build or purchase the vessel in England, and send her out complete. She should be from 150 to 200 tons burden, of a construction sufficiently strong to bear two long 32-pounders, one forward and one aft, and two 68-pounder guns of seven inches bore, one on each side. The weight of shot appears to me of the greatest importance, for I think I can prove that half a dozen shot or shells of these calibres, and employed as I propose, would more than suffice to destroy the largest ship. In this case it is not the number of projectiles, but their nature and proper application that is required.

In order that the vessel should present less surface to the wind and less mark to the enemy, combined with a greater range of pointing and more facility for the use of red-hot shot, the bulwark should be sufficiently low to admit of the guns being fired over it. From the long 32-pounders I propose launching red-hot shot, because, though perhaps not more destructive than shells, they give a longer range; and the fuel required to impel the vessel could easily be made to heat the shot. The idea being rather novel, startles people at first, because, as it has never been put in practice, they imagine there must be some extraordinary danger to which it subjects your own vessel. But this is not the case. The real reason why it has never been adopted hitherto is, that on board a ship you cannot lay your guns before you introduce your red-hot shot, as on shore. This arises, of course, from the motion of the vessel. In other words, the danger arises from the possibility of fire communicating to the cartridge during the operation of running-out and pointing the gun. If, however, it be proved by experience that, with proper precautions, the shot may be allowed to remain any length of time in the gun without setting fire to the cartridge, this difficulty (and it is the only difficulty) vanishes. In fact, during the siege of Gibraltar the guns were pointed against the block-ships after being loaded, it being found that one wet wad alone was sufficient security, and that with it the shot might absolutely be left to get cold in the gun. It may, however, be thought necessary to cast iron bottoms for the hot shot, of the same form as those of wood which I propose to make use of in loading the guns with shells. These may be placed over the wad, and then the gun may be well sponged, to drown any particles of powder that might by accident escape from the

cartridge. With this precaution the shot might be left to cool in the gun, and there could therefore be no want of time to run out and point it. But this would be unnecessary if the gun worked over the bulwark, for it could then be loaded with its muzzle just outside the vessel, having been previously laid to its elevation, the direction being obtained by a slight movement of the helm. Thus there would be no necessity for touching the gun after the shot was once introduced. Perhaps the precautions I propose are in part superfluous, as hot shot are fired on shore without observing them.

Of the destructive effect of hot shot on an enemy's ship it is scarcely necessary for me to speak. The destruction of the Spanish fleet before Gibraltar is well known. But if I may be permitted to relate an example which came under my proper observation, it will perhaps tend to corroborate others. At New Orleans the Americans had a ship and schooner in the Mississippi that flanked our lines. In the commencement we had no cannon. However, after a couple of days, two field-pieces of 4 or 6 lb. and a howitzer were erected in battery. In ten minutes the schooner was on fire, and her comrade, seeing the effect of the hot shot, cut her cable, and escaped under favour of a light wind. If such was the result of light shot imperfectly heated—for we had no forge—what would be the effect of such a volume as a 32-pounder? A single shot would set a ship in flames.

Having treated the subject of hot shot, I shall now pass to the use of shells. It has long been well known that ships are more alarmed at shells than at other projectiles. However, they rarely do the mischief apprehended from them, in consequence of the difficulty of hitting so small an object as a ship with a projectile thrown vertically. This uncertainty prevents bomb-vessels being employed against ships. If, however, shells be thrown horizontally, their effect would be equally great, and the chance of hitting the object aimed at reduced to the same certainty as if shot were used within a certain range. If the shell passed inside the vessel and exploded, the result would be the same as if it had been thrown vertically. My object, however, would be, to arrange it so as to make the shell stick in the ship's side and explode there. The result in this case would be much more decisive, and it would tear away a part of her side, and might send her instantly to the bottom. In both cases it would probably destroy a number of the crew and set fire to the ship.

It remains, therefore, to ascertain whether shells can be thrown to a sufficient distance with precision from guns and carronades, and without any danger to your own vessel. The danger of transporting shells is considerably less than the danger of passing powder. It is, there-

fore, only necessary to prove how they may be fired without danger. The danger of firing a shell from a gun longer than a howitzer or a carronade is, that it might, by rolling in the bore, destroy the fusee and explode in the gun; also, that the fusee might break from the successive blows it would receive before it quitted the muzzle. Now, both these objections are obviated by attaching the shell to a wooden bottom, hollowed out to receive its convexity. Each shell would be kept in a separate box.

We now come to the plan of attack. In executing this, I should go directly for the vessel most detached from the enemy's fleet, and when at the distance of one mile, open with red-hot shot from the 32-pounder forward. The gun laid at point blank, with a reduced charge, would carry on board *en ricochetant*. I would then wheel round and give the enemy one of the 68-pounders with shell laid at the line of metal, which would also ricochet on board him. Then the stern 32-pounder with a hot shot, and again the 68-pounder of the other side with a shell. By this time the bow-gun would be again loaded, and a succession of fire might be kept up as brisk as from a vessel having four guns on a side. Here the importance of steam is evident.

With good locks, tubes, Congreve's sights, and other improvements in artillery, I really see almost as much difficulty in missing a ship of any size in tolerably smooth water as in hitting her. In firing from a ship, the great difficulty is in the elevation; but when my guns were laid at point blank, or two degrees of elevation, neither shot nor shells would ricochet over the enemy.

With regard to any risk of the steam machinery being destroyed by the enemy's fire, there is of course some risk, as there always must be in military operations of the simplest kind; but when we consider the small object a low steamer would present coming head on, and the manner in which the Turks have hitherto used their guns at sea, this risk really appears very trifling. The surprise caused by seeing a vessel moving in a calm, offering only a breadth of about eighteen feet, and opening a fire with heavy guns at a considerable distance, may also be taken into account. I am persuaded, from what I have seen, that in many cases the Turks would run their ships ashore and abandon them, perhaps without having the presence of mind to set fire to them.

It would be necessary to have a Greek brig always in company to carry coals and to tow the steamer, for the steam would only be used in action.[1]

[1] The remainder of the memorandum is occupied with financial calculations, and with accounts relating to the numbers and pay of the crew. The manner in

II.

MEMORANDUM by SIR CHARLES NAPIER, G.C.B., on Military Operations in the Morea against IBRAHIM PASHA in 1826.

If my judgment is correct, the following would be the outline of operations for a regular military force, and explains why I think Napoli di Malvasia (Monemvasia) so important:—

1. At Napoli di Malvasia I would establish my magazines and form the army. I would provision and garrison Napoli di Romania (Nauplia) the best way I could, and leave in it the best of the irregular troops under the command of the most deserving Greek chief. Having done so, I would leave them and the government (with the example of Mesolonghi) to make their defence, and, having cleared myself of all intrigues, take post at Malvasia.

2. When the preparations for the campaign were sufficiently advanced to enable me to act, I would advance with my whole force, *regular* and *irregular*, to Sparta, or near it, according to circumstances of the ground and roads. Then I would prepare a position with field-works, to cover the fortress of Napoli di Malvasia against a force coming from Kalamata, or Tripolitza, or Leondari.

3. This done, if the enemy had his headquarters at Tripolitza, with the mass of his force in that town, I would endeavour to cut off his communications with Navarin, Modon, and Coron, by occupying the position of Leondari, sending one-half of my irregulars into the defiles of Mount Chelmos, and the other half to my rear, towards the fortresses of Navarin, Modon, and Coron. I would concentrate my whole regular force at Leondari, except a small portion left in position at Sparta to secure my communications with Napoli di Malvasia. In fact, Sparta would be the pivot on which all operations would turn, according to the point on which the enemy had assembled his force.

4. In this state I would remain, strengthening Leondari by field-works; and the enemy, no longer able to pass his convoys of provisions from the coast, must attack me in my strong position (and such positions cannot fail to be found in such a country at every turn). If he defeats me, I retire, and my troops rally on Sparta in

which the plan was eventually carried into execution, and some of its results, were narrated by Captain Hastings in a pamphlet written a short time before his death—*Memoir on the use of Shells, Hot Shot, and Carcass-Shells from Ship-Artillery*. By FRANK ABNEY HASTINGS, Captain of the Greek steam-vessel of war Karteria. London, 1828. Published by Ridgway.

the prepared position, where another battle may be fought. If again defeated, the remains of my beaten force retire into Napoli di Malvasia, and await a siege.

5. Suppose that the enemy has begun the siege of Napoli di Romania. Then, instead of marching upon Leondari, I would march upon the rear of the besieging army, and post my force so as to cut off his supplies from Tripolitza; and I would send all my irregulars round that town and along the road to Navarin as far as Leondari and Kalamata. I would strengthen my position as before, and the enemy must again come and attack me or *starve*. If he beat me, I would (as before) retire to Sparta, and if again beaten, enter Malvasia and await a siege.

6. Suppose neither of the above operations could be effected in consequence of the enemy's force being too great, or from some other cause. Then I would remain at Sparta with my irregulars pushed into the defiles along my front, so as to guard the road from Leondari into Messenia; and I would closely observe him, that I might be ready to take advantage of any error he might commit, or fall with my whole force upon any convoy by a rapid march from Sparta, and retire with equal celerity to my position.

7. It is pretty clear, by such a plan, the enemy could not besiege Napoli di Romania, unless he had so large a force that he could form two armies—one to besiege the town, and another to cover the siege by marching against Sparta; and, besides, he would require a force to protect all his convoys from my irregular troops. This, we know, he has not. The real defence of Napoli di Romania depends on Napoli di Malvasia.

8. I have said, that if beaten at Sparta I would go to Malvasia and abide a siege. Suppose, then, the enemy attempted this operation, he would find it very difficult, as I would leave all the irregular troops under an active partisan in the mountains. These would terribly infest his supplies. The place itself is, I am told, of great strength, and, however closely blockaded by the sea, could be supplied by boats at night, and under certain circumstances of weather. If not blockaded by sea very closely, the greatest part of the army would be transported to Napoli di Romania, from whence the same game would be played in favour of Malvasia that she played in favour of Romania, supposing the latter besieged.

Thus, in this sketch, I have endeavoured to show that you may always oblige the enemy to attack you in your own position with your back to a fortress, thus uniting offensive war with defensive positions,

which is the secret of mountain warfare—a warfare that requires more science and better drilled troops than any other.

Peasants may maintain a long war in their mountains without science, but *no results are produced.*

It will be seen in the plan I propose that a single defeat to the enemy would be followed by his total destruction, because, as he would be driven to fight for want of provisions, his army must starve after a defeat, for the victorious army would remain between him and Navarin, from whence he received his supplies. It is true that, if his defeat took place at Sparta, he might escape by Kalamata, though to retreat through a country of defiles exposed to a hostile peasantry is very difficult. But let us suppose he accomplished his object and reached Navarin. Still great results are produced to the Greeks, who would at once besiege him, and the whole country would be recovered, and Tripolitza and Leondari fortified. It is much to be doubted if the Turks could long resist in Navarin when besieged in a scientific manner. I think it certain that ten days or a fortnight would oblige Navarin to surrender.

With the force now under Ibrahim Pasha, I think he could not resist five thousand disciplined troops supported by *one thousand veteran Europeans.* With such a force, and twenty pieces of light artillery, the Morea might be liberated in a month, and great things undertaken.

It is evident that my plan is but an outline, which admits of modifications in filling up the details of execution according to accidents of roads, mountains, supplies, the enemy's strength, positions, movements, &c. In the various operations of the foregoing plan, the garrison of Corinth would come out and take post in the passes commanding the entrance into the plain of Tripolitza from the north-east.

A great advantage of this plan is, that young Greek regulars are not required to attack, but to defend positions. Every old soldier knows how to estimate this advantage. My own opinion is, that neither Greeks nor Turks would succeed in attacking a well-chosen position. The first round of cannon-shot would defeat their column, and make them refuse to advance.

C. N.

INDEX.

ABBAS PASHA, operations under, ii. 94, 95.

Abbas, Tahir, an Albanian leader, i. 100, 106, 112—his mission to the Greeks, 113 *et seq.*

Abel, Mr, secretary to the Regency, ii. 294—dismissed from office, &c., 332.

Aberdeen Lord, his negotiations, &c., regarding Greece, ii. 222.

Aboulabad, suppresses the revolt in the Chalcidicé, i. 252 — operations on Mount Athos, &c., 254—sack of Niausta, &c., 255.

Acarnania, affairs of, 1822, i. 334—movements of the Greeks into, ii. 185—insurrection in, 357 *et seq.*

Achmet I., privilege granted to Athens by, i. 4.

Achmet Bey, defeated at Valtetzi, i. 259—his escape from Tripolitza, 269—his death at Splanga, 333.

Acrocorinth, the, taken by the Greeks, i. 277—by the Turks, 351—recaptured by the Greeks, ii. 21.

Acropolis, besieged by Reshid, ii. 117—its capitulation, 152.

Adam, Sir F., attempts to mediate at Mesolonghi, ii. 102.

Adrianople, massacres of Greeks at, i. 234.

Aghias Mynas, massacre at monastery of, i. 313.

Aghionoros, the, *see* Athos.

Agoyiates or muleteers, the, i. 23.

Agrapha, privileges of, i. 22—sketch of its history, and proceedings of Ali Pasha against it, 26 — insurrection in, and its suppression, 242 *et seq.*

Agricultural population, the, in Greece, i. 15—state of, in the Principalities, 140 *et seq.*

Agridha, first revolutionary outbreak at, i. 180.

Akrata, first insurrectionary movement at, i. 180.

Albania, southern, the pashalik of Joannina, i. 4—condition, &c., of the population, their origin, language, &c., 41 *et seq.*—the Gueghs and Tosks, 42—their adoption of Mohammedanism, 43—character of the country, social state, &c., 44 *et seq.*—population on the decrease, 45—administrative divisions under the Turks, 46—the Mussulmans and Christians in, 48.

Albanian language, the, i. 41.

Albanians, distribution, numbers, &c., of the, in Greece, i. 34 *et seq.*—those of Lalla and Bardunia, 36—of Hydra, Spetzas, &c., 37—their military influence in Turkey, 47—employed as mercenaries in Greece, 49—desertion of Ibrahim by, ii. 191.

Alexander, the emperor, expectations of the Hetairists from, i. 138, 139—disavows the attempt in the Principalities, 156—his views on the Greek insurrection, and rupture with Turkey, 238 *et seq.*—the expectations of the Greeks from him, ii. 160—his death, 171.

Ali Kumurgee contrasted with Dramali, i. 351.

Ali Pasha of Argos, plans proposed to Dramali by, i. 352, 353— occupies Nauplia, 354 — refuses to sign the capitulation of Nauplia, 369.

Ali Pasha of Joannina, i. 4—overthrow of the power of the armatoli by, 26—his proceedings towards the klephts, 29—becomes Dervendji, and his policy, 49—his objects, and means of working them out, 50 *et seq.*—his policy and measures against the Suliots, 55—his second attack on them, 57 *et seq.*—his treacheries and cruelties

toward them, 62—his character, 70—his parentage and early career, *ib. et seq.*—his court, and encouragement of literature, 72—his cruelty, 73—the fate of Euphrosyne, 74 *et seq.*—anecdotes of him, 78—policy pursued by him, 79—the destruction of Khormovo, 80—and of Gardhiki, 82—first measures of the sultan against him, 85—attempts on Ismael Pasho, 86—declared a rebel, 87—his defensive preparations, 88 *et seq.*—his appeal to the Greeks, and its failure, 92 *et seq.*—Joannina besieged, 96 *et seq.*—his surrender, 115—his death, 116.

America, supplies to Greece from, in 1827, ii. 159.

Amnesty, the proposed, refused by the governing commission, ii. 249.

Amphissa, *see* Salona.

Anagnostaras, a klepht, i. 182, 183—at the outbreak of the Revolution, 184—peculations of, ii. 43—his death at Sphakteria, 68.

Anarchy, general, after the fall of Tripolitza, i. 270.

Anatolikon, besieged by the Turks, ii. 13—taken, 101—death of Hastings at, 188—evacuated by the Turks, 207.

Andreas, Paul, a Moldavian banker, i. 149.

Animet, a Danish volunteer at Nauplia, i. 364.

Antipsara, islet of, ii. 49.

Apollo newspaper, suppressed by Capodistrias, ii. 232.

Apostoles, fire-ships proposed by, i. 219.

Arachova, Turks defeated at, ii. 122.

Arcadia, insurrection of 1834 in, ii. 347.

Areopagus of Eastern Greece, the, i. 341—quarrel with Odysseus, 343.

Argos, the national assembly at first meets at, i. 293—flight of the government from, 355 *et seq.*—disorders of the troops, 356—national assembly of, ii. 220—the second national assembly, 250 *et seq.*—attack on the French at, 285 *et seq.*

Armansperg, Count, his character, ii. 294 *et seq.*—his intrigue against Maurer, &c., 327 *et seq.*—his administration, 333 *et seq.*—his recall, 336.

Armatoli, the, i. 24 *et seq.*—measures of Ali Pasha against, 79 *et seq.*—their atrocities, ii. 7.

Armatoliks, number of the, i. 25.

Army, abuses regarding its pay, rations, &c., ii. 42—measures of Capodistrias for organising it, 200 *et seq.*—organisation of it by the Regency, 302.

Arnaout-oglou, voevode of Kalavryta, i. 181, 182.

Arsenal, the Turkish, destroyed by fire, ii. 5.

Arta, sacked by brigands, ii. 344—gulf of, its command obtained by the Greeks, ii. 206—valley of, revolt in, and its suppression, i. 243.

Asemaki, a Hetairist, treason of, i. 124.

Asia Minor, ravages of the Psarians, &c., in, ii. 14—revolt in, 15.

Aslan Bey, his advance to Athens, and retreat, ii. 208.

Aspropotamos, valley of, revolt in, and its suppression, i. 244.

Athens, state of, under the Turks, i. 4—its state at the outbreak of the Revolution, 199—massacres of Turks, and blockade of the Acropolis, 200—capitulation of, 347 *et seq.*—its violation by the Greeks, 348—state of, in 1822, 373—Odysseus governor, 374—commencement of siege, ii. 116—attempts to raise it, 120—further attempts to relieve, 130 *et seq.*—operations before, 143—the fall of, 152.

Athos, Mount, or Aghionoros, i. 248, 249—suppression of revolt in, 253—naval skirmish off, ii. 16.

Attica, Goura's exactions in, ii. 115—brigandage in, 363.

Austrian government, treatment of Hypsilantes by, i. 165.

Bairam, Ibrahim's celebration of the, at Makry, ii. 54.

Balestos, Colonel, i. 323 *note.*

Bardunia, the Albanians of, i. 36—flight of the Albanians and Turks of, 185, 186.

Bavarian administration, general review of it, ii. 337 *et seq.*

Bavarians, their overthrow in 1843, ii. 377.

Benderli, Ali, grand vizier, i. 230—displaced, 233.

Berat, pashalik of, i. 46.

Berats and Beratlees, the system of, i. 131.

Bibisi, a brigand, ii. 363, 364.

Bobolina, a Spetziot heroine, i. 266.

Bœotia, ravaged by the Turks, ii. 8.

Botases, a Spetziot captain, i. 263—named vice-president, ii. 30.

Botzares, Constantine, ii. 65.

Botzares, George, joins Ali Pasha, i. 57—his defeat and death, 58—Ali's treachery to him, 62.

Botzares, Kosta, a member of the governing commission, ii. 264.

Botzares, Marco, i. 323—at Petta, 327-329—his victory and death at Karpenisi, ii. 10 *et seq.*

Botzares, Nothi, ii. 84—his conduct during siege of Mesolonghi, 101 *note* —heads the final sortie, 107.
Bowring, Sir John, and the Greek loan, ii. 155, 156.
Brigandage, its prevalence under the Bavarians, ii. 342 *et seq.*—its increase, 350 *et seq.*—suppressed by Gordon, 353 *et seq.*—again breaks out, 362.
Brigands or klephts, rise of the, i. 27—their proceedings, cruelties, &c., 28 and *note.*
Broughton, Lord, *see* Hobhouse.
Bucharest, the peace of, i. 138—the Revolution at, 152—recaptured by the Turks, 159.
Budrun, the naval battles of, ii. 56.
Budures, Vasili, i. 210.
Bulgares, George, governor of Hydra, i. 210.
Bulgari, Count, confidant of Capodistrias, ii. 198.
Bulgaris, first Turkish governor of Hydra, i. 40.
Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton, on the expenditure of the Greek loan, ii. 27.
Burbaki, Colonel, attempts to relieve Athens, ii. 131—his defeat and death, 132.
Burdett, Sir F., and the Greek committee, ii. 155.
Burdjee fort, defended by Hastings, &c., i. 364—abandoned, 367.
Burduba, a brigand, ii. 363 *note.*
Byron, Lord, declines to make advances for the fleet, ii. 21—his arrival in Greece, 22—his character, *ib.*—his opinion of the Greeks, 23 *et seq.*—his views of the contest, 25—an evening with Londos, 35 *note.*

Canning, the recognition of the Spanish revolted colonies by, ii. 163—his reply to Greek memorial, 167—advocates the establishment of Greece, 170—his death, and change of policy, 189.
Canning, Sir Stratford, ambassador to Turkey, ii. 171—plan for settlement of Greece proposed by him, 222—his memorandum on Greece, 255.
Cantacuzenos, Prince George, i. 166—his flight, 167.
Cantacuzenos, Gregorios, i. 261.
Capitan-pasha, position, &c., of the, i. 3.
Capitation-tax or haratch, the, i. 22.
Capitulations, violations of, by the Greeks, i. 261, 263, 277, 348.
Capodistrians, the party of, and their struggles, ii. 249, 250—their proceedings in the assembly, 251—new intrigues, &c., 264, 265.
Capodistrias, Agostino, appointed general, and his character, ii. 207—a member of the governing commission, 249—chosen president, 254—ejected from office, 260.
Capodistrias, Count John, refuses the direction of the Hetairia, i. 135—appointed president, ii. 138, 139—convention with Albanians in Ibrahim's service, 191—his election as president, previous life, and character, 195 *et seq.*—his first administrative measures, 198—his views and policy, 199—his organisation of the army, 200 *et seq.*—military operations during 1828, 205 *et seq.*—his civil administration, 208 *et seq.*—appointment of his brother Viaro, 210—financial administration, 213 *et seq.*—judicial, 216—education, &c, 218—his arbitrary proceedings, 219—the national assembly of Argos, 220—his intrigues against Leopold, 224 *et seq.*—his increasing tyranny after Prince Leopold's resignation, 230 *et seq.*—insurrections against him, 234—affair of Poros, 235 *et seq.*—effects of sack of Poros on his reputation, &c., 241—his proceedings in Maina and against Mavromichales, 242 *et seq.*—his assassination, 244 *et seq.*
Capodistrias, Viaro, his character and tyrannies, ii. 210 *et seq.*, 232.
Caradja, Prince Constantine, i. 297.
Central government, opposition to formation of, in Greece, i. 279.
Centralisation, progress of, under Mahmud, i. 85.
Cerigo, massacre of Turks at, i. 236.
Chalcidicé, the free villages of the, i. 248—the Revolution in, 251—its suppression, 252.
Charalambes, an opponent of Hypsilantes, i. 289.
Chios, state of, at the outbreak of the Revolution, i. 306—invaded by the Greeks, and precautionary measures of Mahmud, 307—defeat of the Greeks, 311—massacres of the population, 312 *et seq.*—further devastations, and numbers massacred, 319—indignation excited by the massacre, 320—atrocities of the Greek sailors at, ii. 15—attempt of Fabvier at, 187.
Christians, position and treatment of, under Turkey, i. 5.
Christos, Hadji, a leader of irregular cavalry, ii. 66.
Church, Sir Richard, his arrival in Greece, and character, ii. 135—ap-

pointed arch-general, 138—operations before Athens, 143—his indecision, &c., 146—his neglect during the massacre at St Spiridion, *ib. et seq.*—new plans, 149—defeat, 150 *et seq.*—orders the surrender of the Acropolis, 152—his position after the battle of the Phalerum, 174—movements and operations in Acarnania, 185—disorganisation among his troops, 187—left in command by Capodistrias, 201—forces under him, and their state in 1828, 206.
Civil war, the first, ii. 28—the second, or of the Primates, 34 *et seq.*—evils caused by them, 37.
Clergy, the Greek, their position and views, i. 12—character of, under Capodistrias, ii. 219.
Cobbett, his attacks on the Greek committee, &c., ii. 156.
Cochrane, Lord, his arrival in Greece, and character, ii. 137—appointed arch-admiral, 138—operations near Athens, 144—success at the Piræus, *ib.*—at the surrender of St Spiridion, 146—at the battle of the Phalerum, 151—price paid for his services, 155—first naval review, 157—naval operations in 1827, 176.
Codrington, Sir Edward, ii. 178—battle of Navarin, 179 *et seq.*—blamed for allowing deportation of Greeks to Egypt, 183—convention concluded for evacuation of Morea, 188.
Commercial navy, the Greek, its rise, &c., i. 205.
Commissariat, its inefficient condition, i. 282—abuses in it, ii. 42.
Communal system, origin, &c., of the, in Greece, i. 16 *et seq.*—its influence at the opening of the Revolution, 283.
Congress of Verona, views of the powers at, on Greece, ii. 162.
Constantinople, the Greek population of, i. 10—precautionary measures at, 227—executions of Greeks, the patriarch, &c., 228 *et seq.*—anarchy and murders in, 232—fire at, and destruction of arsenal, &c., ii. 5.
Constitution of Epidaurus, cause of its failure, i. 295, 296—its proclamation, 298.
Corfu, emigration of Suliots to, i. 59.
Corinth capitulates to the Greeks, and violation of the capitulation, i. 277—captured by the Turks, 351.
Coron relieved by the Turkish fleet, ii. 14—occupied by the French, 192.
Cos, massacres of Greeks at, i. 234.
Crete, island and pashalik of, i. 5—massacres of Greeks in, 235—repulse of the Egyptian fleet from, ii. 61.
Currency, debasement of, in Turkey, ii. 6.
Customs, administration of, under Capodistrias, ii. 215.
Cyprus, massacres of Greeks in, i. 235.
Cyril, a deposed patriarch, murdered, i. 234.

Dania, Colonel, at Petta, i. 328.
Dawkins, Mr, anecdote of, ii. 276 *note*—attacks of Maurer on, 331—succeeded by Sir E. Lyons, 335.
Deliyannes, an opponent of Hypsilantes, i. 289—joins the war of the primates, ii. 36—imprisoned, 37.
Demogeronts, the, in the Morea, i. 31.
Dervenaki pass, the, i. 352—defeat of Dramali at, 361.
Dervendji-pasha, the, his duties, &c., i. 24.
Dervenokhoria, the, i. 4—its privileges under the Turks, 37—the Revolution in, 195.
Diakos, Athanasios, a leader of the Greeks, and his character, i. 198.
Diamantes, Captain, i. 252.
Dikaios, Gregorios (Pappa Phlesas), his character, &c., i. 175, 176—operations against Dramali, 360, 361, 362—defeat and death of, ii. 74 *et seq.*
Djavellas, Kitzo, defence of Klissova by, ii. 102—heads the final sortie, 107—occupies Patras, 270—arrested, 328.
Djavellas, Photo, a Suliot, joins Ali Pasha, i. 57, 62—defeated near Navarin, ii. 65—enters Mesolonghi, 95.
Djelaleddin Bey, attack by Botzares on, ii. 10 *et seq.*
Dost, Demir, i. 82—his murder by Ali Pasha, 83.
Dragashan, battle of, i. 162 *et seq.*
Dragomestre, movement of Church to, ii. 185.
Drakos, a Suliot leader, i. 111.
Dramali, Mohammed, named dervendji, and operations against Ali, i. 95—suppression of the revolt on Mount Pelion by, 247—operations assigned to, in 1822, 341—the expedition of, 349 *et seq.*—takes Corinth, 351—his plans, 352—want of supplies, and his position, 355—at Argos, 357—retreats, 360—his defeat, 361 *et seq.*—his death, 364.
Dyovuniattes, submission of, to Reshid, ii. 115.
Dystomo, the Greek camp at, ii. 95—Turks defeated at, 123.

Economos, Antonios, insurrection of, at Hydra, i. 210 *et seq.*—his fall, 215 *et seq.*—his death, 217.
Education, state of, in Greece before the Revolution, i. 18 *et seq.*—spread of, among the Greeks, as a cause of the Revolution, 119—measures of Capodistrias for, ii. 218—and of the regency, 320.
Egina, the orphan asylum at, ii. 218.
Egriboz, the pashalik of, i. 4.
Egyptian troops, discipline maintained by the, ii. 59—contrasted with the Greek, 64.
Elez Aga, voevode in Chios, i. 314.
Ellice, Edward, his connection with the Greek loan, &c., ii. 155.
Elmas Bey, leader of the Albanians in Tripolitza, i. 266, 267—defeated at Arachova, ii. 122.
England, protocol regarding Greece signed, ii. 172—her Continental relations in 1826, *ib.*—treaty of 6th July 1827, 174—hatred of Capodistrias to, 196—disputes with, 340.
English government, their indignation at the violation of Ionian neutrality, ii. 19.
Epidaurus, the assembly of, i. 293—the constitution of, 298 *et seq.*—cause of its failure, 295, 296.
Erissos, Turkish ship burned at, i. 219 *et seq.*
Eubœa, operations in, 1822, i. 302 *et seq.*—campaign in, 1823, ii. 8.
Eugenios succeeds Gregorios as patriarch, i. 229.
Euphrosyne, the history of, i. 74 *et seq.*
Europe, state of public opinion on Greece in, ii. 3.
European powers, history of their negotiations, &c., regarding Greece, ii. 161 *et seq.*
Evrenos or Ghazi Gavrinos, privilege held by descendants of, i. 5.

Fabvier, Colonel, attempt on Tripolitza, ii. 81—defeated at Khaïdari, 117—attempts to relieve Athens, 118, 121—succours Athens and enters the Acropolis, 124—surrenders the Acropolis, 152—failure at Chios, 187—neglect of, by Capodistrias, 201—his resignation, 205.
Fauvel, M., efforts of, to save the Turks at Athens, i. 348.
Fellowes, Sir Thomas, ii. 182.
Finances, the Turkish, their disordered state, i. 130—in 1823, ii. 6—their organisation by Capodistrias, 213—their maladministration, 266—under the regency, 308.
Fire-ships, first employment of, by the Greeks, i. 218 *et seq.*—useless expenditure on, ii. 43—failures of, at Budrun, 56—and at Mytilene, &c., 61.
Fleets, operations of the, in 1822, i. 365, 366—comparison between them, 372—the Turkish, 1823, ii. 14—the Greek, 15—operations of the, during siege of Mesolonghi, 97.
France, her invasion of Spain in 1822, ii. 163—a party to the treaty of 6th July 1827, 174—joins England against Russia on the Greek question, 223.
Franz, Dr, ii. 327 *et seq.*
French, the, intrigues of Ali with, i. 57—occupy the Morea, ii. 192—public works, &c., by the troops, 193—garrison Nauplia, 269—attack on them at Argos, 285 *et seq.*
Fustinello, the, the costume of the Tosks, i. 48.

Galatz, massacre of Turkish merchants, &c., at, i. 146.
Galaxidhi, a commercial town, i. 205, and *note*—the destruction of, by the Turks, 272.
Galloway, Mr, the contractor for the Greek steamers, ii. 156.
Gardhiki, alliance between, and Khormovo, i. 81—its destruction by Ali Pasha, 82.
Gatsos, a leader of the revolt at Niausta, i. 254, 255—apostacy of his wife, 256.
Gazas, Anthimos, heads the revolt on Mount Pelion, i. 245, 246.
Gennadios, Professor, anecdote of, ii. 100 *note.*
Gennatas, a favourite of Capodistrias, ii. 213, 218.
Georgaki, a Vallachian leader, and his character, i. 150—troops under him, 153—notices of him, 157—arrests Vladimiresko, 160—his conduct at Dragashan, 162, 163—his continued resistance and death, 168 *et seq.*
Gerard, Colonel, ii. 203—on the sack of Poros, 241—dismissed, 250.
Germanos, bishop of Patras, a leader of the Moreot Hetairists, i. 174, 178—forgery of letter by him, 179—heads the insurgents, 186—intrigues against Kolokotrones, 276—opposes Hypsilantes, 289—his pretensions, 292.
Ghiones, Ghika, a Hydriot, i. 210.
Glarakes, sent to command in Chios, i. 310.

Gogos, an Albanian chief, i. 324—his treachery, 325 *et seq.*—betrays Botzares, 327—his conduct at Petta, 328 *et seq.*—openly joins the Turks, 333.
Gordon, General, on the Hetairia, i. 125—his account of the movement in the Principalities, 147 *note*—his opinion of Panourias, 196—on the cruelties of the Greeks, 237—on the massacre of Tripolitza, 269—character of Hastings by, 319 *note*—on the Chios massacre, *ib.*—on the abuse of the Greek loan, ii. 27—on the conduct of the leaders during the siege of Mesolonghi, 101 *note*—his character and influence, 129—operations for relief of Athens, 131—repulse of Reshid, 132—resigns in consequence of the massacre of St Spiridion, 147—his expedition against the brigands, 353 *et seq.*—his danger during it, 356—on the state of the country, 361.
Goss, Dr, of Geneva, ii. 128.
Goura, peculations of, ii. 43—Odysseus surrenders to, 92 *et seq.*—murders him, 94—commands at Dystomo, 95—his exactions, &c., in Attica, 115—besieged in Athens, 116—his death, 118—death of his widow, *ib. note.*
Gousi, Pylio, a Suliot chief, treason of, i. 61.
Governing commission, the first, its proceedings, ii. 249—new, 261, 263.
Grain, compulsory supplies of, to Constantinople, i. 140.
Gravia, Odysseus defeated at, i. 376.
Great Britain, conduct of the government toward Greece, ii. 161—recognises the revolted Spanish colonies, 163—negotiations at Constantinople, *ib.*—reply to Greek memorial, 167—complaints by Turkey of her conduct, 168—wavering policy after Canning's death, 189—views and policy, 1829, 222 *et seq.*
Greece, interest of, i. 1—its population, Othoman divisions of, 3 *et seq.*—distribution, numbers, &c., of the Albanian race in, 34 *et seq.*—causes of the Revolution, 118 *et seq.*—*see* Greek Revolution—benefits conferred by Roman law, 129—Turkish population on the outbreak of the Revolution, 172—want of preparation on both sides, *ib. et seq.*—attempt to defer the outbreak, 177—first rising, 180—spread of the Revolution to continental, 195—the islands, and outbreak of the Revolution in them, 204 *et seq.*—continental, organisation of, in 1821, 290 *et seq.*—demand for a central government, 292—national assembly convoked, 293—expedition of Mavrocordatos to Western, 321—his operations there, 322 *et seq.*—successes of 1822, and their result, ii. 1, 2—views in Europe on the struggle, 2 *et seq.*—negligence of government, 1823, 7—the first civil war, 28 *et seq.*—preparations in Egypt against, 28—the government in 1824, 29—its members, &c., 30—general anarchy in 1826, 126—suffering in 1827, 158—relief from America, 159—views of the powers at the Congress of Verona, 162 *et seq.*—places herself under protection of England, 170—the Russian memoir of 1823, 164 *et seq.*—treaty between the three powers, 174—state in 1827, *ib. et seq.*—termination of hostilities, 207—nomination of Prince Leopold as king, and his subsequent resignation, 221, 224 *et seq.*—presidency of Capodistrias, 195 *et seq.*—assassination of Capodistrias, and its effect, 246—the governing commission, 249 *et seq.*—Agostino Capodistrias president, 254 *et seq.*—Sir S. Canning's memorandum, 256—Agostino ejected, and new governing commission, 261 *et seq.*—state of the country, 262—general anarchy, 266 *et seq.*—civil war renewed, 272—national assembly of Pronia, 274 *et seq.*—its dissolution, 276—intrigues of the senate, 278 *et seq.*—increasing anarchy in 1832, 285—treaty recognising its independence, 287—Otho recognised as king, *ib.*—treaty with Bavaria, 288—landing of Otho, *ib.* 290—the Bavarian regency, 294—first administrative measures, 301—military organisation, 302—civil administration, 305—municipal institutions, 306—finances, 308—monetary system, 312—judicial organisation, *ib.*—the church, 314—monasteries, 319—public instruction, 320—state, &c., of the press, 321—neglect of roads, 322—Order of the Redeemer, 323—quarrels in the regency, 324 *et seq.*—Kolokotrones's plot, 326—the Armansperg intrigue, 327—administration of Armansperg, 332 *et seq.*—general review of the Bavarian administration, 337 *et seq.*—disputes with England, 340 *et seq.*—brigandage, 342 *et seq.*, 350 *et seq.*—insurrection in Maina, 345—in Messenia, 347—brigandage suppressed by Gordon, 353 *et seq.*—it again breaks out, 362—personal government of Otho, 365—the Revolution of 1843, and its causes, 368 *et seq.*—the constitution, and ob-

servations on it, 377 *et seq.*—general review, 380 *et seq.*
Greek army, contrasted with the Egyptian, ii. 64.
Greek bishops, executions of, at Constantinople, i. 233.
Greek chiefs, submission of, to Reshid, ii. 115.
Greek church, the, its condition, &c., i. 8 *et seq.*—its head, 9—under the regency, ii. 314.
Greek committees at London, &c., conduct of, ii. 154 *et seq.*
Greek fleet, the, its first cruise, i. 213—cruise of 1822, 315—its insubordination, &c., 1823, ii. 15—its operations before Mesolonghi, 88.
Greek government, their neglect of preparations on Ibrahim's invasion, ii. 63—their lethargy during siege of Mesolonghi, 99.
Greek islands, population of, before the Revolution, i. 3.
Greek loans, the, and their misappropriation, ii. 26 *et seq.*—way in which expended, 38.
Greek orthodoxy and nationality, distinction between, i. 8.
Greek Revolution, the, its causes, i. 118 *et seq.*—the Turkish system of law, 119—spread of education, *ib.*—secret societies, 120—the Philikó Hetairia, *ib. et seq.*—its general causes, 126—aided by the decline of the Turks, 127.
Greek troops, their rapacity, i. 245.
Greeks, numbers of, before the Revolution, i. 2—their position and treatment under the Turkish government, 5 *et seq.*—effect of the treaty of Kainardgi on their condition, 6—their state just before the Revolution, 7—their divided state at the opening of the Revolution, 10—the clergy, 12—the primates, 13—the urban population, 14—the rural, 15—their municipal institutions, 16—education among them, 18—general review of their condition on the eve of the Revolution, 20—the Moreots, 29 *et seq.*—the Maniats and Tzakonians, 32—the islanders, 33—decline to support Ali Pasha, 92 *et seq.*—appeal of the Turks to them, 94—their influence in Turkey, 128—effects of treaty of Kainardgi on them, 130—the system of Berats, 131—its results, and increased hatred between them and the Turks, 132—their representations of Sultan Mahmud, 226—massacres of, 233, 234, 312 *et seq.*—examples of their cruelty, 236, 237—violations of capitulations, 261, 263—fraudulent division of booty at Navarin, 263—their position after the campaign of 1821, 278—contrast between the peasantry and the troops, 279—opposition to formation of central government, *ib.*—the primates and military chiefs, 280—revolutionary organisation, 281—broils and disorders among them, 1822, 335—supply the Turks with provisions, ii. 142.
Gregorios, the patriarch, his execution, i. 229—his burial and character, 230 *et seq.*
Grevena, the bishop of, and Ali Pasha, i. 78.
Grigiottes enters the Acropolis, ii. 119, 124—taken by the French at Argos, 287.
Grivas, Gardikiotes, a leader of irregulars, ii. 352.
Grivas, Theodore, cruelties, &c., of, ii. 266—driven back, 272.
Gropius, M., efforts of, to save the Turks at Athens, i. 348—Austrian consul at Athens, ii. 130.
Gueghs, the, a branch of the Albanians, i. 42.
Gueheneuc, General, ii. 250.

Halet Effendi, Turkish minister, i. 126—his first measures against the Hetairists, 227—dismissed, 233.
Hamilton, Captain, compels observance of the capitulation of Nauplia, i. 369—at Nauplia, ii. 79—his influence, 138, 139.
Hane, an English volunteer at Nauplia, i. 364, 367.
Haratch, or capitation-tax, the, i. 22.
Harrington, the Earl of, *see* Stanhope.
Hassan Ghazi, defeat of Albanian brigands by, i. 49.
Hastings, Frank Abney, first notice of, i. 319 and *note*—defends the Burdjee fort, 364, 365—his memoir to the government, ii. 30—his character, 129—succours Gordon at Munychia, 132—success at Oropos, 133—expedition to Gulf of Volo, 139 *et seq.*—victory of, at Salona, 176—conducts the movement into Acarnania, 185—takes Vasiladi, 186—his death, 188—extracts from his letters, *ib. note*—his memorandum on the use of steamers, &c., 385.
Heideck, Colonel, ii. 128—expedition to Oropos, and its failure, 133—administration of the customs under, 215—his character, 294 *et seq.*
Hellas frigate, the, ii. 144, 145—her cost, &c., 157—destroyed at Poros, 240.

Hetairia and Hetairists, *see* Philiké Hetairia.
Heyden, Count, ii. 182.
Hobhouse, Mr, his connection with the Greek loan, &c., ii. 155.
Holy Alliance, the, their declaration against Greece, ii. 3.
Home, Dr, on the peculations of the Philhellenes, &c., ii. 154 *note* — his management of the American supplies, 159.
Hospodars, the, their government in Vallachia and Moldavia, i. 139.
Hume, Joseph, and the Greek loan, ii. 155, 156.
Hussein Bey Djeritlee, force under, for attack of Kasos, ii. 47—its destruction, 48—at the siege of Navarin, 66—captures Sphakteria, 68—killed at assault of Klissova, 103.
Hydra, the Albanian population of, i. 37—the town, &c., *ib.*—character of the population, 38—the government, &c., *ib.*—under the Turks, taxation, &c., 40—social state, population, &c., 204, 205, 206—the primates resist the Revolution, 209—joins the Revolution, 212—activity at, after the fall of Psara, ii. 52—massacre of Turkish prisoners at, 58, and *note*—resistance of, to Capodistrias, 232, 234 — the deputies from, prevented reaching the assembly, 251—they arrive, 257.
Hydriot sailors, their mutinous conduct in 1823, ii. 17—their want of patriotism, 100.
Hydriots, their supremacy in 1824, ii. 30—their conduct in 1827, 157.
Hypatros, a Hetairist, murdered, i. 124, 254.
Hypsilantes, Alexander, becomes head of the Hetairia, his career and character, i. 135 *et seq.*—his expectations from Russia, 139—invades Moldavia, 142—his inefficiency, 143 *et seq.*—present at the massacres at Jassi, 148—tyrannical proceedings, *ib. et seq.*—at Bucharest, 152—his hopes from Russia, 152, 153—general distrust of him, and repudiated by Russia, 155 *et seq.*—his deceitful conduct, 158—arrest and death of Vladimiresko, 159 *et seq.*—battle of Dragashan, 161 *et seq.*—his last acts, and flight, 164—his after fate, 165, 166—distrust of him among the Greeks, 175.
Hypsilantes, Demetrius, his arrogance at Monemvasia, i. 260—at the surrender of Navarin, 262—retires from before Tripolitza, 264—returns after its surrender, 269—loss of his influence and authority, 270—his arrival in Greece, and character, 285—claims supreme authority, 286 *et seq.*—his weakness and errors, 287—intrigues of the Peloponnesian senate against him, 289—convokes a national assembly, 293—deserts the popular cause, 294—authorises invasion of Chios, 307—regiment of regulars formed by, 323 *note*—intrigue of Mavrocordatos against, 344—alliance with Odysseus, &c., *ib.*—patriotism of, during invasion of Dramali, 358 — operations against Dramali, 361, 362—at Lerna, ii. 78—appointed to a command by Capodistrias, 201—his inactivity, 204 — operations in 1828, 205—a member of governing commission, 264—his death, 276.
Hypsilantes, Nicolas, i. 162.
Hyskos, Andreas, a partisan of Ali's, i. 94.

Iatrakos of Mistra, ii. 71.
Ibrahim Pasha, named Pasha of the Morea, ii. 28—sets sail, 53, 54—junction with the Turkish fleet, 55—battles of Budrun, 56—order maintained by his troops, 59—engagement off Mytilene, 60—driven back from Crete, 61—lands in Greece, 62—defeats the Greeks, 65—captures Sphakteria, 67—and Pylos and Navarin, 70—his fleet defeated at Modon, 72—overruns the Morea, 73—victorious at Maniaki, 75—defeats Kolokotrones, 77—takes Tripolitza, and threatens Nauplia, *ib.*—defeated at Lerna, 78—again defeats Kolokotrones, 80 *et seq.*—further operations and successes, 81—ordered to aid in the siege of Mesolonghi, 82—co-operates in siege of Mesolonghi, 98—successes, 100, 101—repulse at Klissova, 103—capture of Mesolonghi, 108 *et seq.*—returns to the Morea, 112—operations during 1826, 113 — devastates the country, and misery caused, *ib. et seq.* — repulsed from Maina, 114 — measures of, against Hastings, 177—battle of Navarin, 178 *et seq.*—Greek slaves sent to Egypt by, 183—sufferings of his troops, and desertion of the Albanians, 191—evacuates the Morea, 192.
Ignatus, bishop of Aota, i. 177—circular against the Suliots by, 59—and Ali Pasha, 79.
Ionian Islands, murder of Turks in the, i. 237—violations of neutrality in, 273 *et seq.*, ii. 18—shelter given fugitive Greeks in, 19—proceedings of the government on violation of neutrality,

21—connection of Capodistrias with, 195.
Iskos, Andreas, joins the Turks, i. 335—and again the Greeks, 339—submits to the Turks, ii. 115.
Islanders, the Greek, and their character, &c., i. 33.
Islands, the, statistics, social state, &c., of, i. 204 *et seq.*—their organisation by Capodistrias, ii. 209—their administration by his brother, 211.
Ismael Gibraltar Pasha, destruction of Galaxidhi by, i. 272—force under, for attack of Kasos, ii. 47—its destruction, 48.
Ismael Pasho Bey, attempt of Ali Pasha against, i. 86—named his successor, 87—his movements against Ali, 91 *et seq.*, 95—captures Previsa, 96—his operations against Joannina, 98 *et seq.*—his death, 96, 101.
Istira, the, i. 140.
Ithaca, violation of neutrality at, ii. 18.

Janissaries, the, their disaffection in 1823, ii. 5—their destruction, 173.
Joannina, the pashalik of, i. 4, 46—siege of, 96 *et seq.*—its surrender, 115 *et seq.*
John of Parga, fire-ships constructed by, i. 219, 220.
Jourdain, Colonel, at Nauplia, i. 364, 365.
Judicial system, the, under the regency, ii. 312.
Justice, Othoman system of, i. 119—administration of, among Greeks and Turks, 129 *et seq.*—failure of Capodistrias to organise its administration, ii. 216 *et seq.*

Kainardgi, treaty of, its effect on the condition of the Greeks, i. 6—its effects on Greek population in Turkey, 130.
Kakouli, defeat of Ali Pasha at, i. 56—captured by him, 61.
Kalamata, capture of, and murder of the Turks, i. 184.
Kalamos, flight of the Acarnanians to, 1822, i. 334.
Kalarites, revolt at, i. 243.
Kalavryta, the insurrection at, and massacre of the Turks, i. 181, 182.
Kalergy, General, wounded and taken at the Phalerum, ii. 151—conducts the Revolution of 1843, 373 *et seq.*
Kaliakudi, defeat of the Greeks at pass of, ii. 12.
Kanaris, Constantine, destroys the capitan-pasha's ship, i. 316—again destroys a Turkish man-of-war, 370—a supporter of Capodistrias, ii. 235—arrested, 236.
Kara Ali, capitan-bey, cruise of, in 1821, i. 271, 273—return to Constantinople, and promoted, 275—expulsion of the Greeks from Chios, 311—massacres there, 313—efforts to arrest these, 314—destruction of his ship, and his death, 318.
Karaiskaki, feud with Rhangos, i. 335—defeated near Navarin, ii. 66—operations for relief of Mesolonghi, 95—fails to co-operate in the sortie from Mesolonghi, 108—defeated at Khaïdari, 117—attempts to relieve Athens, 119—victory at Arachova, 122—at the surrender of St Spiridion, 146—his death and character, 148.
Karatassos, a leader of the revolt at Niausta, i. 254, 255—his wife tortured, 255—defeat of, by the Egyptians, ii. 65.
Karavia, massacre of the Turks at Galatz by, i. 146—treachery of, at Dragashan, 162, 163.
Karayianni, Athanasios, i. 359.
Karitena, repulse of Greeks at, i. 187, 194.
Karpenisi, victory and death of Marco Botzares at, ii. 10—evacuated by the Turks, 206.
Karteria steamer, the, ii. 132, 133, 139 *et seq.*
Karystos, besieged by the Greeks, i. 304—check of Turks at, ii. 9.
Kasiots, naval successes of the, in 1822, i. 372.
Kasos, discontent in, i. 204—population, &c., i. 205 *note*—its state and prosperity, ii. 46—description of it, 47—its destruction, 48.
Kassandra or Pallene, the peninsula of, i. 248.
Kastri, the Albanians of, i. 40.
Katz-Antoni, cruelty of Ali Pasha toward, i. 29.
Katzaro, captain of body-guard to Mavrocordatos, ii. 43.
Katziko-Jani, murder of, by Ali Pasha, i. 29.
Khaïdari, defeat of the Greeks at, ii. 116.
Khasikakhoria of the Chalcidicé, the, i. 248.
Khormovo, the destruction, &c., of, by Ali Pasha, i. 80.
Khosref Mehemet, capitan-pasha, instructions to, ii. 5—his character, and naval operations in 1823, 14—force under, for attack of Psara, 48, 49—destruction of Psara, 51—junction

with the Egyptian fleet, 55—his cowardice, and battles of Budrun, 56 *et seq.*—failure at Samos, 60—his cowardice before Mesolonghi, 88—brings supplies to Reshid Pasha, 97.
Khurshid, pasha of the Morea, i. 101 *note*—appointed to command against Ali Pasha, 101—siege of Joannina, 107 *et seq.*—outbreak of the Revolution, *ib.*—his difficulties, and course he followed, 108 *et seq.*—patriotic course followed by him, 110—captures Litharitza, 112—surrender of Ali Pasha, 115—and his death, 116—repulsed in attempts to penetrate into Acarnania, 203—precautionary measures of, and their effect, 241, 242—suppresses the revolt at Arta, 244—his moderation, *ib.*—his harem captured at Tripolitza, 269—preparations and plans in Western Greece, 1822, 322—operations assigned to, in 1822, 341—his jealousy of Dramali, 350—operations after the defeat of Dramali, 375—his execution, 377.
Kiamil Bey, murder of, i. 277, 278.
Kiapha captured by Ali Pasha, i. 63—fort built by him, 64.
Kiutayhe, *see* Reshid Pasha.
Kleisura, the pass of, i. 52.
Klephts or brigands, *see* Brigands—undue laudations of them, ii. 42.
Klissova, repulse of the Turks at, ii. 102.
Klonares, arbitrary proceeding of Capodistrias toward, ii. 234.
Koering, Mr, ii. 128 and *note.*
Kokovila, Nicolas, i. 210.
Kolandrutzos, a Spetziot captain, i. 263.
Kolettes, John, i. 244—enmity between, and Odysseus, 305—minister-at-war, his character, &c., 345—cowardice and flight of, ii. 8—party formed by, 1824, 31—his position and character, 32—suppresses the war of the primates, 37—during Ibrahim's invasion, 73, 74—force under, for relief of Athens, and his defeat, 121—a member of the governing commission, 249—supports the Romeliots, 252 *et seq.*—the party of, 257—his influence and position in 1832, 263—a member of new governing commission, 264—party headed by, 283—sent as minister to Paris, 352.
Kolodemo, murder of Lazaros Konduriottes by, i. 39.
Kolokotrones, Gennaios, i. 323, ii. 272—his treachery, i. 328.
Kolokotrones, Panos, ii. 28.
Kolokotrones, Theodore, at the outbreak of the Revolution, i. 182, 183, 184—his exploits as a klepht, 32—sketch of his previous career, 189 *et seq.*—his conduct at Tripolitza, 265—the citadel surrendered to him, 268—loss of his influence from his conduct there, 270, 275—his failure at Patras, 276—disposed to support Hypsilantes, 288—operations against Dramali, 360 *et seq.*, 363—his conduct at Nauplia, 368—his indifference to the disorders of the troops, ii. 21—the civil war of, 28—his rebellion crushed, 29—joins the war of the primates, 36—imprisoned, 37—made commander-in-chief, 73—defeated near Tripolitza, 77—forces assembled, 79—again defeated, 80 *et seq.*—his operations during 1826, and military inefficiency, 114—coalition with Konduriottes, 120, 127—proposes election of Capodistrias, 139—tyrannies, &c., of, under Capodistrias, 234—a member of the governing commission, 249—heads the Capodistrians, 271—civil war, *ib.*—party headed by, 282, 283—his plot against the regency, 326 *et seq.*—arrested, 328.
Kombotti, repulse of Turks at, i. 325.
Konduriottes, George, named president, ii. 30—his cruelties, after the war of the primates, 37—his inefficiency shown on Ibrahim's invasion, 63, 64—his timidity, &c., 73—coalition with Kolokotrones, 120, 127—supports Kolettes, 257—a member of new governing commission, 264.
Konduriottes, Lazaros, a Hydriot, i. 210, ii. 233.
Konduriottes, the family of, and murder of Lazaros, i. 39.
Koniarides, the, a Turkish tribe, i. 243.
Konstantinus Economos, funeral oration on the patriarch by, i. 231 *note.*
Kontoyannes, submission of, to Reshid, ii. 115.
Koutzonika, a Suliot, treason of, i. 61.
Kranidi, the Albanians of, i. 40
Kriezes, Admiral, ii. 207, 236.
Krommydi, defeat of the Greeks at, ii. 66.
Kughni, the defence of, by the Suliots, i. 61.
Kurd Pasha, proceedings of, as dervendji-pasha, i. 25.
Kutchuk Hussein, protection of the Hydriots by, i. 39.
Kydonies, the destruction of, ii. 221 *et seq.*
Kyriakoules, i. 303.

Lalande, Captain, ii. 237 and *note.*

Lalla, the Albanian Mussulmans of, i. 36.
Land-tax retained by Capodistrias, ii. 214.
Larissa, defence of castle of, i. 357, 358.
Laybach congress, the declaration of the sovereigns at, i. 238.
Leake, Colonel, his estimate of population of Greece, i. 3 *note*—poem on Ali Pasha published by, 73 *note*—anecdote of Ali by, 78.
Lehmaier, M., ii. 367, 368.
Lekhonia, massacre of Turks at, i. 246.
Lekkas, Captain, instigates the massacre at Athens, i. 348—his fate, 349.
Leopold, Prince, nominated King of Greece, ii. 221, 224—addresses to him, and intrigues of Capodistrias against him, 225 *et seq.*—his conduct in first accepting and then resigning, 227 *et seq.*
Lerna, defeat of Ibrahim at, ii. 78.
Lesuire, General, ii. 352.
Literature, encouragement of, by Ali Pasha, i. 72.
Lithi, atrocities of the Greek sailors at, ii. 15.
Livadea captured by the insurgents, i. 197—massacre of the Turks, 199.
Loans, way in which expended, ii. 38.
London, conduct of Greek committee at, ii. 154 *et seq.*
Londos, Andreas, a leader of the primates, his character, ii. 35—retires to Acarnania, 37—released, 74—his failure at Tripolitza, 81.
Louis, King of Bavaria, ii. 293, 295.
Lyapides, the, a tribe of the Tosks, i. 43.
Lykourgos, attempt of, to excite revolt in Chios, i. 307 *et seq.*—his failure and flight, 311 *et seq.*
Lyons, Captain Sir E., ii. 237 and *note*—British resident, 335, 336—on the state of Greece in 1836, 360, 361—disputes with, 341.

Macedonia, suppression of the revolt in, i. 256.
Mademkhoria of the Chalcidicé, the, i. 248.
Mahmud II., accession of, i. 65—his personal appearance and character, 66 *et seq.*—state of the empire, 68 *et seq.*—at first supports Ali Pasha's policy, 80—first measures of, against Ali Pasha, 85—declares him a rebel, 87—his means of attack, and plans, 90 *et seq.*—measures for the subjugation of Ali, 101—fall of Ali, 115—his preparations in the Principalities, 155—preparations in Greece ordered, 173—his policy with regard to the Revolution, 225—the representations of him by the Greek historians, &c., 226—suppressive measures, 227—executions ordered, 228—that of the patriarch, 229 *et seq.*—increased severities, and his motives, 232—change of ministry, 233—restores order and arrests the massacres, 235—rupture with Russia, 238—his difficulties, 240—his successes, 256—difficulties overcome by him, 257—precautionary measures at Chios, 307—measures for its recovery, 310 *et seq.*—preparations in 1822 for reconquest of Greece, 340—his plan, 341—his firmness, ii. 2, 3—his policy, 4—destruction of arsenals, &c., by fire, 5—his plan of campaign, 6—negotiations with Mohammed Ali for aid against the Greeks, 28—reforms in army and navy, 45—his plans and preparations, 46—convention of Akermann, and destruction of the janissaries, 173—the war with Russia in 1828-9, 190—the treaty of Adrianople, 222—recognises independence of Greece, 287.
Mahmud, grandson of Ali Pasha, executed, i. 117.
Maina, under the capitan-pasha, i. 4—Ibrahim repulsed from, ii. 114—resistance of, to Capodistrias, 232, 234—social state of, and proceedings of Capodistrias, 242—the deputies from, prevented reaching the assembly, 251—they arrive, 257—the insurrection of 1834 in, 345.
Maison, General, occupies the Morea, ii. 192.
Makriyannes, Captain, his gallantry at Lerna, ii. 78—during the sortie from Mesolonghi, 107, 108—conveys intelligence of the state of Athens, 124—outrage by brigands on, 351—during the Revolution of 1843, 372.
Makry, Ibrahim's celebration of the Bairam at, ii. 54 *et seq.*
Makrynoros, repulses of Khurshid at, i. 203.
Makrynoros, passes of, occupied by the Greeks, ii. 207.
Makrys, character of, ii. 41, 42.
Martin, W., defence of Anatolikon by, ii. 13.
Maurer, M. de, his character, ii. 294 *et seq.*—dismissed from office, 332.
Maniaki, defeat of the Greeks at, ii. 75.
Maniats, the, their character, &c., i. 32—ravage Messenia, &c., ii. 282.
Mansolas, Drosos, i. 343.
Mavrocordatos, Alexander, his arrival, and appointed to direction in Western

Greece, i. 290—his measures for organising it, *ib. et seq.*—communications between the Suliots and, 112, 113 *et seq.*—military failure of, at Patras, 297—constitution of Epidaurus, 298—president of Greece, 299—his character and position, 300 *et seq.*—his failure to aid the Chiots, 315—expedition to Western Greece, 321 *et seq.*—defeat of Petta, 326 *et seq.*—enters Mesolonghi, 336—his measures for defence, 337—intrigues against Hypsilantes, &c., 344, 345—displaced, ii. 7—his inefficiency, 9—efforts of, to secure just distribution of prize-money, 20—his intercourse with Lord Byron, 24, 25—his position and conduct after Byron's death, 31, 32—his henchman, 41—during Ibrahim's invasion, 64—measures for defence of Navarin, 67—his escape, 70—his declining influence, 130—supports Kolettes, 258—removed from ministry of finance, 264.

Mavromichales, account of family of, ii. 242 *et seq.*

Mavromichales, Constantine, arrested, ii. 244—one of the assassins of Capodistrias, 245—slain, 246.

Mavromichales, Elias, death of, i. 302 *et seq.*

Mavromichales, Elias, or Katzakos, ravages Messenia, ii. 282—arrest and escape of, 244—one of the assassins of Capodistrias, 245.

Mavromichales, George, at the defence of Navarin, ii. 70, 71—defence of Lerna by, 78, ii. 243, 244—his execution, 246.

Mavromichales, Janni, revolts against Capodistrias, ii. 243—arrested, 244.

Mavromichales, Kyriakoules, i. 322—his death, 333—Gordon's character of him, *ib.*

Mavromichales, Petros—*see* Petrobey.

Megaris, privilege of, under the Turks, i. 37—the Revolution in, 195.

Megaspelaion, monastery of, threatened by Ibrahim, ii. 113 and *note.*

Mehemet Pasha, cowardice of, in command of the fleet, i. 370—defeated by Kanaris, 371—operations under, 376.

Mehemet Salik, Khurshid's kaimakam in the Morea, i. 173—measures against the Revolution, 178—saves the Greeks of Tripolitza from massacre, 181.

Meleti, Hadji, primate of the Dervenokhoria, i. 195.

Mesolonghi, outbreak of the Revolution at, and massacre of the Turks, i. 201—first siege of, i. 336 *et seq.*—the assault, and its defeat, 338—the second siege, ii. 83 *et seq.*—its state and defences, 85—the siege, 86 *et seq.*—Vasiladi and Anatolikon taken, 101—failure of the fleet, 104—failure of provisions, 105—final sortie, 106—fall of the place, 110 *et seq.*—numbers who perished, and heroism of the defence, *ib.*—evacuated by the Turks, 207.

Messenia, state of, in 1832, ii. 281—insurrection of 1834 in, 347.

Metaxas, a member of the governing commission, ii. 264, 271.

Metzovo, the pass of, i. 89.

Miaoulis, Andreas, cruise of fleet under, i. 217, 224—cruise of, in 1821, 273—engages the Turkish fleet, 275—placed at head of fleet, 1822, and his cruise, 315—attempts to control the armatoli in Skiathos, ii. 8—cruise of, 1823, and conduct of the fleet, 15—his danger, 16—declines the command, 18—cruise of, after destruction of Psara, 52—battles of Budrun, 56 *et seq.*—arrests the Turkish attempt on Samos, 60—success of, at Modon, 72—co-operates in defence of Mesolonghi, 88—throws supplies into it, &c., 97—failure to relieve it, 104—proceedings of, at Poros, 236 *et seq.*—supports Kolettes, 258.

Military system, the, in the Morea, i. 188.

Miller, Colonel, ii. 159 *note.*

Miridits, the, an Albanian tribe, i. 43, ii. 9.

Mistra, flight and massacre of Turks of, i. 186.

Modon, relieved by the Turkish fleet, ii. 14—naval success of the Greeks at, 72—occupied by the French, 192.

Mohammed II., charter to Agrapha from, i. 26.

Mohammed Ali, negotiations with, for aid against the Greeks, ii. 28—plans concerted with, 46—force for attack of Kasos, 47—his preparations, and force sent, 53—unwilling to continue the war in 1826, 114—convention for evacuation of Morea, 188.

Mohammed Pasha, assassination of Ali Pasha by, i. 116.

Moharrem Bey at the battle of Navarin, ii. 182.

Moldavia, position, &c., of the Greeks in, i. 11—oppressive government of the hospodars of, 139—*see* Principalities—invaded by Hypsilantes, 142—military operations in, 166.

Monasteries and monks of Mount Athos, the, i. 249—reorganised under the regency, ii. 319.

Monemvasia, surrender of, to the Greeks, i. 260—the capitulation violated, 261.
Monetary system, the regency's, ii. 312.
Morea, the pashalik of the, i. 3—and the Moreots, social condition of, before the Revolution, 29 *et seq.*—precautions of the Turks in, 173—the Hetairists there, 174—attempts to defer the outbreak, 177—the insurrection general, 182—the military system in, 188—successes of the Greeks, 195—the primates of, their party in 1824, ii. 30, 31—progress of Ibrahim Pasha, 73—devastated by Ibrahim, 113—convention for its evacuation, 188—its organisation by Capodistrias, 209—invaded by the Romeliots, 258.
Morning Chronicle, its attack on King Otho, ii. 367.
Muhurdar Besiari, an Albanian leader, i. 100, 106, 111.
Mukhtar Bey, grandfather of Ali Pasha i. 71.
Mukhtar Pasha, his intrigue with Euphrosyne, and its results, i. 74 *et seq.*, 77 *note*—pasha of Berat, 89—deserts his father, 97—execution of, 117.
Muleteers, importance of the, in Greece, i. 23.
Municipal institutions of Greece, the, i. 16 *et seq.*—revived in the Morea, ii. 280 *et seq.*—not understood, 284—organisation of, under the regency, 306.
Municipal system, enmity of Capodistrias to, ii. 209.
Munychia, repulse of the Turks at, ii. 132.
Murusi, dragoman of the Porte, executed, i. 228.
Murzinos, an insurgent chief, i. 184.
Mustai Pasha of Skodra, i. 88—measures of, against Ali Pasha, 89—operations assigned to, 1823, ii. 6—operations under, 9—check at Karpenisi, 10 *et seq.*—his continued advance, 12—joins Omer Vrioni, 13—siege of Anatolikon, 13.
Mustapha IV., death of, i. 66.
Mustapha Bey, defeated at Arachova, ii. 122.
Mustapha, boy of Patras, treacherous murder of, i. 271.
Mustoxidi, a favourite of Capodistrias, ii. 213.
Mytilene, naval action off, ii. 60.

Napier, Sir Charles, memorandum by, on military operations in the Morea, ii. 390.
National assembly, convocation of, i. 293—of Argos, ii. 220—the second, at Argos, 250 *et seq.*—of Trœzene, proceedings of, 138—Capodistrias elected by it, 195—of Pronia, its meeting and proceedings, 274 *et seq.*—rising of the military against it, 276.
Naupaktos capitulates to the Greeks, ii. 207.
Nauplia, capitulation of, to the Greeks, i. 353—their conduct, 354—continued operations against, 364—naval engagement off, 365—its surrender, 368—aspect of, in 1824, ii. 39—threatened by Ibrahim, 77—garrisoned by the French, 269—landing of Otho at, 290 *et seq.*
Navarin, surrender of, to the Greeks, and violation of the capitulation, i. 262—the Greeks defeated in attempting to relieve it, ii. 65—besieged by Ibrahim, 67—capitulates, 70—battle of, 178 *et seq.*—occupied by the French, 192.
Navy, abuses and peculations in connection with it, ii. 43.
Naxos, massacre of Turks at, i. 236.
Nea-Mone, storming, &c., of monastery of, i. 313.
Negris, Theodore, organisation of Eastern Greece, i. 290, 291, 292—his share in constitution of Epidaurus, 298—as minister, 345—plunder and fate of his library, 356.
Neroulos, Rizos, i. 143, 144 *note.*
New York, conduct of the Philhellenes at, ii. 156.
Niausta, massacre of Turks at, i. 254—sacked by the Turks, 255.
Nicholas, the czar, his accession and policy, ii. 171—his views, and declares war with Turkey, 189.
Nikotas, at the outbreak of the Revolution, i. 182, 184—forces under, 1822, 342—operations of, 343—operations against Dramali, 360, 361, 362—enforces observance of the capitulation of the Acrocorinth, ii. 21—retires to Acarnania, 37—defence of Messenia by, 282, 283.
Nivitza, capture of, by Ali Pasha, i. 57.
Normann, General, i. 325—defeated at Petta, 326 *et seq.*
Notaras, Panayotaki, joins the war of the primates, ii. 36—his cowardice, 131, 132.
Nourka, treachery of, at Vrachori, i. 202.
Noutzas, Alexander, murdered by Odysseus, i. 346.

Odysseus, a partisan of Ali's, i. 94, 95—conduct of, in Eubœa, 304—his trea-

sonable conduct and character, 305—forces under, 1822, 342—quarrel with the Areopagus, 343—murder of Noutzas and Palaskas, 346—becomes governor of Athens, 374—cruelties, 375—treacherous negotiations, 376—victory of, at Karystos, ii. 9—the treason of, 92 *et seq.*—murdered, 94.
Omer Vrioni, a partisan of Ali's, i. 89—deserts him, 96—defeat of the Greeks at Stura by, 303 *et seq.*—army under, 1822, 322—victory of, at Splanga, 333—terms granted the Suliots, *ib.*—submission of various leaders to, 335—joins Reshid Pasha, 336—at the siege of Mesolonghi, 337—defeat of the assault, and his retreat, 338—operations assigned to, in 1822, 341—operations assigned to, 1823, ii. 6—joined by Mustai Pasha, 13.
Oropos, failure of Heideck at, ii. 133.
Orphan asylum, an, built by Capodistrias, ii. 218.
Otho, King, his election ratified by assembly of Pronia, ii. 275—his landing, 288 *et seq.*, 290 *et seq.*—the regency, 294 *et seq.*—his marriage, 335, 336—his system of government, 340—his personal government, 365—the affair of the certificate, and dispute with Lyons, 366—his misgovernment, 368—the Revolution of 1843, 372 *et seq.*
Othoman empire, state of the, in 1820, and the policy of Sultan Mahmud, i. 65 *et seq.*—the system of administration, 68—its apparent approaching fall, 69—disorder in its finances, 130.
Othoman government, administration of justice under, i. 119.

Palamedes fort at Nauplia, the, i. 368.
Palaska, a Suliot, i. 63.
Palaskas, Christos, murdered by Odysseus, i. 346.
Palmerston, Lord, supports Armansperg, ii. 334.
Panourias heads the Revolution at Salona, i. 196.
Papadiamantopulos, heroic death of, ii. 111.
Papas, Emmanuel, leader of the revolt of the Chalcidicé, i. 252.
Pappanikolo, Turkish ship burned by, i. 220.
Pasano appointed to succeed Hastings, and his cowardice, ii. 206.
Pasture lands, attempted seizure of, under the regency, ii. 310.
Patradjik, repulse of Greeks at, i. 342.
Patras, outbreak at, i. 186—repulse of the Greeks at, 187—failure of the Greeks at, 276—failure of Mavrocordatos at, 297—captured by the Capodistrians, ii. 269.
Patriarch of Constantinople, position and power of the, i. 9—his official influence, 128—anathema of Hypsilantes by, 156, 227—his execution, 229.
Peasantry of Albania, the, i. 45.
Peculation, examples of, in army and navy, ii. 42 *et seq.*
Pehlevan Baba, operations of, against Ali, i. 95—degraded and executed, 101.
Pelion, Mount, revolt in, and its suppression, i. 245 *et seq.*
Peloponnesian senate, the, its formation, &c., i. 285—intrigues against Hypsilantes, 288—reconstituted, and its proceedings, 294 *et seq.*
Pentepegadhia, contests at the pass of, i. 111.
Pentornea, the Greeks defeated at, ii. 94.
Pergamus, massacres of Greeks at, ii. 15.
Pestilence, ravages of, after the fall of Tripolitza, i. 270.
Petra, capitulation of the Turks at, ii. 208.
Petrobey of Maina (Petros Mavromichales), a leader of the insurrection, i. 182—his character, &c., 183—his proceedings, 184—commands before Tripolitza, 265—disposed to support Hypsilantes, 288—during the invasion of Dramali, 358—Capodistrias jealous of him, and measures against him, ii. 242 *et seq.*—arrested, 244.
Petta, the Greek position at, i. 325—their defeat there, 326 *et seq.*—its effects, 331.
Peutedekas assumes government of Moldavia, i. 166.
Phalerum, battle of the, ii. 150 *et seq.*
Phanariots, the, use made of, by the Turkish government, i. 126.
Pharmaki, an associate of Georgaki's, i. 168—his death, 169.
Pharmaki, Ali, and Kolokotrones, i. 191.
Pharmaki, Captain, attacked by brigands, ii. 351.
Philhellenes, the corps of, i. 323—at Petta, 328 *et seq.*—destroyed there, 331—conduct of the, ii. 154.
Philhellenic committees, their activity in 1826, ii. 128.
Philiké Hetairia, the, its failure in Epirus, i. 93—its objects, 120—first members, and organisation, 121—its schemes, &c., 122—treacheries of members, 124—distrusted by the Greeks, 134—

Alexander Hypsilantes named its head, 135—history of the attempt in the principalities, 143 *et seq.*—its progress in the Morea, 173, 174—proceedings, &c., of its agents there, 176—urge the massacre of the Turks, 188—executions of members at Constantinople, 228.
Philip of Macedon, parallel between, and Khurshid, i. 109.
Philomuse society, the, i. 120.
Phlesas, Pappa, *see* Dikaios.
Phocis, ravaged by the Turks, ii. 8.
Phonia, murders of Turks at, i. 180.
Phrantzes, account of the massacre at Navarin by, i. 263—account of an alleged miracle by, ii. 113 *note*.
Piada, removal of the national assembly to, i. 293.
Pinotzi, a Hydriot captain, i. 214—cruise of fleet under, ii. 18.
Piræus, exploit of Cochrane at, ii. 144.
Plapoutas, Kolias, ii. 348—a member of the governing commission, 264, 271—arrested, 328.
Poliani, the Greeks defeated at, ii. 77.
Polyghoros, revolt at, i. 251.
Polyzoides, establishment of the *Apollo* by, ii. 231.
Poniropoulos, Nikolas, at the surrender and massacre of Navarin, i. 262.
Popoff, Aristides, a Hetairist, executed, i. 124.
Population, decrease of, in Albania, i. 45—its decline in European Turkey, 68.
Poros, the Albanians of, i. 40—the affair of, ii. 235—destruction of the fleet at, 238—sack of the town, 240 *et seq.*
Porro, Count, ii. 128.
Portais or Trikkala, the pass of, i. 90.
Portugal, the interference of England in, ii. 172.
Prapas, Captain, outrage by brigands on, ii. 351.
Premeti, Ibrahim, i. 243, 244.
Press, the, tyranny of Capodistrias toward, ii. 231—measures of the regency regarding, 322.
Primates of Greece, the, i. 13—of the Morea, the, 29—their selfish conduct in 1821, 280, 284—the war of, and its suppression, ii. 34.
Principalities, the, their government and state before the Revolution, i. 139 *et seq.*—the native race, 141 *et seq.*
Prize money, fraudulent appropriations of, i. 214, ii. 20.
Proesti, the, in the Morea, i. 29, 31.
Psara, discontent in, i. 204—population, &c., 205 *note*, 206—joins the Revolution, 209—description of it, and character of the population, ii. 49—attack on Samos, and want of preparations, 50—its destruction, 51 *et seq.*
Psarian sailors, adventures and escape of, ii. 16.
Psarians, naval operations of the, 1822, i. 372—their naval successes in 1823, ii. 14.
Pylos, besieged by Ibrahim, ii. 65—its surrender, 70.

Raikoff, Lieutenant, expels the Romeliots from Argos, ii. 255.
Ralli, attempt of, to excite revolt in Chios, i. 307.
Raybaud, Colonel, account of the massacres at Tripolitza by, i. 268.
Redeemer, Order of the, ii. 323.
Redovuni, defeat of George Botzares at, i. 58.
Regency, the Bavarian, its members and history, ii. 294—its duties, 298—proclamation, 299, 300—administrative measures, 301—military organisation, 302—civil administration, 305—municipal institutions, 306—finances, 308—monetary system, 312—judicial organisation, 313—the church, 314—monasteries, 319—education, 320—measures regarding the press, 321—neglect of roads, 322—Order of the Redeemer, 323—quarrels in, 324 *et seq.*—Kolokotrones's plot, 326—the Armansperg intrigue, 327—broken up, 332—general review of its administration, 337 *et seq.*
Rendina, the Agraphiots defeated at, i. 243.
Reshid Pasha (Kiutayhe), victory of, at Petta, i. 329 *et seq.*—subsequent movements, 334—joined by Omer Vrioni, and first siege of Mesolonghi, 336 *et seq.*—suppression of the revolt on Mount Pelion, ii. 7—his invasion of Western Greece, 84—the siege of Mesolonghi, 85 *et seq.*—his forces, *ib.*—arrival of fleet, and assaults, 87—his difficulties, 89—construction of the mound, 90—its destruction, 91—fortifies his camp, 96—receives supplies from the fleet, 97—Ibrahim co-operates with him, 98—cruelties, 99—capture of Mesolonghi, 108 *et seq.*—his operations during 1826, 114 *et seq.*—victory at Khaïdari, 116—siege of Athens, 117—successes, 118—repulse at Munychia, 132—on the massacre of St Spiridion, 147—victory at the Phalerum, 150—capitulation of the Acropolis, 152—his honourable conduct,

and further successes, 153—operations against him in 1828, 205—made grand vizier, 207.
Residents, the, their feeble conduct, ii. 259—compel Agostino's resignation, 260.
Rhangos, a leader of armatoli, i. 244—deserts to the Turks, 335—and again to the Greeks, 339—submission of, to Reshid, ii. 115.
Rhion, captured by the French, ii. 192.
Rhodes, massacres of Greeks at, i. 234.
Rhodios, secretary of state, made colonel of the regulars, ii. 39, 40—during Ibrahim's invasion, 73, 74—minister at war, 241.
Ricardo, Messrs, contractors for the second Greek loan, ii. 155.
Ricord, Admiral, proceedings of, at Poros, ii. 236 *et seq.*—his conduct during the sack, 241—urges the release of Petrobey, 245—supports the Capodistrians, 250, 256—intrigues of, 277.
Roads, neglect of, under the Bavarians, ii. 323.
Roman law, benefits conferred on Greece by, i. 129.
Romeliot armatoli, their party in 1824, ii. 31—at Psara, 49, 51.
Romeliots, the, their condition, i. 22 *et seq.*—oppose the Capodistrians, ii. 252 *et seq.*—expelled from Argos, 255—they invade the Morea, 257—their exactions in the Morea, 266—outrage on the national assembly by them, 275.
Romey, Colonel, ii. 67.
Rouen, Baron, French resident, ii. 246, 256.
Rouman race, the, in the Principalities, i. 141—their hatred of the Greeks, 142.
Routsos, a Mesolonghian, treachery of, ii. 86—beheaded, 87.
Rückmann, Baron, ii. 245, 256.
Rudhart, M., his admistration, ii. 336—his character, &c., *ib.*—dismissed, 337.
Rural population, the, in Greece, i. 15.
Russ, Dr, ii. 159 *note.*
Russia, complicity of, in the schemes of the Hetairists, i. 123—hostile position of, and Turkey before the Revolution, 137 *et seq.*—rupture between Turkey and, 237 *et seq.*—the expectations of the Greeks from, ii. 160—her conduct, 161—protocol regarding Greece signed, 172—treaty of 6th July 1827, 174—connection of Capodistrias with, 195 196, 197—views and policy, 1829, 222 *et seq.*
Russian memoir of 1823 on the Greek question, ii. 164 *et seq.*—its effect 166.
Sacred battalion, the, in Vallachia, i. 153—destroyed at Dragashan, 162, 163.
Sachturi, a Hydriot captain, i. 214—governor of Navarin during the siege, ii. 67—deserts his duty, 70.
Salik, son of Ali of Joannina, executed, i. 117.
Salik Pasha becomes grand vizier, i. 233.
Salona, the Revolution in, i. 195—massacre of the Turks, 197—occupied by the Turks, ii. 94—victory of Hastings at, 176—capitulates to the Greeks, 206.
Saloniki, massacres of Greeks, i. 234.
Salt, a government monopoly under the regency, ii. 308.
Samos joins the Revolution, i. 217—administration of Lykourgos in, 312—attack by the Psarians on it, ii. 50—intended attack by the Turks on, 53—failure of the Turkish attempt on, 60.
Samothrace, massacre by the Turks at, i. 236.
Samuel, the leader of the Suliots, i. 60—his defence against Ali, 61—his death, 62.
Santa Rosa, Count, his career and death, ii. 69.
Saphaka, a Greek leader, defeated, ii. 94.
Savas, a Vallachian leader, i. 150—his character, 151—troops under him, 153—intrigues, 154, 155, 156 *et seq.*—joins the Turks, 161—beheaded by the Turks, 166.
Schmatz, General, suppresses insurrection in Messenia, ii. 349.
Sclavonian races under Turkish rule, numbers of, i. 3.
Secret societies, influence of, in Greece, i. 120.
Seid Ali, attempt to murder, i. 181.
Seko, monastery of, its siege and capture, i. 168 *et seq.*
Selanik or Thessalonica, the pashalik of, i. 5.
Seliktar Poda, an Albanian leader, i. 100.
Selim III., the attempted reform and fall of, i. 65.
Selim Pasha refuses to sign the capitulation of Nauplia, i. 369.
Senate, its formation, powers, &c., ii. 220.
Sessini of Gastuni, a leading primate, ii. 35—anecdote of him, 36 *note*—imprisoned, 37—dismissed from office, 234.

Sheik-ûl-Islam, murder of the, i. 214.
Shkipetar, the, the native name of the Albanians, i. 41.
Siphakas, submission of, to Reshid, ii. 115.
Skaltzodemos, a klepht, i. 198.
Skiathos, atrocities of the armatoli in, ii. 7.
Skodra, pashalik of, i. 46.
Skopelos, atrocities of the armatoli in, ii. 7.
Skourta, Turkish convoy taken at, ii. 117.
Skourti appointed lieutenant-general of the Greeks, ii. 64—defeated, 65.
Skuleni, the affair of, i. 167.
Smyrna, disorders at, and massacres of Greeks, i. 234—naval engagement off, 316.
Soliotes, an insurgent leader, i. 180.
Soutzos, Alexander, hospodar of Wallachia, his death, i. 145 and *note*.
Soutzos, John, eparch of Venetico, ii. 34.
Soutzos, Michael, hospodar of Moldavia, i. 143, 144—his weakness, &c., 147—deposed, and flies to Russia, 166.
Spain, the suppression of constitutionalism in, ii. 163.
Speliades on the state of Greece in 1822, i. 344.
Spetzas, the Albanian population of, &c., i. 40—state of, 204—population, &c., 205 *note*—the Revolution proclaimed at, 208—activity at, after the fall of Psara, *ii.* 52.
Spetziots, conduct of the, 1823, ii. 17.
Sphakia, the district of, in Crete, i. 5.
Sphakteria captured by the Egyptians, ii. 67 *et seq.*
Spiridion, the monastery of, defended by the Turks, ii. 145—its capitulation, and massacre of the garrison, 147.
Splanga, defeat of the Greeks at, i. 333.
Staikos, broil between, and Vlachopulos, i. 335, ii. 33.
Stamatepopulos, Nikolas, i. 357.
Stamati Gatsu, captain of armatoli, i. 243.
Stanhope, Colonel Leicester (the Earl of Harrington), ii. 25, 26—ordered home, 168, 169.
Steamers, Captain Hastings's memorandum on the use of, ii. 385.
Stelida, repulse of Greeks at, i. 342.
Stengel, Baron, ii. 367, 368.
Stournari, a partisan of Ali's, i. 94.
Strogonoff, the Baron, Russian ambassador to Turkey, i. 238.
Stura, defeat of the Greeks at, i. 303.
Sturnari, Nicolas, heads the revolt in the valley of the Aspropotamos, i. 244.
Stuyvesant, Mr, ii. 159 *note*.
Suleiman Pasha of Larissa, named dervendji in room of Ali, i. 93—degraded and executed, 94—proceedings of, as dervendji-pasha, 25.
Suliots, the, their origin and country, i. 51—acquire the right of bearing arms, 53—social state, &c., of the country, 54—Ali Pasha's operations against them, 55 *et seq.*—his second attack on them, and treachery of the chiefs, 57 *et seq.*—their conquest and fate, 62 *et seq.*—serve against Ali on his rebellion, 98—they join him, 100—their military system, &c., 102 *et seq.*—they join the Greeks, 110, 111—measures of the Greeks for aiding them, 1822, 322 *et seq.* — their capitulation to Omer Vrioni, 333—their removal to the Ionian Islands, 334.
Sulu Proshova, a Mussulman klepht, i. 28.
Synodal Tomos of 1850, the, ii. 318.
Syra joins Hydra against Capodistrias, ii. 235.
Syrako, revolt at, i. 243.

Tahir, capitan-pasha, at the battle of Navarin, ii. 182.
Talanti, massacre of Turks at, i. 199—Greeks defeated at, ii. 121.
Tarella, Colonel, i. 322—slain at Petta, 331 and *note*.
Taxation, the Turkish system of, in Greece, i. 16.
Tchamides, the, a Tosk tribe, i. 43.
Tchanderlik destroyed by the Psarians, ii. 14.
Tebelin, the birthplace of Ali Pasha, i. 70.
Te Deum, the first Greek, i. 184.
Tennant, Sir J. E., account of massacre of Turkish prisoners, by, ii. 58 *note*.
Tergovisht, skirmish at, i. 161.
Thanasapulos, cruelties of bands of, ii. 266.
Theodorides, Achilles, abandonment of the Acrocorinth by, i. 351.
Thessalo-Magnesian senate, the, i. 246.
Thessalonica or Selanik, the pashalik of, i. 5.
Thiersch, Professor, ii. 274 *note*—his character, &c., 259.
Thomas, Captain, ii. 176, 177.
Three powers, treaty between the, regarding Greece, ii. 174 — their discordant views, 189 — proceedings, protocols, &c., in 1829, 221 *et seq.*
Tombazes, Jakomaki, commands the

Greek fleet, and his character, i. 212—second cruise, 217—Turkish ship burned, 218 *et seq.*—his inefficiency, 220—Kydonians saved by him, 223—attempts to excite insurrection at Chios, 306.
Tophana, destruction of the Turkish arsenals at, ii. 5.
Toskides, the, a tribe of the Tosks, i. 43.
Tosks, the, a branch of the Albanians, i. 43—their costume, 48.
Trakadha, a brigand, ii. 363, 364.
Treason, examples of, among the Greek chiefs, ii. 93.
Tricheri, a commercial town, i. 205 and *note*—suppression of the revolt in, 247—subdued by the Turks, ii. 7.
Tricoupi on the Hetairia, i. 125—correction of his history, 180—on the numbers massacred at Chios, 319 *note*——neglect of Santa Rosa by, ii. 69 *note*—his character and influence, 130.
Trikkala or Portais, the pass of, i. 90.
Trikorphas, Greeks defeated at, ii. 80—surprise it, but again driven out, 81.
Tripolitza, blockaded by the Greeks, i. 259, 260—conduct of the Greek leaders before, and its surrender, 264 *et seq.*—general massacre, 267—epidemic in, 293—taken by Ibrahim, ii. 77—attempt of Fabvier on, 81.
Trœzene, meeting of national assembly of, ii. 138—organisation and review of the army at, 202 *et seq.*
Tsamados, Demetrios, i. 210—aids in defence of Navarin, ii. 67—his death and character, 68.
Turkey, decline of population in, i. 68—effects of treaty of Kainardgi on Greek population in, 130—relations between, and Russia before the Revolution, 137 *et seq.*—rupture with Russia, 237 *et seq.*—complaints against England, ii. 168 *et seq.*—the war of 1828 with Russia, 190.
Turkish fleet, the, its first cruise, 217 *et seq.*—line-of-battle ship burned, 220—cruises of, in 1821, 271—Galaxidhi destroyed, 272—defeated near Smyrna, 318—its arrival at Mesolonghi, ii. 87—retreats, 88.
Turkish government, sketch of the position of the Greeks under the, i. 5.
Turkish prisoners, massacre of, at Hydra, ii. 58 *note.*
Turks, moral and physical decline of the, i. 127—their depressed state, 128—administration of justice among, 130—hatred between them and the Greeks, 132—number of, in Greece before the Revolution, 172—their want of preparation, *ib.* 173—first murders, 180—examples of their cruelty, 236—massacre of, at Galatz, 146—at Yassi, 147—massacres of, 180, 181, 182, 184, 186, 187, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 214, 246, 251, 254, 261, 263, 267, 268, 277, 348.
Tzakonians, the, their character, &c., i. 32.
Tzelios, Demo, ii. 359.
Tzonga, a leader of armatoli, i. 202, 203.

Urban population, the, in Greece, i. 14.
Urquhart, Lieut., Hydriot corps under, ii. 144.

Vaïas, Anastasios, massacre of the Gardhikiots by, i. 83.
Valiare, massacre of the Gardhikiots at, i. 82—inscription commemorating it, 84.
Vallachia, position, &c., of the Greeks in, i. 11—oppressive government of the hospodars of, 139—*see* Principalities—progress of the movement in, 155.
Vallachian or Roman race, numbers of the, i. 3.
Valtetzi, victory of the Greeks at, i. 259.
Valtinos, George, joins the Turks, i. 335—and again the Greeks, 339.
Vambas, Neophytos, his character, i. 213.
Variadhes, how recovered by the Suliots, i. 106.
Varnakiotes, a partisan of Ali's, i. 94—a leader of armatoli, 202, 203—a leader at Petta, 327—deserts to the Turks, 335—flies to Kalamos, 339.
Vasiladi, fort, taken by the Turks, ii. 101—captured by Hastings, 186.
Vasiliké, an Athenian slave, i. 4.
Vasos, a Montenegrin leader, i. 302.
Vassos, cowardice of, before Athens, ii. 131, 132.
Vehid Pasha, defensive measures at Chios, i. 308 *et seq.*
Veli, father of Ali Pasha, i. 71.
Veli Pasha, son of Ali, i. 62—removed from the Morea to Larissa, 85—and thence to Lepanto, 86—defence of Previsa intrusted to, 90—flight of, from Lepanto, 95—gives up Previsa, 96—his death, *ib.*, 117.
Vlachopulos, broil between, and Staïkos, i. 335, ii. 33—excess of rations drawn by, 43—during the Revolution of 1843, 373.
Vladimiresko, Theodore, i. 150—his character, 151—troops under him,

154 — intrigues, *ib.*, 156—his views, 158—his murder, 159 *et seq.*
Volo, blockaded by the Greeks, and relieved, i. 247—expedition of Hastings to, ii. 140.
Vonitza, captured by the Greeks, ii. 207.
Vostitza, meeting of Hetairists at, i. 176.
Vrachori, attacked and taken by the Greeks, i. 201 *et seq.*

Washington, contrast between, and Hypsilantes, i. 289.
Wibmer, Dr, ii. 367, 368.
Wrede, Prince, envoy to Prince Leopold, ii. 229.

Yanko, Nicholas, treachery of Ali Pasha to, i. 75.
Yassi, massacre of Turks at, i. 147.
Yussuf, Mutza, great-grandfather of Ali Pasha, i. 71.
Yussuf Berkoftzalee, operations assigned to, ii. 6—ravages Phocis, &c., 7, 8.
Yussuf Bey, measures of, to suppress the revolt in the Chalcidicé, i. 251—superseded, 252—plan proposed to Dramali by, 352.

Zacharias, a Moreot klepht, i. 32.
Zagora, revolt in, i. 245 *et seq.*
Zaimes, Andreas, intrigues of, against Kolokotrones, i. 276—heads the war of the primates, and his character, ii. 34—flies, 37—released, 74—a member of new governing commission, 264.
Zaimes, Asimaki, i. 181.
Zante, violation of neutrality at, i. 273.
Zapandir, massacre of Turks of, i. 203.
Zaphiraki, primate of Niausta, i. 254—his death, 255—death of his wife, *ib.*, 256.
Zeituni, attempt of the Greeks on, and their defeat, i. 341, 342.
Zervas, Nicolas, ii. 359.
Zographos succeeds Rudhart as premier, ii. 337.
Zongas, an adherent of Ali's, i. 94.

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